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Situating globality: African agency  
in the appropriation of global culture 
An introduction 
 
Wim van Binsbergen, Rijk van Dijk & Jan-Bart Gewald 
 
 
 
Background and acknowledgements 
 
From 1997 to April 2002 one of the four theme groups at the African Studies 
Centre (ASC) in Leiden was devoted to the study of globalization and its local 
responses in Africa. This ‘Globalization and Socio-cultural Transformation in 
Africa’ theme group was made up of some of the ASC’s permanent staff 
members, affiliated and visiting researchers in and from Africa, and research 
associates from within the Netherlands. It was closely linked with the national 
research project, which was funded and coordinated by the Netherlands 
Foundation for Tropical Research (WOTRO), on ‘Globalization and the 
Construction of Communal Identities’ that was initiated in 1993 by Peter 
Geschiere and the theme group’s leader, Wim van Binsbergen. This project took 
its cue from work then beginning to appear on the cultural aspects of 
globalization especially in the articulation of identities, the dynamics of popular 
culture under globalizing conditions, and the negotiation of commodification.1 
Through the national research group, the ASC’s theme group was incorporated 
in a worldwide ‘International Network on Globalization Research’ (ING), 
whose prominent members included Arjun Appadurai, Seteney Shami, 
Mamadou Diouf, Partha Chatterjee, Jean and John Comaroff, and Ulf Hannerz.  
To mark the end of theme group’s life-span, an international conference was 
convened in Leiden in April 2002 to take stock of the theoretical, 
methodological and empirical progress that had been made in the study of 
Africa’s globalization. It was hoped that the conference’s title ‘Globalization 
                                                     
1 For example, Appadurai (1990), Anderson (1992), Clifford (1992) and Hannerz 
(1987). 
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and New Questions of Ownership’ would capture the dynamics of appropriation 
and repositioning which, as the Leiden research had suggested, were central — 
yet hitherto underexposed — aspects of the globalization experience in Africa. 
We set out below how this initial theme came to be amended during the 
conference and in the subsequent editorial process leading to the present book.  
The convenors and the editors of this volume, Wim van Binsbergen and Rijk 
van Dijk, register their indebtedness to the African Studies Centre, Leiden, and 
to the Trust Fund of Erasmus University, Rotterdam, for funding the 
conference; to all participants and observers for their contributions to our 
ongoing debate; and to Marieke van Winden and her colleagues at the ASC for 
their logistical support.  
The present collection is the result of that conference. It is based on the 
papers presented in Leiden, that have been substantially rewritten in the light of 
the conference discussions and the editors’ suggestions, emphasizing what 
increasingly emerged as a central theme: African agency in the appropriation of 
global culture. This introduction highlights the arguments of this central theme 
against the background of achievements and problems in African globalization 
studies since the 1980s. Thanks to a generous grant from the African Studies 
Centre, the convenors were able to commission specific library research by Jan-
Bart Gewald who explored the literature and produced a provisional report. The 
editors felt that this report would be put to best use if it were incorporated in 
this introduction, of which Jan-Bart Gewald therefore features as a co-author. 
We are grateful to the ASC’s Library, Documentation and Information 
department whose literature surveys and excerpts, freely utilized in the 
following pages, have considerably facilitated the task of writing this 
introduction.  
Finally, the editors wish to extend their thanks to the following persons and 
institutions who have been instrumental in the realization of this book: to all the 
contributors for sharing and inspiring our intellectual explorations on 
globalization and its African trajectories; to Ann Reeves whose excellent work 
as copy editor often extended into reminding the contributors and editors of 
their schedule responsibilities; to Mieke Zwart-Brouwer for preparing the lay-
out of this book in her usual careful and efficient manner; to Nel de Vink for the 
beautifully drawn maps; to Bookfinish International for facilitating the index of 
proper names; and to Brill Publishers for professional and supportive 
cooperation in all stages of the book’s production. 
Having sketched the context in which the book came into being and thanked 
those who assisted in its delivery, the remainder of this introduction is 
structured as follows. In Section 2 we deal with globalization and Africa in 
broad theoretical terms, taking stock of what our years of research in this field 
have taught us, including the many major puzzles of conceptualization, theory 
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and interpretation that remain. We formulate, in Section 3, what we see as the 
main message of this collection, as summarized by our title ‘Situating 
Globality: African Agency in the Appropriation of Global Culture’. Then we 
briefly introduce the book’s constituent chapters from this overall perspective. 
A bibliography concludes the introduction and is a guide to the understanding 
of some of the most significant aspects of African transformations today.  
 
 
Globalization and Africa 
 
Globalization as a concept, a phenomenon and an ideology 
 
[Globalization constitutes] the dominant international system that replaced the Cold 
War system after the fall of the Berlin Wall. (Friedman 1999: 7) 
 
Over the past fifteen years, ‘globalization’ has become the buzzword in both 
academic as well as popular discourse dealing with Africa, and a fortiori with 
the world as a whole. This is indeed remarkable for a word that, according to 
Waters, did not exist as a processual term in academic literature prior to 1987.2 
In his presidential address to the Ninth General Assembly of the Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) in Dakar in 
December 1998, Akilagpa Sawyerr stated that discussion of the ‘globalization 
process’ contained within it ‘strong doses’ of reality as well as mythology, and 
that globalization, both as reality and as myth, had had a profound impact on the 
daily life of people in Africa. Professor Sawyerr’s address is a fine introduction 
to the state of play in globalization and the social sciences in Africa, and 
emphasizes the ambiguity that has come to be associated with the term 
‘globalization’. An ambiguity, which Sawyerr charmingly admits, ‘is not 
without its uses’ (Sawyerr 1999: 1). 
And that, precisely, is the problem: globalization has come to mean all 
things to all people and in so doing has increasingly run the risk of losing its 
explanatory meaning. There are a number of fields in which globalization, as a 
process, is taken to mean something. Yet within and between each field, the 
meaning ascribed to globalization varies from author to author and from 
discipline to discipline. That is, the various meanings attributed to globalization 
within these fields are often not compatible, let alone between fields. Generally 
though, the term globalization is taken to describe processes that are currently 
taking place on account of changes in information transfer. Due to the recent 
                                                     
2 Waters (1995: 2). However, cf. Levitt (1983) and Robertson & Lechner (1985), in 
whose titles the term ‘globalization’ features. 
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rapid advances in information and communication technology (ICT), these 
processes, which may have been long in the making, have substantially changed 
the world. The transfer in information is quantifiably different from what it was 
in the past, and this has led to a qualitative difference. Unfortunately for much 
of the work dealing with globalization in Africa, the process of globalization in 
itself is taken as a given and events in Africa are viewed solely from within the 
confines of an implicit globalization-based paradigm.  
It is necessary to provide a narrower definition of terms and to distinguish 
between the concept, the phenomenon and even the ideology of globalization. 
Often these three are confused in the application of the term. 
For those seeking enlightenment as to what is to be understood by the term 
globalization, there is a multitude of definitions that all circle around and centre 
on the ever-increasing compression of time and space in the world. This is 
directly inspired by the early work of Giddens (1991) who proposed that, in 
terms of theory, account had to be taken of the fact that modernity entailed the 
increasing expansion of interconnectedness across social, cultural and class 
systems. According to Giddens, this in turn redefined the boundaries and 
interrelationships between these abstract categories and the people within them. 
Giddens proposed that instead of looking at the integration of bounded systems, 
people need to deal with the issue of order as one of time-space distanciation — 
the conditions under which time and space are organized so as to connect 
presence and absence. Giddens noted that modern social systems ‘bind time and 
space’. They connect local activity with activities a long way away and create 
links across time and space that are not necessarily defined by local factors. 
Local temporal and spatial conditions can have an impact on socio-political and 
economic conditions far away. This is nothing new for there have always been 
cultural and economic exchanges between people; yet the intensity and 
centrality of these exchanges have expanded greatly with the onset of 
modernity, and intensified yet again to simultaneously bind all regions across 
the globe.  
Malcolm Waters, writing on globalization in terms of its perceived cultural 
impact, has referred to globalization in terms of the phenomena that make for 
the system that Giddens had indicated and perceives of it as:  
 
a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural 
arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are 
receding. (Waters 1995: 3) 
 
Likewise, Geschiere and Van Binsbergen deploy the term globalization  
 
as a descriptive term to draw attention to the rapidly accelerating circulation of 
goods, people and images on a global scale, since roughly the 1960s; the emphasis 
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here is on ‘rapidly accelerating’ since it is clear that global circuits were much older 
than this.3  
 
There are ongoing debates regarding the origins of the phenomenon of 
globalization. Here the leading question is: is globalization a process that has 
been going on since time immemorial, or is it merely contemporaneous with 
and identical to capitalist development and modernization? Within the social 
sciences for instance, ideas relating to what has become known as globalization 
have a long antecedent. The work by Peter Worsley (1957) on ‘cargo cults’ in 
Melanesia and Terence Ranger (1975) on the Beni Ngoma in East Africa4 
heralded the later work of others, Arjun Appadurai (1990, 1991, 1996, 2000) 
and Ulf Hannerz (1987, 1996) in particular, on the manner in which concepts, 
ideas and material objects, once introduced into societies from the outside, can 
come to be used and deployed in ways that appear to be incompatible and 
illogical to the societies from whence they came. Whatever the position taken in 
that debate, it is generally agreed that the recent spectacular advances in 
information communication technologies have qualitatively changed the manner 
in which the world is perceived, experienced and acted upon.  
Both inside and outside the ASC’s theme group on globalization, much of 
the Dutch research on cultural globalization (and in this it is in line with 
globalization research internationally) has elaborated the insight that ‘processes 
of globalization’ — the impact of modern communication and transport 
techniques, the spread of industrial commodities, new styles of consumption 
and new forms of knowledge on a global scale — do not necessarily lead to 
greater cultural homogeneity. On the contrary, many authors have recently 
stressed that these processes often reinforce parochial identities. Far from being 
subsumed in globalization, parochial identities appear to thrive on the impact of 
globalization. Furthermore, much of what is presented as being traditional in 
character could be shown, upon closer inspection, to be shot through with 
aspects of the modern world — indeed the globalizing world — to such an 
extent that it would be better to refer to these allegedly traditional identities as 
‘pseudo-traditional’ identities.  
                                                     
3 Geschiere &Van Binsbergen, in press (Introduction).  
4 Cf. Worsley (1957), Ranger (1975). ‘Cargo cults’ is the technical term for popular 
20th-century social movements, mainly in Oceania, and emerged as a result of contact 
with the West especially in the context of World War II. These movements centred on 
the expectation of the arrival, by ship or by plane, of loads of valuable goods (including 
Western consumer goods) made available to the local population by the ancestors or 
other spiritual forces. The Beni Ngoma are early (pre-World War II) ballroom dance 
associations in East Africa, exclusive to Africans, whose grooming, style of dress and 
general comportment revealed Africans’ careful adoption of European models current at 
the time.  
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In the African context, Forben (cf. 1995) can be seen as working along a 
very different line, namely the interpretation of globalization as an ideology, or 
even as a policy directive. He is the director of the newly founded African 
Centre for Humanities (ACH) that was ‘set up in response to the need for 
alternative and innovative approaches to the current challenges facing both 
Africa and the world at large’. One such challenge is:  
 
to devise and implement workable global structures which, while being relevant to 
all, also take account of regional, communal and individual differences — so that 
each culture and each individual are able to interpret global norms in a way that is 
most relevant to them locally, while also being consistent with the broader 
objectives of such global structures. (Forben 1995: 11) 
 
While he broadcasts the desire to maintain cultural identity in the face of 
homogenization, his own contribution to the debate is basically a pamphlet 
meant to advertise his own organization and in a sense making use of the 
opportunities offered by globalization. But, one might argue, so much seems to 
apply to all Africanist research, especially if undertaken by non-Africans (cf. 
Van Binsbergen 2003). In terms of ideology, globalization appears to lead to 
debates on the pros and cons, and to the exclusion of neutral positions in the 
defence or rejection of the process. Bauman (1998) has argued in detail and 
with conviction that globalization divides as much as it unites — an observation 
that applies not only to the massive proliferation of new identities (of an ethnic, 
religious, cultural, gender, sexual or consumptive and lifestyle nature) in the 
face of the cliché of threatening McDonaldization (as in hamburger), but also 
and particularly to the element of worldwide, regional and local social 
inequality: globalization means the global availability of objects, services and 
ideas which on the one hand articulates the exalted class position of some, while 
on the other hand reinforces the subordinate, deprived and exploited situation of 
many others. Here we are close to the work of Frederic Jameson and Masao 
Miyoshi (1998) who situate globalization in the logic of the cultural production 
of capitalism and attempt to theorize the specific logic of the cultural production 
of the third stage of capitalism. 
Thomas Friedman (1999), columnist for The New York Times and far from 
being an anti-globalist, indicates the dangers that emerge from the global 
functioning of capitalist financial markets and the unequal access developing 
countries have to these flows. As Thabo Mbeki, then deputy president of South 
Africa, noted on 28 September 1998 in a speech delivered at the African 
Renaissance Conference in Johannesburg: 
 
The current international financial crisis has brought to the fore, very sharply, the 
fact of the accumulation of vast quantities of especially financial capital in the 
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developed countries of the North. The rapid movements of this capital, from one 
corner of the globe to the other, in search of immediate profit have contributed 
greatly to the problems which the world is experiencing today. On other occasions 
we have made the point that we are subjected to the strange situation that the process 
of the further reproduction of wealth by the countries of the North has led to the 
creation of poverty in the countries of the South. There has to be something out of 
joint where wealth begets poverty! 
 
President Thabo Mbeki is5 currently a major proponent of African Renaissance, 
never fully defined by himself as a collection of points, some of which are a 
desperate call for the inclusion of Africa in the maelstrom and perceived 
benefits of globalization.  
 
Even now, we can reel off the list of things that need to be done in this regard, 
including human resource development, the emancipation of women, the building of 
a modern economic, social and communication infrastructure, the cancellation of 
Africa’s foreign debt, an improvement in terms of trade, an increase in domestic and 
foreign investment, the expansion of development assistance and better access for 
our products into the markets of the developed world. (…) We must therefore insert 
ourselves into the international debate about the issues of globalization and its 
impact on the lives of the people and make our voice heard about what we and the 
rest of the world should do actually to achieve the development which is a 
fundamental right of the masses of our people. (Statement by Deputy President 
Thabo Mbeki at the African Renaissance Conference, Johannesburg, 28 September 
1998) 
 
The prime issue is the qualitative difference which space–time compression has 
brought. Hand in hand with the instantaneous transfer of massive amounts of 
money (with disastrous results for local economies) goes the equally 
instantaneous transfer of information. It has been noted that the ‘global context 
remains an empty abstraction unless mediated and translated towards concrete 
settings where we can discern concrete actors’ (Van Binsbergen 1999: 3).  
This leads us to the question of how globalization affects daily life in Africa 
today. As the phenomenon of globalization appeared to have an impact on the 
world’s economy in particular, its effects on continents such as Africa were first 
and foremost defined in economic terms. Under the influence of global 
institutions such as the World Bank, globalization came to mean a desired 
                                                     
5 Mbeki (1998). Although a London and Sussex-trained economist (BA 1962, MA 1966, 
1968 in economics), Mbeki here simulates ignorance of classic Marxist economics 
according to which wealth (in other words capital) has no option but to exploit labour, 
with poverty being the unavoidable result. For the sake of convincing his audience 
steeped in liberal economics, he pretends that a causal relationship between wealth and 
poverty is surprising, theoretically unforeseen, therefore undesirable and repairable.  
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policy and end-state, a prescription for a failing integration in world markets 
and a guideline for the interventions of singular states. But to gauge this effect, 
we must first look at the implications of this ideological and prescriptive 
thinking for Africa’s economy.  
 
The economy and a globalist ideological paradigm 
Figures released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) for the year 2001 indicate that the continent of Africa is a marginal 
player in the world economy.6 Global ‘Foreign Direct Investments’ (FDI) 
consisted of US$760 billion in 2001, of which US$225 billion consisted of FDIs 
in developing countries. The upbeat news was that whereas global FDI fell by 
nearly 50 per cent in 2001, FDI in Africa increased by nearly 20 per cent from 
€9 billion in 2000 to €11 billion in 2001.7 On the down side, this investment was 
overwhelmingly concentrated in Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco and South Africa, and 
was driven primarily by a series of mergers and acquisitions, as well as 
privatizations of state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, in terms of global FDI 
Africa accounted for a mere 1.5 per cent, whilst even in terms of developing 
countries’ FDI Africa accounted only for a mere 5 per cent. What these figures 
indicate is that Africa is to all intents and purposes cut off from the world 
economy. The only bright spot might be the implication that, in terms of these 
figures, Africa is not necessarily directly affected by global economic 
downturns.8 
The staggering comparisons vex the minds of many social scientists and 
economists. The bulk of existing material dealing with globalization and Africa 
is written from an economic perspective, and its production has been funded by 
global institutions that seek to regulate the global economy, notably the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Global Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD),9 and so forth. A reading of this material is interesting 
precisely because it underscores the underlying belief in the virtues of the 
mythical free market, as well as in globalization as an inevitable and necessary 
condition. 
                                                     
6 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘FDI Downturn in 2001 
Touches Almost All Regions’, Press Release, TAD/INF/PR36, 21 January 2002. 
7 To put the figure of US$11 billion in perspective, this is the same amount as the US 
government wants to spend over two years to protect the nation against biological 
terrorism (New York Times, 4 February 2002). 
8 In effect, an echo of the ‘uncaptured peasantry’ concept; cf. Hyden (1980) and 
Geschiere (1984). 
9 Ongoing reports dealing with globalization statistics can be accessed at: www.oecd.org 
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Thomas Friedman (1999: 104) has coined the term the ‘golden straitjacket’ 
as the ‘defining political-economic garment of this globalization era’. He notes 
that countries either adopt the golden straitjacket of privatization, 
macroeconomic stability, fewer market controls, trade deregulation, small 
government and the like, or they fall behind. This state of affairs is in effect 
based on no more than a fundamental belief, albeit a belief that underlies the 
bulk of material emanating from global financial institutions such as the IMF. 
Finance and Development, the IMF’s quarterly magazine, devoted its December 
2001 edition to ‘Globalization and Africa’, and in itself provides a fine 
introduction to the views and beliefs of this institution. Its editors state in the 
introduction that the articles it presents examine how Africa can reposition itself 
to take full advantage of globalization, and they argue that the articles ‘sketch a 
road map that could help make globalization work better for Africa’.10  
In his contribution, Evangelos Calamitsis, the former director of the IMF’s 
African Department, suggests that:  
 
most countries will probably need to implement stronger domestic policies and 
reforms designed to consolidate macroeconomic stability, enhance human resource 
development, improve basic infrastructure and spur agricultural development, 
accelerate trade liberalization and regional economic integration, promote a sound 
banking system, foster private investment, and ensure good governance. 
 
However, much more far-reaching is the contribution by Seyni N’Diaye, 
National Director for Senegal of the Central Bank of West African States 
(BCEAO) who argues that African states will have to undertake extensive 
institutional reforms to facilitate full integration into the global economy. 
N’Diaye notes that Sub-Saharan Africa is confined to the ‘peripheries of 
globalization’, and that this should be met with rigorous action, notably 
structural and institutional reforms, to allow the region to take full advantage of 
the benefits of globalization while minimizing the risks. To transform Africa, he 
calls for the institutional reform and transformation of the state, its civil society 
and the private sector. He views the state as interventionist and declares that 
‘this interventionist system, …[which], eventually ran out of steam … did not 
give way to burgeoning private initiative’. 
Having advocated a dramatic reduction in the state, N’Diaye then calls for an 
expansion in the role of civil society, which, in his view, predictably appears to 
consist of NGOs. It is described as being a mouthpiece for democracy, it is the 
chief challenger of the power of the state, limiting deviations from good 
governance and acting as a regulator in the political arena. It is clear that the 
role of opposition parties is of no importance, and that instead NGOs should 
                                                     
10 Finance and Development can be accessed online at http: //www.imf.org/fandd 
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serve as watchdogs to contain market excesses and to guard against 
environmental abuse. 
While the state is stripped of its powers N’Diaye sees the private sector as 
the ‘main engine for growth’ in the context of globalization. As such, ‘its 
operations must be free of heavy-handed and cumbersome regulatory or 
bureaucratic procedures that could slow its expansion’. Freed of restrictions the 
private sector needs to be supported by a sound banking and financial sector 
within a liberalized institutional context.  
N’Diaye’s optimistic economistic vision shows him to be co-opted by the 
North Atlantic hegemonism that is imposed on the African continent. In a 
similar vein is the work by El Toukhy (1998) that analyses the potential effects 
of the globalization of trade and finance on developing countries. El Toukhy 
focuses on the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the manner in which this relates to Sub-Saharan Africa. He argues 
that Sub-Saharan Africa, in seeking to reduce its losses and enhance any 
possible benefits from globalization, needs to: 
 
develop and strengthen its competitiveness through expanded and diversified 
productive capacities and market diversification, improvement in marketing skills, 
quality control techniques and level of technology. (ibid: 481)  
 
Where the necessary funding for these no-nonsense economic strategies is to be 
found is not indicated but the socio-political improvements which El Toukhy 
believes to be essential are listed as being, amongst others: macroeconomic 
stability, structural reform and good governance. 
A reading of N’Diaye’s work, and through it the underlying assumptions of 
the financial institutions that seek to regulate global trade and finance, 
underscores the analysis of Noam Chomsky in his collection Profit over People. 
This brings together articles and lectures written between 1993 and 1998 and 
Chomsky presents his views on corporate power, media control and the 
international economy. He argues that corporate power and the suppression of 
democracy have led to an increase in the personal wealth of a few in the First 
World at the expense of the majority. Writing on the new global order, 
Chomsky (1998) describes neo-liberalism as: 
 
a set of market-orientated principles designed and propagated by the United States 
government and international financial institutions with the aim of liberalising trade 
and finance, setting prices according to market forces, privatisation and the 
curtailment of inflation. These doctrines are used by the powerful nations and 
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institutions to create a global order to serve the interests of the rich at the expense of 
the poor.11 
 
Yet it is this fundamental belief that lies at the basis of much of the advice that 
is being presented to African states — and many of the regulations that (in the 
form of Structural Adjustment Programmes) are being imposed upon them by 
the international financial institutions and bilateral aid partners.  
A case in point is Nuwagaba’s (2001) analysis of the Ugandan situation, in 
which he focuses on the interface between globalization and poverty reduction 
in Uganda. Incidentally, Nuwagaba adopts a very general use of the term 
globalization. In Africa the most vivid experience of globalization is, he says, 
‘through slavery, characterised by the exploitation of African labour in the 
Americas, Europe and Asia’ (ibid: 32). 
In the early 1980s Uganda adopted structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) with the aim of making the Ugandan economy competitive once again 
on the world stage. The programmes were meant to correct the structural 
bottlenecks and economic disequilibria that had arisen due to increased 
importation and increased government expenditure against the backdrop of 
declining exports and government revenue. These programmes have, however, 
contributed to the escalation of poverty among Ugandans. Nuwagaba argues 
that globalized markets require a much greater competitive capacity than the 
Ugandan economy can provide. In his opinion, most African countries have 
globalized through a series of shocks rather than by making use of 
opportunities. Nevertheless, global competitiveness is inevitable if the Ugandan 
economy is to catch up with global trends and patterns. Globalization must be 
cautiously embraced if development is to be sustainable, but in the last analysis 
African economies do not appear to have much of a choice:  
 
For decades, there has been [a] massive flow of aid to support poor countries but 
donor fatigue has set in. Uganda must find its own solutions. … The powerful and 
invisible forces that have given rise to globalization are impossible to resist. 
(Nuwagaba 2001: 51) 
 
This is not exactly the position of the economist Yash Tandon (1997), who 
views globalization as capital’s final conquest of the rest of the world. With the 
end of the Cold War, the movement of capital is no longer hindered by the 
West’s need to compromise on account of communism. This has brought about 
fundamental changes in the global economic system: the strong can now extract 
what they will, the weak must surrender what they cannot protect. The case of 
Africa is ample illustration of this. Globalization has created a chasm between 
                                                     
11 See also http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Chomsky/Noam_Chomsky.html 
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the North and the South. Even land, one of the few assets Africans still hold, is 
threatened with being globalized. Ironically, whilst capital-led globalization is 
at the root of Africa’s crisis, it is also suggested as its ‘solution’. For in 
Tandon’s opinion, the alternatives for the south are to slow down the process of 
further integration into the global economy; to strengthen local community-
based systems of production and marketing; and to begin to steer local resources 
away from multinational corporations. 
N’Diaye and like-minded powerful actors on the African continent may call 
for the trimming of the African state in the interests of African integration in the 
world’s globalized economy. By contrast however, Nicolas van de Walle (1999) 
discusses and assesses a number of arguments about the impact of economic 
globalization on African democracies, concentrating on the economic 
dimension of globalization, which is simply defined as the process of 
integration of national economies. He tracks the progress of economic 
globalization in the recent past and reviews the reasons given in the literature as 
to why globalization might be viewed as undermining democratic rule. He 
argues that the international economy is much less globalized today than is 
increasingly being suggested. According to Van de Walle, globalization 
processes in Africa are in fact stagnant, if not in retreat. He further argues that 
the low levels of private capital flows to Africa serve to set the continent 
sharply apart from other regions of the world. Africa’s increasing 
marginalization in the world economy means global economic integration has 
different implications for Africa than for Latin America or Asia. Interestingly, 
Van de Walle calls for the reintegration of African states into the global 
economy, believing that to do so would be to promote economic growth and 
limit the leverage of international financial institutions. 
In financial terms, Africa appears to be barely involved in the globalized 
world. Fosu and Senbet (2001) argue that although the economies of Sub-
Saharan Africa have generally been sheltered from the direct effects of financial 
and currency crises because of this disconnectedness, the indirect effects could 
be considerable. They refer to Africa’s increasingly significant economic 
relationships with Asian countries and the impact of the crises in global markets 
on commodity prices. Furthermore, they argue that the crises provide important 
lessons for the African region, especially those that identify mechanisms for 
maximizing the benefits of globalization while minimizing its risks. 
One commonly heard suggestion relating to what Africa should do in the 
face of economic globalization is regional economic integration. Here attention 
focuses on the creation of regional economic blocks as a fortress against 
international financial institutions. Tanoe and Diouf (1999) deal with the serious 
limitations of regional trade areas, such as the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
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Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). They note that openness to world markets and the removal of barriers 
to international trade and investment are key characteristics of liberalization, 
and with it the globalization of world trade. There has been a proliferation of 
regionalized approaches to trade and economic development, however, in 
Africa. Tanoe and Diouf (ibid: 45-6) observe that regional integration 
arrangements leading to free trade areas or customs unions, which could serve 
as a protective barrier to the rest of the world, are only allowed as an exception 
to the most-favoured nation rule, in the context of the global multilateral trading 
system, under certain conditions. The members must also notify the 
arrangements to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for assessment and 
recognition. Thus far only COMESA has been notified. 
In other words, it is as individual states and not as regional blocks that 
African states face immensely powerful regional trading blocks such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union 
(EU). This, needless to say, places African states in a weak bargaining position.  
This section discussed how the assessment of the economic impact of 
globalization on the African continent appears to be producing very different 
views and positions with regard to the question of how and to what extent 
African economies should become integrated in global economic systems. 
Some authors are hopeful in their diagnosis and the prescriptive policies they 
imagine, others remain pessimistic about the chances of such global integration. 
The next section shows that similar discussions can be seen to be taking place 
with regard to the socio-cultural impact of globalization on Africa. 
 
Societal impact and the globalist debate 
Much analysis has been devoted to how Africans have been seeking to 
modernize and participate in the globalized world. This work is tellingly 
countered by that of James Ferguson (1999) who reminds us that in the recent 
past there were parts and aspects of Africa that participated in the global world 
as equal players in ways no longer replicated in today’s conditions. In grim 
detail, Ferguson describes how Zambia, once lauded as the vanguard of an 
African industrial revolution, has moved into economic decline and been 
sidelined in the modern globalized world. As Ferguson (1999: 235) notes, 
‘Zambia, in the good times, had been on the map — a country among others in 
the “modern world”’. Now, Zambia is just another one of the many African 
basket cases. Ferguson uses the word ‘abjection’ to describe ‘a process of being 
thrown aside, expelled, or discarded. But its literal meaning also implies not just 
being thrown out but being thrown down — thus expulsion but also debasement 
and humiliation’ (ibid: 236).  
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It is this humiliation of Africans through the forceful termination of African 
participation in the globalized First World that is part of the focus of Ferguson’s 
work. He cites an article from a Zambian newspaper:  
 
Car owning remains a dream. A decade ago, young men in gainful employment 
were able to buy cars of all models. That era is gone, gone never to return again. 
(ibid: 1) 
 
One of the aspects emphasized by researchers dealing with globalization is the 
uneven impact it has on African communities and societies. The now fairly 
dated work of Brecher and Costello (1994) sought to describe the process of 
globalization and its impact. Although they concentrated primarily on the 
economic impact of globalization, they coined the term ‘downward levelling’ to 
describe a process of cultural and societal homogenization that they argued was 
brought about by globalization. Similar views have been put forward by Barnett 
(1994) and Bauman (1998) who seek to highlight the reduction in cultural 
diversity that has allegedly been brought about by globalization — another 
version of the spectre of McDonaldization.  
Interesting in the work of Brecher and Costello (1994) is the fact that they 
provide an overview of possible and actual strategies as to how globalization is 
to be countered. In so doing, they provide a description of the varied forms of 
resistance that have appeared to globalization in underdeveloped, newly 
industrialized, former communist, and industrial countries. The formation of 
transnational movements of opposition to globalization is particularly 
emphasized in their work. In this their work foreshadows the currently popular 
bestsellers by Hertz (2001) and Klein (2000). 
In contrast to these negative views of the impact of globalization on societies 
is the work of Friedman (1999: 29) who coins the term ‘glocalism’ and defines 
it as follows:  
 
healthy glocalization (...) [is] the ability of a culture, when it encounters other strong 
cultures, to absorb influences that naturally fit into and can enrich that culture, to 
resist those things that are truly alien and to compartmentalize those things that, 
while different, can nevertheless be enjoyed and celebrated as different. 
 
Friedman argues that societies need to develop glocalism, and that failure to do 
so will lead to their further marginalization.  
 
 
The whole purpose of glocalising is to be able to assimilate aspects of globalization 
into your country and culture in a way that adds to your growth and diversity, 
without overwhelming it. 
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Friedman’s point of view would appear to be close to the position that we are 
defending in this collection and that will be highlighted in Section 3 of this 
introduction. However, as is often the case, the closer the affinity, the more one 
notices differences. Friedman appreciates the different forms that the impact of 
globalization can take upon a society but a weakness of his is that he sees such 
differential impact as the result, apparently, of pre-existing and more or less 
immutable features which that society had at the moment when globalization 
manifested itself there. However well intended, his whole approach to societies 
and their dynamics in a global context is static, mechanical and prescriptive. 
How can one speak of ‘healthy’ glocalisation, without burdening one’s 
argument with a heritage of condescension (‘we know what is healthy for you, 
my good man’) that is only an enlightened form of North–South hegemonic 
subjugation? How could one use the word ‘naturally’ in the context of socio-
cultural dynamics (agreed, by definition, to be learned and not genetically 
determined, to be ‘nurture’ and not ‘nature’), unless as a slip of the pen? How 
could one revive the old, originally social Darwinist concept of ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ cultures and societies? How could one reproduce, without even a 
semblance of critical distance, the ideology of the multiculturalism12 of the 
mutual cultural ‘enrichment’ of societies in globalization in the face of massive 
evidence to the effect that, if left to global market forces, globalization would 
amount to a process of cultural and class subjugation worldwide, so that any 
enrichment that took place (for example, the installation of ethnic restaurants 
and festivals) would merely obscure the real loss of identity, autonomy and 
participation that goes on underneath in the South and on the periphery in 
general. And how could one speak of ‘truly alien’, as if it were at all possible 
(presumably with state-of-the-art methods of cultural anthropology?) to identify 
that which is unmistakably proper to a particular culture and that which is 
unmistakably alien? Identity, self, identification and dissociation have been 
recognized throughout modern social-science studies of ethnicity and identity as 
highly selective, eclectic, situational and performative, so that, in a post-modern 
globalizing world, the ‘truly alien’ can only appear as a deliberate, situational, 
strategic construct (on the part of the owners of a particular cultural orientation, 
or on the part of the ethnographer), or both? Essentializing is inevitably part of 
the construction of identity in any globalizing context but one would hardly 
expect the social-scientific analyst to join in the game, as Friedman clearly does 
here.  
                                                     
12 Also compare Friedman’s use of such evaluative, optimistic expressions such as 
‘enjoy’ and ‘celebrate’ in this connection, which smack of American popular language 
use in the (often market-triggered and consensus-driven) exhortative, ideological 
construction of sociability, but that are out of place in analytical social-scientific 
discourse.  
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What we propose to retain of Friedman’s view of glocalization is the 
awareness that the experience and the process of globalization may vary 
infinitely, due to factors that are related to the internal functioning of societies 
undergoing globalization. However, instead of looking for immutable features 
to explain this differential, we ought to be looking at different strategies of 
agency among members of those societies: modes of selection, appropriation, 
creation and transgression of boundaries, as applied by specific actors at a 
specific time and place, and (as we argue when discussing the present 
collection’s project) in the context, not so much of new concerns brought and 
imposed by globalization, but of ongoing concerns towards whose conflictive 
realization globalization provides new material, new ammunition and new 
formats, without initiating these concerns themselves in the first place.  
Implicit in Friedman’s work is the same critique of societies as is to be found 
in the work of the prominent Orientalist Bernard Lewis, since 1986 a Princeton 
emeritus. The American historian Paul Kennedy recounts that in early 1979 as 
Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile in France on 1 February, 
Bernard Lewis declared in The New York Times that the ‘Shah’s overthrow by 
Muslim clerics would lead not to social improvement and democracy but to a 
theocracy, intolerance and clerically controlled mayhem’.  
Kennedy (2002) notes that Lewis’s statements — which today would be 
recognized as remarkably insightful or even prophetic by many well-informed 
people outside Iran — ran counter to popular opinion that held that ‘the Iranian 
people, freed from the Shah’s yoke, would join the modern, anticapitalist, 
freethinking world’.  
In essence these statements contain the issue that vexes all those dealing 
with globalization. Far from inevitably leading to homogenization, globalization 
can also lead to a rise of theocracies that appear in a traditional guise but that 
are in their organizational structure and technological resources thoroughly 
modern entities. Lewis’s latest work, What Went Wrong? (Lewis 2001), deals 
with the responses of the Muslim world to the West over time, and would seem 
to support Friedman’s assertion that a society’s failure to successfully 
‘glocalize’ will lead inevitably to its further marginalization.  
Again Friedman helps us (albeit by inviting our disagreement) to articulate 
more clearly what globalization amounts to. Marginalization is a perspectival, 
relative concept. Only in a world that has just one focus, one centre, is it crystal 
clear where the margins are. It would appear as if the central struggle in 
globalization is not even any more about scarce resources such as wealth, 
weaponry and technology. It is also less and less about a recognition of outlying 
groups and identities by a self-proclaimed and powerful centre. The central 
struggle is increasingly between unicentrism and multicentrism. The illusion of 
unicentrism, with the United States as the uncontested focus of the global 
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economy, politics, monopoly over mass destruction weapons, morality, ethics 
and political blueprints (in such fields as human rights and democracy), is 
increasingly being contested from within and without Africa's intellectual 
circles. The Black Athena discussion13 has been essentially about the 
inevitability of a perspective global multicentredness for the sake of mankind’s 
global future, yet argued on the basis of millennia-encompassing historical 
evidence which European/North Atlantic cultural hegemony has long managed 
to push under the table. Comparative philosophy and, more recently, 
intercultural philosophy in Africa have struggled to drive the message of the 
essential multicentredness of human cultural and intellectual achievement 
home.14 However, a far more explicit, intransigent, belligerent and violent 
challenge of (the US, hegemonic) unicentrism is to be found in militant 
Islamism. What is at stake in the latter is not so much the refusal of proudly 
self-conscious, militant Islamists to be marginalized vis-à-vis the US unicentre, 
but their rejection of the idea that the United States should be ‘the’ centre’ par 
excellence. Failure to appreciate multicentredness as an essential, positive 
feature of the contemporary world (and even of human history since the Late 
Palaeolithic) has brought Samuel Huntington (1996) to interpret its 
manifestations as the inevitable, religion-based Clash of Civilizations, lending a 
thin intellectual justification to a continued and intensified North Atlantic 
hegemonic project.  
Thus, while Friedman and Lewis see globalization as intrinsically the 
imposition of North Atlantic hegemony, it would be analytically more 
rewarding to distinguish between two related processes: 
 
a) the fact that local individuals and communities are increasingly being drawn 
into global networks of communication, information and circulation; or 
b) the fact that such networks are not power-indifferent but tend to concentrate 
power in local, regional, national, continental and intercontinental centres, 
with less than a handful of centres aspiring to effective world centrality — 
with the post-Cold War United States as the most striking example. 
 
Justifiably, most writers on globalization would include (a) in their definition of 
globalization but only a minority would consider process (b) as more than an 
accidental, ephemeral, regressive and essentially undesirable aspect of 
contemporary globalization.  
Associated with the perceived decrease in cultural diversity is the ongoing 
loss of languages. When dealing with the global world and seeking to 
                                                     
13 Bernal (1987, 1991), Lefkowitz & MacLean Rogers (1996) and Van Binsbergen 
(1997). 
14 Cf. Raju (1962), Mall (1995) and Van Binsbergen (2003).  
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successfully ‘glocalize’, a society must of necessity acquire a full working 
knowledge of a global language among at least a sizeable minority of its 
members. Rabenoro (1999) argues that, to avoid being totally left behind, 
developing countries — and African ones in particular — need to rethink their 
language, cultural and educational policies in the framework of their 
development schemes. In Africa, the privileged minority are at least bilingual 
and have at their command both an African language and a language of 
international (in fact, intercontinental) communication, usually their former 
colonizer’s language. Rabenoro notes that the disadvantaged majority are 
generally monolingual or, if they are multilingual, their second language is a 
national, pidginized version of an intercontinental language, one that forces 
exclusion from rather than access to intercontinental circulation. As a result, 
these people have limited access to the modern sector. Rabenoro is critical of 
the propagation of multilingualism and multiculturalism, even though this had 
become part of the ideological politics of recognition by the end of the 20th 
century. In his view, linguistic diversity hampers communication and hinders 
development endeavours. Of particular importance is the question of what 
language is used as the medium of instruction. As one of the possible ways of 
bridging the gap between the Westernized minority and the disadvantaged 
majority that are not proficient in a language of international communication, 
Rabenoro suggests including the teaching of international languages on African 
school curricula. Perhaps it would be more realistic to admit that this has been a 
widespread policy for decades but that it has been fatally thwarted by failing 
infrastructure, poverty and the intercontinental brain drain.15 
Francis Nyamnjoh (2000) does not share Friedman’s normatively optimistic 
view and reminds us that global availability does not mean global affordability. 
He brings to the fore once again the fact that access to the global does not 
necessarily mean that benefits will accrue. He takes a critical look at 
globalization from the standpoint of the African experience of the West and 
discusses ‘modernization’, ‘development’ and ‘globalization’ as different labels 
for the same basic project or mission. This mission consists of freeing the 
African of his natural and cultural Africanness, and inviting him/her to partake 
of a ‘standardized, streamlined and global’ consumer culture. 
Such a freeing, which Nyamnjoh appears to regard with sarcasm, cannot 
pass without further qualification. It could only be liberation in the positive 
sense if one considered Africanness as something negative. The aim of the 
whole project of Afrocentrism is to counter such a negative conception of 
Africanness. However we understand the liberation which globalization is 
claimed to entail, granted the level of poverty in Africa, as only an elite few 
                                                     
15 For an insightful collection of papers on related issues, cf. Fardon & Furniss (1994). 
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qualify to consume first or second-hand. Global availability is not synonymous 
with global affordability. The majority of Africans have to content themselves 
with what trickles down to them from relatives or patrons at the centre of power 
and resources. They have to be satisfied with what Achille Mbembe has called 
lécher les fenêtres, i.e. impotent window-shopping, with rising desire but 
without the financial means to actually make a purchase. In the face of such 
inequities, it is difficult to envisage how ordinary Africans can relate to the 
global (consumer) culture in any way other than with frustration and 
disenchantment. 
Despite and perhaps as a result of such debates on the pros and cons of 
globalization at a macro level of interpretation, an increasing need was felt to 
obtain an empirically based understanding of the impact of globalization on 
local cultures. How are these processes of globalization, both in economic and 
cultural terms, situated at the mundane level of everyday existence? While it 
was evident that in terms of economy and culture globalization was 
transformative of local societies, the exact nature of those changes has remained 
a matter for further investigation. It was in the social sciences dealing with the 
intricate processes of social life that this need was particularly felt. In 
anthropology, social history, political science, human geography and religious 
studies, an interest for processes of globalization emerged based on empirical 
research, which did not a priori intend to speak out on the value or relevance of 
globalization but instead was aimed at a further understanding of the 
phenomenon, its ramifications and the ideologies and imaginations it fostered. 
In various disciplines the challenge was taken up of exploring the ways in 
which globalization has become situated in local communities and social 
processes in Africa. In the following disciplines specific answers are being 
formulated with regard to the place of the concept and the process of 
globalization in academic work, and the ways in which these can or should be 
studied in local situations.  
 
History 
 
Sometime around 1760, Britain, then France and America took off to another world, 
one that was increasingly secular, democratic, industrial and tolerant in ways that 
left many of the other regions gasping at the combined implications of such changes. 
(Kennedy 2002)16 
 
Globalization is an eminently historical phenomenon, one that can only be truly 
understood in a historical context. Over time it has become increasingly 
                                                     
16 For an innovative view as to why this should be so, see Allen (1999). 
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possible for people to come into contact with one another in ever-quicker ways 
and at ever-diminishing cost. Yet, primarily due to the historical discipline’s 
tradition of writing national histories, historians — with some notable 
exceptions, some of which we have already mentioned — have generally not 
dealt with globalization. Heralding what could become another paradigm 
change in the social sciences, and the timely entry of historians into the field of 
globalization is the excellent introduction in the collective work edited by 
Anthony Hopkins (2002), not to be confused with the movie star of the same 
name! The essays presented in his book indicate that the history of globalization 
does not follow a linear trajectory but instead shows that ‘historically, 
globalization has taken different forms, which we have categorized as archaic, 
proto, modern, and post-colonial’ (ibid: 3). Tellingly he challenges historians to 
take up research on globalization. 
 
Identifying the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of globalization, and 
exploring the links between them, is a starting point that should appeal to historians 
who are properly sceptical of definitions that commit them to a particular bias, 
whether economic, political, social or cultural. (ibid: 17) 
 
At the same time he warns historians of the dangers  
 
of using the term without also being aware that different claims about its longevity, 
novelty and significance are frequently founded on variations in the way it is 
defined. (ibid: 36) 
 
These issues are not easily resolved and, having barely entered the debate, for 
historians to make hard and fast statements would be, in Hopkins’s view, 
unwise. He ends his overview with a profoundly optimistic call: ‘Historians 
now have an opportunity to cross disciplinary frontiers by engaging in this 
debate’ (ibid: 36). 
To be sure, the spread of people and ideas around the globe has a long and 
convoluted history. Generally speaking, historians tend to be confined to a few 
decades or, at most, centuries of history. Nevertheless, there are those who 
would dare to consider the several million years of human presence on earth. 
One such person is the palaeoanthropologist Clive Gamble (1993), who seeks to 
present an overview of the manner in which our ancestors covered the globe. As 
he notes, contemporary conceptions of prehistory are still bedevilled by the 
notion of progress, in that human evolution tends to be understood in terms of a 
development from inferior to superior. Gamble dispels some of the more 
persistent myths and distortions that this way of perceiving the human past has 
produced. He presents a synthesis of the archaeology and palaeoanthropology of 
the last two million years that concentrates on changes in behaviour and stresses 
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the deliberate human purpose that our ancestors displayed when they 
encountered variations in climate and environment as they ranged across the 
world. He demonstrates this new way of looking at human prehistory by a study 
of global colonization rather than by a conventional reassessment of fossil 
remains and stone tools. He reconsiders the record of geographical expansion 
that began with the early hominids of Sub-Saharan Africa whose descendants 
spread to new continents. 
Van Binsbergen (1999) employs the concept ‘proto-globalization’ in a 
manner that differs significantly from that used by Hopkins, and defines 
globalization as ‘the social (including economic, political, cultural and 
religious) effects of dramatic advances in communication technology’. He 
continues by stating that:  
 
Given the globular shape of the earth, even fairly rudimentary communication 
technologies of earlier millennia (those of the footpath, the hand-written text, the 
horse and camel as mounts, the sailing boat) have given rise to early forms of proto-
globalization: globalizing religious projects such as Christianity and Islam; 
globalizing intellectual projects such as the emergence and spread of philosophy and 
science. (ibid: 4)17  
 
This is to be distinguished from events in the second half of the 20th century 
when developments in communications technology advanced so  
 
dramatically as to reduce the costs of time and place to nearly zero. (...) this has 
produced massive qualitative changes in the world at large — changes for which the 
term globalization in the narrower sense of the word is appropriate. (ibid: 4) 
 
Van Binsbergen’s words are echoed in those of Friedman (1999: xviii) who 
notes:  
 
The globalization of the present is not new, but is different in its intensity and 
interconnectivity, this is the era of globalization as stage two or turbo-charged. 
 
                                                     
17 As far as the spread of science is concerned, this argument is taken up again by Van 
Binsbergen (2003: Chapters 7 & 15). There too the global history of science turns out to 
be inextricably connected with the global history of (what we identify today as) pseudo-
science, such as astrology and other forms of divination (particularly geomancy), that 
once – in Ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, Greece, the heights of medieval Islamic 
civilization, and pre-modern Europe – constituted the very hallmark of science. Van 
Binsbergen’s fascination with proto-globalization springs from his tracing, since the 
early 1990s, of the world history of geomantic divination. 
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A recent article by Frederick Cooper (2001) makes for interesting reading, if 
only because of his apparent dislike (not uncommon among historians!) of 
generalizing blanket terms — of which globalization is clearly one. Indeed, for 
Cooper, African history reveals the inadequacy of the concept of globalization. 
He argues that what is missing in discussions of globalization today is the 
historical depth of interconnections and a focus on what the structures and 
limits of the connecting mechanisms are. Central to Cooper’s work is a desire to 
seek alternative perspectives to a concept — notably globalization — that 
emphasises change over time but remains ahistorical, and that seems to be about 
space but ends up glossing over the mechanisms and limitations of spatial 
relationships.  
What Cooper seems to be searching for is the right mix between 
transactionalist agency and structural determination — in other words a 
continuation of the debate on reductionist Marxist ‘historiography’ (more like 
historicizing political economy or sociology or anthropology) and its fallacies, 
back in the 1970s.18 In this insistence Cooper is justified, both by the one-
sidedness of much current globalization parlance and by the inconclusive state 
in which the original debate was left at the time the Berlin Wall collapsed, in 
dispelling Marxists in all directions and rendering them inarticulate. 
Reading Cooper, one is struck by his insistence on clarity and sharp 
definition of terms and concepts, which, as he notes, is often the fate of 
concepts in the social sciences. Particularly galling for Cooper is the ‘doing 
history backwards’ of much of the work dealing with globalization and he 
comes close to formulating, in a nutshell, what could be termed ‘the 
globalization paradigm’. In his view, scholars working within the concept of 
globalization have two complementary views of the present: 
 
• the present as the latest in a series of globalizations each more inclusive 
than the last; and 
• the present as a global age as distinct from the past in which economic 
and social relations were contained within nation-states or empires and 
in which interaction took place among such internally coherent units.  
 
For Cooper, both views suffer from the same methodological fallacy: writing 
history backwards, taking an idealized view of the globalized present and 
                                                     
18 Cf. Thompson (1980). Much of that debate was inspired, indirectly, by Popper’s 
(1957) philosophical attack on historicism, including Marxism. African history also 
went through a phase when Marxist-inspired structural history was very much in vogue, 
even temporarily affecting some of the finest historical minds such as Ranger’s (1979, 
1985).  
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showing how everything led up to it, or how everything, up to the arrival of the 
global age itself, deviated from it. 
He notes that colonization does not fit the imagery associated with 
globalization as implying a condition of unboundedness and maximum access. 
Instead, Cooper reminds us of what historians of early colonial Africa have 
stressed all along, that colonial conquests imposed territorial borders on long-
distance trading networks within Africa and monopolies on what was then a 
growing external trade, damaging or destroying more articulated trading 
systems crossing the Indian Ocean and the Sahara Desert and along the West 
African coast. He exhorts Africanists not to rely on imposed theoretical models 
but to investigate, once more, empirically, and with an open mind, what is 
actually happening in Africa. Cooper (2001: 207) notes that: 
 
Africa is filled with areas where international investors do not go, even where there 
are minerals that would repay investors’ efforts. To get to such places requires not 
deregulation, but institutions and networks capable of getting there. 
 
In conclusion, Cooper argues that it would be better to ‘emphasize not a  
 
‘globalising’ Africa, but rather the changing relationships of externally based firms 
and financial organisations, of indigenous regional networks, or transcontinental 
networks, of states, and of international organisations. (ibid: 213) 
 
In other words, from a historical perspective, a politically inspired 
understanding of the process of globalization is indispensable for interpreting 
the impact of the spread of global forms such as that of the nation-state for 
African societies. However, as political scientists discovered at an early stage, 
this spread of global political forms in Africa certainly did not result in a full 
and unproblematic embrace. 
 
Politics 
Writing on globalization, Thomas Friedman (1999: xxi) notes that ‘if you want 
to understand the post-cold-war you have to start by understanding that a new 
international system has succeeded it’. 
The oft-misquoted political scientist Francis Fukuyama, an exponent of 
United States triumphalism and unashamedly Hegelian in his ethnocentrism and 
Eurocentrism, wrote in 1992 that:  
 
a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system 
of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it 
conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently 
communism. More than that, however, I argued that liberal democracy may 
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constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of 
human government’, and as such constituted the ‘end of history’.19  
 
For Fukuyama (1989: 3), economic and political liberalism achieved a complete 
victory in the Cold War and this signalled: 
 
the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western 
liberal democracy as the final form of human government. 
 
In a different though complementary way, the work of Noam Chomsky 
provides a healthy counterweight to the triumphalism of Fukuyama and others. 
In ‘Consent with Consent: Regimenting the Public Mind’, the second essay in 
Profit over People (1998), Chomsky argues that liberal democracy has been 
used, through the manipulation of public information, marketing and 
propaganda, to protect and maintain the position of powerful elites. Chomsky 
argues that transnational corporations, governments and international 
organizations manipulate societies in such a way as to manufacture consent. 
One of the aspects highlighted by the process of globalization is, therefore, 
the decline in the importance of the nation-state and of national boundaries. In 
the African context, the validity of the boundaries of African nation-states, a 
residue of the colonial era frozen by mutual agreement within the Organization 
of African Unity, has been an issue of debate prior to and since independence. 
In the wake of the Cold War, the collapse of many African states has brought 
home, even more forcefully than the two preceding decades, the lesson of post-
colonial African politics: the tenuous nature of the African state.  
The fragility of the African state, though not necessarily in the context of 
globalization, is an issue that was already highlighted in the work of the grand 
old man in African history, Basil Davidson, in his The Black Man’s Burden 
(1992). Following on from Davidson’s work, and introducing the adverse 
effects of democratization on the African state, Naerman (2000) deals with the 
disintegration of the nation-state in the African context. Naermann’s work, in 
his own words: 
 
sets the disintegration of the nation-state in Africa and the disruptive effects of the 
democratization process within a historical perspective, which takes into account the 
artificiality of state borders and the ubiquity of crossborder migrations.  
 
He demonstrates that the colonial national pattern is basically an irrational 
creation — preserved more in the interests of the new African elites than those 
of the grassroots. He explores local reactions to conditions created as part of the 
                                                     
19 http: //www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/fukuyama.htm 
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process of intensified globalization, arguing that the African position in this 
regard is fragile. He then focuses on the internal structures of the modern 
nation-state, dealing with the relationship between the traditional ethnic 
(national) groups’ territorial domain and the present state set-up. He paints a 
broad canvas of the new patterns of conflict that have appeared in recent years, 
giving examples of how various configurations in a diverse spatial pattern are 
the primary basis for a popular affinity that is far stronger than is identification 
with a nation-state. Finally, he focuses on the situation in Kenya and the 
complicated ethnic divisions now structuring political action there. Naermann 
concludes by claiming that, although the academic discourse has found it 
difficult to imagine an African situation without the nation-state, it may be 
possible that new kinds of state structures, cooperation and networks will 
emerge. 
The work of Puplampu and Tettey (2000) deals with the implications of 
globalization for African agricultural development in a situation in which the 
state collapses, or ‘withdraws’ as advocated by N’Diaye, and comes to be 
replaced by NGOs. Puplampu and Tettey note that, in the past twenty years, the 
crisis of the state in Africa has been a dominant feature of the continent’s socio-
political and development discourse. In a region where agriculture is the engine 
of development and the state plays an active role in agriculture, the crisis of the 
state (according to the authors) has created a vacuum in the institutional 
framework required for agricultural development. Consistent with globalization, 
NGOs have emerged and filled the vacuum as viable institutions for agricultural 
development. 
In a similar vein to Chomsky, but complementing the latter by a specific 
application to Africa, is the work of Owolabi (2001: 71). He introduces his 
article by claiming that it belongs to:  
 
the stream of articles that seek to redress the perceived wrongs of globalization and 
urge societal transformations which can be attained through political interventions.  
 
Owolabi’s essay argues that globalization is essentially aimed at the promotion 
of the imperialistic interests of Western society. He claims that this hegemony is 
sustained by propagating the philosophy of liberalism. Liberalism and its 
defence of individual autonomy necessarily promote self-interest, whether at the 
level of the individual or the state. To avoid the injustice and possible anarchy 
that may arise as a result of this, the philosophy of liberalism must be reviewed 
based on criticisms from a communitarian perspective. The only way that 
globalization can attain a just integration and global peace is by jettisoning the 
individualism of liberalism for the altruism and sense of community as 
advocated by ‘communitarianism’. Interestingly, and as a sign of the negative 
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effects of globalization, this African author deploys the term communitarianism 
mainly with reference to North Atlantic 20th-century political philosophers20 but 
largely fails to appreciate that, as an indigenous philosophy, communitarianism 
has a long (though not incontested)21 history on African soil.  
Kwame Ninsin (2000) is critical not so much of the post-Cold War 
democratization project in Africa but of globalization and trade liberalisation, 
which he believes undermine democracy. He touches on the limits of political 
reform in Africa and states that the dominant discourse on democratization in 
Africa is premised on the necessity of establishing the basic institutional 
elements of democracy. This is why, argues Ninsin, elections and liberal 
constitutions in which the structure of state power has been crafted to safeguard 
liberty are the main features of political reforms. However, there is also a strong 
ethical foundation to democracy, which is embedded in liberty as self-
development or progress for both the individual and the group. This 
presupposes an educated, economically secure and critically conscious citizen. 
The conflict between this richer conception of democracy and the narrowly 
defined procedural democracy is at the heart of the failure of the democratic 
revolution in Africa.22 More specifically on globalization, Ninsin argues that its 
forces have eroded the capacity of existing social forces to implement the 
democratic project. He argues that the liberalization of markets has exacerbated 
the social and economic weakness of Africa’s social classes. 
Similar to the views expressed by Ninsin (2000) is the work of Francis 
Makoa (2001) who notes that one of the key demands of globalization, seen as a 
North Atlantic economic ideal, is that there should be no political interference 
in economic activity and investment decisions. Thus, according to Makoa, 
globalization presents the less-developed countries with what appears to be an 
intractable conundrum. While touting democracy as a condition for economic 
success, the neo-liberal ideology that underpins globalization effectively 
removes the economy from the political agenda: for it advocates laissez-faire 
economic policies that preclude government involvement in investment 
decisions. As a result, private capital and the bourgeoisie are shielded from 
social and political scrutiny. Makoa outlines the broad political implications of 
globalization in eastern and southern Africa, and reflects on possible strategies 
that might cushion the regional states against its vicissitudes. 
                                                     
20 Communitarianism (cf. Bell 2001) emerged as a philosophical challenge to the 
classical liberal position (the state is primarily to protect individual freedom) as 
defended by Rawls (1971). Among the contesting authors are MacIntyre (1988), Sandel 
(1998), Taylor (1985, 1999) and Walzer (1983, 1994).  
21 Cf. Wiredu & Gyekye (1992). 
22 The 2002 general elections in Zimbabwe provide a graphic example of exactly what 
Ninsin has in mind. 
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It is, however, not only international institutions, global liberalism or internal 
(ethnic) strife that should be held responsible for the failure of the introduction 
of the global political form of the nation-state on the African continent. The 
disintegration of the state also results from what can be called globalization 
from below: the urge through which African populations increasingly become 
involved in transnational movement and migration. Never before has the 
continent experienced such massive forms of mobility culminating in 
transnational and intercontinental movements of migration of unprecedented 
magnitude. They are of a magnitude well beyond the control of many a nation-
state. 
 
The spatial dynamics of globalization: Migration and transnationalism 
One of the recurrent themes in the context of globalization is the ease and 
rapidity that have been technologically realized in the field of spatial 
displacement. These conditions have resulted in the greatly increased mobility 
of people, images and goods around the world. Initially many believed that this 
would lead to the disappearance of cultural differences but an ever-increasing 
bundle of recent research indicates that this has been far from the case. In 
seeking to come to terms with this paradox, Meyer and Geschiere utilized the 
concepts of ‘global flows’ and ‘cultural closure’. They note (1999: 7) that: 
 
There is much empirical evidence that people’s awareness of being involved in 
open-ended global flows seems to trigger a search for fixed orientation points and 
action frames, as well as determined efforts to affirm old and construct new 
boundaries. For students of globalization it is therefore important to develop an 
understanding of globalization that not only takes into account the rapid increase in 
mobility of people, goods and images, but also the fact that, in many places, flow 
goes hand in hand with a closure of identities which often used to be much more 
fuzzy and permeable.  
 
The work of Winston Meso (2000) deals specifically with the negative impacts 
of migration under the influence of globalization for African societies. Meso 
argues that the migration of skills and labour — human capital — is one of the 
key features of the globalization trend. The management of this process, 
according to him, presents an enormous challenge to the economies of the 
affected countries.  
As the work of Stoller (2002) points out, dealing with West African traders 
on the streets of New York in the context of globalization, transnationality 
involves more than only the movement of people across geographical 
boundaries. It also involves the creation of transnational spaces of cultural 
interaction and imagination, sometimes created through electronic devices such 
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as the Internet, and in other instances forged through virtual interactions such as 
Sassen indicates for the financial flows between transnational cities. 
Ideas of the transnational city in the context of Africa, as expressed by Ali 
Mazrui (1996), link in with the ‘global city’ hypothesis and debate as presented 
by James White, Saskia Sassen and Michael Smith. The most influential, 
though inevitably dated, book on the global city is Sassen’s The Global City 
(1991), in which she establishes a paradigm for analysing cities in a context 
defined by post-1970s economic restructuring, and by the growing power of 
multinational corporations able to move massive capital swiftly around the 
globe. Cities, according to Sassen, have lost their positions as centres of 
manufacturing. Instead they have gained a new role as centres of corporate 
control, with centres of supporting service industries. In conjunction with this 
change there is, according to her, an ever-growing divide between the rich and 
the poor in cities. Her work has been challenged by White (1998) who argues 
that she overemphasizes the economy at the expense of political interventions, 
and that she follows an ethnocentric approach in believing that all cities will 
become like London and New York, as contradistinctive to Tokyo and Paris. 
Michael Smith (1998) rises above the debate between Sassen and White by 
arguing that the ‘global city’ does not exist in reality except as a social or 
intellectual construct, in other words as a space of imagination, 
cosmopolitanism and global interactions which can thus only be investigated in 
approximation. Smith argues for a comprehensive analysis of all cities as nodes 
within a network of relationships that overlap and intersect. 
A useful corrective, meanwhile, to the grandiloquence about the global city 
is offered by Simone (1999) in his study of African cities and globalization. He 
reminds us that African cities are, at one and the same time, the most 
underdeveloped and the most contemporary. As they have not coalesced around 
industrialization, they lack the productive base to provide formal work or 
infrastructural support to their growing numbers, thus compelling continuous 
revisions or reinventions of largely rural-informed practices of survival, but 
they have also fostered socio-economic practices and forms of social 
organization potentially well adapted to globalized post-industrial economies. 
How to begin to register increases in urban economic productivity 
simultaneously with human development gains for urban citizens remains a 
fundamental challenge facing cities in Africa. Particular challenges for African 
urban governance lie in the social and cultural domain as a result, amongst 
others, of the profound fissuring tendencies in urban Africa, increased levels of 
insecurity and crime, and a progressive dissociation of space within cities and 
across cities. Rather than pinpointing specific policy frameworks and 
programmes for urban managers to adopt, the author suggests particular ways of 
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thinking about the city that are important precursors to the generation of specific 
governance practices. 
The study of transnational movement in relation to the global 
interconnectedness of world cities (see Hannerz 1987, 1992, 1996) brings us in 
addition to the crumbling nation-state closer to an understanding of the spread 
and emergence of a range of other phenomena as well. While much of this can 
be studied in terms of style, fashion and music, the final paragraph of this 
section looks at the relationship of transnationalism with the emergence of new 
religious forms. New religious movements are emerging in Africa increasingly 
as a result, if not the product, of global urban interactions. 
 
Religious studies 
A series of articles recently edited by Corten and Marshall-Fratani (2001) deals 
specifically with issues of global flows, migration and nationalism in relation to 
Pentecostalism. The editors note that over the past two decades, Latin American 
and African societies have experienced a phenomenal growth in Pentecostal 
movements. Describing a ‘bricolage’ of heterogeneous elements, the editors 
argue that contemporary Pentecostalism provides a striking example of the 
paradox of difference and uniformity, of flow and closure, that seems to be at 
the heart of processes of transnationalism and globalization. The studies in the 
edited volume reveal the diversity of Pentecostalism in Latin America and 
Africa, especially in its social composition. The dazzling complexity of the 
Pentecostal phenomenon in Africa and its globalization overtones are well 
captured, with chapters on the provenance of African Pentecostal theology in 
Nigerian Pentecostalism, in the Ghanaian Pentecostal diaspora, in the context of 
the Church of Assemblies of God in Burkina Faso and in the expansion of 
Pentecostalism to Francophone Africa (Benin and Brazzaville). 
What is noted for these new religious manifestations of Christianity also 
emerges in the context of another world religion, namely Islam. Ousmane Kane 
(1997) examines the historical role and structure of Sufi orders in West Africa 
in relation to transnationalism. In the context defined by globalization, the 
breakdown of the state, and mass migrations, Kane argues that the network that 
Sufi orders create functions as a substitute for the state in the provision of social 
security. At present, with their increased mobility, the Sufi networks have been 
strengthened over ever-greater distances that extend beyond Africa. Parallels to 
Kane’s work are to be found in the work of Stoller and Van Dijk, both of whom 
deal extensively with transnational religious and trading organizations and their 
significance for African migrant communities. Roy Dilley offers a related 
argument in this volume. 
However, while this interrelatedness between transnationalism and the 
emergence of new religious movements has been well documented, the 
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explanation for the general public’s fascination with these religious forms in a 
context of globalization has resulted in heated debates. Much research has 
concentrated on the collective imagination, the fantasies, that globalization 
brings about especially in the periphery of the global system and the way in 
which these are translated in religious terms.  
In explaining this fascination for new religious movements, it is often 
pointed out that Africans have developed strands of reasoning that seek to 
explain and provide solutions to the confrontation with global systems and the 
feelings of exclusion that commonly result from such an experience. In this 
connection, Van Dijk (1999: 72) refers to ‘the enchanted global economy and 
the moral perils of involvement with foreign commodities’. Here Africans hit 
on explanations that seek to deal with the world, and which to observers may 
appear to be absurd, fantastic and beyond the bounds of the rational. Moreover, 
these are ideas and explanations that seemingly withered and disappeared in 
Europe in post-Enlightenment times under the onslaught of rationalism. 
However, it is worth remembering that the European past and present provide a 
rich corpus relating to the world fantastic and attempts to control this fantastic 
world.23  
Research on the issues of witchcraft and magic in Africa in the context of 
globalization has come to be dominated by the work of Peter Geschiere. His 
discussion on the modernity of witchcraft in Africa is best represented in his 
1997 English translation of Sorcellerie et Politique en Afrique (1995). For 
Geschiere (1998), the obsession with witchcraft in many parts of present-day 
Africa is not to be viewed as some sort of traditional residue. On the contrary, it 
is particularly present in the more modern spheres of society. In the 
comparative, global perspective, this linking of modernity and witchcraft is not 
peculiar to Africa and Geschiere notes that in other parts of the world modern 
developments coincide with a proliferation of what have aptly been designated 
as ‘economies of the occult’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999). Examples from 
situations as diverse as 17th-century Sweden and early 20th-century Surinam 
come to mind, both from the work of Thoden van Velzen and Van Wetering.24 
An African example is offered by the events at the Kansanshi copper mine in 
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), a good 100 km west of the later Copperbelt, 
in 1904. The scene offers one of the first25 instances of the implantation of 
industrial capitalist relations of production in South Central Africa. 
                                                     
23 Cf. from among an extensive literature, Ginzburg (1966, 1989), Thomas (1978), 
Clough & Mitchell (2001) and Ellis (2001). 
24 Cf. Thoden van Velzen (1977, 1995, 1998), Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 
(2001). 
25 ‘One of the first’ because the demarcation between mercantile, agricultural and 
industrial capitalism is not easy to make in this early period of capitalist expansion in 
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Tensions also existed at the Kansanshi mine (...) as became manifest in an 
‘alarming rate of desertions amongst the African workers, apparently related to an 
early anti-white religious movement’. 
 
As Copeman, the Kasempa district officer, made investigations, he ‘learned that 
the Head Capitao [African foreman] and some of his friends appeared to keep 
the remainder of the native employees in a state of terror’. The Head Capitao 
turned out to be in the possession of: 
 
a gruesome collection of skulls and human bones and all the paraphernalia of a 
witch doctor. ... The Capitao by claiming supernatural powers had sought to make as 
many as possible join in a horrible brotherhood of which he was the leader. Those 
who refused to have anything to do with it he used his position to ill-treat. It came 
out that he had boasted that he would live for ever, and that presently all the white 
men would die and he and his friends would take possession of their belongings. 
Those whom he persuaded to join his brotherhood were promised that they would 
share these benefits but before they were qualified to do so they had to go to the 
burial place and dig up the latest buried corpses and possess themselves of certain 
portions, they also had to break the arm and leg bones and suck out the marrow and 
indulge in other loathsome practices. (Van Binsbergen 1981: 342 n. 39, quoting 
from CO 3/4/2 Copeman Papers Box 6, in HM 6 Historical Manuscripts Collection, 
Zambia National Archives) 
 
Copeman publicly destroyed the Capitao’s sorcery kit and humiliated him; with 
their leader. ‘Several of the Capitao’s neophytes were sentenced to periods of 
imprisonment, but the mass desertions ceased from this date.’(ibid) 
The power of contemporary African discourses on occult forces, according 
to Geschiere, is that they relate people’s fascination with the open-endedness of 
global flows to the search for fixed orientation points and identities. Both 
witchcraft and spirit cults exhibit a surprising capacity for combining the local 
                                                                                                                                  
South Central Africa. Arab/Swahili and Portuguese traders had penetrated these lands 
from at least the 18th century CE onwards (cf. Van Binsbergen 1992: 4f and the wider 
literature indicated there). The use of the Portuguese term capitao suggests that early 
industrial relations at Kansanshi were at least in part modelled on local Portuguese 
examples. Moreover, as oral sources from western Zambia (Barotseland) indicate, from 
at least as early as the 1880s (i.e. before the onset of colonial rule), labour migration had 
existed from South Central Africa to capitalist workplaces in the south, first to the 
Witwatersrand, and soon also to the mining enterprises and large-scale farms in 
Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. In Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), in addition to 
Kansanshi, capitalist, European-initiated mining was soon undertaken in Ilaland and in 
Broken Hill.  
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and the global. Both also have specific implications for the ways in which 
people try to deal with modernity’s challenge.  
Views similar to Geschiere’s are to be found in Michael Taussig’s 
pioneering work on commodity fetishism, in which he investigated the 
economy, the functioning of markets and the exchange of commodities in terms 
of culture (1980). Rijk van Dijk has continued this emphasis on the morality of 
commodities within the global economy (Van Dijk 1999: 71-89). Writing on 
commodities in the global space Van Dijk summarizes a common analytical 
approach to this topic in the following terms:  
 
The penetration of foreign commodities into local societies takes place through their 
links with the market place; and foreign commodities seem able to elicit a sense of 
alienation, because the market mediates what is a rupture: between the places and 
cultures where commodities were produced and those where they will be consumed. 
Since the previous ‘social life’ of such commodities is unknown to the local cultures 
which consume them, (…) commodities appear to be enchanted, and to function in 
local systems as if they possessed a will of their own. The result is that their local 
appropriation and use are not considered as innocent, but as ridden with evil and 
embellished with forces that threaten society and personal identities. Social anxieties 
express these perils that arise when foreign commodities become objects of local 
social desire. (ibid: 71). 
 
However attractive as a profound insight into African collective representations, 
Van Dijk (1999: 72) challenges this view, which in his opinion: 
 
seems to primitivize the other’s capacity to deal with the uncertainties and the 
porous quality of social life which result from engagement with the global economy. 
 
Van Binsbergen (2001), in his contribution to Bond and Ciekawy’s recent 
collection on African witchcraft, which is fairly independent of Geschiere’s 
work, also seeks to correct Geschiere’s presentist approach, advocating instead 
that witchcraft in Africa today is about the ‘virtualized boundary conditions of 
the kinship order’ — an order whose basic format goes back at least to the 
Neolithic, as does its basic defiance through witchcraft, even though under 
modern conditions of globalization the specific forms and occasions of 
witchcraft beliefs and practices have been subject to specific changes. The main 
advantage, however, of this line of work has been the exploration of the ways in 
which globalization appears to be refracted on the level of the local in terms 
other than Western positivist science expected. Situating globality in the world 
of the unseen and the world of imagination became a field to which 
anthropology in particular had much to contribute. 
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Anthropology 
The important contribution that anthropology was to make to the field of 
globalization studies was the acknowledgement of the fact that an important 
aspect of Africa’s economic marginalization is that Africans participate in the 
globalized world community not so much as consumers of manufactured 
material goods but as consumers and producers of mere images and ideas 
concerning the global world to which they seem to belong only marginally — 
again Mbembe’s lécher les fenêtres. The anthropological study of globalization 
therefore came to include much more than the field of religion, spirituality, 
occultism and the like, but went into the exploration of what came to be known 
as the deterritorialization of culture. As globalization came to be seen as the 
process through which a priori assumptions about the relationship people-place-
culture become problematic, anthropology began exploring the production of 
culture in other places and spaces. The media, expressions of popular culture in 
art, music, the theatre and so forth as well as the diffusion of consumptive styles 
of behaviour were turned into important areas of research. In addition it 
explored the situationality of the production of intellectual thought and images 
of the idea of Africa, and as such turned the analytical lens upon itself.  
 
 
North Atlantic, the West Africa 
rich poor 
developed infrastructure failing infrastructure 
law and order legal and political chaos 
democracy tyranny and civil war 
internalized discipline absence of discipline 
technological and organizational absence of technological and organizational  
know-how  know-how 
developed under-developed 
civilized uncivilized 
scientific rationality magic and superstition 
 
 
Seen from the North Atlantic, the place of Africa and Africans in 
globalization often has an even more cynical aspect: Africa and Africans tend to 
be reduced to mere symbols of extreme otherness by reference to which the 
Western, North Atlantic identity may be constructed through a process of 
denial, in facile binary oppositions such as:  
Such illusory and hegemonic self-exultation on the part of the West only works 
as long as firm boundaries separate it from Africa, in other words and 
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paradoxically, it only works under the very conditions that are increasingly 
undermined by the undeniable fact of Africa’s globalization.  
Anthropology, as a dominant mode of intercultural knowledge construction, 
is a child of (proto-)globalization, as a form of predominantly North-Atlantic 
scientific endeavour. It is largely part of the project of the West and implicitly 
may contribute to the West’s exalted self-constructions. For these reasons the 
anthropology of globalization is fraught with contradictions, which cannot fail 
to be reflected in print. The manner in which researchers are to measure, 
categorize and represent such consumption and production is inordinately 
complex and confusing, and can lead, not surprisingly, to work and 
observations that may well be dismissed as ‘glo-baloney’. Nevertheless, seeking 
to portray, understand and explain these processes is the self-avowed purpose of 
many researchers in the field of cultural anthropology today.  
Brad Weiss, writing on northwestern Tanzania, has attempted to tackle the 
issue the ‘imaginary’ and the ‘global’ (2001: 1). As Weiss notes,  
 
many of the tangible links through which a global order of relationships is 
concretised are dependent upon the dissemination of imaginative forms. (ibid: 3)  
 
In addition he argues that  
 
lived worlds distinctly situated as they may be throughout the globalised world are 
increasingly constructed through fantasies and fabrications that must first be 
imagined in order to be realized. (ibid: 4)  
 
In this aspect of his work Weiss concentrated on young men in Arusha who 
congregate around barbershops. He has attempted to come to an understanding 
of how these young men imagine the world and structure their lives in 
accordance with this in the context of globalization. Writing on the recent 
history of Tanzania, Weiss notes that Tanzanian society was simultaneously 
opened up  
 
to media, goods, and ideologies never before available, while the decline of state 
services and subsidies has led (after a brief flourishing of both the formal and 
informal privatised economy) to the collapse of a host of employment opportunities. 
This sudden crash on the heels of unprecedented and exhilarating possibilities — 
unrealised by the vast majority of Tanzanians as anything but possibilities — made 
it possible for a broad swath of people to desire the signs and styles of a global 
order, while facing ever narrower means by which to satisfy them. (ibid: 8)  
 
Similar to the work of Weiss is Ferguson’s 1999 anthropology referred to 
earlier in this section. He too has grappled to find words to describe what 
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happens to the African imagination in the face of globalization. Africanist 
researchers, he observes, see that Africans are turned out of the global paradise 
but how can this process be described, including what goes on in people's minds 
and in collective consciousness? In studying the work of imagination and 
consciousness in difficult situations in the Zambian Copperbelt, Ferguson 
writes:  
 
The experience of abjection here was not a matter of being merely excluded from a 
status [developed] to which one had never had a claim but of being expelled, cast out 
(...) from that status by the formation of a new (or newly impermeable) boundary. It 
is an experience that has left in its wake both a profound feeling of loss as well as 
the gnawing sense of a continuing affective attachment to that which lies on the 
other side of the boundary. (ibid: 237-38; italics added)  
 
The views of Weiss and Ferguson are similar to those informing the work of 
Andreas van Nahl who attempts to describe the impact of globalization and the 
resulting marginalization of people in Kenya. Van Nahl (1999: 106) notes:  
 
Rural [Kenyan] towns are nowadays full of young ‘businessmen’ who own nothing 
more than the suit they wear and a self-designed business card. Like consumer 
lifestyle, it seems that business lifestyle is an — at times, desperate — attempt to 
maintain the self in a world of disintegrating social ties and economic relations. 
 
Weiss (2001: 4) has noted that there are ‘models’ and ‘projections’ that inform 
the ‘modes of domination’ which exist within the globalized world. Here he 
refers to the work of Carrier and Miller (1998) who deploy the term ‘virtualism’ 
to refer to such models and projections as have been established in a specific 
time and place yet inform daily practice in quite a different time and place. The 
similar concept of ‘virtuality’ has come to the fore in the work of Van 
Binsbergen (1997), for whom it is to be regarded as one of the key concepts for 
characterizing and understanding the forms of globalization in Africa. Van 
Binsbergen seeks to define virtuality and globalization, and to provisionally 
indicate their theoretical relationship. For him, virtuality is inspiring because it 
seems to offer part of the answer to anthropology’s problematic heritage, 
notably the discipline’s obsession with locality. Yet what exactly is to be 
understood by the term ‘virtuality’?  
Inspired by the earlier work of Korff (1995) and Jules-Rosette (1996), Van 
Binsbergen (1998a: 878) provides the following definition of virtuality:  
 
Ultimately, virtuality stands for a specific relation of reference as existing between 
elements of human culture (A1, A2, …, An). This relation may be defined as follows: 
once, in some original context C1, A virtual referred to (that is, derived meaning from) 
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A real. This relationship of reference is still implied to hold, but in actual fact A virtual 
has come to function in a context C2 which is so totally dissimilar to C1, that A virtual 
stands on itself; and although still detectable on formal grounds as deriving from A 
real, has become effectively meaningless in the new context C2, unless for some new 
meaning which A virtual may acquire in C2 in ways totally unrelated to C1. 
 
In short, the concept of virtuality reminds us that societies live their lives 
according to charters grounded in a historical past, in such a way that not only 
the society but also the interpretations of the historical charter change over time. 
In other words, ideas often outlive the context in which they were first thought 
up.26 
Reading over anthropological work dealing with globalization as it is seen 
today, one is struck by people’s attempts to control or understand the world as it 
is around them. This juxtaposition of historical and contemporary consciousness 
and imagination is fully elaborated on in a number of the contributions in this 
volume as is highlighted in the following section.  
 
 
Situating globality: This volume 
 
Beyond ‘Globalization and Ownership’ 
The conference entitled ‘Globalization and New Questions of Ownership’, held 
in Leiden from 26-27 April 2002, intended primarily to explore processes of 
appropriation of diverse, globally circulating, cultural ‘materials’ on the African 
continent and the way in which they are woven into new or emerging social 
fabrics. 
Most of the papers presented either took the issue of ownership in rather 
concrete terms or choose not to address it at all. Instead, a discussion evolved in 
which a dichotomized representation of issues surfaced. Globalization appears 
first and foremost as an arena of polarization suggesting an unavoidable and 
quite prescriptive formulation of the pros and cons, of perceiving its effects as 
the latest transformation of capitalist encroachment or as a domain of hybridity 
from where new cultural forms will emerge, as a process of victimization or as a 
process leading to greater proximity and vicariousness thus lesser estrangement 
and exoticism; a process to be studied by either the philosopher or the 
ethnographer.  
The dissatisfaction, uneasiness or complete avoidance of the concept of 
ownership during the conference may have had two root causes, which now can 
and should be addressed in a different light. One reason for this apparent 
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unacceptability of the concept may have been the polarized nature of the 
understanding of globalization: ownership as a Western concept has the 
implication of disenfranchizing others, creating ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in a 
static and often highly confrontational mode. Africa then appears as the 
disowned place par excellence. Yet not all the conference papers took this 
position. Wim van Binsbergen’s contribution, ‘Can ICT belong in Africa, or is 
ICT owned by the North Atlantic region?’, emphasized the fact that the question 
of ownership creates a dilemma, a tension between the view that in some 
respects ICT is not owned by Africa but by the North Atlantic region, and that 
in most respects this is a deceptive way of representing social and cultural 
realities. ICT was invented by a small intellectual and technological elite and 
subsequently had to be received — as an alien thing — by the ordinary 
inhabitants of the North Atlantics, and it has been similarly received, and 
effectively appropriated, in Africa along lines sketched in some detail in his 
paper. In his view, the question of ownership evokes the tension between 
inclusion and exclusion that is a major dimension of globalization, without the 
possibility of that tension being truly resolved either in the direction of 
exclusion (as if Africa were invariably and totally disenfranchized by 
globalization) or in the direction of inclusion (as if Africa were effectively and 
totally incorporated towards full participation in global processes).  
Another cause of unease with the concept may have been the result of a 
highly individualized conceptualization of ownership, a kind of individuality 
which Western liberal economies now seem to market around the world, thus 
the product of a particular cultural and historical perception of personhood and 
subjectivity. Old, highly stereotyped and ideology-heavy dichotomies may have 
been at the back of the conference participants’ minds in this rejection of 
ownership: of the West as the place of the individualized self in possession of 
commodities versus Africa as the communalized place of self, of sharing in gift 
and exchange economies. This concept of ownership is simply too static, too 
inert and in a strange way not ‘globalized’ enough to be of use in what the 
conference eventually was to pursue: a dynamic common ground between these 
dichotomies, a productive middle terrain, a place of hybridity in the active 
voice.  
During the conference an awareness emerged that it is no longer viable to 
perceive of globalization as either producing marginalization or victimization of 
the African continent, or on the other hand as the domain of unbridled chances 
and new cultural formations. Instead, a complex dialectic was emerging from 
the confrontation between these views. Key to that dialectic is the understanding 
of reflexivity, understanding how people in Africa create specific forms and 
domains in which particular arenas of reflexivity emerge in which the pros and 
cons, the marginalization as well as the creativity of globalization are debated, 
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lived and experienced. Forms and domains of such reflexivity are both cultural 
and historical, shaped by prevalent political and economic circumstances and by 
aspirations and imaginations of groups even entertaining a Utopian kind of 
view. And they can only be studied by philosophy and anthropology working in 
tandem. These forms and domains of reflexivity can range from what Habermas 
(1989) described as the bourgeois café in European societies to the wedding-bed 
parades in Niger as discussed in the chapter by Adeline Masquelier; from the 
site of Pan-Africanist thought in public speeches of engaged Pentecostal 
churches in Ghana as in Rijk van Dijk’s contribution to the private and 
concealed domains of the inner quarters of family life as in Thera Rasing’s 
chapter. Transformations can occur rapidly as these sites of reflexivity may shift 
from the inner house to the Internet café as in the chapter by Wim van 
Binsbergen, from the public newspaper readings to the proliferation of public 
media as described by Francis Nyamnjoh. None of these forms or domains of 
reflexivity remain frozen in time and what is at stake is that, through the process 
of globalization, they change in nature and in quality more quickly that ever 
before. Basically, we argue, these papers have shown us that the pivotal 
question tackled in these domains and sites of reflexivity is how globalization is 
or should be tailored to local needs, circumstances and imaginations. Local 
debates do not revolve around the question of whether one is either a victim or a 
conqueror of globalization but whether elements of globalization can be used 
fruitfully, for whatever purpose.  
Interestingly, while only a minority of the conference papers explicitly 
pinpointed the contradictory innovatory dynamics of the tension relation 
between the inclusion and exclusion of Africa in globalization, and while some 
(especially those by some of the African participants such as Sichone, Osha and 
Williams)27 instead dwelled at length on the misery and devastation created in 
Africa as a result of globalization, an unexpected theme emerged in many others 
and was reinforced in the stimulating discussion during the conference: the 
theme of resilience.  
The papers by Judy Rosenthal, Ferdinand de Jong, Roy Dilley and Jan-Bart 
Gewald reminded us that, instead of perceiving African societies as creatively 
appropriating globally circulating cultural material or as being crushed by the 
political economy of globalization under North Atlantic hegemony, there is a 
third option: that of societies responding to globalization by the pursuit of at 
least two forms of social and cultural resilience. First, there is a form of 
resilience which emphasizes a proud conscious and innovative return to their 
own time-honoured resources of spirituality, values, world view, forms of social 
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and political organisation, and secondly, another form of resilience can 
contradict and contest globalization by resisting it on its own terms and by 
fighting its influence with its own weapons, so to speak.  
The first form of resilience, which in recent years has been noted in the 
fields of African traditional religion, puberty rites, traditional 
rulers/chieftainship, and ethnic identity, seems to restore the balance against the 
overwhelming effects of global cultural imports into Africa, and favours a view 
in which Africa in globalization is eminently capable of creative responses. This 
form of resilience is successful not only in the appropriation of alien material 
but also in so far as the affirmation is concerned of that which has been Africa’s 
own for centuries and which, after a few centuries of colonial and post-colonial 
suppression and exclusion, now (under the new challenges and the new 
technologies of communication and organization characteristic of globalization) 
proves capable of once more showing its true, splendid colours. 
The second form of resilience, which is discussed particularly in the context 
of Jan-Bart Gewald’s paper on the use of the Western media by the Somali 
warlords in their conflict with the United States, demonstrates quite a different 
feature of Africa’s creative response. Here, the appropriation of global cultural 
imports appears to serve the specific interest of casting globalization back in an 
attempt to defend that which is considered truly inalienable. Globalization can 
thus not only be mocked and ridiculed but appears to provide, in its violent 
arrival, the material, the resources as well as the imagination to contest it on its 
own terms. Examples abound in the societal reactions to international 
interventions in Africa, to the spread of the global media and to the global 
spread of the state and the identities and socio-economic structures it stands for.  
These forms of resilience may not be mutually exclusive but in certain 
circumstances may appear simultaneously or may even work in tandem. 
Furthermore, the convenors also wish to emphasize that discussions of the 
various conference papers bring to light the notion that not in all cases can 
resilience be assumed or taken for granted. Whereas anthropology can help us 
to understand the conditions that give rise to different forms of resilience, 
philosophy is invoked to elucidate the processes of reflexivity that produce for 
every movement a counter-movement and for every discourse a counter-
discourse. 
What the chapters in the present collection bring out almost unanimously is a 
specific appreciation of the form in which globalization manifests itself in 
Africa today. Globalization is not the inescapable, all-encompassing juggernaut 
that is relentlessly rolling on in its way, crushing everything it encounters. It is 
not the tyrannical outside force to which Africa and Africans have only to 
submit passively and without options. On the contrary, in the contemporary 
African context, the specific form globalization takes appears to be largely 
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determined by local and regional concerns and contradictions that were already 
in place before the recent intensification of globalization. The new objects, 
ideas and technologies that have become available in the worldwide circulation 
under modern technological conditions do not simply penetrate Africa merely of 
their own accord. They are appropriated and mobilized in concrete African 
situations through the agency of Africans pursuing concrete goals, which have 
largely been defined by these ongoing anterior concerns, rather than defining 
those concerns in the first place. The objects of globalization are locally co-
opted to constitute new resources and ammunition in pre-existing local 
struggles about material and/or symbolic issues. Inevitably, such appropriation 
cannot fail to have a considerable impact on these struggles, even to the extent 
of partially redefining their stakes and their very format, yet this is only a 
secondary aspect. Inevitably, again, such appropriation falls short of the 
aspirations of the African actors involved, given the fact that their economic 
power is minimal in the world today. Inevitably, such conscious and deliberate 
appropriation of globally circulating objects and technologies can only take 
place within a wider context of a globalized world economy and world politics 
where parameters are set and reset almost entirely without Africans taking part 
in the decision-making process, and the outcome of which has devastatingly 
negative effects on African conditions in the fields of the macro-economy, 
security and well-being. The objective structural features of globalization 
cannot be adequately captured from a perspective centring on specific African 
actors’ agency. Yet even so, the message of the present collection is that we will 
miss the essence and will merely continue to pay lip service to obsolete models 
of totalising hegemonic overkill until we appreciate the eclecticism and the 
agency attending the contemporary African experience of ‘high globalization’. 
With such an approach we hope to advance beyond what Held and MacGrew 
(2002) recently characterized as the ‘transformalist school in globalization 
studies’. With Featherstone and Hannerz as its main exponents, this school 
looks at globalization processes from the perspective of what impact they have 
on local societies. Transformalists, therefore, do not view globalization as a 
homogenizing factor in the way of Wallerstein’s (1974) ‘world system’, but 
point to local variations in the impact of globalization processes and in the 
extent to which (under such an impact) heterogeneity will persist and may even 
increase. Reversing the perspective from the outside to the inside, the advance 
in the present collection lies in the points of agency and reflexivity, highlighting 
African actors as conscious and creative strategic actors whose remaining 
choice, despite the constraints of objective globalizing conditions, is still 
considerable. In the following chapters, the African local groups and individuals 
are not what the rhetoric of anti-globalization has often made them out to be, 
namely passive recipients and victims who, devoid of reflexivity, have been 
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simply forced to adjust for better or worse to the impact of globalization. 
Instead, we show how these African groups and individuals are displaying 
remarkable creativity, resilience, flexibility and determination to survive and 
cope. These features (which incidentally were always indispensable in Africa 
during the colonial and post-colonial periods) are not being destroyed under the 
impact of recent globalization but are merely the conditions for a transformation 
as a result of which local groups and individuals are harnessing globalization for 
their own purposes.  
We have already indicated the tension between such an agency-centred 
perspective and the wider (and inevitably more compelling) structural context of 
objective globalization of the economic and political domains. Another tension 
exists between, on the one hand, the conscious, rationally strategic perceptions 
and motives that we here attribute to Africans in globalization in the context of 
ongoing struggles and concerns and, on the other, the likelihood that what we 
construe to be rational choice may in many situations be clad in the trappings of 
ritual, apparently irrational beliefs (cf. witchcraft!), short-term perceptions and 
decisions in the here and now whose ultimate implications in terms of the 
strategic appropriation of globalization may remain utterly concealed to the 
actors themselves, in the same way as fundamental processes and collective 
representations of their society remain, inevitably, concealed to the 
consciousness of most actors in most societies anywhere and in any historical 
period. This collection suggests that the African selective appropriation of 
globalization usually takes place as strategic choices in the context of local and 
regional conflicts and contradictions. It leaves for further research and reflection 
the question of whether such conflict is necessary for the selective African 
appropriation of globalization or whether, instead, there is also room for such 
processes outside the sphere of direct and open conflict.  
 
The individual contributions 
We have structured the contributions to this collection into three parts. Part I 
contains this introduction, while Part II includes chapters seeking to make 
pronouncements about globalization and the African continent as a whole. 
Given the emphasis on religion in the ASC’s research programme on 
globalization, it is understood that our case studies, discussed in Parts III and 
IV, are mainly derived from the religious field.  
In Part II, ‘Globality through appropriation: Analyses at the continental 
level’, the emphasis is on the media which, through 20th-century technological 
advances, has been a major factor as well as product of globalization.  
The Cameroonian anthropologist Francis Nyamnjoh deals with ‘Global and 
local trends in media ownership and control: Implications for cultural creativity 
in Africa’ and discusses the crystallization of resistance to the cultural 
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homogenization favoured by global consumer media and cultural production, 
stressing that, in most of Africa, threats to a free, open and participatory media 
system and society come as much from repressive governments as from the 
interests of rich nations, international financial institutions and the global 
corporate media. Too cautious to take any serious risks, especially in marginal 
and highly unpredictable zones of accumulation like Africa, global capital needs 
public support and regulation to insulate itself against the vicissitudes provoked 
or exacerbated by its tendency to put profit before people. Africa’s predicament 
notwithstanding, and as a convincing example of the emphasis on agency and 
self-reflexivity which our overall characterization of this collection above 
brings out, Nyamnjoh is critical of meta-narratives that celebrate victimization 
at the risk of obfuscating the reality of negotiation and survival strategies, and 
discusses some of the myriad ways devised by Africans to ensure cultural 
participation for themselves as active agents in local and global processes.  
Just how this may work out in concrete situations is aptly illustrated in Jan-
Bart Gewald’s chapter entitled ‘Global media and violence in Africa: The case 
of Somalia’. Gewald begins by citing the general opinion — which he shares as 
little as Van Binsbergen, the author of the following chapter — that Africa has 
allegedly been sidelined in the global ICT revolution. African societies appear 
to be cut off from the global flows of information. Nevertheless, the manner in 
which war was waged in Somalia between 1991 and 1994 indicates that this 
global revolution has affected not only the manner in which war in Africa is 
reported but also, and more importantly, the very manner in which war is waged 
in Africa. African societies may be cut off from owning and controlling the 
streams of images that reflect their continent but, as Gewald argues, they may at 
times come to temporarily hijack and divert this stream of images and in doing 
so, ensure that images that support or reinforce their political aims come to be 
released into the global flow. In the case of Somalia, the real-time images of 
dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were 
sufficient to compel the United States to end their involvement in Somalia. 
Globalization offered Africans the means of defeating an immensely more 
powerful foe at its own game.  
Against this background, the question that Wim van Binsbergen poses in the 
following chapter on ICT’s role in Africa takes on considerable relevance. ICT, 
as a technological innovation and a major factor in globalization, poses 
particular problems of ownership and identity with regard to the African 
continent. What is the place of ICT in Africa, and what is the place of Africa in 
a world increasingly dominated by ICT? Van Binsbergen seeks to explode the 
apparent contradiction between Africa and ICT. By confronting African 
thinkers like Mazrui and Gyekye who have argued the incompatibility of 
African culture and ICT, and advancing a detailed argument to the effect that 
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ICT is just as much and as little owned by Africans as by any other collectivity 
in the contemporary world, he highlights some of the ways in which the African 
appropriation of ICT is taking shape and provides illustrations of the agency 
and self-reflexivity in the light of pre-existing, ongoing concerns and struggles, 
which we identified above as the specific form which globalization often takes 
in Africa today.  
Strategic appropriation, but then almost in Marx’s literal sense of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ (in other words, high-handed theft), emerges again in the 
following chapter by the Nigerian philosopher Sanya Osha entitled: ‘“Man will 
live well”: On the poetics of corruption in a global age’. The point of departure 
is Osha’s observation that the difference between philosophical and 
anthropological practices in Africa is becoming exceedingly glaring, maybe 
because a dominant tradition in the analytical school of African philosophy is 
limited by a strain of British empiricism. However, new conditions of existence, 
which conventional tropes of analysis in African philosophy seem unable to 
handle, are emerging within the African post-colony. While anthropology has 
produced a voluminous literature on the issue of corruption in Africa, 
philosophy has largely remained aloof of this eminently important topic. How 
then has the problem of corruption been addressed in African philosophical 
practice? Kwame Gyekye, the Ghanaian philosopher, has tackled the problem of 
political corruption by employing discursive strategies derived from the 
Athenian philosophical traditions. Osha argues that Gyekye’s conceptualization 
of the problem does not fully describe the emerging conditions in the post-
colony. On the other hand, Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, the French 
anthropologist, analyses the modes of social organization, forms of sociality and 
the conditions of contemporary globalization that necessitate a more subtle 
theorization of the problem of corruption in Africa and the ways in which it can 
be approached conceptually. A comparison between these two approaches 
makes Osha conclude that a more acute analysis of the situation in the African 
post-colony is still required. 
Part III brings us to a discussion of (the possibility of) African globality 
through world religions, notably Christianity (in the first chapter of this 
section), and Islam (in the other two chapters). Rijk van Dijk’s chapter, 
‘“Beyond the rivers of Ethiopia”: Pentecostal Pan-Africanism and Ghanaian 
identities in the transnational domain’ provides an excellent transition from the 
preceding, Pan-African-orientated Part II, in that it combines a Ghanaian case 
study with a consideration of the Pan-Africanism by which that case study is 
informed. Rev. Mensa Otabil, the founder of the International Central Gospel 
Church in Accra, is considered an influential representative of a new 
Pentecostal-inspired Pan-Africanist ideology. His book Beyond the Rivers of 
Ethiopia lays the foundations of a Pentecostal Liberation Theology that 
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proclaims a Christianized sequel to Pan-Africanism. Operating from Ghana, his 
ideas concerning Africa and ‘Black Consciousness’ have spread to Ghanaian 
migrant communities worldwide. While Otabil has been successful in 
transforming ownership of the intellectualist production of Pan-Africanism by 
tailoring it to the needs of the ordinary Pentecostal believer, it has not been 
adopted so extensively among all Ghanaian migrant communities in the West. 
By exploring Ghanaian migrant communities and their Pentecostal churches in 
the Netherlands, where the staunch identity politics of the Dutch government 
leave little room for the assertive proclamation of ‘Africanness’, Van Dijk 
demonstrates that Otabil’s ideas do not act as a main source of inspiration 
everywhere in the Ghanaian diaspora. The Pan-African ideology crumbles in 
the face of the internal divisiveness of the contemporary Ghanaian experience.  
Islam has occasionally28 been characterized as a (proto-)globalizing project 
initiated by the expansion of early Islam beyond the confines of the Arabian 
peninsula in the course of the 7th century of the Common Era (or rather, and 
more appropriately, the 1st century of the Hijra Era). Hence the contradiction 
between local particularisms and Islamic universalisms has been a recurrent 
theme throughout the history of Islam. With regard to West African caste 
systems, which captivated scholarly attention throughout the 20th century CE, a 
particular illustration of this overall contradiction is offered in Roy Dilley’s 
chapter entitled ‘Global connections, local ruptures: The case of Islam in 
Senegal’, in which he examines the relationship between Islam and caste in 
Senegal. He investigates how new meanings of caste identity have been 
negotiated in view of the differing conceptions of Islam that have taken hold 
within the country. Twentieth-century CE reformist movements challenged the 
predominant role of Sufi brotherhoods, bringing about a reassessment of the 
relationship between caste and Islam. The Nyasiyya brotherhood provides the 
basis for a brief case study, showing that the popularity of this religious order 
abroad is not matched by its reception in Senegal. Some of the possible reasons 
are examined for this disjunction between the global connections that the order 
establishes on the one hand, and the local ruptures it engenders within the local 
Muslim community on the other. The chapter traces the dynamics of Sufism and 
reformist Islam to reveal a double-edged thrust of global connections brought 
about by an internationalizing Islam, and of local ruptures mediated through 
caste identities. 
West-African caste systems were noted in the earliest Arabic sources on that 
part of Africa and were certainly not a product of the introduction of Islam. 
Thus Dilley’s argument is clearly about the strategic negotiation between the 
time-honoured local and the more recent global in a West-African setting 
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largely informed by Islam. In this respect the chapter has considerable parallels 
with that by Adeline Masquelier entitled: ‘How is a girl to marry without a 
bed?: Weddings, wealth and women’s value in an Islamic town of Niger’. In 
Niger, bridewealth has become the target of Izala, a 20th-century CE reformist 
Muslim organization that condemns ostentatious expenditure and promotes 
frugality. In the Muslim town of Dogondoutchi, where Mawri residents are 
increasingly being exposed to Western bourgeois values, the Izala ban on 
excessive bridewealth and extravagant weddings has angered many for whom 
gift exchange is inseparable from social worth. Mothers struggling to equip 
their daughters with the latest trappings of modern domesticity thus reject Izala 
expressions of Islamic frugality. For them, prosperity is not antithetical to 
Islamic piety. This chapter looks at a young woman’s insistence on receiving a 
Formica bed from her impoverished mother. In another illustration of this 
collection’s central points concerning agency, self-reflexivity and strategic 
choice in the context of African globalization, it shows how the acquisition of 
such a bed is implicated in the reconfiguration of a domestic lifestyle that owes 
as much to local understandings of matrimony and morality as to Western 
bourgeois domesticity. 
World religions such as Islam and Christianity are, by definition, globalizing 
projects, offering a myriad of specific contexts in which the subject matter of 
this book can be subjected to specific empirical research and conceptual 
reflection. However, the contributions in Part IV take us to as aspect of 
contemporary African life that would, at first sight, appear to be far less obvious 
as an arena of globalization strategies: the domain of traditional African 
religion. However the authors manage to bring out how this collection’s central 
message also works for them in the specific Senegalese and Zambian contexts 
they describe. 
Ferdinand de Jong’s chapter ‘The social life of secrets’ opens Part IV. By 
looking at initiation rituals, he argues that it is possible to arrive at a better 
understanding of secrets in a given society in a globalizing world. The secret 
emerges in a performance of complicity involving both initiates and non-
initiates, and secrecy produces a shared subjectivity between initiate and non-
initiate. Such complicity is often denied in ethnographic texts that claim 
authority for a subject (the anthropologist) penetrating the secret of the Other. 
De Jong claims that these ethnographic poetics make a distinction between 
subject and object that, in the case of secrecy, seems untenable. Had he been 
tempted to explore the philosophical implication of such a position in addition 
to its anthropological application, he would have realized that the whole thrust 
of post-structuralist modern philosophy (especially Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze 
& Guattari, and Lyotard) supports this line of analysis; the theory of secrecy on 
which he bases himself is in essence an implicit, anthropologically appropriated 
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product of post-modernism, and as such eminently in tune with the age of 
globalization. In the concrete empirical setting of southern Senegal, accepting 
the untenability of the subject-object distinction as for as secrecy is involved 
implies recognition of the co-ownership of secrets. The secrets performed in a 
globalizing world can no longer be localized properties. As ethnographic cases 
in the chapter demonstrate, secrecy creates a translocal intersubjectivity that 
requires recognition in ethnographic texts — especially since it provides the 
anthropologist with a dispensation that appears to be much better founded, as 
far as the epistemology and the politics of transcontinental knowledge 
production are concerned, than anything that can be offered by the habitual 
mystique of fieldwork as a unique penetration into the uniquely Other.  
Strategies of agency and self-reflexivity are also manifest in Thera Rasing’s 
account of ‘The persistence of female initiation rites: Reflexivity and resilience 
of women in Zambia’. Rasing focuses on female initiation rites in Zambia today 
and shows how Zambian women, in the context of a globalized environment, 
reflect on their culture and religion. She examines how initiation rites, as part of 
this culture and religion, are so resilient that they can still be performed today, 
in the same format as centuries ago, by middle-class women in the urban 
environment of the Zambian Copperbelt. Despite many changes in society, this 
rite has remained a major institution even in present-day globalized and 
Christianized urban Zambia. The initiation rights are considered primordial and 
valuable for all women, even for religious sisters. Women are showing 
reflexivity and resilience in their performance of these rites and in adapting 
them to modern urban life. 
In conclusion, through the exploration of these case studies we aspire to 
demonstrate the multifaceted ways in which the appropriation of global forms, 
ideas, objects and resources is taking place in various African societies — ways 
that may strike us as infinitely creative and resilient given the marginalized 
predicament of many of these communities. This diversity in the ways 
globalism is situated in such local circumstances is at the same time an 
exploration of the infinitely rich texture of agency, whether individually or 
collectively defined. While globality appears to create new structures in ways 
that can often only be interpreted through the chaos theory, the domain of 
resilient agency in the context of these emergent structures awaits further study, 
to which this present volume should only be seen as a modest beginning. 
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Global and local trends in media  
ownership and control: Implications  
for cultural creativity in Africa 
 
Francis B. Nyamnjoh 
 
 
This chapter discusses the crystallization of resistance to the 
cultural homogenization favoured by global consumer media 
and cultural production, stressing that in most of Africa, threats 
to a free, open and participatory media system and society 
come as much from repressive governments as from the 
interests of rich nations, international financial institutions and 
the global corporate media. Too cautious to take any serious 
risks, especially in marginal and highly unpredictable zones of 
accumulation like Africa, global capital needs public support 
and regulation to insulate itself against the vicissitudes 
provoked or exacerbated by its tendency to put profit before 
people. Africa’s predicament notwithstanding, the chapter is 
critical of meta-narratives that celebrate victimhood at the risk 
of obfuscating the reality of negotiation and survival strategies, 
and discusses some of the myriad ways devised by Africans to 
ensure cultural participation for themselves as active agents in 
local and global processes. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is commonplace for studies of globalization to focus on the big corporate players 
and macro-processes, often to the detriment of initiatives or responses at the very 
local level by individuals and groups on the margins of meta-narratives of bliss and 
gloom. This chapter attempts to focus on both levels: it examines the double effect 
on cultural creativity in Africa of global trends in media ownership and control in a 
context of continuous authoritarian grip by the state on local national media 
production and freedom of expression in general. It draws on the popular saying 
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‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’ to examine the implications of public or 
private media ownership and control on cultural creativity and political freedom in 
Africa. Although the argument and insights pertain to Africa in general, particular 
illustrations are drawn from Cameroon, a context I have researched extensively 
since the early 1980s. 
Current debates on media ownership and control are informed by and largely 
focused on the effects of globalization of neoliberalism on media scenarios 
throughout the world. Inspired by narrow, individual-centred philosophies of 
personhood, agency and property rights, neoliberalism is aggressive in its sacrifice 
of community rights and group interests, as it pursues profit through the illusion of 
promoting the interests of the autonomous individual as a consumer and citizen. 
Old patterns informed by more inclusive philosophies of ownership and control are 
increasingly giving way to new configurations with a focus on the individual, 
consumerism and exclusion. National state-owned public service media systems 
are yielding to commercial pressure and its emphasis on ‘profit over people’ 
(Chomsky 1999). Propelled by ‘the incessant pursuit of profit’, global media 
entrepreneurs are asking for little short of unregulated commercial exploitation and 
concentrated ownership of the media (McChesney 2001: 1-4). The trend is clearly 
towards global oligopolies, and the guiding logic of the media firms is, as 
McChesney puts it, ‘get very big very quickly, or get swallowed up by someone 
else’. Firms, he argues, ‘must become larger and diversified to reduce risk and 
enhance profit-making opportunities, and they must straddle the globe so as to 
never be outflanked by competitors’ (McChesney 2001: 3-9). 
An obvious casualty of this shift in philosophies of ownership and control is the 
traditional emphasis on public service media that guarantees cultural pluralism and 
diversity by providing for groups and social categories that otherwise would be 
ignored or marginalized by the market. This tradition of public service media, 
while not denying the articulation of individual interests, believed that the greatest 
good came from a negotiated balance between various individual interests as part 
of a community. Media conceived in this tradition stressed negotiation, 
interconnectedness and harmony between individual interests and community 
expectations. Within the ownership logic that inspired the public service media, the 
freedom to pursue individual or community goals existed within a socially 
predetermined framework that emphasized conviviality with collective interests, 
while simultaneously allowing for individual creativity and self-fulfilment. It was, 
therefore, a philosophy of ownership and control that sought to marry individual 
and group or community property rights, rather than seeking to impose the illusion 
of the autonomous individual. 
In Europe, the shift in philosophies has meant that, since the 1990s, the market-
driven ideas of public-service broadcasting serving the interests and preferences of 
individual media consumers have taken precedence over media in tune with the 
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expectations of particular cultural communities such as ethnic minorities, and 
religious and linguistic groupings (Syvertsen 1999, Søndergaard 1999). With a 
focus on consumption as the ultimate unifier, a supreme indicator of cultural 
sophistication and symbol of civilization, individuals are seen and treated as 
autonomous agents glued together by a selfless market slaving away for their 
cultural freedom, development and enrichment as global citizens. This 
development blurs the traditional distinction between public-service and 
commercial media, and passes for public service even the greedy and aggressive 
pursuit of profit without people. It also obscures the distinction between national 
media and world services targeting foreign territories, by emphasizing the 
‘unregulated flow’ and ‘transnationalization’ of the streamlined, standardized and 
routinized cultural products of the media industries of the West (cf. Golding & 
Harris 1997). Not only is the traditional idea of public-service radio and television 
fast becoming outmoded, calls for some ground rules to protect cultural diversity 
have simply been greeted with the rhetoric of free flows at worst or with token 
concessions to cultural minorities at best. What is more, the corporate media are in 
a particularly powerful position, given their dual role as players and umpires in the 
game of profit (McChesney 2001: 3-9). They ‘enjoy an enormous leeway to 
negotiate and protect interests from the vantage of prior monopoly positions’, and 
‘do not have to bend over backwards to strike deals. It is generally the case that 
they decide and the world follows suit’ (Thomas & Lee 1998: 2). And if they 
decide to invest mostly in tastes informed by a narrow understanding of culture, 
then cultural richness and diversity suffer, as the likelihood of cultural imperialism, 
trivialization and misrepresentation increases. Given the free hand and caprice of 
the cultural industries and their investors, the piper may well be undertasked with 
tunes of little significance as creativity, diversity and variety are downplayed in the 
interests of homogeneity and profitability. 
 This implies that, their rhetoric of benevolence and munificence 
notwithstanding, the global media corporations are more about closures than free 
flows among the world’s cultures. The corporate media promotes a largely one-
way flow in cultural products that favours a privileged minority as it compounds 
the impoverishment of the majority through closures and containment (cf. Golding 
& Harris 1997). As ‘empires of image and of the imagination’ the corporate media 
controls global markets and global consciousness (Murdock 1994: 3), mostly by 
denying access to creativity perceived to stand in the way of profit, power and 
privilege. The results are streamlined, standardized, routinized or ‘McDonaldized’ 
cultural products devoid of complexity, richness and diversity that command a 
disproportionate share of the global market. The tendency is to mistake plurality 
for diversity, oblivious of the possibility that an appearance of plenty could well 
conceal a poverty of perspectives (Murdock 1994: 5). 
60 Nyamnjoh 
 
 This leaves ordinary consumers, marginal communities and whole cultures 
literally at the mercy of the McDonaldized news, information and entertainment 
burgers served them in the interests of profits by the global corporate media. 
Because the global media system ‘advances corporate and commercial interests 
and values and denigrates or ignores that which cannot be incorporated into its 
mission’, content becomes uniform, regardless of the nationalities or cultural 
identities of shareholders. This is hardly surprising since what is wanted are 
passive, depoliticized, unthinking consumer zombies more prone ‘to take orders 
than to make waves’ by questioning the ‘light escapist entertainment’ menu 
presented to them by the chosen pipers (McChesney 1998: 7). In this regard it 
could be argued, as McChesney (1998: 6, 2001: 13) has done, that the basic 
differences are not between nation-states as such, but between the rich and the 
poor (whom I term ‘consumer citizens’ and ‘consumer subjects’ respectively) 
across national borders. However, the fact remains that the investors, advertisers 
and affluent consumers whose interests the global media represents, are more 
concentrated in and comprise a significant proportion of the populations of the 
developed world than is the case in Africa where only an elite minority are 
involved and hardly any local cultural tunes get chosen for the global pipers to 
perform. 
 Among other things, this chapter seeks to further situate Africa in relation to 
the global trend highlighted above, and to discuss the crystallization of 
resistance to the cultural homogenization the trend favours. It must be 
reiterated, however, that in most of Africa, threats to a free, open and 
participatory media system and society are as much from repressive 
governments as from the interests of rich nations, international financial 
institutions and the global corporate media. Cultural production in Africa is 
caught between control by the greedy and aggressive pursuit of profit by the 
global media on the one hand, and repression at local levels by states 
marginalized as global players and reduced to flexing their muscles vis-à-vis 
their own populations. Because ‘business does not want to go about its activity 
totally unprotected’, global capital needs public support and regulation as ‘an 
insurance against the full vicissitudes of a turbulent and potentially self-
destructive system’ (Thompson 1999: 142). This expectation of public support 
and protection is even higher when capital ventures into marginal and highly 
unpredictable zones of accumulation like Africa, which accounts for barely 1 
per cent of global trade. In Africa more than elsewhere, multinational capital 
colludes with states at the expense of democracy, equity and social development 
(cf. Mkandawire 2002), and in favour of sterile profitability and power without 
responsibility. 
 Given the weakness of African states in relation to the interests of rich 
nations, international financial institutions and multinationals, and their 
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peripheral position in the global economy and politics, the only real authority or 
semblance of power affordable to African governments is towards their own 
populations, which are often too poor and too vulnerable to organize and 
mobilize effectively against exploitation and repression. What neoliberalism 
wants of African governments is national and regional policies in tune with the 
profitability expectations of global capital, policies that minimize countervailing 
traditions, customs, world views and expectations of continuity. Once they have 
guaranteed global capital stability, security and protection from local labour and 
its needs, African states need do no more than embrace the rhetoric of liberal 
democracy and the tokenism of its freedoms. All multinational capital really 
needs of them is not so much a guarantee of democracy and stability, as a 
dictatorship to ensure that local labour and national interests are kept 
subservient to the interests and power of big business. Often it is understood, 
though not openly stated, that they need do no more than embrace liberal 
democratic rhetoric, since few seriously believe that it is possible, in practice, 
for African states or governments to be both tolerant of the demands of global 
capital and of the clamour for rights and entitlements by their own nationals. 
There is trouble only for governments that, in an effort to please their own 
populations, begin to claim national sovereignty beyond rhetoric, thereby 
impairing the interests of multinationals and of Western states. 
 The final section of this chapter, while acknowledging the predicament of 
Africans as victims of repressive states and the tendency in global capital to 
privilege profit over people, argues against the tendency towards meta-
narratives of victimhood that obfuscate the reality of negotiation and survival 
strategies employed by ordinary Africans. The section provides evidence of 
some of the myriad ways devised by Africans to ensure cultural participation for 
themselves as active agents in local and global processes, despite the reality of 
repression and exclusion. 
 
 
Media in Africa: Between repression and profit 
 
In September 1997, a three-day workshop on ‘Media Ownership and Control in 
West and Central Africa’ was held in Cameroon. Funded by the World 
Association for Christian Communication (WACC) and initially scheduled to 
take place at the University of Buea where I taught and headed the Department 
of Sociology and Anthropology, the workshop was moved to Yaoundé at the 
last minute because the Vice Chancellor of the University of Buea, Dr Dorothy 
Njeuma, had given the background paper a second reading. In her memorandum 
of disapproval to me through my Dean, she wrote, inter alia: 
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It will be recalled that the initial title of the workshop was ‘Communication and the 
Globalization of Poverty’. In his response dated 3 July 1997 to the observations 
which we made relating to the need to observe instructions requiring prior 
authorization from the Presidency of the Republic for international meetings and the 
apparent contradiction in the subject of the workshop, Dr Nyamnjoh underlines that 
the workshop would be a purely academic exercise and that the new title is a sub-
theme of the initial subject. 
We regret to inform you that the background paper on media ownership and control 
as contained in document No. 0111/75-4/UB/SOC of 24 March 1997 carries sensitive 
political overtones which are inappropriate for the University of Buea to be seen to 
promote at this particular time. The slant given in the paper is also at variance with 
the view presented by WACC on the factors which they perceive as contributing to 
the globalization of poverty; the WACC document faults rich nations, international 
financial institutions and communication transnationals for the spread of poverty (cf. 
WACC programme for 1997-2001). 
In these circumstances, we regret that we cannot give approval for the University of 
Buea to host the workshop on media ownership and control.1 
 
The background paper in question was what I had submitted to the WACC for 
funding, in which I blamed the globalization of poverty on global consumer 
capitalism and on authoritarian governments in Africa. The section, which she 
objected to, was the following: 
 
A look at the literature and research on media and mass communication in Africa 
prior to 1990 reveals a tendency towards centralized broadcast systems and a highly 
repressed private press. […. In opting for state ownership and control, these 
governments sought to justify why mass communication needed to be controlled. 
They claimed that centralism was necessary for successful nation-building. 
Government ownership and control was justified as being less wasteful of the 
limited resources, and as guaranteeing the political stability badly needed for rapid 
development. …. As development becomes more and more illusive and 
disillusionment at the grassroots widespread, the question arises whether 
government ownership and control of the media is an answer to the problem of 
people-centred development communication in Africa. 
 
The vice chancellor’s claim that ‘the WACC document faults rich nations, 
international financial institutions and communication transnationals for the spread 
of poverty’ is basically correct. But it tells only part of the story, one that absolves 
the government she represents of all responsibility, while blaming external forces 
personified by global capitalism. This points to the dangers of communication 
                                                 
1 See Memorandum No. 0708/75-4/UB/W000 dated 16-07-97 from the Vice Chancellor 
to the Dean, Faculty of Social and Management Sciences, University of Buea. 
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scholars, NGOs and media activists being caught up with the challenges posed by 
globalization in media ownership and control to the point of trivializing or 
ignoring the traditional hurdles to freedom of expression and cultural production 
posed by state repression and undemocratic governments. African governments are 
all too eager to capitalize upon such concessions or oversights by their critics and 
to divert attention from their rigid regulation of national media and local cultural 
production. 
What the above example shows is that even in the era of intensified 
globalization, academic, media and cultural freedoms in Africa may be threatened, 
not only by the interests of global capital and foreign states but also by zealous 
local officials and repressive governments seeking political survival beyond the 
verdict of the ballot box. African governments and global capital are in a 
partnership of hostility towards any assertion of difference and creativity likely to 
subvert their respective vested political and economic interests. Such double-barrel 
deafness to popular cultural production and reproduction points to a collusion 
between African states and global capital to stifle creative diversity in the cultural 
sphere. Both state and global capital expect Africans to chew unthinkingly, like 
grateful consumer zombies, the bland cultural fodder served them nationally and 
internationally by the mass media as vehicles of one-dimensionalism. 
Nowhere is this partnership and collusion between state and global capital 
better illustrated than in the relationship between African governments and the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Both the World Bank and the IMF have preferred to 
impose pre-packaged, undomesticated ideals of liberal democracy, civil society 
and citizenship on Africa to the reality of democracy that embraces both the 
rights of individuals and those of groups, however constituted or defined (cf. 
Ake 2000). Keen to see neoliberal projects through, these institutions do more 
than ‘resist punishing companies that patronize tyrants’, as ‘they fear 
frightening off businesses that prefer to shop for financing where executive 
decisions won’t be judged’ (Fishman 2002: 41). In addition, they have readily 
provided support for acquiescing governments in order to neutralize opposition 
to the globalization of poverty through unpopular structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs). In this way, SAPs have had highly repressive political 
consequences as they have tended to ignore popular opinion and to rely on 
authoritarian regimes for implementation. The negative economic, social and 
political effects of SAPs have been responsible for the most violent forms of 
exclusion (Gibbon et al. 1992, Mkandawire & Olukoshi 1995, Mkandawire & 
Soludo 1999). The polarization of power and wealth produced by such 
neoliberal agencies and global capitalism makes democratic rule in marginal 
zones like Africa virtually impossible since global capitalism needs autocratic 
powers to penetrate the peripheries with its inequalities (Amin 1997a: 22). This 
is well illustrated by the state-condoned violence among the Ogoni minority in 
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relation to entitlements over the oil in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (cf. Obi 2001). 
Globalization has not significantly corrected this centre-periphery logic (Amin 
1997b). If anything, it has compounded the predicaments of most Africans who 
are reduced to consuming fantasies about the West (cf. Nyamnjoh & Page 
2002), even if some do succeed in translating such fantasies into new social 
identities like the Sapeurs of the two Congos, thereby affording themselves 
‘psychological redemption’ from ‘social dereliction’ while simultaneously 
making a political statement against the misery imposed on them by the 
Western illusion of material success for all and the authoritative structures of 
their own African states (cf. Gondola 1999, Friedman 1990, 1991, 1994). 
Global entertainment media and their McDonaldized (streamlined, 
standardized, routinized, universalized and stop-gap) consumer culture lure or 
coerce Africans, their cultures and creativity to become consumed by the giant 
compressors of the West. The ultimate effect is, as Soyinka (1994a: 209) has so 
aptly observed, that Africans are encouraged ‘to develop an incurable 
dependency syndrome and consume themselves to death’ as the consumerist 
culture propagated in the name of development can only guarantee productivity 
at home in the West by vigorously exporting itself through encouraging the 
marginalization of competing cultures. As an ideology of an elite few informing 
only selected sections of life, consumer capitalism cannot afford African 
cultures the freedom to be of relevance at home or elsewhere in the world 
(Amin 1997b: 41). The outcome, as Soyinka notes, is that Africans are inducted 
into an unequal cultural exchange with the West and are reduced to ‘feeding the 
foreign consumerist machine’, despite their own cultural values. Youths, 
mothers, values and tastes are all victims, ravaged by the elite few of the 
consumer club (ibid: 209-10). 
This perspective, which is popular among African scholars, explains both 
economic underdevelopment, cultural marginalization and stalling democracy in 
terms of the assimilation and exclusion logic of global capitalism, according to 
which only the handful of powerful and economic elite in Africa stands to benefit 
from its internalization and reproduction. The implication of this situation, 
paradoxically, is a world where globalization does not amount to the 
homogenization of entitlements and recognition but rather to an intensification of 
hierarchies and inequalities among individuals, groups, regions and cultures. If 
globalization creates opportunities, these opportunities come to some as paradise 
but to most they come as different degrees of hell. The rhetoric might be one of a 
bazaar to which all are invited, but the reality is few benefit or are given clear-cut 
choices. One cannot afford to be insensitive to the hierarchies of inequalities that 
make globalization less a process of cultural flows than closures, compression than 
inflation, and enhancement than depletion for most communities in the world. 
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Despite liberalization and globalization 
 
Mindful of this, it should be of surprise to few that the mediascape in Africa in the 
age of intensified globalization represents more a degree of continuity in 
repression than change. Despite the winds of liberalization in the late 1980s and 
early1990s, it is still common in many countries to charge journalists, academics, 
musicians, playwrights and other artists simply for creativity that brings the state 
or any of its officials into disrepute. Equally frowned upon by politicians are 
cultural producers critical of national or foreign dignitaries in ways perceived to be 
embarrassing to governments and the vested interests they protect. Although 
governments may proclaim democracy, freedom of expression and cultural 
renaissance as is currently fashionable, in practice most do not hesitate to sanction 
even a cabinet minister, a distinguished academic or a celebrated artist who might 
express a critical or controversial opinion on an issue of pubic interest. This 
restricts access to government-held information and imposes self-censorship on the 
very agents whose creativity is supposed to engender the cultural renaissance of 
official rhetoric. Concerning journalists and the media as vehicles of cultural 
content, little room is allowed for them to choose freely among the competing 
cultural options available. Sometimes African governments would rather trust 
foreign journalists and the media with important decisions concerning their 
countries than honour their own local media with scoops. Few books by journalists 
with intimate, first-hand details of African leaders dead and alive are by African 
journalists, proof perhaps that foreign journalists penetrate African corridors of 
power much more easily, regardless of their qualifications and competencies. 
Similarly, it is much easier for a Western production team to make radio and 
television documentaries about various aspects of African societies than for 
African governments to fund such productions by their own local media. The 
reasons for this are not always inadequate finances, but the consequences are 
devastating for cultural production and reproduction informed by perspectives 
sensitive to local cultures and predicaments. 
Although certain aspects of the draconian laws of the colonial period, the one-
party era and military regimes have generally been replaced since the 1990s by 
new provisions that are relatively more tolerant of opposition views and criticisms, 
the selective application of the new laws, together with the use of extra-legal 
measures, have often been to the detriment of a culture of independence and 
creativity (cf. M’Bayo et al. 2000). There remains a craving to control that leaves 
little doubt about how the lawmakers see journalists, artists and academics as 
potential troublemakers who must be policed beyond considerations for cultural 
survival. The tendency is for new laws to grant freedom of expression in principle 
while providing, often by administrative nexus, the curtailment of press, academic 
and artistic freedoms in practice. And although strongest in Francophone Africa, 
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this use of derogatory and claw-back measures by the state to limit the right of 
expression and press freedom is common throughout the continent. Southern 
African governments have continued to use ‘outmoded legislation inherited from 
their one-party and colonial predecessors’ to criminalize dissent and numb the 
critical instincts of the press (Lush 1998). Even the Nigerian press, frequently 
presented as the most vibrant and critical, has had to struggle with a battery of 
repressive laws by successive governments (Oloyede 1996), and in some cases — 
especially between 1993 and 1999 — certain newspapers and broadcasters had to 
adopt ‘a guerrilla strategy’ against state censorship (Olukotun 2002). In South 
Africa where the first liberation was only achieved in 1994, the press has yet to 
break free of its past record of black debasement. The end of apartheid has not 
necessarily made the newspapers more representative of South African 
diversities (cf. Pityana 2000). The rhetoric of transformation does not seem to 
match the realities and expectations as the press continues to practice exclusion, 
even as it preaches inclusion (cf. Duncan 2000). The same is true of academia, 
which has still to transform itself significantly from its apartheid heritage (cf. 
Hugo 1998a), a point well illustrated by exchanges between Mahmood 
Mamdani and others in the curriculum debate on the teaching of Africa at the 
University of Cape Town (cf. Centre for African Studies, University of Cape 
Town 1998, Hall 1998). Such control occasions self-censorship that has led to a 
crisis of credibility of the press, academia and artists in many countries. 
The same arsenal of repressive measures has been used to police cultural 
production in general. States have sought to institutionalize a definition and 
practice of culture that provides them with the conceptual noises needed to 
justify their excesses, promote violence and silence, and foster mediocrity as a 
strategy for surviving the exigencies of liberal democracy. Since 1967, President 
Omar Bongo of Gabon has been most adept at manipulating the symbolic sphere 
of Gabonese society to guarantee his own political longevity (cf. Ngolet 2000). 
Almost everywhere, the quest for such longevity has implied, inter alia, states 
recruiting the services of pro-establishment academics, intellectuals, poets and 
musicians, while censoring the creative imagination of those perceived to be 
critical and/or controversial in their art (cf. Soyinka 1994b: 7-9, Mongo Beti 
1993: 77-82, Kom 1996, Shear 1996, Mkandawire 1997, Kagwanja 1997, Hugo 
1998b, Ngowet 2001: 118-38; Jua & Nyamnjoh 2002). This tendency is 
illustrated by the reality in Cameroon — an example with parallels in other 
countries in Africa as evidenced in a recent collection of essays in a special issue 
of African Studies Review on ‘African Universities in Crisis and the Promotion of 
a Democratic Culture’ (cf. Nyamnjoh & Jua 2002). 
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By way of example: Cultural repression in Cameroon 
Academic repression in Cameroon has been extensively documented, not least 
under President Biya who took over as president following Ahidjo’s resignation in 
1982 with all the right rhetoric about freedom of expression (Eboussi Boulaga 
1993: 30-34, Kom 1996, Tedga 1998, Jua & Nyamnjoh 2002). Under both leaders, 
the tendency has been to sanction only ‘occasional pieces composed by accredited 
hagiographers’ (Kom 1991: 84-88). Among the overtly pro-establishment writers 
Kom quoted in a 1991 publication were Louis-Marie Pouka M’bague who wrote 
‘Prière-hommage’, a poem in praise of Ahidjo; Samuel Martin Eno Belinga, 
author of Cameroun: La Révolution Pacifique du 20 Mai, a text celebrating the 
‘high deeds’ of Ahidjo; Joseph-Charles Doumba whose Vers le Mont Cameroun: 
Entretien avec Jean-Pierre Fogui was in the same vein; Jos-Blaise Alima, whose 
Les Chemins de l’Unité was ‘a glorified account of Ahidjo’s nation-building 
efforts’; Mono Ndjana, whose L’Idée Sociale chez Paul Biya made of him ‘the 
ideologue and chief censor of the New Deal’; and Fame Ndongo, Bandolo and 
Etoundi-MBalla, whose Le Prince et le Scribe, La Flamme et la Fumée, and Une 
Vie à l’Envers were, respectively, apologies for administrative or conventional 
thinking. Over twenty titles have since been added to this list in accordance with 
Fame Ndongo’s call in Le Prince et le Scribe for a new ‘race of writers capable of 
producing aggressive and conformist works in response to the misguided efforts of 
“lost” souls such as Mongo Beti, Alioum Fantouré, and Emmanuel Dongala’ 
(Kom 1991: 87). Many academics who initially kept their distance from such pro-
establishment scholarship have since yielded to the pressures and bait of co-
optation by the regime that has refused to hearken to popular expectations and 
expressions of legitimacy. These old and new writers — like the government they 
serve — use selective discrimination in their observations, thus presenting an 
incomplete, preponderantly positive account of governments that have failed to 
deliver on nearly all fronts (cf. Nyamnjoh 1999, Jua & Nyamnjoh 2002). 
The government has traditionally not hesitated to honour the efforts of 
researchers who sacrifice critical cultural production for praise-singing quasi-
scholarship. Not only was Bandolo named ‘Intellectual of the Year’ in 1985 by 
Radio Cameroon following the publication of La Flamme et la Fumée, in May 
1988 he was appointed Minister of Information and Culture. Two years after the 
publication of his book that was highly critical of the anti-government press, 
Valentin Nga Ndongo, a journalist and sociologist, was appointed Director of 
Press, Information and Propaganda for the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic 
Movement (CPDM) on July 1 1989. In 1990 Hubert Mono Ndjana became a 
member of the Central Committee of the CPDM as Press and Propaganda 
Secretary, and subsequently rewarded President Biya with many more praise-
singing volumes, including Les Proverbes de Paul Biya (1997). Others, like 
Jacques Fame Ndongo, were already well placed when they wrote, but still, an 
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additional or a more prominent appointment has usually been the government’s 
way of thanking its ‘scribes’ or those who, like Fame Ndongo (1985), were 
charged with training ‘les journalistes du Renouveau’. After serving briefly as 
Rector of the University of Yaoundé I, he was appointed Minister of 
Communication in 1998 in appreciation of his commitment to the defence of the 
status quo. For writing Pour Un Multipartisme Reflechi (1990) and for showing 
unconditional loyalty to President Paul Biya — ‘the indomitable lion of 
Cameroonian politics’ — as Director of Cameroon Radio Television (CRTV), 
Professor Gervais Mendoze has earned himself the reputation of being the longest 
serving general manager of ‘the indomitable lion of the broadcast media’, a 
position he has held since October 1988. Most of the establishment scholars share 
the same ethnic origins as President Biya (who is Beti) and are generally 
sympathetic to inoffensive cultural production from this ethnic region. This would 
explain the dominance and prominence of Bikutsi music on national radio and 
television to the detriment of music from other ethnic regions. 
With such an elaborate system of control and selective diffusion of cultural 
production, critical researchers and creative writers have largely been driven 
underground or have stayed bottled up by lies and the fear of victimization. When 
cornered by competing alternatives, the powerful have shown themselves tolerant 
of limited reform but never a radical ‘remise en cause’ of what they stand for — 
lies, mediocrity, double standards, exploitation and the primacy of the ‘politics of 
the belly’ (cf. Bayart 1993). Any change that means sharing their power and 
wealth with the dispossessed has been resisted, hence the banning of critical 
publications, music, theatre, art and performances. By thus feeding Cameroonians 
with falsehoods, the government has compelled everyone to adopt as reality its 
world of appearances. Convincing people has not been easy, especially as the 
context and cultures in place suggest that reality is much more than what the 
sensory perceptions bring home, and that the invisible or hidden hand is very much 
part and parcel of the order of things (cf. Mbembe 1997, Nyamnjoh 2001). 
 
 
Economic consequences of rigid state control  
 
The situation of political control has been aggravated by the resilient economic, 
technical and professional difficulties facing the press and cultural production in 
nearly all countries. Rigid control means that few serious local investors (never 
mind the global moguls or oligopolies) have found the press and cultural industry 
in Africa an attractive option. Financial difficulties have thus compounded the 
problems of news gathering and news production, and made newspapers in most 
countries even less credible as they struggle to produce every edition. The situation 
is little different with the private broadcast media in most countries and even the 
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official media has not always escaped financial difficulties. An obvious 
consequence of this situation is the lack of research in most news stories, while the 
electronic media has simply been pushed into the arms of global news and 
entertainment radio and television corporations for cheap alternatives to locally 
produced programmes. In some countries, there is no means of encouraging 
specialized reporting and journalists are compelled to be ‘jacks of all trades and 
masters of none’. Another result is the dearth of trained and experienced personnel: 
most newspapers have only a skeletal staff, and some are just a one-man show. 
This has been the case especially since the 1990s when the greater tolerance of 
press freedom attracted opportunists who saw in the press a window for self-
enrichment and the pursuit of other ambitions. Because of such constraints, the 
press has lost much of its dynamism, vibrancy and credibility of the colonial 
era. Until recently, only governments have been able to afford to operate daily 
newspapers, with the advantage of being able to shape public opinion on a daily 
basis both in the print and the state-owned electronic media which they are 
reluctant to privatize or to make truly public service in character and content. 
Forces critical of government have often had to wait for the weekly or monthly 
publications in which to express their views, no matter how urgent. The 
ultimate casualty of all this is cultural freedom, diversity and creativity. 
 
 
Private initiative and globalization in the making 
 
Despite such persistent government control and the continent’s inability, as yet, 
to attract big capital investment by the global oligopolies of the media world, 
there has been a significant opening-up to private capital and initiative almost 
everywhere since the 1990s. The ongoing quest for democracy has resulted not 
only in multipartyism but also in a sort of media pluralism. In almost every 
country, the number of private newspapers has increased dramatically with the 
clamour for recognition and representation by individuals and groups. Private FM 
radio and television stations have mushroomed, with international broadcasters 
such as the BBC and RFI now readily available locally on FM in certain 
capitals and provincial cities. The entire continent is experiencing a boom in 
private, local or commercial radio stations and satellite television (cf. Fardon & 
Furniss 2000). Malawi launched its first national television station in January 1999 
and Botswana followed suit in July 2000. For their part, Lesotho and Swaziland 
have mobilized a South African commercial broadcaster — M-net — to provide a 
pseudo-national television system that broadcasts mostly foreign programmes 
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from South Africa and the West.2 However, the surge in private initiative has not 
been matched by an increase in the quantity and quality of local cultural 
production. 
Not only has South Africa reformed the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), which served as the mouthpiece of apartheid into the 
early 1990s (cf. Teer-Tomaselli & Tomaselli 1996, Barnett 1998, Graybill 
2000), it has also been opened up to satellite television, with significance for the 
rest of the continent. The subscription satellite television service M-net that has 
been operational since 1986 and is owned by a consortium of South African 
newspaper publishers has rapidly spread its tentacles throughout the continent, 
and together with Multi-Choice (a subscriber management company whose 
Digital Satellite Television — DSTV — offers over 23 satellite television 
channels and 48 audio channels) and Canal Horizon of France virtually 
dominate the satellite television entertainment scene (Paterson 1998, Banda 
2000, Teer-Tomaselli 2001). They have virtually colonized the palates of elite 
Africans along linguistic and cultural lines, with Canal Horizon harnessing 
Francophone Africa, and DSTV the Anglophone rest. Canal Horizon, M-net and 
Multi-Choice specialize in routinized, standardized or McDonaldized 
international sport and entertainment, which they serve to every subscriber on 
the continent regardless of region, nationality or cultural preferences, an 
approach that has occasioned renewed criticisms of Western cultural 
imperialism through South African and French media outlets. As Teer-
Tomaselli (2001) notes, apart from increasing its local programming content 
and bringing a bit of the rainbow composition of South Africa to reflect on its 
on-air presentations, M-net has done little to alter its positioning in the new 
South Africa. Transformation, as Tomaselli and Dunn (2001: 3) point out, 
should mean more than a mere shift in discourses and demographics; it should 
entail a change in structures and ethos, something yet to be reflected in the 
mediascape of the new South Africa. It is hoped that increased local production 
and programme exchange through organizations such as the Union of National 
Radio and Television of Africa (URTNA) would correct the dependence on 
cheap, imported programmes and sports of little direct relevance to Africa. 
South Africa has equally witnessed an explosion in community radio 
stations, with more than one hundred licences having been granted, of which 
‘some 80 stations were actually on the air on a daily basis’ in 1998 (Van Kessel 
1998: 12-13). It is estimated that there will be over 200 community radio 
stations in the near future, although the veteran community broadcaster Zane 
                                                 
2 For an idea of the changing media ownership and control scenarios in West, Central 
and Southern Africa, see Media Development, vol. xlv (4) 1998 & xlviii (4) 2001. 
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Ibrahim of Bush Radio Cape Town claims that a proliferation of stations is not 
necessarily a good thing, as those likely to benefit most ‘are the “consultants” 
and the many new broadcast equipment supply companies’ who are more likely 
to be ‘laughing all the way to the bank’ than serving any community interest. 
He is equally critical of government involvement in community radio, as it can 
only be detrimental to ‘communities not overly friendly with the ruling party of 
the day’ (Ibrahim 1999: 15). Other countries have also embraced community 
radio — with and without donor funds — but ‘African broadcast cultures’ (cf. 
Fardon & Furniss 2000) are yet to be domesticated in tune with valid critiques 
of some culturally coloured assumptions about broadcasting and the uncritical 
internalization of Western media cultures by African broadcast professionals 
trained in the West or in Western-type schools (cf. Golding 1977). 
This modest opening up to and involvement of private capital and initiative in 
the media can be termed change in media ownership in Africa. But control 
remains largely with government (in terms of laws regulating media ownership 
and operation) or with the transnational producers of global news and 
entertainment content on which the continent’s media heavily relies. The media in 
Africa is effectively controlled by government and capital, both of which are keen 
to feed the public with nothing subversive to their interests and power. If the 
growing concern in the world is how to mobilize forces to curb or resist the 
growing concentrated ownership of the media in the service of neoliberalism, in 
Africa there is the added concern of mobilizing forces to resist government 
repression and highhandedness to or through the media. Mobilization must be 
undertaken with the understanding that African governments are in a predicament: 
they are being compelled by the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and other 
institutions of neoliberalism to facilitate the penetration and rape of their markets 
by multinational capital on the one hand, and are additionally having to face up to 
the rising expectations and growing disillusionment of their own populations on 
the other. It is a situation that allows repression and greed to pillage the humanity 
of ordinary Africans with impunity and callous indifference. 
 
 
Resisting victimhood in Africa 
 
In a context like that described above in which Africans are finding themselves 
peripheral to global trends and subjected to the highhandedness and repression of 
their own governments, it is easy to slip into meta-narratives that celebrate 
victimhood. While there is genuine reason to be pessimistic and cynical, there is 
often, on closer observation, also reason to be hopeful. However repressive a 
government may be and however profound the spiral of silence induced by 
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standardized and routinized global media menus, few people are completely 
mystified or wholly duped. There is always room for initiative or agency at an 
individual or group level to challenge domination, exploitation and the 
globalization of poverty. Histories of struggle in Africa are full of examples in this 
connection (cf. Mbembe 1992, Gecau 1997, Barber 1997). It is important always 
to explore how people on the margins of power and wealth strive to survive. The 
contention here is that Africans have found myriad ways of participating as active 
agents in national life and global socio-economic processes, their victimhood 
notwithstanding. This point is further developed below under two subheadings: 
‘Resistance to state repression’ and ‘Creative appropriation of ICTs’. 
It has been argued that citizenship and globalization are bazaars to which — to 
use the biblical expression — many Africans are called but few are chosen (cf. 
Nyamnjoh 2000). Cultural exclusion seems to be the order of the day, even as 
national and global rhetoric indicates otherwise. Like the rest of the world, 
Africans are generously invited by capital to partake of the standardized, 
routinized, streamlined and global consumer culture, of which McDonalds, Coca-
Cola, CNN and satellite entertainment television such as DSTV are harbingers 
(Golding 1994: 7). However, given the level of poverty among Africans, only an 
elite few qualify (largely through corruption, embezzlement and the abuse of state 
power and office) to consume first- or second-hand. Global availability is not 
synonymous with global affordability. The majority have to content themselves 
with what (if anything) trickles down to them in the ghettoes and villages from 
relatives and patrons at the centre of power and resources. In the face of such 
inequities, it is difficult to envisage how ordinary Africans can relate to the global 
consumer culture in any terms other than the frustration and disenchantment it 
brings them. To most, globalization is nothing but the ‘misery and incoherence of 
life in the suburbs’ and villages; ‘the collapse of public transport, state-run 
educational and public health services; the breakdown of electricity and sewage 
systems; the serious degradation of ... infrastructure and the sheer abuse of power 
by self-serving functionaries’ (Devisch 1999: 5).  
This leaves them and their cultures at the mercy of capital and the elite few 
in power. As part of a global ecumen for ‘the transnationalization of … a 
supremely local and parochial set of images and values’ from the West 
(Golding & Harris 1997: 9), the power elite in Africa cannot afford to pay more 
than lip service to local cultural production and reproduction. Their daily 
activities and behaviour undermine the very doctrine of the importance of 
upholding African cultural values. The identity and power conferred by joining 
the global consumer club explains why, despite much rhetoric about cultural 
renaissance in many African states, the ruling elites continue to acculturate 
themselves and to ‘progressively take on the look of strangers in their own 
country due to their daily lifestyle, modeled on that of homo consumens 
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universalis’ (Amin 1980: 175). With a ruling elite whose weakness and 
marginality vis-à-vis global capitalism and its institutions of legitimation have 
been certified, consuming foreign consumer items becomes a major way of 
staking claim to power locally and of further mystifying the disaffected 
populations with whom they have lost credibility. At best, these elites 
commission ‘traditional dances’ and ‘praise singing’ cultural productions which 
they can use for their personal amusement or to entertain foreign friends and 
visiting counterparts. Performances that were reserved for solemn occasions in 
the past have been trivialized and in certain cases commodified for touristic 
consumption, partly for the gratification of the local elite but also because of the 
desperate quest by sidestepped cultural communities to survive through feeding 
consumer tourism. 
 
Resistance to state repression 
The processes and effects of co-optation or assimilation of the elite few by 
consumer capitalism, and how these elite few, in turn, use their consuming 
foreign as an identity marker and as a source of prestige, status and power have 
been discussed elsewhere (cf. Nyamnjoh 2000). Here the focus is more 
specifically on cultural resistance and the creative processes of appropriation 
underway. As far back as one cares to look, there is evidence that deprived and 
marginalized voices in Africa refused to celebrate victimhood. Far from giving up 
in the face of rigid colonial repression, threatened African nationalists eager to 
communicate their liberation agenda among themselves and with the African 
masses adopted various strategies: to publish and perish from the repressive axe 
of the colonial administration; to go underground with the press and its 
liberation rhetoric enhanced by pamphlets, tracts and word-of-mouth; to turn to 
or marry with alternative channels of communication such as the grapevine, 
political rumour and derision; and to use the indigenous media as a substitute or 
supplement to the shackled press. These strategies were as useful in the 
Algerian revolution as they were in the radical nationalism of Cameroon’s 
Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) party, both against brutal French 
colonialism and racism. Frantz Fanon, as a member of the Services de Presse du 
Front de Liberation Nationale in Tunis, was able to take advantage of El 
Moudjahid, whose articles were not by-lined, to disseminate his revolutionary 
ideas on colonialism in Algeria and Africa. Thanks to such excessive control 
and creative responses, the press in Africa has, since colonial times, shared 
many characteristics with rumour and political derision, including identification 
with certain values, beliefs and outlooks commonly held by ordinary Africans, 
some of which may appear bizarre and highly implausible to Western reporters 
and readers (cf. Ellis 2000). 
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Faced with post-colonial repression in the 1970s and 1980s, Africans easily 
drew inspiration from the more muted forms of criticism of colonial times. 
Excessive control of the established media and other conventional channels of 
communication helped account for the popularity and importance of Radio 
Trottoir, Pavement Radio or Rádio Boca a Boca, which proved itself the perfect 
medium for communicating dissent and discussing the powerful in unflattering 
terms across the continent. In various countries where dictatorship and 
repression have thrived over democracy, Radio Trottoir has proved effective not 
only as a vehicle for popular and informal discussion of power and current 
affairs by urbanites in particular, but also as a counter-power: the ‘poor-man’s 
bomb’ or the ‘weapons of the powerless’ in the face of government 
arbitrariness, water cannons, tear gas and guns. Usually in the form of anecdotal 
gossip, Radio Trottoir in Mobutu’s Zaire for example, served the poor as ‘a 
phenomenon of revenge and a rebuttal of censorship’ against ‘the totalitarian 
discourse of the Party-State’, often through the display of ‘an extraordinary 
verbal creativity’, rich in humour, parody and irony (cf. Devisch 1995: 623-24).  
In his famous ‘Provisional Notes on the Postcolony’, now part of his book 
On the Postcolony, Mbembe argues that political derision or humour directed at 
the autocrat is an attempt by ordinary folk to present the powerful as ordinary 
mortals with the same appetites and nature as any other person. ‘Hence the 
image of, say, the President’s anus is not of something out of this world — 
though to people’s great amusement the official line may treat it as such; 
instead, people consider it as it really is, capable of defecating like any 
commoner’s.’ Through ridicule, Mbembe argues, ordinary people can tame, 
shut up and render powerless state power. The autocrat, stripped of his aura or 
magic, becomes domesticated — a mere idol, a familiar friend or a member of 
the family as much for the ruled as for the rulers (Mbembe 1992: 8-9). Rural 
pottery on the Ndop Plains of the Bamenda Grassfields thrives by carrying such 
domestication a step further through the mass production of clay figures of the 
president, his ministers, gendarmes and military officials for public 
consumption by the victims of the violence and misery over which they preside. 
With such banalization and given the fragility of its creation, the pottery 
contributes towards the neutralization of these otherwise omnipotent symbols of 
state power and terror. 
Rumour, the most distinctive feature of Radio Trottoir, defines itself in 
opposition to official discourse, which it challenges and seeks to replace. The 
same is true of political cartooning in general, which could be described as the 
sketched or caricatured version of rumour about the high and mighty in society. 
Both political rumour and cartooning, it could be argued, are ways of 
cushioning the hardness of the crushing and stifling official discourse, which 
monopolizes the public sphere, often claiming to be the sole bearer of truth. 
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They are an unequivocal confirmation of the truism that withholding relevant 
information from the public results in desperate attempts by the public to invent 
that information, and that such inventions are seldom a flattering mirror of the 
status quo. Cultural vitality in silent spaces is thus the consequence of cultural 
repression in public spheres. Instead of dying out, repressed creativity 
reproduces itself in the most unlikely, veiled and often misleading ways. The 
more repressive the social and political environments, the more metaphorical 
the forms in which repressed creativity are reproduced. 
In Africa today where there is a semblance of democratization, not only has 
Radio Trottoir and political derision become more open and daring, cartooning 
has joined the bandwagon of political commentary and satire. Caricatures of 
presidents and their ministers are now uncommon in the press. In Nigerian 
newspapers — The Guardian and The Times for example — cartoons in the 
1980s and 1990s depicted political leaders and the military — their partners in 
power — in a very stereotypical fashion. Associated with the Nigerian 
politician in cartoons are such words as ‘rigger, thug, area boy, hidden agenda’, 
lexemes which imply ‘a cheating, deceitful, crooked, and corrupt individuality, 
and emphasize the politician’s lack of morals and ignorance and contempt for 
justice and fair play’. Through cartooning, politicians are stereotyped as 
‘completely selfish, self-centred, and self-indulgent, lacking in any altruistic 
thought, action, or motive’, and being completely at variance with those they 
purport to serve. The military, in general, are depicted to be forceful, disdainful 
of propriety, indifferent to established rules and regulations, and as having ‘a 
tendency towards absolutism and totalitarian control’ (Medubi 2000: 200-205). 
This shows that cartoonists and the ordinary Nigerians and Africans who 
appreciate their art can ‘see beyond the mask or veil of deception worn by the 
people in power’ (Sekoni 1997: 143) and, with ambivalence, ‘bring to the fore the 
challenge of identifying popular understandings of “democracy” that celebrate “the 
supremacy of the people” over dominant illusions and imposed edicts’ (Gecau 
1997: 151-59). This in itself is something that could be empowering, even if it 
does not bring about a revolution or the overthrow of the structures of inequality, 
mediocrity and cultural control. Increasingly though, in the context of the 
possibilities offered by increasing technological advances and media plurality, 
ubiquitous state control of public and private spheres is bound to diminish 
considerably with time. Hence a future for local and global cultural exchange 
facilitated by the media outside both the logic of state control and control by global 
capital may not be that difficult to contemplate. 
 
Creative appropriation of ICTs 
Regarding neoliberalism and the globalization of poverty, Africans have been 
equally creative in their responses, despite their perceived passivism and 
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victimhood. Like other anti-neoliberal forces in the world, African activists 
have taken advantage of the new information and communication technologies 
to mobilize and strategize against the multinational corporations and the 
uncritical support they receive from African states. Prominent African activists 
such as Dennis Brutus, Trevor Ngwane and Fatima Meer of South Africa are 
leading members of the anti-globalization coalition that is increasingly 
becoming a headache for the WTO and the G8. A recent victory by popular 
forces against the giant pharmaceutical companies in South Africa in 
connection with the production of affordable generic versions of AIDS drugs 
locally is equally significant (cf. Bond 2001). Various formal and informal 
networks are taking advantage of the Internet to promote their agendas in 
situations where the conventional media continues to blunt aspirations for 
creative diversity in the global cultural landscape. Web pages and websites have 
sprung up to celebrate cultural diversity, even if only by elite academics, civil 
servants, lobbyists and NGOs representing the interests of diverse indigenous 
minorities such as the Baka Pygmies of the rainforest and the Bushmen of the 
Kalahari Desert, to the concerns of large cultural entities such as the Yoruba 
and the Zulu of Nigeria and South Africa respectively. Spokespersons for 
marginalized groups fighting for cultural recognition and representation have 
found inspiration, support, accommodation and hope on the Internet, and even 
ordinary people are benefiting enormously through direct or indirect 
connectivity. 
Although connectivity in Africa is very low compared to other areas of the 
world (cf. Jensen 2000, Franda 2002), Africa’s cultural values of sociality, 
interconnectedness, interdependence and conviviality (cf. Nyamnjoh 2002) 
make it possible for others to access the Internet and its opportunities without 
necessarily being connected themselves. In many situations, it suffices for a 
single individual to be connected for whole groups and communities to benefit. 
The individual in question acts as a point of presence or communication node, 
linking other individuals and communities in a myriad of ways (cf. 
Olorunnisola 2000) and bringing hope to others who would otherwise be 
dismissed as not belonging by capital and its excessive emphasis on the 
autonomous individual consumer.  
In the Cameroonian city of Bamenda, for example, where resident telephone 
lines are grossly inadequate and defective at best, and where Internet 
connections are difficult and expensive, literate and illiterate people eager to 
stay in touch with relations, friends and opportunities within Cameroon and in 
the diaspora flood the few Internet points with messages to be typed and 
emailed on their behalf. Replies to their emails are printed out, addressed and 
pigeonholed for them by the operators who can only afford to check for mails 
twice a day because of exorbitant costs. What is noteworthy, however, is that  
78 Nyamnjoh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 
 Global and local trends in media ownership and control 79 
 
the high charges do not seem to temper the determination of those involved to 
stay in touch with the outside world. The names of some of the Internet 
businesses (e.g. ‘Allied Bamenda’ and ‘Mondial Computers’) reflect their 
determination to be connected and interconnected.  
Through such connections, people are able to exchange news on family, 
projects, events and developments of a personal and general nature. They are 
also able to exchange news on different cultural products and to arrange how to 
acquire the products for one another. It is mainly through this means that 
Cameroonians abroad manage to stay in touch with local music releases, 
publications, satirical humour, artefacts and fashion. Each visitor to the home 
village is armed with a long list of cultural products to take back for 
him/herself, fellow Cameroonians and friends. Many unmarried young men and 
women in the diaspora would have given up hope of marrying someone from 
their home village or country and doing so in accordance with local customs 
and traditions, had email not been there to facilitate contacts and negotiations 
with parents and potential families-in-law. 
In addition, the cosmopolitan identities of Cameroonians in the diaspora 
serve as itinerant billboards or as evangelists seeking converts to the cultures of 
their home villages. Thanks to such advertisements, Grassfields medicine and 
ngangas have been drawn to the West and other centres of modern 
accumulation where the rising interest in the occult is creating demand and 
opportunities for marabouts, sangomas, ngangas and muti or magic from 
Africa. The growing need for magical interpretations to material realities 
(Moore & Sanders 2001) under millennial capitalism (Comaroff & Comaroff 
2000) has meant creating space on the margins for marginalized cultures and 
solutions. This would explain the back-street shops and dealers in African 
cultural products ranging from foods to charms and amulets. It also explains the 
fact that not all the customers visiting these shops and markets are diasporic 
Africans. The diaspora and the rest of the world are thus connected to the local, 
and both can work actively to ensure continuity for cultures and communities 
marginalized at the national and global levels by the big players. Lesson: it does 
not have to be big to be noticed. 
The same creativity displayed in relation to the Internet is true of other 
technologies as well. The latest technology to be domesticated is the cell phone, 
which in South African townships and informal settlements, for example, has 
been used creatively by poor urban dwellers to stay in touch with rural relatives 
and through them maintain healthy communication with ancestors (cf. Thoka 
2001). Under the current structural adjustment programmes, most African states 
have restructured and privatized parts of their telecommunication facilities, 
providing for cellular networks that have transformed telecommunications (cf. 
Ras-Work 1998). A case in point, once again, is Cameroon where 1998 saw the 
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creation of the Cameroon Telecommunication Company (Camtel) by merging 
Intelcam and the Department of Telecommunications at the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications. Another company created was the Cameroon 
Telecommunication Mobile Company (Camtel Mobile), an affiliate of Camtel, 
with the specific duty of installing and exploiting mobile phones in the country. 
With this initiative, private investors such as Mobilis (or Orange) and MTN-
Cameroon have since extended and improved upon the telecommunication 
services. From a fixed telephone network of around 87,000 subscribers after 
independence, Cameroon now boasts more than 200,000 cell-phone subscribers 
for MTN-Cameroon alone. Owning a telephone or being connected by Internet 
has, since 2000, become much less of a luxury for those who can afford it in the 
major cities. Even those who cannot afford a cell phone stand to benefit thanks to 
the sociality and solidarity of the local cultures of which they are a part (cf. 
Nyamnjoh 2002).  
Most cell-phone owners in West Africa tend to serve as points of presence for 
their community, with others paying or simply passing through them to make calls 
to relatives, friends and contacts within or outside the country. Thus for example, 
although Nigerians might actually own fewer phones than most countries in the 
West, the country generates higher average revenue per user (ARPU) per month. 
The ARPU of a cell-phone user in Nigeria, with a GDP per capita of US$ 363, is 
US$ 91, which is five times that of South Africa with six times Nigeria’s GDP per 
capita, and almost twice that of the United States, with close to 1,000 times 
Nigeria’s GDP per capita. For a country with a low level of economic activity 
relative to G8 countries, Nigeria has a high level of minutes of use (MOU) of 200, 
compared to 154 in France, 88 in Germany, 149 in Japan, 118 in Italy, 249 in 
Canada, 120 in UK and 364 in the US (cf. Merrill Lynch Investment Bank 2002). 
These statistics could be explained by Nigerians receiving more calls than they 
make, and also by the reality of single-owner-multi-user (SOMU) communities. 
This suggests that the economic and social value (ESV) of a cell phone in 
countries like Nigeria and Cameroon with a higher volume of SOMU communities 
is much higher than the ESV of a cell phone in countries with single-owner-single-
user (SOSU) communities. Contrary to popular opinion, sociality, interdependence 
and conviviality are not always an obstacle to profitability. 
By way of further illustration, the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon are 
noted for their ‘subversives’ and for spearheading the questioning by 
Anglophones of the political and cultural domination of Cameroon by 
Francophones and French cultural values (cf. Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). By 
using a cell phone, such dissidents or subversives are better able to bypass 
conventional channels of control with their messages of struggle to one another, 
and are easily alerted to possible danger by collaborators at the centre of state 
power. Dissidence can be planned and coordinated right up to the minute of 
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execution by collaborators who do not have to be physically located in their 
national territories to be relevant and useful to ongoing struggles. At the social 
level, diasporic Grassfielders or migrants collectively supply a free phone to 
someone in their home village so they can call to give and receive messages 
from family and friends. Marriages, feasts, funerals, ‘crydie’ and village 
development initiatives can no longer pass any Grassfielder by simply because 
they are in the diaspora. The cell phone has become the long arm of the village 
chief or council, capable of reaching even the most distant ‘sons and daughters of 
the soil’ trapped in urban spaces with requests for the development of the home 
village (cf. Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 1998). The dramatic increase in the sales and 
theft of cell phones is an indication that this technology is welcome among 
Grassfielders exploring ways of denying exclusion to its smile of triumph. 
Bamenda is also an example of how Africans are negotiating their cultures 
and creativity out of the artificial silence imposed on them by political and 
economic imperatives. The city has created space for cultural products of 
diverse origins and qualities. Bamenda has the latest high quality global 
entertainment television delivered by DSTV (Multi-Choice) and Canal Horizon 
of France to the elite few in their mansions and offices. It also boasts of poorer 
consumers seeking to catch up in bars, hotels, lodges, ‘resting places’ and 
chicken parlours using the same facilities as bait for customers big and small.  
Bamenda is equally full of shops owned mainly by the Nigerian Igbo 
business community selling at affordable prices Nigerian-made and pirated 
films from Hollywood and Bollywood. Pirating may be a breach of copyright 
but it is also an indication of the desire to belong by those denied first-hand 
consumption of the cultural products in question. Anglophone Cameroonians in 
general are benefiting from the Nigerian cinema industry that has refused to 
wait until the time it is able to produce high-quality films with sophisticated 
modern technology. Using very basic equipment and releasing its products 
directly on video cassettes, Nigerian filmmakers have captured a large market 
among West Africans at home and in the diaspora, offering films more 
culturally relevant than even the most sympathetic Hollywood product. Such 
creativity has contributed to making Christianity more relevant to illiterate 
urban and village folks, as it is possible for ‘Jesus of Nazareth’, his white skin 
notwithstanding, to be betrayed, crucified and resurrected in Pidgin English and 
local Grassfields languages and, above all, to be affordable, thanks to dubbing 
and pirating. The films may flicker and frustrate even the most accommodating 
viewers but their popularity seems to suggest that a poorly produced culturally 
relevant film is better than none at all. This is also suggested by the ready 
availability of such gadgets as camcorders, digital cameras and VCRs that are 
ready to capture and immortalize the high points in the lives of individuals and 
communities. Births, marriages, funerals, ‘crydies’, graduation ceremonies and 
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feasts are all moments to be captured for ‘future memories’, and not having a 
camera of one’s own is hardly a deterrent given the number of photo studios, 
roving photographers and cameramen. Sons and daughters of the region 
working with the state television that is perceived to marginalize the English 
language and Anglophone culture, sometimes use their initiative and influence 
to direct the attention of the television camera to people and events from their 
home areas. 
In the domain of scholarly production and creative writing, the climate of 
repression since independence has meant a dearth of local publishing in general 
and of quality in particular. Publishers have had to steer clear of all 
controversial material, which, given the sensitivity of government to anything 
mildly critical, has forced them out of business or reduced them to printers of 
inoffensive but unprofitable literature. Little of what is published in Cameroon 
can boast even an ISBN number. In the 1990s however, a semblance of political 
liberalization provided some individuals with the opportunity to get into 
desktop publishing. One of those to have distinguished themselves in this regard 
is Dr Linus Asong who has taken up self-publishing since the publication of his 
first novel, Crown of Thorns, in Canada. His desktop publishing company — 
Patron Publishing House — has even expanded to publishing other local 
writers, including a conversational autobiography of Ndeh Ntumazah, an 
opposition political leader who has spent the best part of his life fighting for a 
new political culture in Cameroon. Although the quality of printing and binding 
leaves a lot to be desired, Asong’s hard work may have brought to the limelight 
novels, poetry and books that otherwise would never have made it into print in a 
situation where potential authors are either victims of administrative censorship 
or suffer a high rejection rate at the hands of commercial publishers. If and 
when there is a breakthrough, this is often on the publisher’s terms and the 
profit motive is never disguised. Asong’s efforts may be trivialized and mocked 
by colleagues with their heads in the clouds but they tell a story of resistance 
and hope worthy of emulation. Otherwise, much cultural creativity would 
continue to waste away on the periphery of the global cultural industries. 
A similar situation exists in the local music industry. Although Cameroon 
has had an impressive list of stars with proven track records since 
independence, budding musicians find it difficult to make a breakthrough, 
partly because few of those who have succeeded have bothered to invest in the 
industry at home. Success seems to imply going to live in France, and coming 
home briefly for concerts or at the invitation of the ruling elite to celebrate a 
certain anniversary. The Bamenda Grassfields are arguably the region where 
there has been the least achievement in producing local pop stars. The reasons 
are not obvious but it is clear that Grassfielders love their indigenous music 
heritage. Gatherings and occasions at home or in the diaspora are always an 
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excuse for singing, drumming and dancing to local rhythms. Amateur audio and 
video recordings are easy to come by, and are widely reproduced and circulated. 
Dedicated performers of dances are not difficult to find in cities where 
Grassfields elites may want to show off or entertain their guests with a bit of 
‘our culture’. Not wanting to be totally eclipsed, some elites have attempted to 
sponsor the production of local Grassfields talent, some of whom (Francis 
Ndom, Prince Afo-AKom, and ‘Bottle Dance’ musicians like Richard Nguti, 
John Minang, Ni Ken and Depipson) have made it to the national scene with 
music from their home area. These and other up-and-coming artists in the 
region and elsewhere shop around for sponsors ranging from businesses to 
NGOs and publicity-seeking elites, through other artists and the national 
orchestra.3  
The quest for success does not exclude prostitution in various forms,4 and 
the outcome is not always a foregone conclusion. But few give up too readily, 
even if this means a form of success limited to performing in bars and market 
places and at private functions like itinerant musicians and for very little pay. 
However limited the financial rewards, local performers do more than ensure 
continuity for their home cultures. They often have more space to articulate 
social criticism than their better-known foreign-based counterparts, and their 
poverty is in a way a blessing since it compels them to stay within Cameroon 
instead of migrating to France to celebrate success. Critical music in tune with 
popular expectations is not limited to the most disfavoured regions of the 
country. Even among the Beti whose Bikutsi music has been given greater 
prominence on state television and radio by the sheer fact of its association with 
President Paul Biya and his ethnic brethren in power, not all voices have been 
singing their praises. Critical Bikutsi songs have emerged among local performers 
to challenge complacency and support for President Biya, ‘a son of the soil’ who 
has repeatedly failed to deliver on promises even to those of his own ethnic kin 
(Onguene Essono 1996). 
 
 
                                                 
3 John Minang’s album, Issiah, carries advertisements for ‘L&B’, ‘Beneficial Life 
Insurance’ and ‘PMUC’. Prince Afo-Akom obtained sponsorship from the World 
Wildlife Fund thanks to his song ‘Our Environment’, in which the WWF is mentioned 
positively. 
4 In order to get by, some Cameroonian musicians include in their lyrics the names of 
individuals seeking greater social or political visibility in exchange for monetary 
payments.  
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Conclusion 
 
In most of Africa the threats to a free, open and participatory media system and 
cultural production are as much from repressive governments as from the 
interests of rich nations, international financial institutions and multinational 
capital. The chapter suggests that it is necessary to look beyond meta-narratives 
of euphoria and victimhood to understand how marginalized individuals and 
communities are responding to state repression and the global logic of cultural 
flows and closures.  
The creative responses highlighted here and explored by others elsewhere 
(e.g. Friedman 1990, 1991, 1994, Gondola 1999) are only indicative of the 
ongoing efforts by ordinary Africans to be part of national and global processes 
on their own terms, even when clearly excluded by the structures in place. 
Together with the creative appropriation of ICT and second-hand consumer 
goods from the West, these responses are evidence that ordinary Africans are 
refusing to lose hope in the face of disenchantment with neoliberalism. New 
religions, some no less entrepreneurial than leading multinationals, have 
developed to capitalize on this resilience in ordinary Africans. They promise 
‘new hopes’ for the ‘cheerful givers’ (cf. Meyer 1998, Van Dijk 1999) and their 
popularity is yet another indication of how determined Africans are to fight off 
exclusion. Together with healing churches informed by a creative marriage of 
African and Western traditions, the new churches are competing for material 
and spiritual attention among slum dwellers trapped by ‘misery and hardship’ in 
‘tragic spaces’ (Devisch 1995, 1996). Pyramid schemes, casinos and games of 
chance have also fed on the resilience of ordinary folks, by provoking in them 
‘fantasies of abundance without effort’, and leading them to believe in the 
possibility of ‘beating capitalism at its own game by drawing a winning number 
at the behest of unseen forces’ (cf. Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000: 297). Criminal 
rackets promising effortless immigration and work permits have sprung up to 
take advantage of the burning desire in ordinary people to succeed. Similarly, 
Nigerian 4-1-9 and Cameroonian Feymen fraudsters have equally used the 
Internet and cell phones creatively to access more people with their letter scams 
and fraudulent business deals that have brought some of them dazzling riches 
(cf. Fisiy & Geschiere 2001: 227-42, Malaquais 2001). Adults and children 
have been sold into slavery, and magical solutions are being increasingly sought 
for material predicaments (cf. Comaroff & Comaroff 2000, Moore & Sanders 
2001). It is clear that the reality of exclusion in neoliberalism has created its 
own opportunists but in this opportunism should be seen the determination of 
ordinary Africans to forge on, victimhood notwithstanding. The creative 
responses hinted at in this chapter imply that it is hardly the end of the story to 
acknowledge disempowerment and marginalization, for in process (and often 
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veiled or subtle) are countervailing forces in the service of hope. Because the 
‘Tam Tam’ remains relevant, even as the Internet and the cell phone are being 
adopted and celebrated (cf. Ras-Work 1998), Africans are able to make the best 
of all worlds in a context where cultural survival has long ceased to be a matter 
of course. And thanks to their creativity, sociability, negotiation and 
conviviality, Africans have refused to endorse the requiem for their way of life. 
The future may well have much to draw from African world views and cultures, 
marginalized currently by power and wealth. 
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Global media and violence  
in Africa: The case of Somalia 
 
Jan-Bart Gewald 
 
 
It has been argued that Africa has been sidelined in the global 
ICT revolution and that African societies appear to be cut off 
from global flows of information. Nevertheless, the manner in 
which war was waged in Somalia between 1991 and 1994 
indicates that this global revolution has affected the manner in 
which war has come to be waged in Africa. African societies 
may indeed be cut off from owning and controlling the streams 
of images that reflect their continent, but they may, however, at 
times come to temporarily hijack and divert this stream of 
images, and ensure that images that support or reinforce their 
political aims come to be released into the global flow. In the 
case of Somalia, the real-time images of dead US soldiers being 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were sufficient to 
make the United States end their involvement in Somalia.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Any form of good scholarship dealing with Africa would of necessity place 
African societies within the context of the wider and thus global world. The 
bulk of material dealing with Africa in the context of globalization has been 
dominated by economic studies, many of which fail to take cognisance of, let 
alone deal with, the social or cultural aspects of globalization. Fortunately, there 
is also a substantial amount of literature within the social sciences that deals 
with Africa in the context of globalization. Unfortunately some of this literature 
is esoteric, and thus generally unintelligible to the majority of readers, or 
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anecdotal in the extreme.1 It is often forgotten that anecdotes, though they may 
lead to complementary head-nodding and exclamations from admiring academic 
audiences, do not in themselves explain why events are taking place. Thus 
descriptions of Somali or Liberian gunmen bearing their arms in ways copied 
from US television shows may be interesting but do not explain why these men 
are taking up arms in the first place.2 Wars in Africa cannot be adequately 
explained merely through reference to fashion. This is not to deny that styles 
and images may influence the manner in which wars are fought. In his work on 
northern Tanzania, Brad Weiss explicitly states that his focus is on the interplay 
of ‘the imaginary’ and ‘the global’, and it is in dealing with imagination that he 
makes the following tantalizing remarks: 
  
Far from (simply) an indulgence in escapist and illusory delusions, imaginative 
practice becomes essential to the very definition of reality as it is perceived and 
encountered. Conceived of in this way, fantasy becomes a medium through which to 
pursue the concrete processes by which consciousness is engaged in the world. A 
further insistence of many who address ‘the imagination’ is the recognition that such 
practices include far more than liberatory exercises in boundless, cultural creativity. 
Our interests in the imagination must incorporate the fantasies of ethnic cleansing 
and other brutalities as well as educational aspirations, regimes of mass 
consumption as well as utopian visions of democratic reform (Weiss 2001: 5, 
emphasis added).  
 
In other words, imagination does not only include the pleasing and desired 
aspects of life, but can also just as often come to include the darker side of life, 
fantasies that include the hurt and destruction of others. However, ideas and 
fantasies in and of themselves are not sufficient explanation as to why violence 
should occur.3 This is well presented by Clapham (2001) who, in dealing with 
developments in Sierra Leone, readily refers to aspects of a globalized popular 
culture in seeking to explain aspects of violence: 
 
                                                 
1 To be sure there could be those who would wish to argue that there is no need for 
academic literature to be intelligible to the majority of readers. However, I do believe 
that the role of the academic is to seek to explain the world, and to do so in ways that 
are easily accessible to as large a group of people as possible. 
2 For an extreme example of this sort of material, see Amina Mama (2001), ‘Gender in 
Action: Militarism and War’ at: http://www.uct.ac.za/org/agi/papers/military.htm. 
For an overview of some of these perceptions to be found in the popular media, see 
Ottosen (1994) and Kennedy (1993). 
3 Regarding the human mind, evil imagination and destructiveness, interested readers 
may wish to see Erich Fromm (1973) The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.  
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The products of an alienated American youth culture, notably the Rambo film ‘First 
Blood’ and gangster rap music, were readily reinterpreted in local terms as 
symbolising and legitimising resistance against a repressive official structure. 
(Clapham 2001)4 
 
Equally disturbing to the work that seeks to explain violence in terms of 
fashion, is that of the widely read and respected American commentator, Robert 
Kaplan (2001), who writes: 
 
As anybody who has had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, ‘technicals’ in 
Somalia, Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell you, in 
places where Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always 
been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence. … worrying about mines and 
ambushes frees you from worrying about mundane details of daily existence.5 
 
For Kaplan, isolated Africa has not attained a ‘certain economic, educational, 
and cultural standard’ that would ‘tranquillize’ physical aggression that he sees 
as a part of being human. In other words, African primitives need to be civilized 
and, until this occurs, wars and violence will be the natural way of things in 
Africa.  
There is a burgeoning literature that shows that the wars being fought out 
across the length and breadth of Africa are intimately connected to international 
global flows of weapons, drugs, diamonds and other trades. The work of 
Christopher Clapham, Stephen Ellis and Paul Richards on the wars in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia provide insight into the manner in which these wars take 
place within a global setting in which Africa is not an isolate. The genocide 
committed in Rwanda, and the subsequent Congolese wars, took place within a 
global context in which ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity could be 
imagined — a context in which horrific examples of success are accessible and 
available to allow the imagined successful implementation of similar crimes 
against humanity. Yet to describe the violence committed in Rwanda, as the 
high priest of globalization studies Arjun Appadurai (1998: 905) does, as a 
vivisection of the body politic is assuredly poetic but far from explanatory. 
 
… bodily violence may be viewed as a form of vivisection, and as an effort to 
resolve unacceptable levels of uncertainty through bodily deconstruction. This 
approach may cast light on the surplus of rage displayed in many recent episodes of 
inter-group violence. … such extreme and intimate violence may partly lie in the 
                                                 
4 http://www.ippu.purdue.edu/failed_states/2001/papers/CLAPHAM2.pdf 
5 Kaplan’s view of Sierra Leone is countered by Richards (1996). 
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deformation of national and local spaces of everyday life by the physical and moral 
pressures of globalization. 6 
 
It is generally accepted that the process of globalization has been in progress for 
decades, if not centuries. What is truly new in the last twenty years though has 
been the introduction of the electronic ability to compress space and time in a 
manner that is accessible to the majority of people on earth.7 The major 
difference with the past is the amount of information and the speed with which 
both information and real-time images can be transferred from one point on the 
globe to another. In the whole globalization discussion, it is this issue of space-
time compression that is the most important for our work. Having said this, it is 
necessary that examples as to how space-time compression has affected 
violence in Africa be presented. How has space-time compression qualitatively 
changed violence in Africa?8 An example of violent conflict in Africa is 
examined here and the role of space-time compression discussed therein. It is in 
effect an argument about a specific form of space-time compression, namely the 
local and highly contested use and appropriation of features of the global spread 
of mass media and mass communication.9  
 
 
Globalization and Somalia 1991-1994 
 
In 1991 Peter Arnett, CNN’s reporter-at-large, became the face and voice of the 
world’s first globalized war. Standing on the roof of the Intercontinental Hotel 
in downtown Baghdad, Arnett covered the first air raids of the American-led 
Allied forces against Iraq. Television viewers around the world saw Operation 
Desert Storm unfold. At 3 a.m. in Baghdad, 1 a.m. in Amsterdam, and the 
                                                 
6 See also Appadurai (1998: 906) ‘Yet, to my knowledge, no single work has sought to 
explore the precise ways in which the ethnic body can be a theatre for the engagement 
of uncertainty under the special circumstances of globalisation’. 
7 Certainly telegraph and later telephone and even later wireless have been available 
from the 1860s onwards, but only for a limited audience and only within specific 
settings. The major transformation is the availability of real time mass-media images 
and mass communication. 
8 It has been in seeking to deal with the impact of globalization on Africa that the entire 
WOTRO globalization project was established in 1994. 
9 In his discussion of the information age, specifically in relation to questions of 
ownership, Castells (1997: 309-352) argues that the media, or rather access to media, 
has become the essential domain for politics. In this domain the most important issue is 
the (visual) image that puts a specific message across. In this struggle for images the 
most effective political message to be found is the image that conveys a negative 
message. Politics has, according to Castells, become the domain of images of spin. 
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beginning of prime time, 5 p.m. Eastern Standard Time in New York, anti-
aircraft fire streamed through the air, the streaks of tracer bullets clearly visible 
on television screens around the world. Surface-to-air missiles rocketed into the 
sky, their thunderous blue-to-orange exhaust trails sporadically dominating 
television images. Approximately half an hour after the anti-aircraft barrage had 
begun, the first incoming cruise missiles and other ordinance launched miles 
away began exploding in and around Baghdad. Explosions lit up the Baghdad 
skyline, and seconds later the rumbling sound of the same explosions reached 
Peter Arnett and his CNN news crew standing on the hotel rooftop in the centre 
of Baghdad.10  
Drinking bourbon and nibbling anchovies, I, along with the rest of the 
modern world, watched on TV the opening stages of the world’s first truly 
globalized media war. For 17 hours, thanks to the services of CNN and Peter 
Arnett, the world could see, live before their very own eyes, the unfolding of an 
allegedly new era of warfare, in which media, smart bombs and the near total 
absence of Allied casualties on the Alliance’s side were the order of the day. 
This did not mean that there was no carnage.11 As the war progressed, Alliance 
forces killed tens of thousands of Iraqi conscripts. Iraqi soldiers came to be 
buried in their trenches by American bulldozers, Iraqi troops and Iraqi and 
Palestinian refugees fleeing Kuwait were strafed and killed,12 and the world’s 
largest conventional ordinance, euphemistically known as the ‘daisy cutter’,13 
was dropped on Iraqi positions. For all its extensive media coverage, this, the 
seedier reality of war, was not transmitted to the world’s television audiences. 
Instead, they were presented with what became known as the ‘Incubator Scam’. 
                                                 
10 Peter Arnett no longer works for CNN but those interested can contact him directly 
via his personal website: http://www.peterarnett.com/ 
11 For an excellent first-hand view of the Gulf War by an American marine, see 
Swofford (2003). 
‘We fire and fire the AKs, a factory of firepower, the fierce scream of metal downrange 
and discharged cartridges and sand flying everywhere, now all of us shooting in the air, 
shooting straight up and dancing in circles, dancing on one foot, with the mad, desperate 
hope that the rounds will never descend, screaming, screaming at ourselves and each 
other and the dead Iraqis surrounding us, screaming at ourselves and the dead world 
surrounding us, screaming at ourselves, at the corpses surrounding us and the dead 
world. . . . And I know we'll soon carry that mad scream home with us, but that no one 
will listen because they'll want to hear the crowd-roar of victory.’ 
12 For a report on the ’Highway of Death’, see URL: http://deoxy.org/warcrime.htm. 
This site contains a report compiled by Ramsey Clark who served as Attorney-General 
in the Johnson administration. Clark was convenor of the Commission of Inquiry for the 
International War Crimes Tribunal that presented the report in New York on 11 May 
1991. 
13 For technical details and gung-ho views on the ‘daisy cutter’, see: 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/sys/dumb/blu-82.htm. 
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In it, the audience of the US television programme Sixty Minutes was presented 
with a bereft and distraught Kuwaiti nurse who stated that she had personally 
witnessed Iraqi troops throw new-born babies out of incubators in a hospital in 
Kuwait City. It was only later that this turned out to be a propaganda hoax, and 
the nurse none other than the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United 
States. 14 
It is a truism, but the first casualty in war is indeed the truth. However, it has 
also been said that reality is what you can get away with. From the very 
beginning, the Gulf War was the mother of all media wars. Every evening for 
the duration of Operation Desert Storm, Allied commanders presented the world 
with clinically clean videogame images of missiles thudding into buildings and 
bunkers — and never any bodies. Norman Schwarzkopf, Colin Powell and 
others gloated at the Iraqi driver who failed to look in his rear-view mirror. 
Live, real time, in our living rooms, bars and workplaces, we watched 
beleaguered Israeli citizens collecting government-issued gas masks and sealing 
their apartments against imminent Iraqi attacks. American Patriot missiles 
rocketed into the night sky above Tel Aviv and allegedly intercepted incoming 
scuds, whilst crack British SAS teams sought out and destroyed mobile scud 
launch sites in Iraq. But, was it the truth? When Peter Arnett, now a well-known 
name, reported on the bombing and destruction of a baby-milk factory in a US 
bombing raid, CNN was put under pressure to ditch him.15 When journalists 
began reporting on the Highway of Death, the war was over, and nobody 
wished to entertain the suggestion that Alliance soldiers could ever have 
committed war crimes.16  
 The Gulf War, which ended with American forces being feted in a ticker-
tape parade through New York City, was — from the beginning to the end — a 
global media event.17 Live, the citizens of the world could see how the United 
States overcame its Vietnam syndrome and pounded home the truth that 
henceforth the United States of America was the Lone Ranger, the sole 
superpower answerable to none. 
 In the aftermath of the Gulf War, American military strategists, when 
analysing their total and devastating victory, took on board the concept of the 
‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), otherwise known as the ‘Military 
Technical Revolution’ (MTR). RMA is a concept that, interestingly enough, 
                                                 
14 For a report on this fabrication and others like it, see http://www.fair.org. 
15 In 1995, when Arnett returned to Baghdad, the baby-milk factory was back in 
production. 
16 This even though RAF pilots refused to take part in the carnage that was taking place. 
17 With regard to the first Gulf War, see, in particular, Baudrillard (1995). For a further 
interesting and humorous view on these issues, see Castells in discussion with Harry 
Kreisler: http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Castells/castells-con4.html 
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developed out of what had initially been dubbed ‘military technical revolutions’ 
by Soviet military planners. In the 1970s, Soviet military theorists identified 
periods of fundamental change in military affairs, and sought to theorize these 
changes. By the early 1980s, Soviet military theorists recognized and began 
considering ‘the implications for future war of technological advances in 
microelectronics, sensors, precision-guidance, automated control systems, and 
directed energy’ (Watts 1995). In 1988, Discriminate Deterrence, the American 
commission of inquiry on long-term defence strategy, submitted a report 
suggesting amongst other things: 
 
Dramatic developments in military technology appear feasible over the next twenty 
years. They will be driven primarily by the further exploitation of microelectronics, 
in particular sensors and information processing, and the development of directed 
energy. These developments could require major revisions in military doctrines and 
force structures. ... [T]he Soviet military establishment is already engaged in a major 
effort to understand the military implications of new technologies, and appears to 
have concluded that revolutionary changes in the nature of war will result. The much 
greater precision, range, and destructiveness of weapons could extend war across a 
much wider geographic area, make war much more rapid and intense, and require 
entirely new modes of operation. (Iklé, Wohlstetter et al. 1988) 
 
Seen in this light, particularly with its emphasis on ICT, RMA is very much part 
and parcel of the process referred to as globalization.18 The work of Ajay Singh 
(1995-96), which emphasizes the changes that have been brought about in what 
he refers to as the ‘Space-Time Paradigm’ is particularly relevant here. In 
March 1993 the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published 
a report entitled ‘The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework’, 
in which it was declared that MTR was ‘a fundamental advance in technology, 
doctrine, or organization that renders existing methods of conducting warfare 
obsolete’ (cited in Watts 1995: 4). It was with this doctrine in mind that the 
United States declared war on Somalia. 
 
 
                                                 
18 There is a fair amount of literature available on RMA and MTR. However readers 
seeking a finely written and strident introduction are directed to read, M.J. Mazarr 
(1994), The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning. The 
publication can be accessed at:  
http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs94/rma/rma.pdf 
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Somalia 
 
‘We know you better than you know us.’ (Hassan Al Tourabi)19 
 
Of late, al hadji Osama Bin Laden has appropriated a substantial amount of 
airtime on the world’s various media networks. In his ever-extending fifteen 
minutes of fame, Bin Laden has been wont to state that events in Somalia 
proved to him that the United States of America could be beaten. 
The end of the Cold War had serious implications for states in Africa.20 In the 
Horn of Africa, Somalia and Ethiopia were countries that had vacillated 
between Soviet and US support. In both instances the withdrawal of superpower 
support for their respective regimes had major implications. Ethiopia came to be 
divided into two separate states, and Somalia collapsed into anarchy. In March 
1991, US Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen declared Somalia to be a 
civil strife disaster, after which the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance began 
funding relief efforts there.  
Immediately after the Gulf War, the position of George Bush Sr. as president 
of the United States of America appeared unassailable. However, the substantial 
public support that Bush had enjoyed evaporated by the middle of 1992. In the 
immediate run-up to the presidential campaign, the Bush administration 
attempted to shore up the president’s ever worsening position. On 14 August 
1992, a month prior to the start of the presidential campaign, the Bush 
administration turned its attention to Somalia again and ordered a major airlift 
of relief supplies (Operation Provide Relief). 
Operation Provide Relief, like other attempts to provide relief to the starving 
in Somalia, ground to a halt and in the absence of a centralized authority, relief 
workers were unable to transport goods to their intended destinations. In 
keeping with the logic of a scarce market, a situation had developed in Somalia 
in which a multitude of armed factions demanded taxes prior to allowing the 
transportation of food aid through their territory. Without protection, food 
convoys were unable to move and calls for solid and sustained military 
intervention in support of the food convoys were voiced. In November, with the 
presidential elections over, US aid agencies and members of Congress lobbied 
to have the US take greater action in Somalia. Undoubtedly, George Bush Sr, 
who had just been crushingly defeated in the presidential elections by Bill 
Clinton and had seen his stature fall from all-conquering world leader to 
                                                 
19 Dr Hassan al Tourabi is a graduate of the University of Oxford and the Sorbonne, 
founder of the Sudanese National Islamic Front, and a former friend and colleague of 
Osama Bin Laden. 
20 Regarding the ending of the Cold War and its impact on Africa, see, amongst others, 
Akinrinade (1998), Oyebade & Alao (1998) and Furley (1995). 
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unpopular president, saw in the situation that was developing in Somalia an 
opportunity which could allow his presidency to end with a positive flourish, 
and ensure his entry into the proverbial history books as a good and benevolent 
president.21 
To the world’s sole superpower, the assorted and factious gunmen scattered 
across the former state of Somalia appeared to be a walkover. Having overcome 
their Vietnam syndrome in the Gulf War, the United States of America 
proceeded to walk slap bang into the Somalia syndrome. 
At the end of November 1992, the outgoing Bush administration decided to 
commit 28,000 US troops to spearhead an armed intervention in Somalia in 
support of UN relief efforts. On 4 December, the United Nations Security 
Council voted to support US intervention, and George Bush went live on 
television to address the nation: 
 
There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down. Anarchy 
prevails. … It’s now clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe 
delivery of the food Somalis need to survive. … And so, to every sailor, soldier, 
airman, and Marine who is involved in this mission, let me say you’re doing God’s 
work. We will not fail. Thank you, and may God bless the United States of 
America.22 
  
From the very beginning, Operation Restore Hope was a major media event. 
Work conducted elsewhere indicates that it was only following Bush’s decision 
to intervene that media coverage of Somalia truly expanded. In other words, 
contrary to voiced opinion, media attention had in itself not been responsible for 
the president’s decision to intervene (Robinson 2000, 2002). Though printed 
media coverage increased substantially, it was specifically in the sphere of live 
television coverage that truly absurd situations developed. In the days 
immediately after Bush’s announcement, media teams from the competing 
networks scurried around the various possible landing sites that might be used 
by the intervention force. Camera crews, some with portable generators, set up 
camp at what appeared to be the most likely landing sites. In the event, the US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff did not disappoint the many and varied media concerns. In 
the early hours of 9 December 1992, heavily armed US marines and Navy Seals 
                                                 
21 To be sure there is another far more sinister line of reasoning that relates US 
intervention in Somalia to the machinations of Bush and his staff to further support oil 
prospecting rights on Somali territory. See ‘The Oil Factor in Somalia’, an article by 
Mark Fineman in the Los Angeles Times, 18 January 1993:  
http://www.netnomad.com/fineman.html 
A similar view can be found at: http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2001/msg01143.html 
22 President Bush’s address to the nation on 4 December 1992, cited in Robinson (2001). 
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landed on the beaches around Mogadishu in a blaze of flashbulbs and live 
worldwide television coverage. 
 Live, real time, those preparing evening meals for their loved ones in New 
York City could watch as, halfway round the world, US forces — who were the 
epitome of Hollywood’s finest soldiers — stormed ashore. In the nights prior to 
the US forces’ landing, camera crews had anxiously peered out to sea, providing 
their worldwide audiences with expansive shots of an empty sea accompanied 
by newspeak debating and announcing the imminent arrival of American forces. 
When the forces did finally arrive, irate Defence Department spokesmen chided 
the media crews for being there, not realizing the apparently precarious and 
dangerous nature of their position. If anything, the landing of America’s finest 
on the shores of Somalia in a blaze of publicity served to emphasize to all 
observers the importance of publicity and media in the modern world. Andrew 
Purvis, a journalist currently working for Time magazine, recently wrote: 
 
I was on the beach when US troops arrived in Mogadishu in 1992, and the feeling 
around me that tempestuous night was a mixture of euphoria and awe. Most Somalis 
genuinely welcomed the US deployment, waving as Navy Seals in face paint and 
black camouflage waded ashore. They believed the US would help rid them of the 
anarchy and famine that had already left tens of thousands dead. AK-47-toting 
militiamen in their cloth wraps and rubber sandals were also impressed by the 
military show, not knowing what the US colossus was capable of. Within a few 
months, all that had changed. (Purvis 2002) 
 
Prior to becoming involved in Somalia, the US National Security Council 
commissioned think tanks in the United States to submit reports recommending 
what was to be done should the United States choose to intervene in Somalia. 
An operational concept plan, ‘Military Intervention in Somalia’, was drawn up 
by Frederick C. Cuny on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace and the Center for Naval Analysis, and submitted to the US NSC.23 Apart 
from listing recommendations with regard to the operational concept — 
Objectives, Force Structure, Security Zones, Exclusion Zones, and so forth — 
the eleven-point plan included the following final paragraph: 
 
The most troublesome element is the likelihood of sniping. There will undoubtedly 
be some individuals and possibly groups who will find cause to fire upon US or 
allied troops. The terrain outside the city is not suitable for ambushes or sniping; it is 
flat and open. The most likely place for sniping will be Mogadishu since it alone 
                                                 
23 A copy of this report is to be found at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cuny/laptop/somalia.html. 
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offers concealment and escape possibilities. For this reason, it is strongly 
recommended that US and allied forces stay out of the city.24 
 
Three days after landing in Somalia, American forces were in combat. From 
then onwards, with intermittent periods of relative calm, they became drawn 
ever deeper into war. After being initially overawed by the intervention force, 
Somali combatants came to challenge American forces increasingly openly. 
Within a month of their arrival, American forces had identified Mohammed 
Farah Aidid as their primary opponent. On 12 January 1993, the first marine 
was killed whilst on patrol in Mogadishu and from then onwards, slowly but 
surely, Somali combatants gained in confidence, and the American forces were 
constantly harassed by snipers operating in the city. Time and again, even 
though gun ships attacked Somali positions, American forces were subjected to 
surprise attacks. Eventually, after seven months of bungling, many wounded 
and a number of dead, members of the 3rd Battalion 75th Ranger Regiment and 
the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (DELTA) were deployed to 
Somalia with orders to capture Aidid. In conjunction with this deployment, 
Operation Eyes Over Mogadishu was started. It entailed round-the-clock 
surveillance of Mogadishu by Lockheed Orion surveillance planes and 
helicopters supported by helicopter gun ships, and helicopter troop carriers.  
America’s involvement in Somalia was predicated on a positive media 
image: American forces guarding food-aid convoys and aiding the starving and 
needy. This image changed completely when Wild West ‘wanted’ posters 
bearing Aidid’s image appeared throughout Mogadishu.25 In support of these 
posters, and in an attempt to minimize American casualties: 
 
The U.S. launched its campaign from the air, using attack helicopters and AC-130 
Specter gun ships to carry out what military analysts confidently described to the 
world’s media as ‘surgical’ strikes. They were not. In the most notorious incident — 
to Somalis, anyway — Cobra gun ships blasted a tall white stucco building in 
central Mogadishu in July 1993. The target was a well-publicized meeting of clan 
elders loyal to Aidid, but the victims, some 70, included innocent civilians. Word of 
the strike spread quickly through Mogadishu’s alleyways and coffee houses. When a 
                                                 
24 The Operational Concept Plan justified its recommendation that American forces 
refrain from entering Mogadishu by referring directly to the costly lessons learnt by the 
Indian army in its failed operations in Jaffna Town in Sri Lanka, and suggested that, 
should Mogadishu be included, the British should be encouraged to ‘commit an 
experienced force ex Northern Ireland to manage the irregular urban warfare threat’. 
25 Robert Oakley, US Ambassador to Somalia between November 1992 and May 1993, 
noted that the reward of US$25,000 was an insult.  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html 
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handful of foreign journalists arrived at the scene, Somalis, including women and 
children, turned on them and beat four to death. (Purvis 2002) 
 
The killing of the four western journalists unleashed a storm of protest in the 
West, and must have provided Aidid and his planners with an indication as to 
how they could strike back at the ‘Lone Ranger’.  
But who was Mohammed Farah Aidid, the man so anxiously sought and 
vilified by the Americans? Aidid had been a general in the Somali national 
army, and as such had enjoyed military training in both the East and the West.26 
In the late 1980s Aidid was instrumental in deposing the Somali dictator 
Mohammed Siad Barre and in the ensuing chaos in which Somalia came to be 
torn apart, Aidid became president of what remained of Somalia. Even so, 
American forces treated him with the utmost contempt, placed a price on his 
head and declared him a bandit, a thug and a warlord. To be sure, this view of 
Aidid was reinforced every time militiamen allied to Aidid demanded payments 
and prevented food convoys from moving through areas under their jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the truth remains that he was simply dismissed as a serious 
opponent, yet he — more than any other general since Giap — defeated 
American forces at their own game. 
Aidid was effectively trapped in Mogadishu, yet to all observers it was clear 
that the United States was reluctant to commit forces on the ground in the city. 
Instead, as was noted above, US forces preferred to attempt to reach their 
objectives by pounding their alleged opponents with cannon fire from the air. 
Dropping specialized units from helicopters into the city complemented this 
strategy. In keeping with Operation Eyes Over Mogadishu, helicopters 
continually flew over the city, aircraft that — as Aidid’s forces so capably 
showed — could be shot down with the simplest of weapons. On 3 October 
1993 an American helicopter attempting to ‘exfiltrate’ an American unit was 
shot down by a RPG 7, a simple shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenade. The 
aircraft crashed and was immediately surrounded and attacked by Aidid’s 
soldiers. When another American helicopter attempted to provide support for 
the downed aircraft, it too was shot down, also by an RPG 7. With two of their 
aircraft shot down in the city, American forces attempted to reach them 
overland but to do so they too had to enter the city — terrain held by Aidid’s 
forces. American armoured personnel carriers sent into the city ran into 
ambushes.27 In this single event, an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Somalis, including 
                                                 
26 Mohammed Farrah Aidid’s son and successor, Hussein Mohammed Aidid, possessed 
American citizenship and returned to Somalia as a US marine in 1992. See: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1146000/1146654.stm.  
27 For a profoundly disturbing view of these events:  
http://www.angelfire.com/ne2/somalia/enter.index.html. 
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non-combatants, were killed and wounded, whilst 18 US servicemen were 
killed and no less than 78 wounded.28 
 American forces had effectively flown, driven and crashed into a terrain in 
which all of their high-tech communications equipment counted for nought. 
Citations for ‘Medals of Honor’, posthumously awarded by the US army to two 
of its snipers killed in the events of 3 October, clearly indicate the nature of the 
terrain: 
 
When debris and enemy ground fires at the site caused them to abort the first 
attempt, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader were inserted one 
hundred meters south of the crash site. Equipped with only his sniper rifle and a 
pistol, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader, while under intense small 
arms fire from the enemy, fought their way through a dense maze of shanties and 
shacks to reach the critically injured crew members. Sergeant First Class Shughart 
pulled the pilot and the other crew members from the aircraft…29  
 
The pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, survived the engagement but 
was captured by Aidid’s forces. 
 Immediately after the battle, on the morning of 4 October, jubilant Somalis 
dragged the body of an American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu. 
CNN broadcast these unedited images live to the world. Abdullahi Hassan, who 
acted as Aidid’s propaganda minister, arranged for CNN to receive a copy of 
the video footage of the captured pilot stating: ‘Innocent people being killed is 
not good’. Durant was held captive for eleven days by Aidid’s forces during 
which time Abdullahi Hassan allowed the competing media networks access to 
Durant and the world received images of a frightened young American being 
held captive and being cared for by the followers of Aidid. He told Mark 
Huband, a journalist with The Guardian: 
 
Too many innocent people are getting killed. People are angry because they see 
civilians getting killed. I don't think anyone who doesn't live here can understand 
what is going wrong here. Americans mean well. We did try to help. Things have 
gone wrong. 
 
Within a month of Durant’s capture, all American servicemen had been 
withdrawn from Mogadishu. Aidid had defeated the world’s sole superpower 
                                                 
28 Malaysian and Pakistani soldiers assisted the American forces that entered 
Mogadishu. Many of them were also killed and wounded. Robert Oakley (US 
Ambassador to Somalia) estimated the number of Somali casualties in an interview with 
PBS: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/ambush/interviews. See also Hirsch & 
Oakley (1995). 
29 http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohsom.htm. 
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and, as Osama Bin Laden has been happy to point out, Somalia proved that 
America could be defeated. 
 In Somalia, Mohammed Farah Aidid hijacked the weapons of the powerful 
and used them for his own aims. The US intervention in Somalia was 
determined and defined by the media and in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the 
US public had come to expect and anticipate clean real-time live images of their 
men doing ‘God’s’ work. That this medium could also provide them with real-
time live images of mangled American bodies and frightened captured young 
men had not been anticipated, and no amount of spin-doctoring could prevent it. 
In Somalia, Aidid took control of, if only for a short period of time, part of the 
arsenal of ICT superiority that the US had, and used it against them. Hungry for 
their media ratings, international media companies struggled with one another 
to scoop the images that would terminate America’s involvement in Somalia, 
and subsequently Rwanda. Direct real-time images of death and destruction, a 
development that had been made possible by the rapid advances in ICT, spread 
around the world. From Tokyo to Johannesburg, Sao Paolo, New York and San 
Francisco, audiences heard the words and saw the face of the frightened young 
pilot urging America to withdraw, and within the space of a month America 
withdrew. 
 
There was no longer any support for the US to engage Somalis in combat as far as 
the US public was concerned. The impact of Americans being dragged through the 
streets, a large number of Americans killed and wounded without any real 
explanation by the White House, in advance, of why we were there. The fact that the 
mission was no longer a humanitarian mission. That we were somehow engaged in a 
war and why this war was worthwhile meant that there was no support whatsoever 
for any sort of active operation, other than self-defense military operations in 
Somalia.30 
 
The reaction by the United States to events in Somalia had wide-ranging 
repercussions. Bosnian Serbs publicly celebrated developments in Somalia, 
secure in the knowledge that they would never have to face US troops in face-
to-face combat (Power 2002). With events in Somalia in mind, Rwandan 
extremists planning to commit genocide developed a plan of action that would 
guarantee the withdrawal of foreign European troops from Rwanda. On 11 
January 1994, Major General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian officer 
commanding the United Nations Assistance Mission of Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
contacted UN headquarters in New York and transmitted a coded cable via 
satellite. The cable proves that by as early as January 1994, the world had 
knowledge about the impending genocide. In his cable Dallaire referred to a 
                                                 
30 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html 
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Rwandan informant, a ‘very very important government politician. … is a top 
level trainer in the cadre of interhamwe’.  
 
He informed us he was in charge of last Saturday’s demonstrations whose aims were 
to target deputies of opposition parties coming to ceremonies and Belgian soldiers. 
They hoped to provoke the RPF BN to engage (being fired upon) the demonstrators 
and provoke a civil war. Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from 
Parliament. Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgians soldiers resorted to 
force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal 
from Rwanda.31 
 
 
Hijacking the powerful 
 
Castells has noted that one of the prime constraints on the fighting of wars for 
rich countries is the flow of information: 
 
It's not just that people no longer feel there are values worth dying for, but their 
ability to get information about what's happening on the battlefield is the kind of 
information flow that leaders who want to engage in war have to respond to, and are 
therefore forced to get out of the war quickly.32 
 
That this is the case has been clearly brought to the fore by what happened in 
Somalia and later Rwanda. In both cases, the weapons of the powerful — here 
the media — could and can be hijacked for a short period of time and then 
released again. This temporary ownership has effects and results that are totally 
unintended on the part of the powerful. In and of itself there is nothing new 
about the images being presented, yet what is new is the speed, pervasiveness 
and quantity of the material being presented. When the Germans were defeated 
in battle in Namibia in the late 19th century it took at least four months before 
the defeat could be avenged, yet when Aidid shot down a helicopter above 
Mogadishu, the change was immediate. The example of Somalia indicates that 
there is a struggle for access to media streams. It also highlights the need for 
further study on how local actors use international media streams to advance 
their own aims that is a move away from the anecdotal and a move into the 
concrete. In essence, the case of Somalia is a further example of the struggle, on 
the part of Africans, to develop ways and means with which to divert and hold, 
                                                 
31 A copy of this cable is to be found at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/warning/cable.html. 
32 http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Castells/castells-con4.html 
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even if for only a limited amount of time, the streams of information and goods 
that flow around the globe.  
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Can ICT belong in Africa, or is  
ICT owned by the North Atlantic  
region? 
 
Wim van Binsbergen 
 
 
ICT, as a technological innovation and a major factor in 
globalization, poses particular problems of ownership and 
identity with regard to the African continent. What is the place 
of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) in Africa, 
and what is the place of Africa in a world increasingly 
dominated by ICT? This chapter seeks to explode the apparent 
contradiction between Africa and ICT. In the first part the 
author confronts African thinkers like Mazrui and Gyekye who 
have argued the incompatibility of African culture and ICT. 
Having advanced an argument to the effect that ICT is just as 
much and as little owned by Africans as by any other 
collectivity in the contemporary world, the second part of the 
chapter sets out, with a more empirical argument, some of the 
ways in which the African appropriation of ICT is actually 
taking shape.  
 
 
Introduction: Two worlds? 
 
Until well into the 1970s when computer terminals were still scarce and the 
microcomputer unknown, academic computer use in the Netherlands was 
mainly restricted to main frames that today we would consider hopelessly 
antiquated. Usually we ran our jobs at night, in our absence, as the computer 
was slow and the queue of rival jobs was virtually endless. The supreme 
moment came the next morning when we grabbed our batch of output from the 
counter assistant who ran the printer to which we had no direct access: The 
output consisted of enormous quantities of A3 fanfold paper full of barely 
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legible printed lines of 80 characters in caps. Walking away from the counter, 
we would hold the wide and hopefully heavy batch of output at eye height, and 
with pounding heart would start to skip through the output to see if the 
computer had brought us the outcomes we had hoped for. 
Ten years later, when doing cultural anthropological research into the 
psychotherapeutic practices of local oracular priests in the mangrove woods of 
the West African country of Guinea-Bissau, I was struck time and again by the 
similarity between our tense and hopeful scrutiny of computer output back in 
the 1970s and the stance that these priests (often practising in groups of two or 
three at a time) adopted when administering the frequently-resorted-to ‘chicken 
oracle’. In local Manjak society,1 sacrifices to spirits and ancestors were the 
order of the day. Each sacrifice’s acceptance or rejection by the spirits had to be 
ascertained by a one-bit decision device: in a swift movement the belly of a 
chicken was cut open, and the unexpectedly long, cream-coloured string of guts 
was held high in the sunlight to be scrutinized professionally so that the priestly 
colleagues could decide on the presence or absence of unnatural darker stains on 
the outside of the guts. The outcome could be black (unfavourable) or white 
(favourable). The priests wore no outward signs of their professional status but 
they stood out unmistakably as servants of the supernatural — privileged with 
extraordinary power and knowledge — by the combination of their tense 
technical attention; their fond deliberations on details absolutely invisible to lay 
outsiders; their relentless and triumphant final judgement that for the client held 
the greatest possible significance (for they were supervising sacrifices, no 
Manjak will sacrifice unless driven by despair, and each sacrifice involves very 
great costs of time, money and frustration); and the studied neglect with which 
the disfigured dead animal was cast away. 
The choice of these two opening vignettes, one Dutch and one African, 
purposely conjures up the compartmentalized world image from which I want to 
step back in this chapter. ‘Africa’, ‘Europe’, ‘the North Atlantic region’ — 
these are not neutral descriptive categories and certainly not distinctions 
underpinned by scientific analysis but merely geopolitical programmes serving 
to designate the hegemonic relationships in the contemporary world:  
 
• The North Atlantic region as characterized by material technology in which 
the interaction between man and machine (i.e. a conglomerate of highly 
heterogeneous material part objects functioning on the basis of a rationally 
composed and empirically underpinned coherent complexity) entails, in 
addition to social effects, an interference with nature that is explicitly  
 
                                                 
1 See Van Binsbergen (1984) and (1988). 
 Can ICT belong in Africa? 109 
intended as well as demonstrably effective, and that may be conducive to 
some social utilization of natural forces. 
• Africa as characterized by socio-ritual technology (‘magic’) in which 
machines in the above sense do not feature, and in which man only produces 
a social effect by merely the illusion of an interference with nature, through 
interaction with objects that are either naturally given (the chicken), or that 
may be produced with the aid of simple technology (the priest’s knife slitting 
open the chicken’s stomach). 
 
According to such a conception of the world, ICT (Information and 
Communication Technology), as eminently typical of the technology of North 
Atlantic modernism and postmodernism, would be alien to Africa. Accordingly, 
it would — allegedly — merely do violence to African people if material 
technology were to occupy just as much of a central and taken-for-granted part 
of their lives as has come to be the case in the North. By such a postulated 
development, the most beautiful, most essential contribution of Africans to the 
global achievements of mankind would — still allegedly — be destroyed, given 
the constraints imposed by this world view. But this would be unlikely to 
happen anyway for, because of their own ‘culture’, ‘Africans’ would (so this 
conception of the world maintains) be scarcely capable of developing the 
various specific skills necessary for contemporary computer use. In accordance 
with the essentialism characteristic of geopolitical constructions, the division of 
labour between North and South is conceived of as perennial and immutable: to 
us the computer, to them the chicken oracle — as presumably it has been since 
the beginning of time, or certainly since the late 19th century, when British 
colonial expansion in Africa took place to the tune of the following late 19th-
century popular couplet that in its emphasis on the Northern monopolization of 
the technical achievements of that time and age (including advanced weaponry) 
implies the essence of a not-yet-globalized world:  
 
Whatever happens, 
we have got 
the Maxim gun 
and they have not. 
 
One of the principal tasks of intercultural philosophy is to explode precisely this 
world view, and to replace it by a model more in accordance with the 
contemporary global reality that is characterized by immense diversity, the 
international interconnectedness of cultural orientations, and the virtually 
unlimited global availability of state-of-the-art technologies.  
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The problem as seen from the perspective of intercultural 
philosophy 
 
Intercultural philosophy investigates, as its central theme, inter-culturality.2 It 
does so by means of a theoretical reflection on such concepts as culture, cultural 
difference, cultural diversity, cultural relativism, identity, multiculturality, 
power, hermeneutics and dialogue. With the use of such concepts, intercultural 
philosophy critically explores the conditions under which we might speak of 
interculturality. What are the units between which the interaction takes place 
that is presupposed in the concept of ‘inter’-culturality? On what grounds (and 
are these valid grounds) do we distinguish between such units? What nature, 
permanence, boundedness vis-à-vis each other, internal structure or internal 
consistence can we attribute to these units? Is it meaningful to speak of a 
plurality of cultures (in line with well-established contemporary language use) 
in such a way that we attribute to each culture out of which that plurality 
consists, such features as internal integration, boundedness vis-à-vis other such 
cultures, association with a specific part set of humanity, and association with a 
part of the earth’s surface as the historical habitat of that part set? Or is such a 
use of ‘culture’ and ‘cultures’ too much a reflection of such self-evidences as 
have established themselves in the socio-political structure of contemporary 
society — self-evidences that the philosopher ought to critique rather than take 
for granted? Is it meaningful to speak of an African ‘culture’ or ‘cultures’, and 
to attribute distinctive features to it or to them? The world appears in our 
experience as a complex of contradictions, foremost among which is the 
contradiction between existing inequalities in terms of power and resources, on 
the one hand, and the appeal to a shared humanity regardless of these 
inequalities, on the other. What is the relationship between (a) such underlying 
inequalities, and (b) thinking in terms of culture and cultural differences? Is (b) 
simply the masked, oblique expression of (a)? Are intercultural knowledge and 
intercultural communication possible? Or will such knowledge always remain 
invalid, to the extent to which it is incapable of escaping from the distorting 
effects produced by the hegemonic subjugation of one subset of humanity to the 
language, power, productive interests, world view and values of another such 
subset? Is it possible for cultural mobilization initiated by the local actors 
themselves, and by philosophical reflection by intercultural philosophers, to rise 
above these limitations? Can such mobilization and reflection even be a means 
to redress inequalities and to enhance the validity of intercultural knowledge? 
These are some of the themes of intercultural philosophy. 
                                                 
2 Cf. Mall (1995), Mall & Lohmar (1993), Kimmerle (1994), Kimmerle & Wimmer 
(1997) and Van Binsbergen (2003: Chapter 15 and passim). 
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With specific application to ICT this yields two central questions: 
 
(1) Is ICT to be viewed as the specific and characteristic achievement of 
only a subset of humanity (notably the North Atlantic part)? and 
(2) Is ICT therefore not really at home in Africa? 
 
I will answer these questions in a largely negative way. This allows us to situate 
Africa within a globalizing world, and to admit that in such a context Africa has 
unmistakably and self-evidently access to essentially metalocal elements such 
as ICT. Next, we can pose the more empirical question as to how such access 
takes shape in concrete terms. In other words, how does the enculturation of 
ICT in Africa manifest itself by means of a transformative localization — often 
a virtualization — of whatever is available worldwide in the ICT field? 
 
 
ICT as North Atlantic and therefore as not really at home in Africa? 
 
Several African philosophers have concerned themselves with the question of 
the retention or loss of cultural identity under conditions of contemporary 
information and communication technology. Does electronic ICT in Africa lead 
to creative and liberating cultural appropriation by Africans? Is it leading to the 
annihilation of the African cultural heritage? Or do both propositions apply 
somehow? Is the computer in Africa to be taken for granted or does it remain an 
alien element? Way back in the late 1970s, the prominent political philosopher 
Ali Mazrui (hailing from Kenya and now at the State University of New York, 
USA) regarded the computer as a ‘cultural transplant’ from the North, alien to 
the societies and cultures of Africa and only capable of having a devastating or 
subjugating effect in the African context (Mazrui 1978). Jules-Rosette (1990) 
summarizes Mazrui’s view in the following terms: 
 
[the] imported nature [of the computer] might badly fit the tasks and orientation of 
non-western workers, and as a result it may form a source of socio-cultural 
disruption, increasing economic dependency and introducing modes of thought 
which are alien to the working environment in which the computer is being used. 
 
Mazrui was recently supported in this point of view by the Ghanaian 
philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1997: 37), who stated that:  
 
 
Ideally, technology, as a cultural product, should rise from the culture of a people, if 
it is to be directly accessible to a large section of the population and its nuances are 
to be fully appreciated by them.  
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But by contrast, Paulin Hountondji from Côte d’Ivoire maintains a relativizing 
distance from any attempt to claim an absolutely distinct African identity and 
culture, including an African philosophy. He invites his African colleagues to 
recognize the fact that contemporary African expressions are increasingly 
linked up with a global cultural, philosophical and technological mainstream. 
Here Africans, provided the intercontinental inequalities attending the material 
conditions for the production of knowledge are lifted and on the basis of the 
African historical background of what Hountondji calls ‘endogenous knowledge 
production’, may very well prove able to make a contribution, which then is to 
converge with, rather than deviate from, widely accepted formats and 
achievements.3 For Hountondji, ICT is the answer to Africa’s lagging behind in 
academic knowledge production, and the African Institute for Advanced Study, 
which Hountondji is now in the process of setting up in Benin (based on 
Princeton’s model for such institutes), will rely on electronic ICT and not on 
such time-honoured African means of communication as the talking drum).4 
Open debate on these questions is severely impeded by the fact that it is 
situated in global and national arenas where social control favours the public 
production of politically correct statements, or of statements that reflect the 
parochial collective interests of a particular group of participants in this debate. 
Many philosophical positions on the issue of the transcontinental reception of 
ICT are possible, and among them are socially privileged geopolitical points of 
view, entrenched by the effects of societal power distribution, ideology and 
media coverage. The latter points of view may have become installed in the 
collective representations of large sets of people in such a way that these 
viewpoints can hardly be explicitly discussed and confronted any more without 
prejudice or without inviting bitter controversy. These collective representations 
also tend to invade the philosophical discourse, to the extent to which 
philosophers, too, are children of their time and of their wider society.5 The 
naïve geopolitics of everyday North Atlantic parlance, such as the evocation of 
a particularly negative othering of African conditions and people, is often 
replicated in what are otherwise sophisticated specialist philosophical 
arguments.  
Let us seek to sketch, by means of a few rough distinctions, the fields of 
tension that are encountered here. 
In the times of mercantilism, imperialism and colonialism, ‘the African’ was 
constructed, in North Atlantic thought, as the other par excellence — an other 
                                                 
3 Cf. Hountondji (1996, 1988, 1990, 1994). 
4 Hountondji (personal communications, 1997-1998). 
5 Cf. Van Binsbergen (2003: Chapter 15). 
 Can ICT belong in Africa? 113 
to whom the philosophical achievements of the Modern Age (insights in the 
human condition, and such human rights as derived from such insights), 
scarcely applied, even though Europeans insistently claimed these insights and 
rights for themselves. Subsequently, after decolonization, the second half of the 
20th century witnessed two almost opposite movements seeking to redress — 
with the mobilization of a good deal of emotion — this racialist exclusion of 
Africans:  
 
(a) On the one hand, in a modernist Enlightenment-derived frame of mind, 
and largely in the context of development cooperation, and its underlying 
philosophies, there is the attempt to reclaim things African under the 
heading of allegedly universally applicable, and originally North Atlantic, 
categories (such as ‘world religion’, ‘democratic constitutional 
arrangements’, ‘modern health care’, ‘formal education’, ‘the formal 
organization’ as the dominant format for social and economic life, 
‘modern technology’, ‘economic planning’, ‘literature’, ‘philosophy’, 
‘art’). From this perspective, being ‘African’ would be an irrelevant 
category, under which more essential universal categories become 
manifest.  
(b) On the other hand, there is the particularism projected onto fragmented 
African identities as an aspect of the ethnicization process in which 
(under postmodern conditions such as the erosion of the modernist world 
view of the Enlightenment, of the centralist nation state, and of the 
illusion of the autonomous subject) the contemporary world as a whole is 
involved. This process consists of the fact that politics is no longer 
primarily experienced as a struggle for scarce material resources but for 
public recognition of a particularistic group identity. Once such 
recognition has been extended to the group, it will successfully claim 
material resources as a matter of course. From this perspective, ‘being 
African’ is a quality in its own right, not to be relegated to any more 
universal category.  
 
From the perspective of movement (a), things African dissolve as a slight ruffle 
amidst so many others within the great flow of world culture and world history. 
Movement (b) however battles against such a blurring of distinctions and 
stresses the construction and presentation of an identity of one’s own at the 
local, regional, national and continental level. The tension between these two 
movements produces a torsion that lends confusing double binds to much of the 
contemporary thinking about Africa, North Atlantic hegemony, and 
universality. From the ethnicizing perspective (b), African identity appears as 
the emphatic politicized condition for participation in intercontinental processes 
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of communication, knowledge production, cooperation and intervention. From 
the development perspective (a), however, African specificity has been 
underplayed in favour of universalism in science, economics and social-
organizational and constitutional matters. These two simultaneous movements 
(a) and (b) each lead to a different appreciation of such cultural programming as 
structures everyday life, political organization, forms of production, world 
views and religious practices. According to movement (a), each cultural 
ordering (even if recognized to be unmistakable, comprehensive and difficult to 
escape from) is yet a more or less ephemeral, superficial orientation under 
which more fundamental intercultural communalities lurk — communalties that 
are claimed to be universal but that in fact are conceived primarily in 
accordance with North Atlantic models. This view implies the possibility that 
culture does not produce a total experience encompassing an individual’s entire 
life, and therefore also implies the probability that each individual is 
simultaneously involved in a plurality of different cultural orientations. It would 
not, thus, be meaningful to speak of a ‘culture’ or of ‘cultures’ in the sense of 
integrated, bounded, distinct human modes of being that encompass life as a 
whole and that are shared by large sets of people.6 The surface fragmentation of 
‘cultures’ would be taken to dissolve into comprehensive spatial and temporal 
communalities and continuities at a deeper level. By contrast, the ethnicization 
movement (b) invites us to let the many concrete cultural orderings coincide 
more unequivocally with the identities that we construct for ourselves within 
contemporary political arenas, and to attribute to these orderings, in this context, 
a permanence and a discrete distinctive nature that are commensurate with the 
severity of the contradictions and with the seriousness of the struggle within 
these arenas. The South identity or identities, from a development perspective 
(a), would ultimately appear to be contingent and unessential, yet from the 
ethnicization perspective (b) would appear to be reified and essentialized. Since 
the greatest, most conspicuous inequality in our time is that between North and 
South on a global level, from the ethnicization perspective (b) it would amount 
to a treacherous attack on the most important resources available for improving 
the conditions and enhancing the empowerment of people in the South, if as 
under (a) one were to take a relative view of any Southern, for instance any 
African, identity. Thus perspectives (a) and (b) lead to utterly contradictory 
positions, neither of which could be said to be more justified than the other. 
Interculturality is invariably characterized by the puzzle of contradicting 
positions between which we cannot choose unless we are prepared to destroy 
the equality of these positions and forfeit interculturality for the sake of a one-
sided alternative of hegemony, subjugation, objectification or ethnocentrism. 
                                                 
6 Cf. Van Binsbergen (2003: Chapter 15). 
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This goes some way towards sketching the complex context in which we 
may explore, from an intercultural perspective, the strained relationship 
between, on the one hand, ‘Africa’ (i.e. African identity), and contemporary 
ICT, on the other.  
We have to admit that ‘Africa’ is not a fixed and firm reality. When Mazrui 
and Gyekye see ‘Africa’ as being penetrated by the computer, then their 
concern is not so much with a land mass that extends between certain latitudes 
and longitudes, one on which hundreds of millions of people move in a gaudy 
interplay of cultural and social organizational varieties — partially rural and in 
accordance with historically specific local patterns, partially urban and 
increasingly in accordance with patterns that are either recent local innovations, 
or transformed borrowings from elsewhere in the contemporary world. In the 
debate surrounding ICT, ‘Africa’ is primarily an identity construct: the issue is 
‘African culture’ or ‘African cultures’ that are alleged to be negatively 
influenced by the supposedly alien computer and the latter’s capabilities of 
communication and information. 
To what might such a possibly negative influence be attributed? Here at least 
three answers would be possible:  
 
(1) (1’) ICT is Northern culture, and hence (1’’) ICT is irreconcilably 
opposed to African culture;  
(2) (1) ICT is metalocal world culture, without local specificity and local 
validity, and hence (2’’) ICT is, in principle, devastating for any 
localizing cultural identity such as the African one; and 
(3) (3’) ICT is inimical to culture, and hence (3’’) ICT is inimical to the 
African culture or cultures. 
 
At first glance something could be said in favour of each of these three theses 
but none entirely passes the test of closer scrutiny. This is partially due to the 
dual nature of each of these theses: each starts with a global cultural appraisal of 
ICT, followed by a claimed effect of the global characteristic on the African 
situation. Even if either of the two parts were true, their combination might still 
be false.  
 
 
ICT inimical to any culture? 
 
Only in the case of thesis (3) is the derivation of (3’’) from (3’) evident: 
whatever is inimical to culture is inevitably inimical to African culture or 
cultures. Technological pessimism has been part of the recent continental 
philosophical mainstream with its principal exponent being Heidegger (1977), 
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who has claimed that technology is by its essence perpendicular to any culture 
and does not constitute an integrated part of it. But even so, thesis (3) can hardly 
be defended. Whatever definition we offer of culture, in continuity with 
widespread established language usage, we are likely to prefer to describe 
culture as something that has a collective nature — in other words, something 
that is the attribute of a set of people, of a subset of total humanity. In addition, 
our definition is likely to include an aspect of spatial extension, since even the 
smallest set of people inevitably occupies a certain space. Regarding the time 
dimension, our concept of culture is likely to include a certain permanence, 
supported by interpersonal learning processes to bridge the gap between 
generations and to guarantee cultural continuity in the face of the individual 
mortality of a culture’s human bearers. In other words, culture is likely to be 
considered as being subjected to processes of regulated transfer between people 
whose cultural competence is initially unequal: people belonging to different 
generations, classes, genders, linguistic groups, local outsiders versus local 
insiders, etc. And our definition of culture is also likely to include an aspect of 
recognizable patterned ordering that allows culture both to be specifically 
recognized as a transferable collective attribute and to be actually transferred to 
those who adopt patterned cultural specifics as their distinctive collective 
attribute.  
Information and communication are implied in most of these aspects of our 
definition of culture. Information and communication are thus essential aspects 
of culture, and they always take place via a specific medium — a specific 
technology. The face-to-face communication7 by which culture is predominantly 
transferred in family settings constitutes a technology of speech and rhetoric — 
in other words a technology of information and communication. Another such 
technology of information and communication has been formed — ever since 
the earliest imperial times of the Assyrians, Persians, Chinese and Romans — 
by the technologies of the mail road with its shunting points where horses and 
couriers were replaced, or in the last thousand years (if we go by the Chinese 
invention of block printing, rather than by the West European variety of 
detached type) the technology of printing, and in most recent times the 
technologies of movies, radio, television, video and the Internet. These have all 
amounted to technologies of information and communication constitutive of 
culture. Instead of being inimical to culture, ICT constitutes a central element in 
everything we would prefer to call culture. There seems to be little reason to 
                                                 
7 Even here though the role of non-spoken representations – in sacred emblems, images, 
writing, photographs, videos, email, telephone conversations, etc. – must not be 
underestimated or restricted to the most recent times. 
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exclude present-day electronic ICT from this general picture. However, we must 
point out the tension between:  
 
(i) the ethnicization perspective on culture (according to which culture is 
bounded, specific and integrated, and comprises and defines specific part 
sets of humanity); and 
(ii) communication as a fundamental aspect of any culture.  
 
The former (i) is conducive to demarcation, the latter (ii) to extension, which in 
principle may be unlimited and may comprise mankind’s entire world. In other 
words, communication that is constitutive of culture may spill over beyond that 
one culture and thus assault its specificity. The fact that language is one of the 
principal means of communication for constituting culture works to the 
advantage of demarcation: language is highly structured and specific in terms of 
its lexicon, phonology and syntax. Languages are in principle not mutually 
intelligible and each specific language therefore effectively limits the part set of 
humanity and (to the presently rapidly decreasing extent to which languages are 
neatly distributed across the globe in the way of geographical language areas, 
each of which is tied to a specific section of the earth’s surface) the spatial 
radius within which communication takes places and culture consolidates itself. 
Not for nothing is language the main stable indicator of ethnic identity. But 
regardless of how language is acquired,8 many (probably most) people in the 
world are multilingual to a greater or lesser extent, and thus it is possible to step 
out of the limitations imposed by merely one language. Moreover, language is 
by no means the only method of communication, by no means the only factor 
constituting the communication element in culture. One example may make this 
clear. Anyone who makes a transcontinental trip across Africa in an old car will 
meet people along the way with whom they can barely converse, if at all, but 
who are able to repair their car should the need arise. Obviously communication 
about that type of technological knowledge (and many other types of 
knowledge) is language dependent only to a very limited extent. Through 
communication processes culture is both consolidated and continually spread 
outside the space that was initially defined as that culture’s proper domain. 
Moreover, by communication processes, culture is continually invaded from 
                                                 
8 Most anthropologists would claim language mastery to derive exclusively from a 
learning process, but reasons have been advanced from various sides to qualify this 
statement, for example, from Chomsky (1968, 1986) postulating the innate nature of 
language ability to Sheldrake (1981, 1988) suggesting that the acquisition of an 
unknown language is made easier the more speakers that language has, as if an 
intangible supporting network – a ‘morphogenetic field’ – would add to individual 
learning achievements. 
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outside within the proper domain it has initially claimed for itself. As a result, 
the localization of culture and the close link between culture and identity in the 
process of ethnicization tend to be continually threatened and destroyed. On 
these grounds one might argue that ICT is both constitutive of, and inimical to, 
culture, but one might as well maintain that the very conception of culture as 
localized, bounded and identitary, is inimical to culture! Exit thesis (3). 
 
 
ICT as Northern culture 
 
Thesis (1) is considered to be true by the early Mazrui and by Gyekye. Our 
example of African car repairs is doubly instructive, for it also shows that many 
forms of cultural programming (such as knowledge of transport technology, 
specifically of the internal combustion engine), that we would initially be 
inclined to situate in a particular area of the contemporary world (notably in the 
North Atlantic), have not confined themselves to that region, and have in fact 
gained worldwide distribution. Not only the silly clichés of globalization, such 
as jeans, Coca Cola and the McDonald hamburger, but also other globally 
trendy styles of clothing, of cosmetics and bodily hygiene, means of transport, 
organizational forms, world religions, and globally circulating forms of time 
reckoning, of music and its reproduction, of dance, recreation, sports and 
sexuality, have gained an absolutely metalocal distribution. Africa takes part in 
this distribution, not so much because Africans can afford actual consumption 
out of this global supply (most of them cannot) but vicariously: to the extent to 
which representations of this metalocal culture, via TV, video, radio, the printed 
press and people’s own observations across class boundaries, have reached 
contemporary Africans and inform their desires. Africans today seek to partake 
of Modernity on a Shoestring (cf. Fardon et al. 1999). All this amounts to the 
cultural aspect of globalization. By globalization we mean, in general, the 
process through which local contexts in the world are more and more dissolving 
into a worldwide network of interaction under the influence of technological 
innovations that have reduced to virtually zero the costs (in terms of time and 
money) of communication and information. Globalization was, in the first 
instance, observed with regard to transnational movements of capital along 
electronic media but in the meantime turns out to have important cultural 
dimensions.9 
                                                 
9 A selection from the rapidly growing literature in this field includes Bauman (1998), 
Beyer (1994), Featherstone (1995), Friedman (1995), Hannerz (1992), King (1991), 
Meyer & Geschiere (1998), Robertson (1992), Van der Veer (1996), Warnier (1999), cf. 
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In this situation, appealing to ‘African culture’ or ‘African cultures’ implies 
the risk that we dissimulate the problematic, constructed, virtual nature of these 
concepts. One of the main themes of the contemporary African experience has 
been the revival, often even the militant reconstruction, of the ‘authentically 
African’ despite, and often with the aid of, prominently installed metalocal 
contemporary technologies: the printing press, music, recordings, film, radio 
and television, the Internet, cultural festivals with electronic sound technologies. 
There is no empirical support for the claim that historical African culture may 
still be captured, entirely intact and self-evident anywhere on the African 
continent today, by any means. Whatever passes for African culture today has 
become to a lesser or greater degree virtual: in name it harks back to historical 
cultural material (world views, norms and values, religious symbols, institutions 
deriving from the local past), but in fact it appears in contemporary 
representations as fragmented, as produced under a new globally influenced 
format, and as having lost its coherence with a more integrated and persistent 
local cultural framework. It has become redefined and hangs in the air (Van 
Binsbergen 1997b, 1998). 
In this context, to speak of ICT as a cultural transplant is misleading to the 
highest degree. Such a claim denies the continuity between North Atlantic and 
African manifestations of globalized metalocal culture and suggests instead — 
in a nostalgic re-enactment of the redeeming mysticism of things African — a 
geopolitical separateness between continents in the cultural domain, and in 
general a purity and authenticity of cultural domains that in our day and age is 
certainly nowhere to be found. I reserve for another argument the question of 
whether such purity and separateness at any moment in the past would have 
been adequate terms to describe the actual situation within Africa and the 
relationship between Africa and the North Atlantic. The fact that Mazrui and 
Gyekye pursue cosmopolitan forms of knowledge production (philosophy, 
political science) in an originally European language (English), and that they do 
so effectively and with great success and appeal especially outside their African 
country of origin, is in itself sufficient proof of the point I wish to make here 
with regard to the present lack of separation and of purity. 
Would it even be anachronistic to claim, in our time and age, a specific local 
or regional origin and identity (for example ‘North Atlantic’, ‘American’, 
‘European’) for technologies that at present have a metalocal distribution, 
including electronic ICT? 
It is characteristic of modern times that technological innovation has 
expressly become an industry, a collective, explicit and rationally organized 
                                                                                                                       
Van Binsbergen (1999), the English version of which appears as Chapter 12 of Van 
Binsbergen (2003). 
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production process. Technology has loosened itself from the more 
comprehensive socio-cultural frameworks that produced it, and has for a long 
time largely ceased to be an expression of the local socio-cultural forms which 
such frameworks have assumed. In other words, apart from minor and 
immaterial embellishments, there is nothing remarkably Dutch any more about 
Philips (‘the inventors of the CD’, as their advertising slogan claims) CD 
equipment, nothing remarkably American about Macintosh computers, nothing 
remarkably Japanese about Fuji cameras. Patent law regulates the appropriation 
of forms of technology that generate so much productivity and on which 
products for such lucrative markets are based, that restrictions on the circulation 
of that type of knowledge are worth enforcing, at least in the immediate future. 
Of course, these restrictions on the circulation of knowledge only serve to 
ensure the greatest possible circulation, with the greatest possible profit, of the 
products made on the basis of that knowledge in line with the general trend of 
globalization.  
The spatial imagery surrounding innovation is often deceptive. Typically, 
innovation tends to be imagined as coming from the outside, from a different 
domain from one’s own, even if in fact that origin is far more continuous with 
one’s own domain. For the Dutch farmer who has taken to monitoring his cattle 
by computer, this is a ‘town’ technology, initially alien to his own rural 
environment but his very appropriation of this technology, as of so many others, 
has already rendered relative the entire contradiction between town and country. 
To the Dutch academic who in the last fifteen years has totally transformed 
his/her style of writing, research and teaching following the arrival of the 
microcomputer and the Internet, the latter may have appeared as an alien 
‘American’ technology, but again its very appropriation renders relative the 
distinction between the European home and the no-longer-faraway United 
States.  
But is there any way of denying that the computer is originally North 
Atlantic? Some readers may know that the Internet was originally a specifically 
American military innovation in the 1960s, long before the advent of the 
microcomputer. The computer in general undoubtedly originated in specific 
accumulative cultural achievements of North Atlantic culture. The computer 
testifies to this state of affairs in many ways: in its internal design; in its 
external design and aesthetics; in the principles according to which the user 
interface has been conceived to readily appeal to the most likely, North Atlantic 
users; in the iconography and syntax informing the communication between 
computer and user, and between users; and in the illusion of an absolutely 
individual autonomy in ownership, access, financial and legal responsibility of 
the owner — whereas in reality that user tends to be blindly dependent on 
systems that are inaccessible as black boxes and that owe no accountability to 
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anyone. The Microsoft empire and the negative stereotyping it generates among 
the more conscious users is a case in point. Even the built-in conflicts, ironies 
and humour in the computer domain may be relegated to the specific types of 
cultural programming attending the scientific, technological, military and 
entrepreneurial milieus — strongly North Atlantic and predominantly US — in 
which this technology has realized its rapid development. The language aspects 
of the computer are in the first instance American English. And without the 
inventive mathematics of Von Neumann, Turing and the members of their 
generation from the North Atlantic region, there would have been no computer.  
Does this mean that the computer and ICT in general are eminently at home 
in the North Atlantic world? That is admittedly where they have been received 
for years with great rapidity in all kinds of successive phases of their 
innovation. But this reception in itself already shows that, even in the North 
Atlantic world, computers are not in the first place at home — the environment 
in which they originated is scarcely the standard North Atlantic environment but 
something far more limited and specific. The most adequate description of this 
process of reception may be one of globalization, for instance in the following 
terms. 
Older formations of culture were made possible by older technologies of 
communication and information technology (from the footpath and the talking 
drum to writing, the mail coach and the sailing ship). At the same time these 
older cultural formations were breached by communication spilling over (by 
virtue of the same older technologies of communication and information) 
outside the localizing frames of identity. The double effect of both constituting 
culture and spilling over beyond the boundaries of cultural specificity has been 
a general feature of technologies of information and communication. Also, in 
the technologies of the computer (and of ICT in general), the local specificity of 
a cultural orientation has transcended itself by creating a medium that by its 
very nature is communicative and informative, and that is so even to a far 
greater extent than the older technologies by which older socio-cultural 
formations were supported. Far from being anathema to culture, contemporary 
ICT displays the typical dramatic relation vis-à-vis culture that technology has 
always had: facilitating and destructive at the same time.  
Electronic ICT may, on the one hand, be a product of Northern culture but, 
on the other hand, it puts paid to this very type of localized culture. It is capable 
of supporting historical cultural identity constructions and is admittedly used for 
that purpose (see, for example, Anderson 1992), but of far greater significance 
is its ability to breach identitary boundaries and to render thinkable and to 
support new forms of identity (like communities of emailers, electronic 
discussion groups, etc.) that are exclusively ICT based. This new medium has 
turned out to be communicative and informative, and thus it claims its place 
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among the instruments not for the destruction but for the perpetuation of 
culture.  
Even if it were only for this metalocal nature inherent in electronic ICT, the 
computer in Africa cannot justifiably be called a North Atlantic cultural 
transplant — for its North Atlantic nature has been too much transcended to 
make ‘North Atlantic’ a fitting characterization any longer. Moreover, as we 
have seen, the globalizing metalocal domain extends to include contemporary 
Africa where the ‘authentically African culture/cultures’ have at best survived, 
if at all, in the form of carefully maintained virtual enclaves, geared to the 
annual production of a harvest festival, a chief’s ceremony, a dancing 
performance, all of which have been partially reshaped in accordance with 
global models of media production, and thus have been virtualized.10 Nobody 
who takes an overview of contemporary socio-cultural life in Africa can escape 
the conclusion that in most places globalized elements are present and are even 
taken for granted, are no longer seen as alien but have been successfully 
appropriated in order to end up as local and indispensable even though they may 
still stand out as sources of prestige. Nowhere in Africa do the jeans, the bra, the 
car, canned food, formal organizations in education, health services or religion 
give rise to surprise anymore — they demonstrate that in many respects life in 
Africa has ceased to be ‘African’ but — just like life in Western Europe — has 
become metalocal, not to say global. Often, but not always, African Christian 
churches turn out to play a major role in filtering the market supply of modern 
consumption items, and in selectively validating and rejecting these: for 
example, accepting ladies’ underwear and the maxi skirt but rejecting women’s 
trouser suits and miniskirts; accepting the video but rejecting the disco; 
accepting Coca Cola and Fanta but rejecting bottled beer; accepting — from the 
images of fast North Atlantic life seen on videos and TV — the expensive and 
prestigious car but rejecting the open admission of the practice of sexual 
promiscuity, etc.11 
This non-authentic Africa, however inefficient and unpredictable in its 
details, is also for Africans a much more tangible reality than the mythical 
‘authentic Africa’. And in this tangible non-authentic Africa, ICT is not an alien 
transplant but an increasingly important aspect — taken for granted and no 
longer dispensable — of a socio-cultural milieu (notably that of the African 
elites) that, while geographically situated in Africa, has since the 19th century (if 
                                                 
10 Cf. my 1992 Amsterdam inaugural lecture: Van Binsbergen (1992a = 1994b). On the 
same problematic, cf. De Jong (1994, 2001) and Van Binsbergen (1994a). 
11 On these church practices in the context of the global market, cf. the contributions by 
Meyer and Van Dijk, both on Ghanaian Pentecostal churches, in Fardon et al. (1999) 
and Van Binsbergen (1997b: Chapter 1). 
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not earlier) closely followed North Atlantic technological developments and 
participated in these developments as a matter of course.  
 
 
ICT as metalocal global culture 
 
What remains is thesis (2):  
 
(2) (2’) ICT is metalocal world culture, without local specificity and local 
validity, and hence (2’’) ICT is in principle devastating for any localizing 
cultural identity like the African one. 
 
This argument contains sufficient elements to render plausible the first part (2’) 
of this thesis but what about the second part (2’’)? Localizing cultural identities 
in Africa, as elsewhere, exists in a state of tension vis-à-vis the globalizing 
elements (including electronic ICT) that have spread so abundantly all over 
Africa. This tension is, in principle, not necessarily destructive because, as 
argued above, the new technologies may also serve to support historical 
identities. The apparently alien transplant may yet turn out to further in 
unexpected ways that which is local and identitary, pace Mazrui and Gyekye. 
But to be able to serve that purpose, these technologies must in the first place be 
available and must also — as a further condition — have undergone some 
degree of local acclimatization. In Africa, these conditions are by now met for 
such communication techniques as the written press, radio, the telephone, 
television, cassette recorders and video, and in many places these technologies 
demonstrably support and inform identity constructions. However, in most 
places in Africa this is not yet the case with regard to the Internet: there are far 
too few user computers and providers, electronic network connections are 
unreliable, and the costs of Internet use are prohibitive for most Africans. Yet in 
the urban centres, around universities, and in the interplay with intercontinental 
migrants residing in the North Atlantic where Internet access is a matter of 
course, the computer is beginning to play an important role in the articulation of 
ethnic, cultural and religious identities. A large and ever-increasing number of 
African expressions are now available on the Internet, often as a result of 
Africans in the diaspora building websites largely for consumption at home, in 
Africa.  
But the majority of the African population has, as yet, hardly any access to 
this medium so that it is not available as a direct expression of local identity. 
Whatever manages to present itself, and to maintain itself, under such 
conditions of scarcity, does so usually by virtue of non-local inputs in terms of 
124 Van Binsbergen 
interests, means and formats, and therefore would produce only the most 
misleading representations of what may yet pose as a local situation.  
This state of affairs was particularly driven home to me with regard to the 
rural district of Kaoma in the heart of western Zambia. I have conducted 
anthropological and historical research there since 1972 but it was only in 1994 
that I could for the first time make an international telephone call from the 
district; and only a year later could I, from the Netherlands, have my first e-mail 
contact with someone residing in the district capital. 
Anyone who searches the Internet for ‘Kaoma’ with any of the usual search 
machines, does admittedly find a number of hits that unmistakably apply to this 
district.12 But if one tries to construct an image of Kaoma District on the basis of 
these hits, one gets absolutely lost in the fog — the kind of fog that hangs over 
North Atlantic polders or prairies, not the kind that in the early morning hangs 
over Kaoma’s dambos (wetlands) at the bottom of its shallow, wooded valleys 
where duiker antelopes and wild pigs (and until the 1980s even buffalo and 
elephants) are startled by local hunters; some of whom are in the employ of 
local princes, and some of whom still wield Portuguese muzzle-loading guns 
from the 19th century. Kaoma’s representation on the Internet is a misleading 
travesty of the actual local situation, not a form of valid knowledge but a form 
of ignorance. The Kaoma District that speaks to us via the Internet is merely a 
reflection of the intercontinental presence in the district, including a Dutch 
development project parading on its website an exceptionally successful local 
woman farmer (but one belonging to the locally hated, non-local immigrant 
group of the Lozi). There is also the US-controlled evangelical parent body of 
the Evangelical Church of Zambia that operates a major hospital in the district 
and its matron shares her unmistakably Southern States spirituality with visitors 
to her website. 
                                                 
12 ‘Kaoma’ is only a very short word and is likely to exist in several other languages and 
contexts than that of western central Zambia, where it has been the name of a district 
since 1969 (previously called Mankoya District), and the name of a stream since time 
immemorial. It is likely that the word ‘Kaoma’ has also penetrated the Internet from 
some of these other contexts, e.g. in Bemba, a major Zambian language, which however 
is not a lingua franca anywhere near Kaoma District, ‘Kaoma’ is one of the names of 
the High God. In a government move directed at Lozi rebelliousness, President Kaunda 
replaced the older district capital’s name Mankoya with Kaoma in 1969. ‘Mankoya’ 
was based on the Nkoya ethnonym, while ‘Kaoma’ is derived from the nearby Kaoma 
river and therefore was considered to be ethnically neutral. Likota lya Bankoya, a 
collection of Nkoya oral traditions from the first half of the 20th century, proposes an 
etymology for the hydronym Kaoma in terms of the destruction of a king’s ceremonial 
drums (in Nkoya called mawoma) in the 19th century (Van Binsbergen 1992b: 389). 
However, hydronyms are notorious for their tendency to immutability over long 
stretches of time, which makes this recent etymology of Kaoma somewhat suspect.   
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ICT between the local and the global in an African context 
 
The specific case of Kaoma suggests a situation around African ICT which I 
would deem eminently capable of generalization: when it comes to knowledge 
production concerning Africa, the Internet only renders to the outside world 
what that outside world has put into the Internet in the first place. In this light, 
there would seem to be little reason for the euphoria that generally attends 
discussions about ICT in African intellectual circles.13 For the time being, we 
should look anywhere except on the Internet for valid and representative 
knowledge production on Kaoma District and its inhabitants.14 And Kaoma 
District is representative of very many districts in Africa where, despite the 
virtualization and globalization of life, the traces of older historical socio-
cultural forms can still be discerned so that people may yet entertain the illusion 
— although it is an illusion and nothing more — that these forms have braved 
the decades or even the centuries.15 
A new field of tension arises here: that between the medium-specific format 
(in which inevitably the North Atlantic cultural origin of ICT shines through) 
and the contents, that in principle may be derived from all knowledge systems 
of all times and from all over the world. From the extent to which ICT is 
metalocal, it is valid to say that this medium — irrespective of its North Atlantic 
origin — may display great flexibility as far as its specific cultural context of 
use is concerned. Sharing the cultural orientation, the mathematical rationality, 
the iconographic and aesthetic principles of the makers of ICT, is by no means a 
condition for the effective appropriation of this medium, and for the subsequent 
use of this medium for purposes and from the perspective of a world view that 
in itself would be rejected by that very same mathematical rationality: many 
divination systems including African ones such as Ifa and Hakata, ‘voodoo’ 
(which has now become a globalized term without any meaningful referent to 
any specific ritual practice in any specific time and place but which originally 
referred to the West African indigenous concept of vodun), recently invented or 
                                                 
13 Cf. Nkwi (1995), Nyamnjoh (1997), Ras-Work (1998). Also cf. the central role that 
Thabo Mbeki (1999), Nelson Mandela’s successor as president of South Africa, 
attributes to ICT. 
14 My own texts, which often mention Kaoma District, have only been available on the 
Internet since March 1999, and apart from a few exceptions do not carry the catchword 
‘Kaoma’ among their metatags. In mid 2001 an initiative arose among young Nkoya 
intercontinental migrants now in the United Kingdom to create a Nkoya website that 
would enhance the visibility of Kaoma District on the Internet. This is another example 
of how new technologies of globalization may help to articulate local identities. 
15 Remarkably, one may also critique the Internet, not because it offers incorrect but 
because it offers correct information in Africa and therefore disturbs Utopian identity 
constructions; cf. Okigbo (1995). 
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re-invented traditions such as the wicca witch cult, and forms of oriental 
systems of thought such as Taoism — all of these are well represented on the 
Internet. But when they appear there, it is almost invariably in a format (that of 
short written texts in a North Atlantic language, supported by visual material 
largely conceived in accordance with North Atlantic modernist or postmodernist 
aesthetic conventions as mediated by popular graphics computer programs) that 
implies a subjugation, domestication, of these non-Western forms of knowledge 
to North Atlantic models, at least at the formal and iconographic level. What is 
more, they often appear in the form of irritatingly gratuitous pseudo-knowledge, 
without critical apparatus — as sub-intellectual instant food, as a globalized and 
virtualized product (usually with a strong New Age element) that has only its 
name and superficial appearance in common with the original knowledge 
system that is claimed to be thus represented.  
It appears as if ICT strikingly manifests the themes of unity and diversity, 
localization and globalization in the modern world. An analysis of ICT, as 
attempted here, forces us to discard the illusion of sharp distinctions between 
cultures and between continents; such illusions make up the widespread but 
distortive geopolitical, ideological mind-set concerning the structure of the 
modern world. Instead it advocates a view based on a plurality of fields of 
tension and a plurality of kaleidoscopically superimposed and counteracting 
contradictions, between which the intercultural philosopher has to pick his or 
her way, just as prudently and falteringly as does the contemporary world 
citizen at large.  
Let us now assess how the enculturation of ICT is taking place in Africa 
itself as an aspect of globalization. 
 
 
How is the African enculturation of ICT taking place? 
 
The expansion of ICT in Africa 
Since the 1960s the use of the computer has continuously expanded, not only in 
the North Atlantic region but also in Africa. The first move was the rise of in-
house computing by the transition from the main frame to the microcomputer, 
and the transition from input by means of punched tape or punch card to input 
via the computer screen. In government institutions and universities, and in 
successful, capital-intensive sectors of commercial life, a total transformation of 
the administrative workplace has occurred. Previously the workplace was 
characterized by forms that hailed from the colonial era: authoritarian 
relationships, over-staffing, defective competence, and ritualization. New forms 
of management, cooperation (or, due to the fixation of everyone to his/her 
individual computer screen, the absence of cooperation!), the personal exercise 
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of power, and career mobility have come within reach due to the 
microcomputer. Computer specialists have taken the place of accountants and 
other administrative personnel with an intermediate-level training, women have 
gradually gained their own place in this new set-up and professional 
organizations have been formed in order to guard over the new power and 
privileges to which computer skills have given access. Wherever the 
microcomputer has been introduced, it has tended to lead to a marked increase 
of responsibilities and competences of first-line administrative personnel. This 
has resulted in fundamental changes in labour relations within bureaucracies 
and enterprises; moreover, vis-à-vis the public, the individual civil servant, now 
armed with a computer screen, can even more convincingly than before conjure 
up and exploit the image of the omnipotent state answerable to none — one of 
the most intransigent heritages of the colonial state in post-colonial Africa. 
Private training institutions have begun to exploit the new market generated by 
such expectations of professional upward mobility, steep rises in income, 
consumptive opportunities and security as have been associated with computer-
training certificates. Thus the collective technological Utopia that has been 
noticeable in the affected sectors of African urban life has been mirrored by a 
personal Utopia.  
One of the few researchers to have carried out richly conceptualized 
empirical research on ICT in Africa has been the prominent African American 
anthropologist Benetta Jules-Rosette in her book Terminal Signs (1990). 
Although the path of her analysis is somewhat hampered by a social-contract 
view of national societies in Africa, and by her rather humourless unconditional 
loyalty vis-à-vis the African computer workers featuring in her research, Jules-
Rosette (1990: 10f) offers nice examples of the kind of contradiction that one 
may encounter in the field of African ICT:  
 
A senior programmer at a Kenya wholesale outlet attempts to manage the transition 
from a labor-intensive NCR keypunch computer to a new electronic multi-user 
system while increasing the number of employees for whom he is responsible. If he 
increases the number of employees, although their individual work tasks have 
diminished, he will obtain the title of data processing manager and double his salary. 
Government administrators in Ivory Coast strive to develop a computer policy that 
will limit the activities of multinational computer vendors such as IBM, BULL, and 
UNISYS, while simultaneously encouraging these companies to invest in the 
country. The Kenyan government organizes the computerization of key government 
ministries but imposes stringent restrictions on public access to computers. These 
cases are not merely management conundrums. They share a common theme. Each 
case illustrates an effort to manipulate the narratives of public discourse in order to 
delimit everyday practices that constitute the adoption of new technologies. 
Computer policies project a specific representation of development and change. 
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The pattern of expanding ICT differs greatly between African counties. 
Government policy (as enshrined in national five-year development plans and in 
import tax legislation) varies between the consistent furthering of ICT as a 
recognized precondition for post-industrialization in Côte d’Ivoire, via a 
restrictive and contradictory government policy in Kenya that slowly but surely 
is achieving automatization, and via countries with a slow and vague take-off in 
ICT like Mali and Sudan, to countries that are barely ready for ICT like Niger 
and Angola due to their stagnant economies or civil wars. Until recently South 
Africa formed a case apart. This country has for 150 years boasted an advanced 
industrial and scientific infrastructure that became tributary to the apartheid 
state in the second half of the 20th century resulting in ICT imports being 
prohibited by an international boycott until 1990. This boycott, however, was 
only consistently observed by Scandinavian countries, and as a result South 
Africa has been, and remains, by far the most computerized African country 
(Slob 1990). South Africa is also the only African country that scores high (20th 
position) on the international list of Internet implementation and use.  
Not only international enterprises but also continental African institutions, 
research bodies, UNESCO,16 North Atlantic governments and development 
agencies are active in the field of enhancing ICT in African countries. For 
instance, the proceedings of the Second African Colloquium on Information 
Research, held in 1994 in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, were 
made into a prestigious book (Tankoano 1994) of close to a thousand pages 
filled with formulas, diagrams, tables and bibliographies. Publication was made 
possible by an eloquent combination of national and international organizations: 
the University of Ouagadougou, the Burkinabé Ministry of Development, the 
University of the United Nations, the National Institute for Research in 
Information and Automation of Burkina Faso, ORSTOM (the French Institute 
for Scientific Research in the field of Development and Development Co-
operation), PII-IIP (UNESCO’s intergovernmental information programme), 
CIMPA (the International Centre for Applied Mathematics) and the Association 
of African Universities. About half of the many authors contributing to the book 
were Europeans either in Africa or in French ICT institutions, but African 
researchers make up the other half. The entire world is involved in ICT in 
Africa, and ICT demonstrates that Africa is indeed part of the wider world — as 
an unmistakable aspect of the globalization process into which the countries and 
societies of the African continent are increasingly being drawn. Despite the 
abundance of ferrous dust (the African continent is one large tableland whose 
surface is coloured red by ferrous minerals), power failures, the permanent risk 
of ritualization, the constant threat of burglary and theft of hardware, and the 
                                                 
16 Cf. UNESCO (1980). 
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unmistakable class formation and poverty which means that for the time being 
only a happy few can effectively participate in ICT in Africa, ICT is, in 
principle, just as much (or as little) at home in Africa as elsewhere in the 
modern world.  
 
The tension between ICT euphoria and the negative assessment of African 
globalization 
There is no lack of lengthy arguments that sing the praise of the potential of 
today’s ICT, especially the Internet, for Africa. These arguments discuss 
technical limitations (defective infrastructure, for example the telephone 
network, the number of ICT connections, the low quality of the servers 
available), economic aspects (poverty and the fact that many Africans operate 
economically outside the formal sector of the government and commerce and 
hence have no access to the Internet), the transformation of bureaucracy as 
discussed above, and the possibilities of generating an innovating flow of 
information via the Internet in the rural areas of Africa.  
The euphoric thought that ICT could mean a bright future for Africa is 
widespread, not only among intellectuals17 but also among politicians. Here it is 
significant that Thabo Mbeki, the president of South Africa, has attributed a 
decisive role to the ICT revolution in his blueprint for an African Renaissance 
(Mbeki 1999). 
The euphoria is surprising. No doubt we must situate the spread of ICT in 
Africa in a context of globalization but where Africa is concerned globalization 
is, in general, not a reason for euphoria but for profound concern. For Africa, 
economic globalization has been synonymous with an ever-increasing 
marginalization: the intercontinental proceeds from Africa’s products have 
declined in spite of increasing productivity, and today Africa is involved in no 
more than one per cent of transactions in the world economy. Under post-
colonial governments, the continent’s national economies have been disrupted 
due to mismanagement and the erosion of bureaucracies. These national 
economies have moreover been plundered by national elites who have 
appropriated the state. In most African countries the citizens have long since 
learned not to count on essential government bodies such as the police, the 
judicial powers, health services, educational services and public works. Because 
of the hideous debt burden, more money leaves the African continent in the 
form of interest payments than it receives in the form of development aid, 
including balance-of-payments aid. Such Structural Adjustment Programmes as 
have been intercontinentally imposed upon African countries have brought 
neither political stability nor economic rationalization but have produced an 
                                                 
17 Cf. Nkwi (1995), Nyamnjoh (1997), OAU (1995) and Ras-Work (1998).  
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increasing impoverishment of large sections of the African population. Yet, at 
the same time, the increased communicative aspects of the globalization process 
have led, in the most frustrating way, to the installation of new consumptive 
targets and desires among that same population. Incapable of effectively 
protecting (let alone actively taking care of) their citizens, many post-colonial 
African states have been the scene of violent struggles involving regional and 
ethnic groups and political adventurers during the last few decades. Under the 
heading ‘development cooperation’, prolonged and many-faceted interventions 
from the North Atlantic region have yielded incidental local successes. This has 
contributed to the formation of a comfortable local point of address in the form 
of an NGO-based, servile, loyal and affluent local sub-elite with good 
organizational and technical skills (including ICT). But all this has not been 
able to redress the overall miserable situation prevailing in Africa today. 
It would appear as if the expansion of ICT in Africa has coincided with the 
disintegration of African societies. Does this mean that Jules-Rosette’s title 
Terminal Signs has (despite the optimistic positioning of its author) a double 
entendre: does the title not just refer to the social and semiotic interpretation, by 
Africans, of the signs that appear on computer terminals? Do these very signs 
testify to the destructive contradictions, the almost terminal illness, of Africa 
today? Could Mazrui (1977, 1978) be right after all and is ICT, as an 
unmistakable aspect of globalization in Africa, establishing the conditions for 
the further economic subjugation of the continent? Do we have to add to this 
economic subjugation, a cultural subjugation in this sense, that African ways of 
interacting between fellow-humans and between man and world (ways whose 
praises have been sung so frequently in African ethnographies and African 
philosophies) are — as argued by Gyekye — miles apart from those social and 
cosmological models that are necessary for the successful use of computers? To 
answer this question we must assess the cultural dynamics that surround ICT in 
Africa.  
 
An empirical context of ICT enculturation: The Francistown cybercafé 
If in principle, as argued above, ICT is just as much at home in Africa as 
elsewhere in the world, then let us go and visit it in Africa. In Southern Africa 
(not only in South Africa as mentioned above, but also in Botswana, Swaziland, 
Lesotho and Zimbabwe), ICT is expanding faster than elsewhere on the African 
continent. A sign of the increasing accessibility for a substantial proportion of 
the population is the proliferation of cybercafés in these countries in recent 
years. But before becoming too optimistic about conclusions based on this 
phenomenon, let us take a closer look at one such café as a place of ICT 
enculturation in Africa.  
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In April 1999 I spent a week working in a cybercafé in Francistown, 
Northeast District, Botswana. Francistown was founded a hundred years ago as 
a result of European capitalist interests. In the following decades, Africans came 
to constitute the majority of the population, and in the 1980s the town 
underwent rapid demographic and economic growth. Seen from the North 
Atlantic, Francistown (Botswana’s second largest town with about 70,000 
inhabitants in 1999) is an unpromising place: an ugly agglomeration of endless 
rows of identical small houses grouped around two veritable shopping streets 
with traffic lights and modern buildings of up to two floors (malls, banks) 
flashing the logos of world brands: Adidas, Nashua, Texaco, Toyota, IBM, 
British Airways, etc. Seen from the villages that still house half the population 
of the African continent, Francistown is a baffling world city. This is where, in 
the late 1980s, I made my acquaintance with the fax machine, which until then 
did not play a role in my Dutch academic life. I thus had high expectations of 
the cybercafé that was situated on the top floor of one of the newest malls. 
I was disappointed. The cybercafé’s hardware consisted of five customer-
operated computers and one reasonably fast professional computer used as the 
server for a few hundred Internet subscribers in the region. The front part of the 
shop was equipped for the sale of current hardware and software, and computer 
books could be found in amazing abundance in the adjacent general news shop 
and bookshop that had no links with the cybercafé. Francistown is an important 
centre of commerce and industry, and the vast majority of Internet subscribers 
are to be found in these sectors of the economy — as it turns out when we 
search the Internet for ‘Francistown’ with one of the current search machines. In 
the week I was there, the designing of a website for a local bridal fashion shop 
took much of the attention of the cybercafé’s staff of four: the tawny-coloured 
manageress who was equally fluent in Southern African English and Setswana, 
the black male assistant with a good basic knowledge of the Internet, the white 
female graphic designer, and finally the black cleaning woman, a mature 
slightly corpulent lady whom the manageress and the other staff treated much as 
though she were an elderly family member to the extent that sometimes the 
impression given was one of a tightly-knit family enterprise headed by the 
cleaner! With one or two exceptions, the Internet café’s clients used only a 
minimal selection from the range of facilities offered: in a daily or weekly 
routine they hastily read and sent a few emails (they were anxious not to exceed 
the cybercafé’s minimum fee of about €1 per 15 minutes). Some asked for help 
when searching for the many websites that offer free email accounts. 
Occasionally young black women came in for advice on how to open email 
accounts, manifestly at the instigation of absent white South African boyfriends, 
to enable them to stay in touch regularly and cheaply. Only a very few people 
looked on the Internet for a specific site or cautiously surfed between sites, but 
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after visiting a few sites even these customers vacated their bar stools with an 
eloquent look at the clock. All bodily and verbal contact between clients was 
avoided as if they were catching each other in socially discouraged or taboo 
behaviour. Staff–client contact was limited to a minimum, and nothing of the 
richly textured personal relationship between the staff was shared with the 
clients. Interaction in a public toilet could not have been more impersonal. This 
lack of social exchange contrasts markedly with Francistown public culture, in 
whose turbulent recreational setting the word ‘café’ has certainly connotations 
of sociability, exchange, self-presentation, status-seeking through conspicuous 
consumption, the experience of identity by associating oneself with a fixed 
social and physical location in the recreational space. Most of the time, I was 
the only customer in the cybercafé. Even in a town as developed and dynamic 
as Francistown, the target group of the cybercafé was obviously only the few 
people who (to judge by their general appearance) could not afford a state-of-
the-art computer (including the subscription to the electricity mains network, 
the telephone network, and the Internet) and who had no access to such 
hardware in their place of employment but who nonetheless were coming to 
explore hesitantly the new information and communication technology. 
Enculturation, appropriation towards a local cultural programming, was only 
very partially the case. On the contrary, for the customers, the Internet would 
appear to form a secluded domain that one might appropriate instrumentally 
(with considerable monetary cost, effort and frustration), but whose contents 
were not in line with the socio-cultural programming of one’s own life as a 
Francistonian. The game of social relations was grinding to a halt in the 
intimidating nearness of the computer. However, the cybercafé’s staff had 
already regained their natural pose and thus manage to incorporate ICT in their 
everyday lives in a much more natural manner. Preliminary conclusions made 
after a week in the Francistown Internet café were that if the Internet is to be the 
hope of Africa, the realization of that hope would take a while in large parts of 
Africa.  
 
Backgrounds of ICT enculturation 
How is ICT appropriated and localized in African environments in the sense of 
the emergence of practices that amount to an original creative elaboration upon 
this new technology and in the course of which local symbols and meanings — 
both old and new — are conferred upon that technology?  
Above I sketched a field of tension, one of whose poles was that ICT might 
be primarily thought of as eminently North Atlantic. In this respect ICT fits in 
with an ideal of the appropriation, by Africans, of European symbols of power, 
prestige and success. During the colonial period (which incidentally lasted 
considerably less than a century in most part of Africa), this ideal spread widely 
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over the continent. It was expressed in styles of clothing, hairstyles, housing and 
interior design, family life, choice of modes of transport, recreation, religion — 
not only among the elite but also among a much larger urban middle class and, 
to some extent, even right out to the remotest corners of urban slums and to the 
rural areas. 
We should not read too much positive submission in the adoption by 
Africans of North Atlantic cultural models. Here, as always when it comes to 
the adoption of cultural elements across sizeable distances in space and/or time, 
a considerable ‘transformative localization’ occurs:18 that which was initially 
alien is encapsulated by more or less altering its form, meaning, use or a 
combination of these aspects, according to principles that already exist locally. 
Nowadays, decades after African states gained their independence, the structure 
of African elites has changed considerably. They have become more inclusively 
and unabashedly cosmopolitan, global. But the elites continue to search for 
prestigious lifestyles and symbols of domination, this being what they have in 
common with socio-political elites all over the world. The exercise of power in 
contemporary Africa is increasingly taking place within the framework of 
formal organizations (such as the state, the army, the party, the enterprise, the 
church, trade unions, universities) but this framework tends to be much looser 
and less compelling than in the North Atlantic, far more subject to personal and 
particularistic manipulation. Often the formal organizations in Africa do not 
work properly, and if they do work to some extent this is due less to effective 
bureaucratic and legal rationality than to patronage, ethnic manipulation and 
informal social networks behind the façade of the formal structure. Here 
virtualized models of social and political power are being mediated that are not 
rooted in the North Atlantic heritage but instead in pre-colonial forms of 
leadership and initiative within kinship groups and pre-colonial states. In many 
parts of Africa, for several centuries before the effective European colonization 
of the continent, trade goods hailing from afar were both the symbols of an 
unrivalled power over life and death, and access to the supernatural (for 
example, firearms and imported liquor — like Dutch gin which came to 
constitute the preferred libation liquid at local African shrines), and the 
attributes of incomparable prestige (textiles, Chinese glazed ware, Ancient 
Egyptian artefacts, European clothing, etc.). The appropriation of ICT as a 
means of power must also be seen in this light: not as the imitation of the power 
and lifestyle of Europeans but as a localized means of prestige that, at the same 
                                                 
18 The term ‘transformative localization’ refers to the process of local accommodation 
by which, in the course of diffusion, a geographically displaced item of culture is 
transformed so as to fit the systematics of local cultural orientations, cf. Van Binsbergen 
(1997c). 
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time, constitutes a real means for the exercise of power in the African social 
environment. It appears to be a common trait in any system of power, no matter 
where it occurs in space and time, inside or outside Africa, that the effective 
exercise of power by means of force goes hand in hand with an ensemble of 
collective representations which draws this exercise of power into the domain of 
the numinous and the speculative, that projects it into a magic of power, and 
hence facilitates people’s submission to that power without them openly 
confronting it.19 In Africa, this magic has of old taken the form of a discourse on 
sorcery20 — of evil that is perpetrated by humans in an extrasensory way and 
that forms one of the major indigenous explanations of misfortune. In many 
African societies connotations of sorcery have of old surrounded those 
occupying high status and specializing in the communication with a human, 
extra-human or supra-human outside world at the boundary of local society: the 
king, the headman, the diviner-priest-healer, the blacksmith, the bard, the trader. 
Although the roots of this complex of collective representations lie in a local 
kinship order that goes back at least to Neolithic agricultural communities, 
during the last few decades Africa has seen an intensification of sorcery as an 
idiom par excellence for the articulation of the contradictions of modernity — 
the tension between consumptive desires and (as a condition to fulfil those 
desires) the breakdown of historic forms of social organization, solidarity, 
morals and ethics. 
The individualized microcomputer fits very well in this cultural framework 
— in the first place as a new prestige object of elitist power, and as an 
instrument for the effective exercise of power in the management of social, 
political and commercial information, processes and contacts. But this is also 
and particularly so because ICT conjures up the numinous magic of power so 
strikingly with its flashing, uncannily real images, its high speed and 
instantaneous access which give the impression that space and time appear to 
submit to the user/owner of the microcomputer. Thus, especially in the eyes of 
uninitiated onlookers, old magical dreams such as bilocation, omnipresence and 
omnipotence appear finally to come true. For instance, in Benin today the 
computer is known as grigri yovo: ‘the magico-religious object21 of the Whites’, 
and the Internet is explicitly equated with voodoo (a cult system based on 
                                                 
19 Cf. Taussig (1997). For an African application of similar ideas, cf. Van Binsbergen 
(1992b, 1993), and for a theoretical elaboration applied to Ancient Mesopotamia, cf. 
Van Binsbergen & Wiggermann (1999). 
20 Cf. Van Binsbergen (2001). 
21 I avoid the word ‘fetish’ which without further discussion would only give rise to 
confusion. 
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ecstasy and initiation that, next to and in collusion with the post-colonial state, 
constitutes the major form of social organization in this African country).22  
The microcomputer and especially the Internet have, therefore, inserted 
themselves not only in the recreational practices of African elite children and in 
the scientific data collection of African intellectuals but also in the power 
strategies of prominent African politicians and entrepreneurs, and of those 
aspiring to join their ranks. In the practices of these politicians and 
entrepreneurs this state-of-the-art form of ICT is often seen to occur in 
combination with: 
 
• modern natural science and business economics;  
• more traditional magical practices (diviner-priests are frequently 
consulted for political and economic success and for protection in that 
connection); and  
• esoteric world views (theosophy, Rosicrucianism) that from an Oriental 
and/or pseudo-scientific periphery of North Atlantic rational thought are 
in the process of conquering Africa in the same way as they are spreading 
in the North Atlantic in the New Age context.  
 
That the African enculturation of ICT is triggered not only by specific 
technological and career advantages but also by the desire to explore and 
appropriate a comprehensive new lifestyle, and even new idioms of social and 
cosmic power, is suggested by a remarkable research finding from Francistown, 
Botswana. 
My research on the urban culture of Francistown as a window on both local 
rural traditions and on the process of cultural globalization in Africa brought me 
into close contact with the three highest-ranking local leaders of the cult of the 
High God Mwali. This cult is a pre-colonial organization that has now 
superficially reorganized itself, displaying to the state the appearance of an 
effective modern formal organization (a professional association of traditional 
healers, and an African Independent Church) that is more in accordance with 
Botswana civil law. The three priests combine their high office with flourishing 
therapeutic and herbalist practices, and in addition operate — in line with a 
widespread Southern African pattern — a bar, a bottle store, a butchery, a 
transport company and a dancing troupe. Inside their modern, detached houses, 
designed and appointed according to cosmopolitan standards, their lives centre 
around the television set crowned with plastic flowers and surrounded by a 
circle of heavy armchairs with embroidered head covers. Apparently Africa’s 
consumptive modernity (whose aesthetics appear to be somewhat dated and 
                                                 
22 Personal communications, Elly Reinierse and (via Elly Reinierse) Ulrike Sulikowski. 
136 Van Binsbergen 
second-rate from a North Atlantic perspective) can very well be combined with 
religious leadership of an originally pre-colonial type. The point is that all three 
of these cult leaders have young adult daughters who, around 1990, were 
vaguely active in their fathers’ cults (for example in some sort of informal 
receptionist capacity, attending to callers seeking therapy and ritual advice), but 
who were primarily pursuing introductory computer training. These daughters 
were thus among the few Francistonian women who at that time could mobilize 
the financial means and the kinship support for their personal ventures in ICT. 
As specialists in an old sphere of power, these specialists, through their 
daughters’ computer training, made sure they did not miss out on a new sphere 
of power. 
Of course, the perception of ICT as magical and as kindred to sorcery, in the 
eyes of political and economic leaders and of those — almost all of them devoid 
of computers — over whom they hold sway, is only one aspect of the 
localization of ICT in Africa. I have already mentioned its use in offices and by 
intellectuals. Here we see a combination of purposeful rational behaviour, on 
the one hand, characterized by universalist procedures and assumptions 
(bureaucratic management, information processing), and, on the other, not so 
much dreams of computer-underpinned power (as among the political and 
economic elite), but certainly Utopian pondering on personal career success and 
on the redress of Africa’s ICT backwardness as compared to the North Atlantic 
region. This Utopian aspect constitutes an additional incentive to acquire 
computer skills, and lowers the threshold of ICT reception. 
All this means that within contemporary African societies, an extensive and 
many-sided discourse about computers has developed which facilitates the 
further personal and collective appropriation of ICT. Again the situation is not 
fundamentally different from that in the North Atlantic: one does not need to 
command, or even to emulate, the mathematical and micro-electronic rationality 
of the designers in order to use the computer effectively as a black box — the 
methods of such use are learned, formally or informally, in a circle of equals 
(secondary school pupils and university students, friends, colleagues, system 
managers in training), and in a way in which ordinary everyday spoken 
language turns out to play a remarkably significant role — even if spiced for the 
occasion with intercontinental computer terms that are preferably left 
untranslated. Here again we see the tensions between local and global, 
intracultural and metacultural, which make ICT such an interesting testing 
ground for the investigation of interculturality.  
These two factors together, namely the appropriation (in a colonial, pre-
colonial and post-colonial context) of alien artefacts within more or less elitist 
frameworks of power, magic and Utopia, and the fact that culturally the 
computer is a user-friendly black box which is serviceable anywhere, globally, 
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metalocally, furnish us with the beginnings of an answer to the obvious question 
as to why the incursion of ICT into Africa has met with so little resistance and 
has been so readily accepted — as if cultures do not exist.  
 
From book to web in the African context  
I suspect that in answer to this last question other factors might be adduced in 
addition to the two already mentioned. These additional factors refer to the 
structure of communicative and procedural connections in ICT such as those it 
has developed globally in the form of hypertext, hyperlinks and the nested and 
layered criss-crossing structures engendered in that context. Before the advent 
of computerized ICT, information management and information transmission 
were largely modelled on the book. This implied the model of a large, unique, 
self-contained and clearly demarcated quantity of information, highly organized 
and internally consistent, almost exclusively verbal (i.e. not visual, auditive, 
motoric, etc.), and as such linearized from beginning to end, in such a way that 
in principle the medium cogently prescribed one, and only one, path through 
this information. Such a book model has provided the unit of knowledge 
production for five millennia in the Ancient Near East including Egypt, Graeco-
Roman Antiquity, China, India, the world of Islam, and finally Europe. The 
‘book model’ emerged particularly in Ancient Egypt, where from the New 
Kingdom onwards the papyrus-leaf Book of Coming Forth by Day (also known 
as the Book of the Dead) was only one example of the proliferation of books as 
the central repositories of knowledge, cherished at the ancient temple academies 
called Houses of Life and further manifested by the usual burial gift of a copy 
of the Book of the Dead.23 By contrast, the Ancient Mesopotamian books formed 
conceptual units held together by titles and rubrics but were physically 
distributed over a considerable number of clay tablets and hence did not 
contribute physical unity. After the book model, the idea of the human person 
was modelled.24 The same model also informed the idea of the formal 
organization with its legal (text-based) authority; and probably its was also the 
book model that informed the idea of the distinct culture, each culture being a 
specific item in a range of a plurality of cultures, and codified by means of a 
certain genre of books, notably ethnographies. The world’s subjugation to North 
Atlantic hegemony between the 18th and 20th centuries of the North Atlantic era 
meant the subjugation to the book (including the Bible, in so far as this 
subjugation took the form of the spread of Christianity) and likewise the much 
earlier submission of large parts of Asia, Europe and Africa to Islam, following 
the Prophet Muhammad’s departure (hijra) from Mecca that marked the 
                                                 
23 Cf. Budge (1989), Allen & Hauser (1974). 
24 I owe this suggestion to my colleague Jos de Mul. 
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beginning of the Islamic era, and amounted to a submission to the Book, 
notably the Qur’an. Not only the colonial subjects’ subjugation but also their 
subsequent assimilation and final emancipation (by appropriation of North 
Atlantic models of equal rights, socialism, trade unionism, formal education, 
franchise, etc.) meant an internalization of the book model. In Africa this 
disciplining in terms of the book model has only partially taken root even 
though millions of Africans today are closely comparable with the North 
Atlantic readers of the present book in terms of formal education and 
employment within formal organizations. However, African societies have 
never quite turned into book-style cultures in the same way as this process has 
advanced progressively in the North Atlantic region and especially in the 
latter’s urban centres. In West African English, the expression ‘You know 
book’ has become a standard expression for the person who has a formal 
education, praising him and setting him apart as a relative exception at the same 
time. Over the last century, the domain of globalization and virtualization has 
certainly been an expanding aspect of African societies but the size of that 
domain in proportion to the totality of African life has remained limited. A 
considerable part of African life has continued to take place outside formal 
organizations, and whatever was created in terms of formal organization 
functioned mainly informally, if at all. The linearity and consistency of the book 
model did fit a North Atlantic modern world characterized by social and 
political relations that have largely taken on an instrumental nature, have lost 
many of their former ritual and symbolic aspects, and therefore have lost much 
of their meaning. The individuals involved in these relations are increasingly 
atomized, autonomous and competent, living their lives in political and 
economic security. Most Africans in colonial and post-colonial settings have 
always lacked such security, and this is one explanation, among several others,25 
as to why the book model — the individuality, the viable and smoothly 
functioning formal organization, the linear path thorough social, political and 
symbolic relationships, and the almost total disenchantment (Weber) of the 
world — has never occurred in Africa on a scale anywhere comparable to that 
of the North Atlantic. In modern Africa, one has always needed to compensate 
the insecurities of the modern, urban, state-based aspects of social life by 
maintaining (as far as possible) old systems of kin-based and ethnic solidarity 
— orientated toward the village with its centuries-old practices and systems of 
representation encompassing many domains of life, and with its concomitant, 
endlessly proliferating and branching networks of social relations. For excellent 
reasons, the relational network has proved to be a very fertile concept in the 
                                                 
25 Other such factors, having to do with ideological and political processes of the longue 
durée, are discussed at the end of Chapter 8 of Van Binsbergen (2003).  
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study of African towns, where informal networks turned out to form for the 
most part the principal format of social structuring (Mitchell 1969). In this 
African context it is normal to think in web-like structures, which would be 
dismissed as inconsistent, incompetent and insufficiently bounded from the 
point of view of the book model. In this connection there are many points for 
further research on such crucial topics as: what the consequence is of this web-
like or rhizomatic,26 typically African, social structure, for people’s orientation 
in space and time; the local definition (as porous? as ambiguous?) of the person 
within such a ramifying environment; the nature of the social and physical 
space. How might this web-like orientation facilitate, in its turn, modern uses of 
computers? It is not necessary to appeal in this connection (as Afrocentrists are 
bound to do) to a special vitality of African cultures, to some special innate 
talent of Africans, or to some special type of ‘savage thought’ (Lévi-Strauss 
1962) that allegedly might characterize informal situations inside and outside 
Africa. For an explanation of the continued survival in Africa of non-formal, 
non-booklike practices and concepts that in North Atlantic societies have been 
largely supplanted by the state and by other formal organizations with their 
enormous influence on daily life and the everyday experience, we need only 
refer to the extent to which colonial and post-colonial insecurities attending the 
formal situations have been created in Africa by North Atlantic initiative.  
For as long as the book remained the norm, and for as long as the forms of 
communication associated with the book predominated, Africa with its un-
booklike response self-evidently lagged behind in ways that it would never be 
able to make up. It is not the computer in itself which constitutes an assault on 
the formal and the linear in information, and puts an end to the book as the gold 
standard. Rather, such a revolution is being prompted by the ramifying, 
rhizomatic forms in which information is being presented and may be managed 
on the Internet and in the hypertextual structures within microcomputers. ‘The 
stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner’ 
(Mt 21: 42). Not of course because they are Africans but because they are in a 
privileged position to bring out the problem and potentials of the South, of the 
Third World, in our times (grosso modo, to Asia and Latin America the same 
perspective applies), modern Africans have as a matter of course mastered the 
skills needed to survive with their families in a social context characterized by 
the tension between, on the one hand, the insecure, urban, formal environment 
                                                 
26 Cf. the concept of ‘rhizome’ with Deleuze & Guattari (1972, 1980, 1991), with which 
they seek to contrastively pinpoint for contemporary North Atlantic society, the 
transformation from the book model to a freer form of subjectivity, one which makes ‘it 
possible to let the individual and/or collective instances come to the fore as self-
referential existential Territories, adjacent to, or functioning as boundary conditions for, 
an alterity which in itself is subjective’ (Guattari 1992; my translation). 
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and, on the other, the manifestations — which also to Africans are often 
ambivalent — of a persisting but eroded system of kin-based and ethnic 
solidarity with ultimately a rural and historical referent. In such a context one 
seldom puts all one’s eggs in one basket but instead tends to cultivate and 
operate simultaneously many contacts, many strategies, many obligations, many 
kin relations along a multitude of alternative genealogical paths, with many 
compromises, many contradictions between these commitments — with a logic 
that is inclusive rather than exclusive, and that prefers not to abide by the 
principle (which has governed the entire Western philosophical tradition) of the 
excluded third, in the hope that one may be allowed to have one’s cake and eat 
it too. This structural feature permeates all aspects of African life especially in 
the increasingly insecure post-colonial situation. It is highly manifest in 
situations where public life is constantly on the verge of total collapse, such as 
depicted in recent ethnographic studies by René Devisch (1995, 1996) and Filip 
de Boeck (1996a, 1996b) on Congo (-Kinshasa). Freely translated towards 
computer practice, the art of living needed for such situations reminds one of 
practices for hypertext-based Internet use on the modern computer. This would 
mean that the modern African is someone who is at least as well equipped, if 
not better, for the mental requirements of state-of-the-art computer use as the 
North Atlantic adult, whose main handicap in this computer era may very well 
prove to be his attachment to the gold standard of the book. 
But we have not yet reached the stage where Africa can cash in on this 
apparent advantage in the handling of web-like structures. Inhabitants of the 
North Atlantic region and of East and South Asia are strongly represented in the 
world of ICT, and Africans are mere newcomers there. In this connection, 
Northerners may continue to boast their skills in the handling and improvement 
of formal systems. For after all, the rhizomatic structure of the actual 
application of ICT, however far it tends towards the chaotic, requires us to 
begin with a strictly formal, logical point of departure in the algorithms and 
technologies used. But also with regard to formal systems, Africans have their 
own local traditions. It is not impossible that Africans training in ICT may 
derive some unexpected advantage from their being acquainted with 
indigenously African formal systems such as mathematical board games27 and 
divination methods28 that are encountered all over the African continent. 
Hountondji, the African philosopher who has so strongly criticized the 
construction (in the hands of his African colleagues and their North Atlantic 
                                                 
27 See Zaslavsky (1990), Seidenberg (1960), Schmidl (1915) and Van Binsbergen 
(1997a). 
28 See Maupoil (1943a, 1943b), Bascom (1980), Abimbola (1975), Akiwowo (1983), 
Mákanjúolá (1991), Kassibo (1992), Traoré (1979), Aromolaran (1992) and Van 
Binsbergen (2003: Chapters 5, 6 and especially 7). 
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supporters) of an African mystique under the pretext of philosophy,29 considers 
the exploration of such historic local forms of science, mathematics and 
technology an important field of research (Hountondji 1996, 1994). The 
purpose of such research is not so much to help explode racial stereotypes and 
to gather points in favour of Afrocentrism but to further among Africans a 
proud and empirically underpinned vision of their own competence and their 
own birthright to engage with modern technology.  
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‘Man will live well’: On the poetics  
of corruption in a global age 
 
Sanya Osha 
 
 
The difference between philosophical and anthropological 
practices in Africa is becoming exceedingly glaring, maybe 
because a dominant tradition in the analytical school of African 
philosophy is limited by a strain of British empiricism. 
However, new conditions of existence, which conventional 
tropes of analysis in African philosophy seem unable to handle, 
are emerging within the African post-colony. How has the 
problem of corruption been addressed in African philosophical 
practice? Kwame Gyekye, the Ghanaian philosopher, has 
tackled the problem of political corruption by employing 
discursive strategies derived from the Athenian philosophical 
traditions. This chapter argues that his conceptualization of the 
problem does not fully describe the emerging conditions in the 
post-colony. On the other hand, Jean-Pierre Olivier de 
Sardan, the French anthropologist, analyses the modes of 
social organization, forms of sociality and the conditions of 
contemporary globalization that necessitate a more subtle 
theorization of the problem of corruption in Africa and the ways 
in which it can be approached conceptually. Perhaps a more 
acute analysis of the situation in the African post-colony is still 
required. 
 
Insofar as it is ‘philosophical’ or ‘theoretical’, the Greek corpus stretches — for 
Arendt — from Parmenides to Plato and Aristotle, and then to Heidegger. It is 
characterized by the primacy of truth, theoria and the vita contemplative. 
Heidegger’s Presocratics, including Anaximander, are modern in Arendt’s eyes. The 
only genuine Presocratic experience is political experience (an echo of which can 
still be heard in Aristotle), where the focus is not truth but freedom. For freedom, by 
definition, is not a philosophical concept: it is an exclusively political concept, 
indeed the quintessence of the city-state and of citizenship. Our philosophical 
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tradition of political thought, beginning with Parmenides and Plato, was founded 
explicitly in opposition to this polis, and its citizenship. (Cassin 1990: 39) 
 
 
The Garb of Kant 
 
The extract above in theoretical terms is at the centre of my subsequent 
discussion: the irreconcilable tensions between the philosophical and the realm 
of politics. Since philosophy prides itself on having rigorous methods of 
inquiry, since its innate sense of wonder compels it to articulate discourse at its 
margins and beyond its frontiers (metaphysics), since as Derrida (1978) states, it 
poses questions to itself that it cannot answer, then it sometimes shows itself in 
a bad light. In short, my subsequent discussion would end up highlighting the 
limits of a particular kind of philosophizing, the exhaustion of theoria, of 
categorical imperatives in the face of overwhelming social dynamics. Evidently, 
in a context of rapid social flux, gestures of philosophical distanciation never 
fully describe transgressive social landscapes. Rather, they tend to reify the 
abstract in social processes to the detriment of the ‘real’ dynamics that motivate 
those very processes. 
Kwame Gyekye, the Ghanaian philosopher, devotes an entire chapter in his 
1997 text Tradition and Modernity to the issue of corruption. For him as a 
philosopher, philosophy serves as a guiding light, as the cognitive apparatus by 
which to get to the bottom of the matter. A central part of my purpose here is to 
indicate the limits of his approach and also demonstrate how certain disciplinary 
markers rather than shedding understanding may engender even more 
confusion. 
One of the grave shortcomings of philosophy as a discipline in Africa seems 
to lie in the framing of inappropriate questions: ‘Does African philosophy 
exist?’ ‘What constitutes the being of African philosophy?’ Otherwise it adopts 
counterproductive methodologies such as ethno-philosophy, which has 
encountered severe criticism.1 Lately, in my opinion, philosophy in its extreme 
pseudo-theoretical form, that is, in its anti-sophistical gestures and its 
                                                 
1 See Mbembe (2001a). The disciplinary conflicts between history and anthropology and 
between philosophy and anthropology have become even more pronounced under 
conditions of contemporary globalization. In his essay ‘The End of Geography’, Arvind 
Das (2002: 34) writes: ‘the idea of “nation”, which historians institutionalized over the 
last few centuries, is also seen to be outdated, like history itself. Instead, the 
anthropologists seem to prevail over the historians, asserting that it is the a-temporal 
cross-sectional division of humanity into various ethnicities that is more relevant than 
the historically evolved nationalities and nations that have hegemonised political-
ideological discourse till recently.’ 
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overestimation of its powers, sometimes attempts to describe social processes 
using the wrong tools.  
Gyekye (1997: 193) states that ‘political corruption, despite its name, is 
essentially or fundamentally a moral problem’ and continues by saying that 
‘political corruption is thus an act of corruption perpetrated against the state or 
its agencies by persons holding an official position in pursuit of his own private 
or personal profit’. Thereafter, he lists a whole variety of corrupt political 
practices that do indeed shed light on the broad range of issues surrounding this 
topic. For instance, he writes that ‘graft, fraud, nepotism, kickbacks, favoritism, 
and misappropriation of public funds are all acts of political corruption’ (ibid:). 
Gyekye does not limit the scope of his definition to political corruption alone. 
Business executives, public officials, clerks in all sectors and immigration 
officials all perpetrate corruption. 
He also makes several normative statements — as philosophers are wont to 
do — as he enumerates the conditions under which corruption can thrive: 
 
Political corruption can flourish under weak political leadership. For political 
leaders or top public officials who are weak and can hardly be expected to control 
subordinate officers tempted by bribes and forms of political corruption, either 
because, being weak leaders, they do not have the nerve or courage to exert control, 
or, perhaps, being honest themselves, they have compromised their own integrity 
and moral authority and so cannot discipline others. (Gyekye 1997: 194). 
 
Here, he is attempting to maintain the stance of a philosopher (and a 
committed one at that) who can make insightful comments on the workings of 
the polity. That is to be expected in philosophy but philosophers must be 
cautious about running philosophy down since an element in the nature of the 
discipline perhaps prevents it from a humble demarcation of its own limits. 
Gyekye, in addressing himself to the problem of corruption, not only defines 
it as a philosopher should but also proposes solutions. In the space between the 
definition of the problem and the articulation of the solutions we find an entire 
conceptual region that invites a series of interesting analyses. Has he in fact 
exhaustively defined corruption? From what context or concatenation of 
contexts do his definitions emerge? This question is crucial because the African 
post-colony that constitutes the primary site of inquiry is indeed a most 
interesting, if perplexing, site. In addressing ourselves to this particular site, not 
only do we have to interrogate the various configurations of the social processes 
taking place therein, we also have to debate the nature of the state and its 
various problematic trajectories, the forms of life and death that now 
predominate on the continent and how these forms invite fresh methodological 
categories to describe these new developments and social processes, and finally 
the nature and status of moral philosophy itself. In relation to the last point, not 
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only do we need to situate instruments of abstraction in their most viable 
context but we also need to address the political economy of moral philosophy 
in contemporary Africa in order to be more keenly aware of the appropriateness 
of our conceptual implements, in other words, the multiple and problematic 
relationships between theory and society and how they might or might not 
conceptualize the new. This brings us back to the issue raised in the first 
quotation in this essay, that is, the apparent irreconciability of philosophy and 
political practice. In Arendt’s corpus there is a sustained focus on the divide 
between philosophy and political science, i.e. thinking (philosophy) and 
conditions of activity in the public sphere (politics), and this dichotomy is never 
quite resolved. The problem is not merely one of theory and practice, it also 
relates to an evident disciplinary impasse, the running against limits. When a 
discipline questions itself about something for which it has no answers, what 
does it then do? 
In facing this important question, Gyekye ransacks the inventory of 
philosophical tools and comes up with a set of established disciplinary 
responses. Philosophy, being the mother of all other disciplines, ought to have 
an appropriate response. In putting the final nail in the coffin, Gyekye (ibid: 
201) states that ‘political corruption is a moral problem and should be grappled 
with from that standpoint’. For him, ‘it is a moral pollution of officialdom as 
well as of the wider society’ (ibid: 203). And according to him, ‘the next 
question is to determine a satisfactory approach to dealing with it’ (ibid: 205). 
He does not define precisely what he means by ‘moral’ but we can assume that 
his stance on the issue is inflected and overdetermined by classical Western 
philosophical thought. Let us examine a number of interesting points Gyekye 
makes along the way. 
First, he addresses the nature of political corruption in the politics of 
traditional Africa. Granted that the institutions of governance and the 
sophistication of official bureaucracies in traditional Africa are limited, Gyekye 
agrees that ‘it cannot at all be denied that political corruption in the form of 
receiving and giving bribes or misusing or misappropriating public or 
communal or lineage goods and resources does exist in the traditional politics 
and administration in Africa’ (ibid: 201-203). In making this assertion, Gyekye 
has ventured into the historical anthropology of corruption in Africa, a 
multidisciplinary space into which one would have expected him to expand. 
Second, he incorporates a sociological perspective when he writes: ‘I was once 
told by a fairly senior public official who was seeking election to a parliament 
in a country in Africa: If I get elected, I would seek an appointment as secretary 
of trade. If I get it, man will live well’ (ibid: 204). Gyekye makes half-hearted 
forays into history and sociology in coming to grips with the problem of 
corruption in Africa. 
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In addition, he discusses the nature of the state, which from an African 
perspective is a highly contentious issue. On this he writes: ‘governments are 
generally perceived as distant or objective entities whose activities have little 
bearing on the welfare and the daily lives of the citizens, and to whose activities 
the citizens, in consequence, have very little ideological and emotional 
attachment’ (ibid: 195).2 This comment indeed opens up a large discursive space 
that we cannot afford to miss because it links the superstructure of the state to 
the moral economy of corruption in intriguing ways, especially within the 
Africa context. My view here is that philosophy again comes up against its own 
limits. There will be more on this later.  
This question of philosophy’s limitations is particularly evident when 
Gyekye addresses the solutions to corruption. 
 
One of the central problems of moral life is the problem of moral weakness, that is, 
the problem of knowing the right thing and yet doing the wrong thing, of acting 
against our better judgement. (ibid: 210) 
 
In classical philosophy, Gyekye tells us that ‘the ancient Greek philosophers 
called this problem of moral conflict akrasia: moral weakness, weakness of 
will, incontinence’ (ibid: 210). Indeed, Gyekye’s primary discursive impulse 
owes much to the ancient Greek tradition, as is evident in the considerable faith 
he places on rationality. And he deduces that rational human beings would 
always behave in morally just ways. This opinion commendably tries to break 
the bonds of exceptionalism, to speak of a problem in Africa in the broadest 
universalistic terms possible. But this commendable thrust brings us to another 
problem that lies at the heart of universalism itself. As noted, one of the well-
known shortcomings of philosophy in Africa is its project of ethno-philosophy. 
And some of the conceptual breakaways from this dead-end have been robust 
espousals of universalism. Mudimbe (1988, 1991), Appiah (1992) and Mbembe 
(2001a, 2001b) have all, to varying degrees and in various ways, posited forms 
of universalism in their conceptualizations of Africa and African topics. For 
Mbembe (2001a), this project encapsulates seeing ‘the world as a category of 
                                                 
2 This point has a direct bearing on the question of ownership. Figures of authority in 
Africa are commonly known to privatize the instruments and powers of public office 
(see Ake 1996). This phenomenon forces us to consider the genealogy of ownership. In 
times of corporate capitalism, ‘long-distance nationalism’, as formulated by Anderson 
(1992), reproblematizes the notion of the homeland. Writers such as Ayer (2000, 2002) 
have proffered even more radical accounts of what now constitutes a home. See also 
Appiah (2002). 
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thought’. It also includes a rigorous critique of what he terms ‘the prose of 
nativism’ (Mbembe 2002).  
Thus, philosophically speaking, not all terms of universalism are universal. 
The universal is always mediated by factors that stem from the particular. By 
extension, the particular invariably creates the conditions of possibility for the 
universal and vice versa. These complimentary and contradictory logics are 
always in motion defining both the universal and the particular in a field of 
dialogics. In Gyekye’s particular case, his brand of universalism, in a way, does 
a disservice to the particular. To be sure, the way in which it does this might in 
fact be no particular shortcoming of his own but rather that philosophy as a 
discipline has a lot to answer for. 
The next part of this chapter deals with the particular local conditions that 
Gyekye’s mode of philosophising (mis)represents. Again, I stress that in 
attempting to get to the roots of this shortcoming it might be more useful to 
interrogate the limits of philosophy itself, to call it to order for transgressing its 
boundaries and for not discovering new conceptual instruments or annexing 
better-suited disciplinary boundaries. Perhaps the fact of the matter is that 
philosophy has a lot to answer for by failing to carry out processes of 
remapping upon itself and its territories.  
 
 
Freefall 
 
Interestingly, corruption in Africa can be read and described in other ways. In 
relation to Gyekye’s reading of corruption, Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan’s 
essay entitled ‘African Corruption in the Context of Globalization’ is instructive 
from both a theoretical and an empirical angle. First, he reminds us ‘that 
anthropology is a discipline concerned with empirical researches and grounded 
theories’ (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 247). This disciplinary signal is, to be sure, 
important and he agrees with Gyekye that ‘the “corruption complex” includes 
nepotism, abuse of power, embezzlement and various forms of 
misappropriation, traffic in influence, prevarication, délits d’iniliés, abuse of the 
public purse, etc.’ (ibid). There are basically no definitional disagreements 
between Gyekye and Olivier de Sardan but their conceptual trajectories and 
methods of discursive articulation are markedly different, and this difference 
becomes fundamental when viewed from the disciplinary perspective. 
Before moving on to differences in approaches let us note that Gyekye 
(1997: 195) says: ‘corruption is common to all human societies, even though the 
frequency and prevalence of its incidence may differ among societies’. 
Similarly, Olivier de Sardan (1999: 248) points out that ‘corruption is a 
worldwide phenomenon, but it is not only a modern one; it has existed from the 
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Roman and Byzantine empires through to communist and post-communist 
Eastern Europe, and from the political machinery of nineteenth-century 
American towns to Mediterranean societies’. Perhaps this is why Gyekye 
disagrees that there is a ‘culture of corruption’ specific to Africa. 
The similarities end there. First, Olivier de Sardan informs us that corruption 
is related to monetarization and commodification. So theoretically, ‘corruption 
in Africa today is embedded in collective norms, collective logics and collective 
identities, and that is the reason for its pervasiveness on a continental level’ 
(ibid: 248). For Olivier de Sardan, it makes sense to discuss corruption in Africa 
on the basis of regionalization and globalization. These conceptual paradigms 
are absent in Gyekye’s discussions. In addition, Olivier de Sardan (ibid: 249) 
demonstrates why North Atlantic forms of corruption differ from African forms. 
And even within African forms of corruption there are essential differences. 
Thus, ‘Botswana or Burkina Faso were once said to have very little corruption, 
while the pervasiveness of corruption in Zaire is unparalleled’ and furthermore, 
he writes that ‘there are very different spaces and levels of corruption. I shall 
distinguish international, regional and local corruption’ (ibid: 248). These 
crucial distinctions are obviously paradigmatic in the way in which they 
highlight particular disciplinary practices. Let us now examine the various types 
and distinctions in Olivier de Sardan’s analysis of corruption. 
There is a difference, for instance, between big-time corruption and petty 
corruption. Big-time corruption involves presidents, ministers, directors of 
important offices and heads of public corporations, while petty corruption is 
practised by policemen, clerks, nurses, customs officers, etc. The fact is that 
‘everyone in Africa, man or woman, peasant or townsfolk, young or old, has 
routine experiences of dealing with corruption (and the like), this being a part of 
the social landscape’ (ibid: 250). 
In Achille Mbembe’s (2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) corpus, this 
routinization of corruption, violence and processes of brutalization assume more 
dramatic characteristics. We are forced to acknowledge the emergence of an 
entirely new political economy of violence, exploitation and domination in 
addition to the construction of new public and private moralities to which they 
give rise. Again, theoretically, these configurations reverberate strongly on the 
ways in which we perceive and reconstruct events in everyday life. Our 
discursive epistemologies have to take these developments into account in order 
to remain relevant. 
Olivier de Sardan notes that in Africa there is often a reluctance to report 
evident cases of corruption to constituted authorities. Such cases are then left to 
the realm of rumour and speculation, clearly adding to the moral economy of 
witchcraft. (In most parts of post-colonial Africa, most things that cannot be 
explained are attributed to sorcery, especially in places where literacy levels are 
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low and in the continent’s various sites of problematic modernities. See the 
numerous articles by Peter Geschiere and also Wim van Binsbergen on this 
issue.) In the words of Olivier de Sardan (1999: 251), ‘denouncing to the police 
a relative, a neighbour, the relative of a friend or of a neighbour — anyone with 
whom one has a personal tie, even a weak one — is unthinkable: the social 
disapproval would be too great’. 
This brings us to the specific forms of sociality to be found in Africa. Indeed 
certain forms of these social networks have assumed transnational proportions. 
Migrant francophone trading communities in Johannesburg serve as powerful 
ethnic and national bases for new immigrants from those communities and 
assist them with integration into the host city.3 The same can be said about 
Nigerian traders of Ibo extraction based in South Africa. Studies have indicated 
that these migrant communities are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their 
modes of integration and activities but this is at the transnational level. At the 
local level, these forms of sociality are no less complex and in fact, they are at 
the very heart of the social bond. The injunction to be one’s brother’s keeper is 
not only biblical in its coloration but is also linked to primordial origins and 
even in an age of excessive bureaucratization and technological surveillance 
post-colonial subjects are finding ways in which to bypass complex and 
advanced social systems to reinscribe the ‘filiative’ and the ‘affiliative’ in often 
intriguing and unexpected ways. 
The practice of gift giving is, for example, an interesting area in which to 
interrogate how African forms of sociality mediate the dynamics of corruption. 
In this respect, it is pertinent to note that corruption is linked with bargaining, ‘a 
commodified form of negotiation regulating almost all forms of exchanges 
current in Africa’ (Olivier de Sardan 1999: 253). Thus: 
 
The practice of corruption benefits from this logic of negotiation and bargaining. 
Not only is corruption in the strict sense of the word an object of bargaining — thus 
affecting the form of normal, customary commercial transactions — it also takes the 
shape of a simultaneous negotiation of rules, their pertinence and modes of 
interpretation. (ibid: 253) 
 
There is verbal sparring involved in the bargaining process associated with 
corruption just as it is an established practice to employ middlemen in everyday 
life to protect oneself from aspects of corruption. At this juncture, we have to 
bear in mind the difference between African forms of sociality and North 
Atlantic ones. Olivier de Sardan points out that European forms of sociality ‘are 
clearly inferior, diverse factors — including withdrawal of the nuclear family, 
confinement within limited circles of friends and close acquaintances, absence 
                                                 
3 See Simone (2000) and also D.B. Coplan (1994, 1995). 
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of relations between neighbours — have resulted in a weaker sociability in the 
North than in the South’ (ibid: 256). On the other hand, in Africa: 
 
One cannot refuse a service, a favour, a bit of string-pulling or compliance to a 
relative, neighbour, party comrade or friend. No more ought one refuse the same to 
someone ‘sent’ by any of the above. The circle of individuals to whom one feels 
obliged to render services is thus astonishingly wide. The other side of the same 
coin is that one has a great number of people to call upon. The system thus becomes 
one of a ‘generalized exchange’ of services, big or small, usually in the shape of an 
officially illicit favour. (ibid: 256) 
 
By extension, one of the worst fates that can befall an individual in Africa is to 
be devoid of social capital as its weak forms of governmentality, 
bureaucratization and economic development, which encourage familial forms 
of sociality, make chronic patrimonialism inevitable. Social capital in Africa has 
very distinct forms. A lucrative government appointment is seen as an 
opportunity not only to enrich oneself, one’s immediate family and extended 
family but also possibly one’s local community. Thus, to refuse a position of 
authority in Africa ‘would be a simultaneous show of ingratitude, egotism, 
pride, naivety and even stupidity’ (ibid: 258). Related to this, there is a blurring 
of the distinctions between the private and public domains. This lack of 
distinction between the private and public domains in Africa is a feature that 
can be traced to pre-coloniality where traditional chiefs ‘were obliged to make a 
general show of largesse and thereby attract public praise for their generosity’ 
(ibid: 258) and the transitions in Africa between the colonial state and the post-
colonial state are not always very significant because the colonial state was 
erected on an epistemology of violence that the political elites inherited and 
hardly modified. 
Olivier de Sardan made two other points that are of significance here. First, 
he points out that: ‘in Europe, everyday forms of consumption oblige constant 
dipping into one’s pocket. But everyday forms of sociability shy away from the 
monetary idiom. In Africa, on the contrary, everyday sociability requires quite a 
lot of cash’ (ibid: 260). This view is quite accurate. House-warming ceremonies, 
‘freedom parties’ for artisans who have completed their training programmes, 
burials, ‘washing’ the purchase of a new (today, second-hand) car are all social 
events that require considerable expenditure. Thus the monetarization of 
everyday life exerts a lot of pressure on all and sundry. 
Given this kind of trajectory, Olivier de Sardan’s analysis of corruption in 
Africa is decidedly more nuanced than that which is to be found in current 
approaches in African philosophical thought. In his hands, the anthropology of 
corruption in Africa obviously leads us to a related set of questions. What is the 
nature of the state in contemporary Africa and how have its colonial antecedents 
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contributed to its present trajectory? I ask this particular question because 
Gyekye, in his characterization of the state in Africa, casts it in a rational light. 
But is this really the case? In addressing this question we would be able to get a 
more representative picture of the political economy of morality in Africa. And 
finally, in addressing the general economy of conduct it would be useful to note 
how the crises of the state have give rise to other non-statist technologies of 
violence and domination and the particular moralities that this development 
engenders. Both Gyekye and Olivier de Sardan in their analyses of corruption 
do not do this. One is not saying — especially in the case of Olivier de Sardan 
— that they ought to have done so per se. However, I think it is worthwhile 
indicating the emergence of social processes, configurations and developments 
that will definitely compel a rethink of what we mean by the state, law and 
order, and the common good. If we are able to cast these terms into the vortexes 
that are currently transforming African social spaces, they might come to 
acquire the specificity that is often lacking in African contexts. 
Jean and John Comaroff draw our attention to what they term ‘the 
metaphysics of disorder’ in post-apartheid South Africa (Comaroff & Comaroff 
2002). In particular, they observe that: 
 
Crime, itself ever more global, looms large in the ‘new world disorder’. Its forms are 
becoming increasingly flexible, copying strategies from the legitimate business 
world as it constitutes an ‘uncivil society’ that flourishes especially where the state 
withdraws; hence the ubiquitous role of the mafia in Russia and other post-
totalitarian polities which perform, for a fee, services that government no longer 
provides. These criminal ‘phantom states’ are an ever more prevalent feature of our 
time. They exist in relation to transnational crime of increasing sophistication, 
shading imperceptibly into networks of terror that are rapidly replacing conventional 
military forces as the prime challenge to ‘national’ security. (ibid: 3) 
 
This state of affairs is particularly evident in the African post-colony and affects 
the general economy of conduct in startling and fundamental ways. Thus it 
means we have to find new conceptual frameworks in which to theorize terms 
such as corruption, the state and the common good. Gyekye’s discussions of 
these allied matters show the limits of his disciplinary approach. Olivier de 
Sardan, on the other hand, opens up a space for even more productive discourse. 
The type of discourse that Olivier de Sardan engenders is now the focus of my 
attention. 
These spaces that Gyekye’s discussion excludes and which Olivier de 
Sardan draws attention to only demonstrate with greater urgency the task facing 
the human sciences. There is a pressing need for multivocality and multiplicity 
in (re)presenting the world, in probing the disjunctures and continuities between 
the abstract and the concrete in modern existence, between the individual and 
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society and between the citizen and nation and how these various configurations 
are being transformed through impersonal neo-liberal processes of 
commodification and monetarization. Thus there is the need for us to retool our 
rhetorical and conceptual strategies in dealing with them. 
Let us now turn to the general economy of violence in the post-colony. As 
already mentioned, the origin of the colonial state is based on violence or what 
Mbembe (2001b) terms the dictum of the commendement. He defines the 
character of the post-colony in the following terms: 
 
The notion ‘post-colony’ identifies specifically a given historical trajectory — that 
of society recently emerging from the experience of colonization and the violence 
which the colonial relationship involves. To be sure, the post-colony is chaotically, 
pluralistic; it has nonetheless an internal coherence. It is a specific system of signs, 
a particular way of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes. (ibid: 102) 
 
And in most post-colonies, the violence of the colonial state is usually inherited 
by succeeding political elites who are prone to the privatization of public 
authority.4 In this context it becomes absurd to act and think within either 
strictly Athenian or modern regimes of rationality. Those alien regimes of 
rationality must first of all be established on clearly lopsided and violent 
foundations. 
Let us consider a few concrete examples. The often-mentioned ‘crisis of the 
nation’, ‘the dissolution of the state’ and ‘the exit of the state’ in many parts of 
Africa have acquired several dramatic forms. In fact, there is now talk about 
‘the terror of the state’. This general state collapse has given rise to the spread 
of illicit organizations and ‘uncivil’ actors that are now usurping the spaces 
vacated by the state. This has led to the near institutionalization of processes 
that were formally regarded as informal. Chronic statist disorder and withdrawal 
have transformed the state in post-colony under neo-liberal conditions into an 
anomaly or a chimerical phantom overwhelmed by the violence that produced it 
and also the violence it in turn dispels without a seemingly rational basis. Given 
this scenario, we have to devise new ways of viewing and conceptualizing civil 
publics in Africa. If, for instance, it has been noted that ‘the South African 
underworld is peopled not just by the unemployed, but also by the “well-healed 
and well-educated”, suggesting that, for a growing sector of the population — 
above all, young black men — the gangster lifestyle has a seductive appeal’ 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2002: 7), then we have rethink the entire constitution of 
both civil and uncivil society in Africa. In other parts of Africa, the spread and 
entrenchment of uncivil publics is more or less a way of life. 
                                                 
4 See Ake (1996). 
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Mbembe describes the instrumentalization of war as a way of life in which 
lives and bodies are judged on the basis of value, usually monetary, and 
supposedly valueless lives are destroyed by both statist and non-state 
formations in the pursuit of gain.5 The cases of Rwanda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and even Nigeria bear this out. If the 
functions and aims of the state have indeed changed this much, we cannot 
afford to employ unsuited conceptual paradigms to describe the forms of life 
and death now prevailing in the post-colony. Thus in relation to a particular 
phenomenon — such as corruption — these new moral and socio-political 
geographies have to be taken into account. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I began with a discussion of Gyekye’s treatment of corruption. Gyekye 
approaches the issue by employing established philosophical trajectories and, in 
a somewhat Socratic manner, he concludes that the problem of corruption is 
basically a moral one. One needs to possess the strength of will to overcome 
corrupt inclinations and practices. But in arriving at this conclusion, he takes his 
milieu — Africa — for granted. Thus his discussion and conclusion are, to put 
it mildly, removed from their essential context. 
Olivier de Sardan, on the other hand, situates his discourse within a 
considerably more graphic and identifiable context, and the social dynamics that 
activate the construction, perception and dissemination of corruption are more 
clearly drawn. This project of regionalizing and localizing corruption for 
analytical purposes is indeed useful. For any discussion of corruption to make 
sense, the emerging existential conditions on the African continent — the 
collapse of the state(s), the informalization of most productive sectors and the 
gangsterization of everyday life — must be taken into account. And when 
considering these disturbing parameters, it becomes evident that most of our 
descriptive and conceptual paradigms for the emerging configurations in the 
post-colony need to be modified. Just as the routinization of supposedly corrupt 
practices and processes of brutalization have become entrenched, new moral 
loyalties and geographies are emerging from them. The task now should be to 
carry out interrogations of these moral geographies in a fairly representative 
way.  
Indeed the challenge is to examine the logics of morality in the post-colony 
and the related issues to which they give rise without the usual old vocabularies 
which do not have the capacity to fully describe them. Even a metaphysics of 
                                                 
5 See Mbembe (2000a) and his ‘Necropolitics’ in Public Culture (2003, vol. 15, no. 1). 
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disorder is usually ensconced within a specific dynamic and based on a modus 
operandi that paradoxically allows for the production of life. And the 
production of life secures its own means of preservation even within the 
Hobbesian jungle and the violence of its seemingly irreversible logic. Even 
communities of crime and social disorder (in a country such as Nigeria) have 
codes of behaviour and loyalty, no matter how rudimentary they may be. In 
other words, in spite of the overwhelming chaos, violence and decay that mark a 
significant proportion of African lives in the post-colony, there are still ways 
and means of bonding that display characteristics of normalcy. The extreme and 
in some ways oppositional condition would be outright war. How can African 
philosophical thought account for the widespread institutional failures in the 
African post-colony? Evidently, it would have to avail itself of rigorous social 
research, which Gyekye, as we have seen, does not quite succeed in doing. In 
this case, African philosophy as a disciplinary practice is not adequate until it 
discovers the usefulness of interculturality (in its anthropological and 
philosophical combination). At that point, its flexibility and potentialities are 
bound to increase dramatically. 
Finally, the process of narrativizing these developments brings us back to a 
theme I touched on at the beginning of this chapter — the limits of certain 
disciplinary enclosures. My response to that important theme is simply this: in 
coming up against unproductive limits, we not only miss opportunities and the 
ways in which to describe how the new occurs, we also contribute in no small 
measure to the closure of discourse, to the end of disciplinary practice itself.6  
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‘Beyond the rivers of Ethiopia’:  
Pentecostal Pan-Africanism  
and Ghanaian identities in  
the transnational domain 
 
Rijk van Dijk 
 
Rev. Mensa Otabil, the founder of the International Central 
Gospel Church in Accra, is considered an influential 
representative of a new Pentecostal-inspired Pan-Africanist 
ideology. His book ‘Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia’ lays the 
foundations of a Pentecostal Liberation Theology that 
proclaims a Christianized sequel to Pan-Africanism. Operating 
from Ghana, his ideas for Africa and for ‘black consciousness’ 
have spread to Ghanaian migrant communities worldwide. 
While Otabil has been successful in transforming ownership of 
the intellectualist production of Pan-Africanism by tailoring it 
to the needs of the ordinary Pentecostal believer, it has not 
been adopted so extensively among all Ghanaian migrant 
communities in the West. By exploring Ghanaian migrant 
communities and their Pentecostal churches in the Netherlands, 
where the staunch identity politics of the Dutch government 
leave little room for the assertive proclamation of 
‘Africanness’, this chapter demonstrates that Otabil’s ideas do 
not act as a main source of inspiration everywhere in the 
Ghanaian diaspora.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The emergence in various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa of a thriving literature of 
religious tracts, booklets and pamphlets — mostly of a Christian nature — has 
been noted by many authors (see Meyer 1995, 1999, Ellis & Ter Haar 1998, 
164 Van Dijk 
  
Gifford 1998, Maxwell 1998, 2001, Van Dijk 1997, 2001a). This literature is 
sold or sometimes handed out for free in bookshops, at market stalls or among 
the many church congregations that have sprung up particularly in urban areas. 
Some churches, and certainly not only the established mission churches, have 
their own printing presses and publishing houses that are responsible for 
producing many of these publications in addition to their own regular church-
related journals. In West Africa, countries such as Ghana and Nigeria are known 
for the activities of a particular brand of Christianity in this field: the new 
charismatic Pentecostal churches. These churches represent the fastest growing 
form of Christianity in this part of Africa and many scholars have observed their 
dominance in the public sphere and in the public media (Hackett 1998, Meyer 
2001, Marshall-Fratani 1998, Van Dijk 2001e) where they actively broadcast 
their religious messages on radio and television, produce glossy brochures in 
which their victorious nationwide spread is portrayed and publish books 
discussing their religious and moral creeds.  
 These books and tracts comprise several distinct genres ranging from a 
‘confession’ literature of conversion experiences to testimonies of personal 
journeys into the dark world of evil and occult powers (and the author’s 
victorious re-emergence) to highly theological treatises concerning certain 
Biblical truths and dogmas. Popular fascination with this literature often focuses 
on booklets that describe the author’s highly mystical and emotional 
confrontations with a demonic world of witchcraft and evil spirits.1 Sometimes 
replete with details about the nocturnal activities of witches and their hideous 
assaults on the normal order of society or the writer’s reputation in daily life, 
books of this genre tend to reveal a society’s nightmares and anxieties in a 
world full of uncertainties. Particularly in the West African setting, all this 
literature is transmitting a moral and socio-political message in a context where 
increasing pressure is being exerted on the legitimacy of the authority wielded 
by such institutions as the state, chieftaincy, established mission churches or 
family elders. Although much of this literature is not explicitly political in focus 
or nature, it is not difficult to see the ways in which it turns matters pertaining to 
moral authority and power in social life into issues of Christian or even 
Pentecostal beliefs, truths and points of view. Booklets and pamphlets that 
speak out against involvement in occultism, witchcraft and moral laxity do so in 
a West African context in which holders of power have increasingly become 
suspected of dealing with hidden forces, of being involved in exploitative and 
self-serving ‘crooked’ relations and machinations. This literature can, at first 
sight, be interpreted as religion and Christian morality filling a void that the 
                                                 
1 The best-known example of this genre is Emmanuel Eni’s Delivered from the Powers 
of Darkness (Ibadan, Scripture Union Press, 1987). 
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steadily reducing legitimacy of state and other civil organizations is leaving 
behind. 
 In Ghana, many books of these diverse genres have been written by founder-
leaders of the new Pentecostal churches that have emerged over the last two 
decades in the country. Rev. Mensa Otabil, the leader and founder of the highly 
successful International Central Gospel Church in Accra, is considered one of 
the most influential representatives of this group of renowned religious leaders. 
He is considered by many to be the ‘Rabbi to the Nation’ because of his sharp 
and moral pronouncements against the Ghanaian government. Like many of his 
colleagues, he has written a number of booklets dealing with Pentecostal truths 
bearing such titles as ‘Four Laws of Productivity’ and ‘The Why, What, How, 
When and Where of Giving’, all of which have been published by Altar 
International, the publishing house connected to his church.2 
However, he has also published a remarkable piece entitled ‘Beyond the 
Rivers of Ethiopia: A Biblical Revelation on God’s Purpose for the Black Race’ 
(Otabil 1992). It is exceptional in comparison with all the other genres of 
literature that have emerged in these Pentecostal circles in that it represents a 
relatively new and Pentecostal-inspired Pan-Africanist ideology. In it, Otabil 
lays the foundations for what has been called an ‘Evangelical Pentecostal 
Liberation Theology’ (Larbi 2001: 349) which proclaims a highly Christianized 
Pan-Africanist sequel to the ideas of Fanon, DuBois and, more recently, Gilroy 
(1993). In a critique of Mudimbe’s Idea of Africa (1994), Davies has placed this 
book alongside Appiah’s In My Father’s House (1992) as works that display a 
different sensibility with regard to the meaning of present-day African 
philosophical thought (Davies 1998). The ‘cunning aim’ (as Davies calls it) of 
these books is not to replace the white colonial library or the white Bible, nor to 
glorify ‘Egypt’ in a Bernalian sense,3 but to rework them and re-inscribe an 
essential black presence into these texts. Without such a presence, liberation or 
messianic hope would never have come into existence. 
 In the present global context of increasing marginalization of Africa, such 
notions of ‘black pride’ appear to be appealing to many. Operating from Ghana, 
Otabil has been preaching his message for Africa and for ‘black consciousness’, 
as he calls it, not only in many parts of the continent but also in the Ghanaian 
migrant communities in the United Kingdom and the United States where his 
ideas have started circulating among some of the Black American communities 
in places such as New York. Crucial to an understanding of his popularity is the  
 
                                                 
2 See Van Dijk (1999) for a discussion of the idea of a Pentecostal economy. 
3 See Van Binsbergen (1997) for an extensive discussion of Martin Bernal’s work on the 
Black Athena hypothesis.  
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fact that works such as those of Otabil and Darkwah for instance, offer a 
Christianized re-appropriation of Afro-centric ideas capable of achieving two 
things at the same time: a new ownership of longer dating but highly intellectual 
and secular Pan-African ideals, and a critical confrontation with Western ‘book 
knowledge’ as it is often pejoratively called and to which many Africans have 
become increasingly exposed through the global spread of formal education. In 
emphasizing divine wisdom and inspiration in the appropriation of Afro-centric 
ideals, a unity of Africans is proclaimed on the basis of spiritual empowerment 
by heavenly forces. 
 In this chapter I explore the significance of this work for and within 
Ghanaian Pentecostalism, and its spread to various parts of Africa and beyond. 
The relationship between the Ghanaian diaspora and the global spread of 
Ghanaian Pentecostalism is evident and has been substantiated by recent 
research. However, ideas of Pentecostal Pan-Africanism are not equally vibrant 
among all Ghanaian migrant communities in the West. By exploring Ghanaian 
migrant communities and their Pentecostal churches in the Netherlands, this 
chapter demonstrates that these ideas are not considered a main source of 
inspiration everywhere in the Ghanaian diaspora. It examines the relative 
success of Mensa Otabil’s Pan-Africanist message in Ghana and its marked 
absence in the life of the Ghanaian diasporic community in the Netherlands. It 
argues that staunch identity politics by the Dutch government, in this particular 
case, have left little room for the assertive proclamation of ‘Africaness’. 
Interestingly, the Dutch government has recently celebrated 300 years of 
diplomatic relations with Ghana and plans to erect a ‘slave monument’ as a lieu 
de memoire of the Dutch role in the slave trade, but its identity politics appear to 
be obfuscating Otabil’s appeal. Identity has become too much of a contested 
terrain for Ghanaians, a contestation in which any reference to Pan-Africanist 
notions is not considered helpful to their community’s cause in the multicultural 
society of the Netherlands. 
 
 
Pan-Africanism and Pentecostal transnationalism 
 
Historically, Ghana had a pivotal position in the efflorescence of Pan-
Africanism. Without going into historical detail here, it is clear that a number of 
those leading personalities whose contributions to the establishment and 
worldwide spread of Pan-Africanist ideals and organizations through birth or 
descent are related to what is present-day Ghana. Accra, the capital city of 
Ghana, is very much part of what Ebron (2000) recently called the ‘memory 
scape’ of Pan-Africanism. It is home to such organizations as the Pan-African 
Writers’ Association and features, for instance, the George Padmore Library 
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and the W.E.B. DuBois Centre which highlight Ghanaian achievements and 
contributions to Pan-Africanism. An ever-increasing interest is developing 
among Afro-American communities into the countries of the former Slave 
Coast, with Ghana drawing specific attention (see Ebron 2000, Hasty 2002, 
Davis 1997). Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president, displayed an explicit and 
pronounced interest in maintaining ties with the diaspora, in enhancing the 
spread of Pan-Aficanist ideals within Africa and in keeping the memory of the 
slave trade alive for generations to come. Later presidents would follow suit. 
Nkrumah based his ideas about the African spread of Pan-Africanism on the 
activities of early Pan-Africanists who saw it as their task to come to Africa, 
settle in various countries and establish direct links with Pan-African 
conferences held in the Western world. For instance F.Z.S. Peregrino, a Ga 
from Accra who had settled in the United States around 1900, was one of these 
early ‘Ghanaian’ Pan-Africanists who firmly believed in the need to create unity 
among the African peoples and nations not only in the diaspora but on the 
African continent as well (Parsons n.d.). He thus settled in Cape Town and, in 
line with Pan-Africanist ‘tradition’, began publishing books and tracts and even 
a journal, the South African Spectator, in which Pan-Africanist ideals were 
introduced to many in Southern Africa. His work reached as far as present-day 
Botswana and Zambia. 
Later presidents of Ghana, in particular J.J. Rawlings, recognized in the 
relationship between Ghana and the diaspora, and in Ghana’s role in Pan-
Africanism, other dimensions in addition to the politically motivated ideals of 
unity, dimensions that would relate to cultural and economic aspects of the 
relationship between Ghana and Afro-American communities. As in so many 
other postcolonial African states, the government — controlled by Rawlings’s 
National Democratic Party (NDC) after it came to power in a coup in 1981 — 
stepped up efforts to overcome the legacy of colonialism and missionization by 
using the past as a rich resource for societal renewal, for achieving progress and 
development in a ‘Ghanaian’ way. While some of the cultural traditions are 
approached critically, the state’s policy of augmenting the general public’s 
awareness of its cultural heritage has aimed at fostering national cohesion and 
involving the diaspora in domestic affairs. The NDC government thus created a 
National Commission on Culture that uses governmental funds for the 
organization of local, regional, national and international festivals. Furthermore, 
it gave a high priority to culture on school, college and university curricula (for 
instance, in the form of music and dance classes), and actively supported 
organizations such as the DuBois Centre and PANAFEST, a biannual Pan-
African festival featuring the cultural variety of Ghana’s heritage both in Ghana 
and its expressions in the diaspora. It has become a widely acclaimed Pan-
African cultural festival with extensive programmes of Ghanaian cultural 
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displays, dance classes, literature and ritual ceremonies. It actively promotes 
photo, film, video, theatre and musical productions that seek to produce images 
of Ghanaian cultural life and show its diversity and vibrancy. The PANAFEST 
festivals reach out to communities of Ghanaian migrants and descendants in the 
former slave colonies and encourage them to remain in close contact with their 
cultural roots.  
This festival must be placed in the context of other initiatives that seek to 
engage the diaspora in the life of the nation. There is a great deal of ‘roots’-
oriented tourism from Black Americans who visit the Slave Coast and places of 
significant meaning in the history of slavery (for instance, the slave fortresses) 
(Bruner 1996). The economic interest for Ghana in this specific type of tourism, 
even defined as a secular pilgrimage by some (Davis 1997, Ebron 2000), has 
become so substantive that Rawlings once called slavery a ‘blessing in disguise’ 
(Hasty 2002). Events such as the state-orchestrated Emancipation Day or the so-
called Home-Coming Summits with all their visitors from overseas have 
acquired a clear economic significance for the local population. On the other 
hand, visits by presidents and paramount chiefs from Ghana to the overseas 
diaspora communities have attributed political support to the cause of black 
communities in the United States and the United Kingdom in particular. It was 
during such visits that former president Rawlings would emphasize Pan-African 
ideals in general and point to Ghana’s needs in terms of development.  
 It is in this sense that an overlapping of diasporas has occurred (Lewis 1995, 
Hanchard 1999, Byfield 2000: 5). The way in which Pan-African ideals feed 
into the support of Ghana in cultural and economic terms coincides with the 
way in which revenues are accrued from the migration of Ghanaians. Ghana, as 
even the present newly elected president Kufuor acknowledges, is dependent for 
its survival in the modern world on its diaspora. (Overseas revenues are the 
country’s third largest source of income after gold and cocoa.) In the past two or 
three decades Ghana has become a country of large-scale emigration, a form of 
mobility focused on places where black communities of former descendants of 
the Slave Coast already exist. In addition however, shifts have occurred as the 
search for job opportunities also came to focus on Western countries that 
featured much less in the production of Pan-Africanist notions, such as 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.  
 It is estimated that 12 per cent of Ghanaians are presently living abroad (Peil 
1995) and the ambition of many young urbanites is to participate in 
intercontinental labour migration. Many families in Ghana perceive migration to 
the West of one or several of its members as a strategy of economic success and 
survival. This is a clear departure from earlier colonial and postcolonial 
movements of labour migration in and out of the country. Much of Ghana’s 
history in the 20th century can be described as being cloaked in mobility. In the 
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colonial period, lasting until the mid 1950s, a great deal of internal migration 
occurred from northern groups moving to the southern and central regions in 
search of paid employment in the emerging sectors of cocoa production, mining 
and urban industries. Large migrant quarters arose close to cities such as Accra 
and Kumasi where the northern labour migrants settled, contributing to the 
growth of the urban areas and their economic success. Experiencing an 
economic boom during the 1960s, independent Ghana under Nkrumah 
witnessed an influx of labour migrants of a more regional nature and 
particularly an unprecedented labour migration by Nigerians (Peil 1979, 
Sudarkasa 1979). During the 1970s, Ghana’s economy, particularly cocoa 
production and similar export-oriented activities, were hit hard by deteriorating 
world-market commodity prices. A massive out-migration began of Ghanaian 
labour migrants seeking their fortune regionally. Nigeria, by then with a new 
booming economy, attracted and absorbed large numbers of Ghanaian migrants 
until 1983. During Nigeria’s rapid decline in the mid 1980s, the country’s 
rulers, contrary to previous ideals of African unity, developed a new and rather 
violent policy of mass deportation of those labour migrants that its economy 
could no longer absorb. Hundreds of thousands of Ghanaian migrants were 
faced with expulsion from the country while a return to Ghana and its 
deteriorating economy was no viable option either.4 It was at this time that the 
new and massive intercontinental migration began, leading to the establishment 
of Ghanaian migrant communities in many European cities such as Hamburg, 
London, Amsterdam and New York. Ter Haar (1998) showed that by 1996 the 
Ghanaian migrant population had become the largest group among all the 
officially recorded migratory movements from Sub-Sahara Africa to Europe. 
 It was in the movement of large numbers of people from Nigeria back to 
Ghana that a new form of Christianity — known as charismatic Pentecostalism 
— was introduced into Ghana, inspired by similar religious movements that had 
already emerged in Nigeria. Pentecostalism has since become the most popular 
form of Christianity in Ghana over the last twenty years and has become deeply 
intertwined with the diasporic movement of Ghanaians worldwide. Between 
1987 and 1992 the number of Pentecostal churches grew by as much as 43 per 
cent (see Ghana Evangelism Committee 1993). Although there are many 
different forms of Pentecostalism and not all are gaining popularity at the same 
rate, recent figures show a marked increase in the spread of Pentecostalism 
throughout both rural and urban Ghana. Many of these churches belong to what 
has become known as the ‘second Pentecostal wave’ that has swept through 
Africa since the 1970s, and has led to the emergence, particularly in urban 
                                                 
4 See Aluko (1985) and Yeboah (1986) on the Nigerian expulsion policy and the 
international outcry that    followed. 
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areas, of a newer type of Pentecostalism that in contradistinction with other 
independent churches began to proselytise a highly modernist discourse in 
which notions of individual self-making strongly prevail. These churches, such 
as Dr Mensa Otabil’s International Central Gospel Church and Bishop Duncan 
Williams’s Christian Action Faith Ministries which were founded in the late 
1970s, quickly attracted many members amongst the young and urban middle 
class in search of success and prosperity in life (Gifford 1998, Van Dijk 1997, 
1999).  
 This popular second wave of Pentecostalism continued a process that can be 
described as the indigenization of earlier mission-based Pentecostalism (see 
Meyer 1995, Larbi 2001). Missionary Pentecostalism was introduced to Ghana 
during the first three decades of the 20th century and took root with the founding 
of churches from England and the United States such as the Assemblies of God 
and the Apostolic Church. Though sometimes viewed in anthropology as 
belonging to the category of so-called spirit-healing churches that emerged at 
roughly the same time (locally known in Twi as sunsum asore), important 
differences in terms of ritual discourse, practices and modernist outlook have 
meant that Pentecostalism eventually took a different path to these other 
independent churches.  
 In terms of the various forms of Christianity, these Pentecostal churches 
have engaged in a cultural dialectic on two fronts. They have challenged 
mainstream Christianity on the perception of evil, on the diabolization of key 
elements of the African cosmology and on ways of counteracting witchcraft and 
evil spirits. Mainstream Christianity (Presbyterianism, Catholicism, Methodism 
and Anglicism) has preferred to deny the existence of witchcraft (bayiE) and 
has rejected the power of spirits (adze), amulets (asuman) and traditional 
healing practices as being mere superstition. It has refused to accommodate or 
absorb any of the elements of African cosmology in order to save the pure faith 
from being contaminated by devilish and occult forces. The development of 
independent African Christianity and its diverse forms of spirit-healing 
churches can be interpreted as a process of coming to terms with the powers that 
mainstream Christianity denied and ignored, and as a way of providing 
individual members with healing and protection. Whilst including Christian 
doctrines, the spirit-healing churches such as the Nazarene Healing Church and 
the Musama Disco Christo Church have provided healing through a range of 
objects and substances that clearly originated from ritual practices rooted in the 
veneration of abosom (family and ancestral spirits) and their worship through 
the shrine priests (okomfoo). The use of herbs, candles, oils, baths, concoctions, 
magical rings and the like was very much a part of this world and was included 
in the spirit-healing churches’ symbolical repertoires.  
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 However, the new Pentecostal churches engaged in a second dialectic here 
as they could not accept practices that would signal the continuation of a 
cultural past that would make the church vulnerable to attacks from the Devil 
and his many demons. Ancestral spirits, witches and ritual practices that related 
to veneration and protection were consequently classified as demonic and were 
diabolized (Meyer 1999). A rigid dichotomy was developed distinguishing 
benevolent from malevolent powers and spiritual forces, leaving no middle 
terrain for ambiguity. Whereas ancestral deities (honhom ananom) can either 
work for good or bad in the community or particularly in the family, not 
denying their existence and influence in Pentecostalism is equivocally 
brandished as malevolent. Healing and deliverance from such powers can only 
take place through the ‘blood of Christ’, the laying-on of hands and ecstatic 
prayer sessions in which the benevolent presence of the Holy Spirit is manifest 
through speaking in tongues (in Twi kasa foforoo, literally ‘speaking the new 
language’). Objects and substances that relate to a cultural past are not allowed 
within its ritual practice and discourse. In Pentecostal practice attention is paid 
to fasting, which is primarily perceived as a way to come to a spiritual control 
and inspection of the belly (yam) as the place where the ancestral spirits make 
their presence felt and influence the reproduction of society. 
So while the mission Pentecostal churches started to Africanize around 1950 
in terms of leadership and forms of worship, the importance of their own 
distinctive ways of dealing with evil forces in society grew. This approach 
contradicted mainstream Christianity that denied the efficacy of these forces and 
opposed the ‘demonic’ practices of the spirit-healing churches. It is important to 
note that while the Pentecostal churches grew in strength, the spirit-healing 
churches became less influential, less appealing and less able to adjust to the 
changing fortunes of Ghanaian society as it entered a global system. 
 Although the older Pentecostal churches were clearly represented in Ghana’s 
urban areas and could claim international links through their overseas branches, 
the new type of charismatic Pentecostal churches made internationalism their 
hallmark (Van Dijk 1997, 2001b, Gifford 1998). In Accra and Kumasi, 
churches were adding terms such as ‘international’, global’ and ‘world’ to their 
names, promising religiously inspired access to transnationalism.5 Furthermore, 
this new Pentecostalism appears to be inspired by the developments of 
Pentecostalism in America. Firmly located in the prosperity gospel, it 
propounds the notion of the individual’s combined spiritual and socio-economic 
                                                 
5 Examples include the well-known International Central Gospel Church, the Global 
Revival Outreach Ministry, the Harvest Ministries International and the World Miracle 
Church. In some of these churches, their international approach is represented 
symbolically by placing flags near the pulpit of each country in which branches have 
been established.  
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success. Leaders come across as having charismatic powers and acumen in 
business relationships. 
 From the mid 1980s onwards, another salient feature of these churches has 
been their international self-presentation. The global claim has become a 
prominent feature, demonstrating that, unlike most spirit-healing churches, they 
can extend beyond Ghana, and Ghanaian and West African culture. 
Consequently, they have actively sought to enter other cultural contexts and 
have ascribed a place for them in their ideology, organization and subsequent 
religious experience. The claim is not simply that Ghana is ‘too small a place 
for our message’, but that entering other cultural contexts deepens, enriches and 
essentializes the religious experiences of Pentecostal communities (Van Dijk 
2001a, 2001b). Operating from Accra or Kumasi, these churches began setting 
up branches outside Ghana, particularly in Western Europe and the United 
States. Pentecostalism has connected with the ‘new’ African diaspora through 
its message for a mobile urban population eager to participate in transnational 
movement. Over the last decade, migrating to the West has become increasingly 
difficult due to the stiff measures taken by most governments to curtail 
immigration from Africa. While Europe has turned into a ‘fortress’, large 
numbers of Ghanaian Pentecostal churches have been able to establish 
themselves in the continent’s major cities, thereby once more adding to the 
image and promise of success and internationalism that Pentecostalism appears 
to harbour. In many cities in Western Europe but also in the US and even in 
Israel and Japan, these new Pentecostal churches have been able to establish 
satellite congregations, and cater to the needs of the Ghanaian migrant in the 
diaspora. 
Pentecostalism in Ghana feeds into the Occidentalized notions that many 
young people still maintain of the West, of images that bespeak the West’s 
affluence as a place of desire. These churches have, therefore, developed 
connections with international Pentecostal circles through modern means of 
transport and communication and are creating an extensive exchange of people 
and materials both to and from Ghana. Conversely, some of the Pentecostal 
churches that were founded in the Ghanaian diaspora have ploughed their way 
back to Ghana. In other words, alongside Ghanaian-based Pentecostal churches 
that have been set up among Ghanaian communities in Amsterdam, London or 
Hamburg, Pentecostal churches with no previous links with Ghana have 
emerged. Pentecostalism has become a transnational phenomenon that in its 
modern forms is reproduced in its local diversity through a highly accelerated 
circulation of goods, ideas and people. In fact it has formed a moral and 
physical geography whose domain is one of transnational cultural inter-
penetration and flow as created and recreated through travel and encounter.  
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 In the Netherlands there are approximately 40 Ghanaian Pentecostal 
churches in cities such as Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam where 
sizeable Ghanaian migrant communities are to be found. They vary in 
membership from 50 to 600 adults and include both legal and illegal migrants. 
In The Hague, which is the location of one half of my multi-sited research (the 
other being in Accra), eleven Pentecostal churches are currently operating in a 
community of (officially) 2.000 adults (Van Dijk 2001c, 2002b). They hold an 
influential position in the community and function as the de facto moral 
authority on a wide range of matters pertaining to birth, marriage, funerals and 
other rituals and arrangements. Six of these churches have direct links with 
churches in Accra while the others were founded in The Hague during the late 
1980s. Styles of ritual practice, worship, the elements of personalism and 
international linkage refer to what can be observed in Accra among these 
churches and create a deep sense of transnational continuity, global unity and 
exchange, and direct accessibility for the Ghanaian migrant. Despite the ever-
toughening border controls and identity politics of the Dutch government with 
regard to immigration, one of the latest arrivals within the Ghanaian community 
in The Hague has been a satellite of one of the most remarkable Pentecostal 
churches in Accra: the International Central Gospel Church of Mensa Otabil. 
 
 
The Pan-Africanist message of Mensa Otabil 
 
Rev. Mensa A. Otabil, the leader and founder of the International Central 
Gospel Church (ICGC) in Accra, is by far the most influential, renowned and 
outspoken of all the Pentecostal leaders who have come forward in Ghana’s 
second Pentecostal wave. His eloquence and innovative style, his command of 
the public media and his uncompromising public pronouncements have made 
him an example to be followed by many emerging Pentecostal leaders in the 
public domain in Ghana. His flamboyance and his public presence have also 
made him a favourite subject of study in much of the science-of-religion type 
literature on Ghana. Studies such as those by Gifford (1998), Hackett (1998), 
Larbi (2001) and Darkwah (2000) emphasize various aspects of his moral and 
religious message, his theology and the sources of inspiration he has sought in 
American Pentecostalism, his coverage of the public media and his role in the 
emergence of what can be called the highly appealing prosperity gospel in 
Ghana. These authors do not fail to note the elements of political criticism that 
transpire in many of his messages, which have made him the moral watchdog of 
the nation, as well as the Pan-African sentiments that come across strongly. It is 
the tantalizing combination of Pentecostalism, Pan-Africanism and political 
criticism that explains much of his massive appeal in Ghana, on the African 
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continent, as well as in many parts of the Ghanaian diaspora and other black 
communities overseas. The peculiarity of this combination is unique and must 
be explored against the backdrop of the transnational nature of Ghanaian 
Pentecostalism. 
 Otabil established the ICGC in central Accra in 1984 in line with the way in 
which a predecessor, Bishop Duncan Williams, had established his church, the 
Action Faith Ministries, and who in his turn had imported this form of religious 
organization into Ghana from Nigeria. Starting with church services in a 
cinema,6 the church then decided to move to one of the biggest halls in the city 
until it finally moved to a newly constructed multi-billion cedi church building 
in the very heart of Accra in 1996. The success of the church and of Otabil’s 
appeal have coincided with the broad and popular success of Pentecostalism in 
Ghana at large but is also due to Otabil’s charismatic personality and the many 
services the church renders to the public. It is run on the basis of a modernist 
and highly liberal notion of religious entrepreneurship which includes the 
professional proliferation of its basic tenets through the production of cassettes, 
videos, tapes, printed materials such as books and magazines, television and 
radio shows and church planting activities throughout Ghana and in other parts 
of the world. Otabil’s messages reach every corner of Ghanaian society and are 
rapidly spreading across Africa and the diaspora. The books he has written 
circulate around the world and discussions about his ideas can be found on the 
Internet. He himself holds two honorary doctorate degrees in the Humanities 
and Divinity, and the church also moved into academia when in 1998 it opened 
the first privately owned Pentecostal university in Africa, Central University, 
with two faculties, namely, Theology and Business Administration. Otabil 
became the chancellor of the university and as part of this academic effort 
began publishing his own lectures in a separate series, New Dawn publications. 
For ordinary members of the ICGC, however, other and more religious 
services of the church have remained important, particularly the ‘Solution 
Centre’ where people go for spiritual healing and deliverance. The purpose of 
these rituals is to bring ‘divine provision’ to every individual in his/her quest for 
success, prosperity and progress in life. Here people are told they should enter 
into a covenant with the heavenly forces and be disciplined, diligent and 
determined whatever that covenant sets forth. This is all dependent on personal 
free will, choice and ambition and it is for this reason that the so-called 
Winner’s Club was established, a special division of the church with an 
‘exclusive membership of the highly motivated and dynamic achievers in fields 
                                                 
6 This was the Regal Cinema, Osu. Birgit Meyer attaches specific significance to the 
fact that so many of these new Pentecostal churches tend to occupy cinemas for their 
church services. Many of them do so as they cannot afford to build a place of their own.  
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of business, law, commerce, accountancy who seek to use biblical and secular 
principles to affect society’ (Gifford 1998: 81). It is exclusive particularly in 
terms of membership fees, which often amount to hundreds of dollars a year.  
The overall success of Pentecostalism in Ghanaian society can, in addition to 
its transnational appearance and globalizing outlook, be explained by this 
ideology and praxis which strike a responsive chord among the educated 
English-speaking and upwardly mobile groups in Ghanaian society. In Otabil’s 
case this ritual practice and its public appeal relate to his Pan-African ideas. 
These are very much based on the Hamitic hypothesis but are largely inspired 
by Senghor’s negritude, and proclaim the worldwide redemption of the Black 
Race not by a return to traditional African heritage but by an African 
appropriation of the Bible and the Gospel. They are deeply Afro-centric in the 
first place. In his book Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia (1992) Otabil develops a 
specific form of liberation theology, which redefines the position of Black 
people in the Bible as crucial to God’s redemptive and messianic plan for the 
world.  Davies (1998: 130) writes: 
 
The aim of the book is clear: to retrace within the Bible (the King James version, no 
less) “the purposes of God for the Black Race”. Thus we have an exegetical exercise 
in which the Bible is rethought in terms of Abraham’s third wife, Keturah, of Moses 
father-in-law, of the Midianites, of the Cushites, of the Cyrenians, of Simon the 
cross-bearer, of some of the early Church elders. 
 
Whites have distorted the Bible and its message for the future of Africa to such 
an extent that even Africans themselves have come to believe that the black race 
has been cursed. Otabil is convinced that his liberating Afro-centric work plays 
a role in what he calls the breaking of a certain mentality which he finds is 
prevalent among many Africans: a mentality of ‘slavery’, ‘dependency’ and that 
of a ‘begging attitude’ as he once called it in one of his public sermons. 
Through the appropriation of the Gospel, African peoples and descendants of 
former slaves can look for prowess and pride in being black and of having 
played such a crucial role in saving mankind in Biblical and present times: 
‘Whenever the world has been in crisis the black man has always appeared on 
the scene’ (Otabil 1992: 87). The book is a strident rejection of this mental 
slavery and proclaims a ‘breaking’ of attitudes that do not confirm this quest of 
self-esteem and promising initiative and entrepreneurship: 
 
The most difficult part to break in any situation of addition and dependency is not 
the physical but the mental, so then mental slavery is more difficult to break than 
physical slavery. (p. 69) 
When I was called into the ministry, one of the things the Lord led me to do was to 
liberate my people from mental slavery through the preaching of the Gospel and to 
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lift up the image of the black man so as to be a channel of blessing to the nations of 
the world. (p. 18) 
Businessmen, lawyers, inventors, teachers, your time has come.... You may be 
starting late, but you must run with purpose. (p. 86) 
 
The book, tellingly opening with a foreword by L. Lovett a professor in Afro-
American religious studies at the Oral Roberts University in Oklahoma (from 
which Otabil received one of his two honorary doctorates), has been widely 
read in Afro-American circles throughout the United States. Internet discussions 
and readers’ reviews can be found acclaiming the book and Otabil’s message 
for as one reader stated: 
 
This book shatters the myth that we as black people are not in the Bible. God has a 
plan for us and Christianity is not a white man’s religion. We were never cursed. In 
the light of white America’s lies through the years it is time to get the truth. 
(www.Amazon.com/Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia/p. 2) 
 
Otabil began receiving numerous invitations to speak at events in America, 
thereby giving greater circulation to his ideas in Afro-American communities. 
Beyond the International Central Gospel Church branches that were established 
across the Atlantic, for example in New York but also in London, his books, 
tape recordings, video recordings as well as his privately owned magazine 
Greener Pastures received wide circulation in Ghanaian migrant communities 
and among a great number of the Afro-Americans interested in their roots. His 
private initiatives, such as the university he established, received material 
support from these communities and the university has become affiliated to the 
Council for Christian Colleges and Universities in the US.  
He took further measures in Ghana and other African countries to spread his 
specific Pan-African message by establishing the so-called Pan-African 
Believers’ Conference, an annual meeting of representatives of African and 
Afro-American Christian communities and churches. The one I was able to 
attend in 1998 had as its central theme ‘Lift Up Your Head, Africa’ and in his 
opening speech Otabil deplored what he called the ‘I don’t care attitude’ and 
warned all present that: 
 
We should not make the mistake of copying Western and Asian countries blindly. 
The Malaysian economy has become a model for Africa, but unfortunately for us 
their economy is now in crisis. We must demand our rights and must develop our 
own models by fighting the ‘I don’t care’ attitude of our leaders! 
 
On other occasions he openly criticized African leaders, including President 
Rawlings, for putting African countries under the yoke of neo-colonialism and 
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under the control of such organizations as the IMF and the World Bank and 
their structural adjustment programmes (Gifford 1998: 88). Books he published 
after Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia developed this line of thinking, of 
combining Afro-centric ideas with economic success and development through 
the preaching of a change in attitude whereby a promise of progress and 
prosperity is reserved for those eager to be industrious, studious and willing to 
sacrifice time, energy and resources to developing their own initiative. In a book 
entitled Four Laws of Productivity, for example, he admonishes the reader: 
‘Most of the time the reason why people are poor is because of laziness’ and 
continues: ‘Make sure you go beyond what everyone else is doing. And that 
may mean sleepless nights studying. But one day you will come to stand above 
the others.’  
Outside Ghana his visits to other countries in Africa have often left local 
Pentecostal leaders deeply impressed by his powerful appearance and messages. 
In Zambia and Zimbabwe his participation in large Pentecostal summits 
attended by influential leaders from within the region such as Ezekiel Guti 
(Zimbabwe), Nevers Mumba (Zambia) and Enock Sitima (Botswana)7 left many 
baffled and surprised by his messages of black pride, Pentecostal awakening 
and resistance to oppressive political and economic structures (Gifford 1998: 
236-45). This appealing combination of Afro-centrism and Pentecostal 
liberation theology was unheard of in this region of Africa where political 
dictatorships continued to rule until the mid 1990s. Preaching fire-and-
brimstone messages against the ‘African inferiority complex’ as he called it, his 
public sermons became news and were hotly debated in the public media, partly 
because of their alleged anti-white sentiments, (being expressed in countries 
with a still considerable ‘white’ population) and partly because of their overtly 
political criticism: 
 
…your personal individual prosperity is tied up with the prosperity of the nation. We 
have to think structurally about the economy of the nation. You can’t preach in 
Africa and not be political. If a nation is poor, its people will be poor. Christians 
can’t say ‘let’s leave politics to politicians’. No, if wrong policies are made, you can 
pray all you want, and you won’t have anything. In South Africa, God has changed 
the situation. They have a black President, but 98% of the wealth in South Africa is 
in non-black hands. So you can have a black President, but what’s different? 
Christians have the faith, non-believers have the money. But you can’t claim 
anyone’s money by faith — it’s illegal. If you want to have money, there is only one 
way: work. On 6 March 1957 Ghana was the first nation to get Independence. But 
the economy is not controlled by Ghanaians. The economy is controlled by 
                                                 
7 See Maxwell (1998) on Guti in Zimbabwe and Van Dijk (2002a) on Sitima in 
Botswana. 
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multinationals. We worked for them to create wealth for them to take it out of the 
country. We were hewers of wood and drawers of water for them. I prayed to God to 
prosper, but we have to change economic structures and social structures. If I don’t 
have that opportunity, I can pray all I want and I’ll still be poor. When we were 
colonised, structures were built in our nations. The British came not because they 
thought we needed the gospel; they came because they wanted raw materials…and 
impoverish you. You can pray all you want, but it won’t help…unless we start 
looking at the structures of our nations.  
How come you live in your own country, and you don’t own anything? The only 
thing is to run to Botswana and South Africa. The tragedy of African governments is 
that they keep their own people poor, and keep foreigners rich. The key lies in a 
work-conscious, ownership conscious, skilled populace. Don’t think, ‘who can give 
me a job?’ Think, ‘When can I start a business? (Otabil addressing a crowd in 
Lusaka, Zambia, August 1994, quote taken from Gifford 1998: 240, 242) 
 
What we can conclude is that Otabil’s triangulation of black pride/Afro-
centrism, Pentecostal liberation ideology and a prosperity gospel based on 
private entrepreneurship provides him with a prism with many sides to show in 
a variety of contexts. Whereas his messages in the context of Afro-American 
relations emphasize a break with slave mentality and a unification of purposes 
across the trans-Atlantic — which global Pentecostalism provides — in Africa 
black pride is becoming a constitutive element of private enterprise in the face 
of failing governments and white economic dominance.  
Despite his overall success and appeal in Ghana, in many parts of Africa and 
overseas in Ghanaian and Afro-American communities of the English-speaking 
world, his ideas have not particularly struck a chord in the Dutch Ghanaian 
community. A branch of Otabil’s church was set up relatively late in the 
Netherlands when compared to all the other Ghanaian Pentecostal churches that 
were established from the mid 1980s onwards. Furthermore, it was established 
in The Hague, one of the smaller concentrations of Ghanaian migrants in the 
Netherlands, while in fact the largest concentration is found in Amsterdam (Van 
Dijk 2001c, 2002b). In the meantime 40 different Ghanaian Pentecostal and 
other congregations had already come into existence, and so the International 
Central Gospel branch has remained small in membership and dependent on the 
help and support of one or two ‘like-minded’ churches in the city (Acts Revival 
and Rhema Gospel Church). Mensa Otabil has never visited the branch, as far 
as I am aware, although he has been to the much larger London-based branch of 
the church. The various magazines related to Otabil’s activities (such as 
Greener Pastures or the university-related magazine Pathfinder) do not 
circulate widely in The Hague, nor do his tapes or video recordings. Some 
church-related musical recordings are an exception, particularly those that 
feature Ghanaian or American gospel artists, such as Black Heritage or Ron 
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Kenoli, and their performances on stage in the Christ Temple in the centre of 
Accra. Many of Otabil’s views on black pride and Pentecostal liberation 
theology, however, remain absent from much of the Pentecostal discourse in the 
city of The Hague where his branch in located. Given the immense popularity of 
Otabil in Ghana and the far-reaching influence of much of his Afro-centric and 
politically critical thinking, this absence and silence is indeed striking.  
 
 
Conclusion: Interpreting Otabil’s absence 
 
The first point to be made is that the growing elitist outlook of Otabil’s church 
and its dominant views have meant that the church has moved away from a 
more popular and broader-based Pentecostalism in which the ritual practices of 
‘breaking’ and deliverance dominate. The majority of Ghanaian migrants in the 
Netherlands were unskilled or semi-skilled when they left Ghana to try their 
luck in this part of Europe, unlike those who migrated to English-speaking 
countries where training and education were, or became, of dominant 
importance (see Ter Haar 1998). The Pentecostal churches, which in a sense 
followed this migration pattern to the Netherlands, were mostly of the type of 
popular or per force populist orientation in which the practices of breaking and 
deliverance are considered major elements of their appeal. Many of these 
churches that have been established in Amsterdam, such as the Resurrection 
Power Ministries or the Bethel Prayer Ministries, became successful in Ghana 
and in the diaspora largely because they embraced the practice of deliverance. 
This is a ritual practice of dealing with evil and misfortune that has become part 
of the hallmark of Pentecostalism and directly relates to the widely shared 
concerns of the general public. 
 On several occasions Otabil has proclaimed to be alarmed by the deliverance 
hype that hit Ghana in the last decade and which has often led, in his view, to a 
frenzied search for the occult and dark powers in people’s private and social 
lives (personal communication with Mensa Otabil, but see also Gifford 1998: 
108). Gifford writes: 
 
His concern arose for a characteristic reason: that because in practice deliverance 
bears on idols, local spirits, ancestors, stools and face markings, it hardly applies to 
whites and is really tailored for blacks, and is thus one more way of alienating 
blacks from their culture. (Gifford 1998: 108) 
 
What is this practice of deliverance that is so abhorred by Otabil? The practice 
of deliverance (ogyee) has become a common denominator in popular 
Pentecostalism as it shares and negotiates a fear of how demons, ancestral 
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spirits and the like from the past may haunt a person in the present. The more 
positions of leadership were taken by Africans and the more Pentecostal 
churches and breakaway groups were started by Africans, the more the practice 
of deliverance — a way of dealing with a person’s past — came to take a 
central position in worship and church organization. Its significance has become 
the subject of extensive study, by scholars from Ghana (see, among others, 
Atiemo 1993, Adubofuor 1994, Larbi 2001) as well as from elsewhere (Meyer 
1995, 1998, Van Dijk 1997, 1999, Gifford 1998: 97-109, Ter Haar 1998: 175-
76).  
 The aim of deliverance is to free people from the powers of Satan that hold 
them in bondage through demonic forces. These demonic forces are said to 
reside within society at large but more particularly within the individual’s 
immediate circle of family relationships and descent. Satan is believed to work 
through ancestral or generational curses (nnomee), which can become manifest 
in specific problems haunting individual family members such as infertility, 
alcoholism, misfortune or tragic death. Pentecostal believers are, therefore, 
urged to be aware of such manifestations that may signal the presence of a curse 
from a past and of which the individual was unaware.  
 Deliverance is aimed at creating a rift, a clear-cut rupture with the known or, 
in most cases, unknown past. Deliverance should be preceded by ‘breaking’ 
(obubu), the spiritual breaking of the bonds that keep people entangled with 
their past, their former upbringing within the family circle where the ancestors 
are venerated at the family shrines through the practices of the shrine priests 
(okomfoo). Name-giving, ‘outdooring’ (an elaborate ritual of bringing a new-
born child out into the community), initiation, healing and the pouring of 
libation to the ancestors performed at important events in a person’s life may 
signal links with the family spirits which in Pentecostal discourses provoke 
danger and impurity.  
 Deliverance ministries are established in most churches and provide a break 
with the past. ‘Make a complete break with the past’ is a cry often heard in the 
context of these ministries (see Meyer 1998). Such a break operates on two 
levels. One is the person’s immediate lifestyle, the engagement with present-day 
society in which the confirmed believer is trapped in moral wrongdoing — 
drinking, theft, other forms of crime, greed, poverty, rudeness, envy and hatred. 
These are all redefined in Pentecostal ideology as resulting from evil spirits, or 
even as spirits manifesting themselves in these forms.8 Being Born Again is, 
                                                 
8 As Pastor Ampiah Kwofi proclaimed at a gathering of his Global Revival Outreach 
Ministries which I attended on 29 October 1995: ‘Poverty is a spirit you need to get rid 
of’. 
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therefore, often portrayed as a fierce battle between the individual and the 
powers from the person’s immediate past.  
 At a deeper level, however, deliverance from the ancestral past confronts the 
bondage of the longue duree. The past life of the family is to be inspected for 
the sins that have been committed in the past. Any person alive today may be 
haunted by ancestral curses that become manifest through recurrent problems in 
terms of the blood-line with the past: families and individuals may experience 
problems with childbirth, with being able to conceive, with chronic diseases, 
with afflictions from ancestral or evil spirits which become apparent in 
possession, madness and nightmares. In Pentecostal ideology these ancestral 
curses all result from blood covenants that in the past have been established 
through and by the ancestors with devilish powers. The answer to such 
problems, as is stressed during deliverance rituals, is a complete break with the 
blood tie that keeps a person trapped within the realm of an ancestral curse. It 
may imply a subsequent rejection of all those rituals, such as initiation and 
funerals, that emphasize connections with a family’s bounded past.  
 Most churches operate special hours, meetings places or even entire ‘camps’ 
where people can subject themselves to what are sometimes called ‘spiritual 
operations’ meant to relieve them of their burdening ancestral influences (Van 
Dijk 1997). Often taking place in a highly ecstatic and emotional atmosphere, 
people are ‘broken’ through prayer healings from these ties and all evil 
influences are spiritually cast away. Before this takes place, particularly in the 
context of admittance to prayer camps, people are requested to fill out extensive 
questionnaires in which every detail of their exposure to ancestral worship, 
traditional healing practices or ‘devil worship’ are investigated so as to enhance 
the spiritual treatment of all of them. As I have shown elsewhere (Van Dijk 
1997), the ritual practices at these specialized prayer camps are considered by 
many aspiring migrants to be essential before moving from Ghana to other parts 
of the world to partake in all that migration may offer. 
While breaking and deliverance are seen as key elements in the Pentecostal 
ritual structure as they provide a personal reconstruction of an individual’s past 
and heritage, the control of time, history and self-making it prescribes is 
reinterpreted by Otabil in a different dimension. He, his church and some of the 
other churches that came later and that followed the inspirational lines he had 
set out came to perceive of a second wider and cultural domain of controlling 
the past: the moral supervision of culture. These Pentecostal churches, which 
for instance include the successful Lighthouse Chapel, are deeply concerned 
about culture and how the government and other authorities negotiate the call 
for a preservation of heritage, ritual and symbolic styles. These Pentecostals 
perceive African rituals as yet another dangerous avenue by which Satan 
ensures that ancestral and generational curses manifest themselves in present-
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day society. They tend to provoke a profound contestation in the public realm in 
terms of a politics of culture and its implied nostalgia (see for violent clashes, 
Van Dijk 2001e).  
In their view, traditional ritual blocks progress not only at an individual level 
but also at the community level. In other words, social-cultural traditions form 
an impediment to the community’s and even to the nation’s progress, and 
Pentecostal initiative is thus directed at disqualifying such displays of cultural 
life. Consequently, Pentecostals critically examine efforts, such as those by the 
state, that are aimed at reviving and rejuvenating certain traditions, and that aim 
to overcome the ruptures with a cultural heritage which have been brought 
about by the modern projects of colonialism, missionization, western education, 
and capitalist market relations. Instead, within much Pentecostal ritual 
surrounding birth, death, marriage and so forth, we notice an explicit strategy 
aimed at replacing the cultural forms that are so cherished by those wishing to 
preserve their heritage.9 
 In Otabil’s view therefore, breaking and deliverance require — at a higher 
level of abstraction — a critical examination of cultural styles and repertoires, 
of tradition and of the Ghanaian state’s cultural policy of re-inscribing a cultural 
heritage into present-day public life. Black pride must be a Christianized pride, 
which runs counter to a state that has become complicit in encouraging and 
preserving certain traditions that are defiling to the nation. Considering this 
staunch criticism, it is remarkable that Otabil has become an influential member 
of the National Commission on Culture which, established under Rawlings, has 
become the patron of much of the state’s effort to preserve cultural heritage for 
national interests (which in practice demonstrates the perplexing intricacies of 
the courting relationship between religion and politics in the modern 
developments of state formation in Ghana, an issue which I will leave for 
further discussion elsewhere).  
In the Ghanaian migrant communities in the Netherlands, breaking and 
deliverance in the perspective of personal healing and fortune have remained 
the dominant perspective of most of the Pentecostal churches that have been 
                                                 
9 Replacement may take place, for instance, when after childbirth, usually within a 
period of about three months, a name-giving ceremony for the baby is held. I once 
witnessed how an ICGC pastor took full ‘possession’ of the ritual, proclaimed the name 
of the baby and, instead of the usual alcohol, put water, salt and honey on the lips of the 
infant ‘to make him taste the three essences of life’. At similar rituals, the power of the 
family and elders is publicly and substantially reduced and detachment proclaimed. 
While in a non-Pentecostal context the parents themselves, the family elders or the 
okomfoo (the shrine priests) proclaim the name of the baby in public, in what has 
become known in English as the ‘outdooring’ ceremony (Akan, dintoo), here the church 
directly asserts its detaching power over new life. 
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active since the mid 1980s. They did not, by and large, form part of the more 
intellectual and reflexive Pentecostalism developed by Otabil after the 
publication of his book in 1992 (since most of the migrants had already arrived 
in the Netherlands by then) and their relative seclusion from cultural 
developments in the Netherlands gave them little incentive to be concerned with 
such issues as the moral supervision of local cultural heritage. Most of the 
concerns of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands have remained highly 
personal and private and have not seemed to lead to a more structural 
interpretation of their individual circumstances and predicaments. This 
dominant orientation towards personal healing was again evidenced by the visit 
of highly popular Pentecostal healing prophets from Ghana between 1998 and 
2000, healing prophets who were able to attract mass audiences at deliverance 
practices, which turned into veritable spectacles of healing. When these healing 
prophets showed up in The Hague, they found thousands of Ghanaian migrants 
waiting to be delivered from whatever was haunting them in their private lives.  
While these Ghanaian migrants were unfamiliar with Otabil’s thinking as far 
as the relationship between breaking/deliverance and the quest for black pride in 
cultural terms, the inverse of this is also true. Otabil’s ideas of black pride in 
relation to self-esteem, one’s own initiative and entrepreneurship seem not to be 
tailored to the specific situation of many Ghanaian migrants living in Dutch 
society. Otabil’s ideas appear to assume too much in terms of freedom to take 
initiative, to develop entrepreneurial activity, to travel around the world in a 
cosmopolitan fashion in the pursuit of economic success and independence, as if 
conditions were the same everywhere and as if everybody had equal access to 
all sorts of resources to be able to live up to the expectations of these aspects of 
black pride. His ideas and public statements seem too little attuned to the often 
harsh political realities of the Ghanaian migrants’ predicament in societies such 
as the Netherlands that are increasingly turning hostile to the presence of 
foreign labour. 
 In the Netherlands it has been particularly the presence of large numbers of 
Ghanaian and other West African migrants that has been a cause of alarm to the 
authorities with regard to Dutch immigration and identity policies. Around 
1992, after the crash of an Israeli plane into a low-cost housing area of 
Amsterdam that caused an unknown number of Ghanaian deaths in the fire that 
followed, the commissioner of police sounded alarm bells concerning the 
allegedly high number of illegal Ghanaian migrants in Dutch cities. The 
Netherlands came to experience an unprecedented tightening of its identity 
policies which in the following years specifically targeted five immigrant 
communities, labelling them officially as ‘problem countries’. At the top of that 
list was Ghana (Van Dijk 2001d, 2002b). The official view came to be that 
identity documents of any kind from these countries can never be believed to be 
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genuine and that in almost 100 per cent of cases the identity papers of their 
citizens must be considered fraudulent.  
 The Ghanaian community became the subject of intense control and 
investigation by the Dutch authorities. The Dutch government introduced so-
called verification procedures in Ghana whereby investigations into a person’s 
true identity would take place in the first instance on Ghanaian soil (see Van 
Dijk 2001d, 2002b). This has led to feelings of unrest among the migrant 
community as well as among their families and friends back home in Ghana. 
Verification in fact soon became the most pressing problem for many Ghanaian 
migrants as it prevented them from travelling, from accessing resources 
elsewhere, from marrying spouses from Ghana, from being united with their 
families and children from and in Ghana and from obtaining tenured jobs in the 
Dutch labour market. It also led to a situation in which the many Ghanaian 
Pentecostal churches that had emerged in the meantime came to be seen by 
some as the only remaining safe haven where illegal migrants could take part in 
a social life of some kind. Churches are not commonly targeted for identity 
checks by the authorities, unlike almost all other public places in the city. 
Contrary to Ghanaian indignation about these identity and taxonomic state 
policies, the Dutch authorities basically perceived them as ways of dealing with 
a kind of corruption which in principle could be tackled though technical and 
administrative solutions. 
 As a consequence of the many measures the government took to curb what it 
saw as illegal immigration from Ghana, protests against harsh treatment from 
within the Ghanaian community soon mounted. Voiced by a number of 
Ghanaian migrant interest groups in the country, and not so much by the 
Pentecostal churches, these protests did not adopt a race-related discourse. The 
groups could not argue that Ghana had become listed as a ‘problem-country’ on 
the basis of racist thought, leading Ghanaians to become a disenfranchised 
people. This listing included non-black countries as well (India, Pakistan and 
the Dominican Republic). Although racial discrimination undoubtedly has a 
long and dark record in Dutch labour relations — a problem many Ghanaians 
have certainly encountered — the implementation of these specific identity 
procedures that impacted on the community to such a large extent have never 
developed a clear racial bend (Van Dijk 2001d, 2002b). Nor have issues of race 
ever really emerged either among the Ghanaian population and the way they felt 
they were treated or among Dutch officials. An issue of globalization, 
weakening state borders, parochial identities, yes, but not an issue of racial 
identities as such.  
 So, Otabil’s ideas seem to have missed their mark in this specific context. 
While his ideas of black pride appear to resonate in a cosmopolitan world where 
he, his books and his ideas can have unfettered travel, can foster opportunity-
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seeking in an entrepreneurial fashion unhindered by borders of any kind and as 
such seem to fulfil the promise of globalization, Ghanaian migrants instead have 
begun to face the consequences of the ‘fortress called Europe’ (Ter Haar 1998). 
Ideas of black pride and free enterprise appear to have little meaning and appeal 
in a situation where globalization has come to mean blockades, control and 
increasing supervision through a state apparatus that extends its investigations 
into Ghana as well. Hence, breaking and deliverance in a structural sense, as 
proclaimed in Otabil’s Pentecostal liberation theology, do not bespeak a 
situation in which these problems of blockade, control and supervision above all 
have come to be experienced as a highly personal, private problem; an 
individual’s quest for ‘verification’ of all sorts of documents and as such a 
highly individualized conquest of almost Kafkain administrative procedures.  
 Instead of fighting a (pre-supposed) inferiority complex, many Ghanaians 
see themselves besieged by such questions as: ‘Which force from within my 
family, my background, my past is responsible for these verification problems I 
am facing? ‘Why is this all happening to me and who is to be held responsible 
for this particular kind of misfortune?’ Breaking and deliverance remain 
inescapably personal and individual. Due to the lack of leverage in a practical 
sense, Otabil’s ideas come across as irrelevant to a Ghanaian migrant 
community facing the predicaments of Dutch society where bureaucratic and 
taxonomic rationales have been able to turn ‘identity’ into an exclusively 
individualistic affair of coping and manoeuvring. 
Important conclusions can be drawn from this difference in the appeal of 
Pentecostal Afro-centric ideas with regard to the intellectual ownership of such 
views, and the world and social groups to which they seem to belong. There is 
no self-evident relationship between such ownership and belonging, as Otabil’s 
case for black pride and the Africanization of the Bible appear to imply. His 
claim, after all, is that the ownership of ideas of black pride and Pan-African 
unity do not belong a priori to an intellectual class of people well versed in 
Western enlightened ideals of scholarship but can and ought to be placed in the 
hands of the ordinary believer. While Otabil’s Pentecostal views display a sense 
of ownership of specific Pan-African identity and entelechy in what it aims to 
achieve, the Ghanaian migrants who share this identity do not feel that Pan 
African ideals are part of their longing and belonging. This chapter has, thus, 
argued that ownership and belonging cannot be taken together as one great 
solvent of local identity contesting global marginalization, but that there is a 
dialogue between the two that requires a contextual understanding for each of 
the situations in which it emerges.  
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Global connections, local ruptures: 
The case of Islam in Senegal 
 
Roy Dilley 
 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between Islam and caste 
in Senegal. It investigates how new meanings of caste identity 
have been negotiated in view of differing conceptions of Islam 
that have taken hold within the country. Twentieth-century 
reformist movements have challenged the predominant role of 
Sufi brotherhoods, bringing about a reassessment of the 
relationship between caste and Islam. The Nyasiyya brotherhood 
provides the basis for a brief case study, which shows that the 
popularity of this Order abroad is not matched by its reception 
in Senegal. Some of the possible reasons are examined for this 
disjunction between the global connections the Order establishes 
and the local ruptures it engenders within the local Muslim 
community. The chapter traces the dynamics of Sufism and 
reformist Islam to reveal a double-edged thrust of global 
connections brought about through an internationalizing Islam, 
and of local ruptures mediated through caste identities. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Certain theories of globalization suggest that we are living through very 
particular times, in which processes connected with the increasing speed of 
communication, of movements of goods and people from one part of the world 
to another make for a unique experience that is driven by connections being 
forged on a global scale. It is easy to regard this as a unique late-20th-
century/early-21st-century phenomenon. This chapter seeks to suggest that in 
other periods of history movements of people and ideas on a global scale were 
also in evidence, and arguably one of these was the spread of the religion of 
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Islam itself from the Middle East across North and Sub-Saharan Africa, through 
parts of Europe, as well as east into Asia and elsewhere. This movement began 
as early as the late 7th and 8th centuries CE, and the spread of ideas within the 
Islamic diaspora has waxed and waned ever since. I attempt to pick up some of 
the threads of this sense of connectedness with respect to different conceptions 
of Islam in West Africa, and especially how these varying conceptions of 
religious thought and practice have been formed within a conversation between 
Muslims within West Africa and those beyond the region. 
 These ideas about global connectedness form a backdrop to one of the central 
issues under investigation in this chapter, namely, the relationship between 
Islam and caste in Senegal. Islam as a globalizing force has been shaped in its 
encounter with local conceptions of social and cultural difference — that is 
‘caste’. This investigation entails the study of how in the contemporary period 
new meanings of caste identity have been negotiated with respect to the 
differing conceptions of Islam that have become established in Senegal. The 
relationship between caste status and the religion of Islam has been historically a 
matter of local debate in the region and, as is shown below, 20th-century 
reformist Islamic movements have brought this matter to the fore once again. 
Islam in Senegal has been forged historically by a series of global 
connections: reformist movements from the Almoravids in the 10th century, the 
influence of Moorish scholars in the 17th and 18th centuries, and the Wahabbist-
inspired jihads of the 19th century under the leadership, for example, of El Hajj 
Omar Taal are all examples of this.1 This chapter picks up threads of this 
conversation from the early 20th century, in particular by examining an assault 
on Sufism by anti-Sufist Muslims as well as by those educated in a Western 
rationalist tradition. Globalization, however, is not a one-way process. Global 
connections linking one locality to another are complex and ambiguous, and 
must be understood by reference to those worlds of meaning in which people 
find themselves. While the impact of ideas generated in places outside West 
Africa can be plotted, so too can the attempts by members of a locality who 
actively seek out new sources of knowledge and authority to meld them into 
forms that have roots within any particular location. I aim to trace the dynamics 
within Sufism in Senegal, and this investigation reveals a double-edged thrust of 
global connections and local ruptures. Two contradictory processes are at work: 
while some Muslims seek a more internationalist platform for their faith, others 
are developing conceptions of the Muslim community that address local 
ruptures. One main form of social distinction that has constituted a rupture 
within the community of Sufi Muslims in Senegal has been ‘caste’, a label used 
to refer to members of occupationally specialized artisan and musician groups 
                                                 
1 See Willis (1967, 1970) on the Wahabbist influences on Taal. 
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who have conventionally been excluded from full participation as co-
religionists.2 This chapter examines the relationship between Islam and caste in 
Senegal with regard to processes connected with colonialism and the post-
colony. 
 The kind of Islam most commonly associated with Senegal in the literature 
on West African Muslims is that of the Sufi brotherhoods, particularly the 
Tijaniyya, Qadiriyya and the Muridiyya. One central area of expertise among 
the marabouts of these orders is the control of Arabic literacy and associated 
forms of ‘book magic’ (Goody 1968) that constitute one of the most significant 
forms of magical operation that marabouts control. But what might be called the 
‘esoteric construction’ of knowledge and the role of literacy within these Sufi 
orders is under attack. The main protagonists in this contest are Islamic 
reformers and Islamists who are leading an assault on contemporary forms of 
Sufi mystical practices in West Africa. Traditional Sufi brotherhoods have been 
challenged in terms of how their systems of belief and practice represent a 
departure from ‘orthodoxy’. Reformers and Islamists have traced anew where 
the Muslim community should draw the limits. And their new definitions of this 
community have entailed the inclusion and the exclusion of specific categories 
of people. These Islamist critiques of Sufism have proposed replacing what 
might be seen as ‘local’ forms of religious belief and practice with more 
internationalist or global forms. These represent for some observers a modernist 
vision in Islamic guise. 
What seems to be happening today is a bifurcation in the Senegalese Muslim 
community: Islamists and reformers propose radically new visions of the 
jama’a, the Muslim community, while at the same time, others are reinventing 
and recasting conventional forms of West African Sufism. There is, therefore, a 
complex set of shifting patterns of social association and religious identification 
in Senegal. Indeed, running parallel with the Islamist and reformist 
developments has been the spread of Sufi brotherhoods outside Senegal. The 
Murid Order, for example, operates internationally in both Europe and the 
United States, and the Nyasiyya — an offshoot of the Tijaniyya — is developing 
a global reach beyond the boundaries of Senegal. While many of these 
developments are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is the Nyasiyya that forms 
the focus of this investigation. The popularity of this order abroad, however, is 
not matched in terms of its standing and reception at home in Senegal. This 
                                                 
2 See Dilley (2000) for a discussion of the use of the term ‘caste’ to describe such 
categories of persons. As employed here, the gloss ‘caste’ provides a generalized, non-
ethnic-specific short cut for a range of social categories that are variously named in 
local vernaculars. In Pulaar, for instance, they are known as nyeenybe. Its use also 
reflects popular usage by local speakers who use the term ‘caste’ interchangeably with 
‘race’. 
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chapter examines some of the possible reasons for this disjunction between the 
global connections that the order establishes on the one hand, and the local 
ruptures it is engendering within the Islamic community on the other. The 
association between the order and people of ‘caste’ origin is central, the chapter 
argues, and this plays a large part in the local understanding of the order’s place 
within a Senegalese Islamic context. 
 
 
Forms of knowledge and education 
 
The nature of literacy practices and the status of ‘book magic’ within Sufi 
brotherhoods have been thrown into relief by virtue of the challenges laid down 
by opponents of mystical Sufism. Brenner (2000) refers to the ‘esoteric 
episteme’ that underpins a variety of forms of West African Sufi mysticism. 
This episteme also supports their corresponding forms of knowledge and 
conceptions of power. However, new forms of knowledge and conceptions of 
power have been used to challenge mystical Sufism, and this challenge comes 
not only in the form of a secular Western education. It is also derived from 
within Islam itself, especially from radical reformist movements bent on 
confronting what they regard in Sufi religious practice as wrongful innovation 
(bid’a), condemnable religious acts (sihr), religious mixing (ikhtilât), and the sin 
of association (shirk) in the near deification of marabouts. Sufism for them is a 
degenerate form of worship that has lost sight of Islamic law and custom (sharia 
and sunna) and has moved away from the message of the Qur’an and the 
motivations of the early Muslim community. These critiques must be seen 
within an historical frame that highlights the changes taking place in the field of 
education.  
The early European-oriented educational system in Senegal, established in 
the 19th century, aimed at a policy of educating Senegalese for administrative 
positions in the expanding colonial government. This system established literacy 
in French as a key skill for the emerging local urban elites and developed in 
parallel with a system already set in place by local Muslims, namely a network 
of schools for Qur’anic study. The French colonial authorities attempted to 
modify progressively their own European system to accommodate Muslims 
needs. These attempts, however, met with little success (Bouche 1974). The 
traditional Qur’anic school (dudal) constituted an element within the system of 
literacy restricted by and large to the children of cleric families. The gulf 
between education in rural and urban areas became apparent too in wider 
divisions over the direction of educational policy in the country as a whole. One 
view advocated a universal education system based upon the European tradition 
and another on the realities of Senegalese social life in the countryside (Colin 
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A new mosque, being built with the help of Middle-Eastern finance, in the town of 
Tivouane, the centre of the Tijaniyya in Senegal 
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1980). In the more recent period of structural adjustment, characterized by the 
withdrawal of the arm of the state from rural areas such as Fuuta Toro, there has 
been a mobilization of self-help schemes (bamtaare, mutual-aid groups), most 
of which have been based upon remittances from emigrant workers in France 
and elsewhere. These schemes have provided health and educational facilities as 
well as provision for the construction of new mosques (Knight 1994), a 
development encouraged by Muslim reformers. 
 The installation of new European-based schooling did much to encourage 
what Brenner (2000) has called ‘a secular rationalist discourse’ in which 
knowledge and power are differently construed in comparison to West African 
Sufism. Access to knowledge was no longer effected through an initiatory 
process linked to a single spiritual and divinely gifted individual but instead 
learning became a topic of public acquisition and enquiry. Personalized methods 
of Sufi Islamic apprenticeship were replaced by impersonalized techniques of 
learning. Brenner (2000: 38) states — in relation to Mali — that ‘the grip of the 
esoteric episteme would begin to erode [with the arrival of European colonial 
powers], challenged by the imposition of new power structures that ignored and 
denigrated esoteric claims to knowledge and power’. The emerging system of 
education was not simply dualistic, however, with European secular rationalism 
opposing Muslim Sufi mysticism, for within the Islamic community a series of 
fundamental shifts were taking place. 
 Muslim reformers, often operating outside the system of Sufi brotherhoods, 
began a two-pronged attack on education provision from the 1930s onwards in 
Senegal. Critical of what they considered to be the neglect of Islam in the 
French system, reformers attempted to establish a broadly based education in 
which the use of Arabic was central, sometimes alongside French, as the 
language of instruction; and a wider curriculum was developed beyond strict 
Qur’anic studies. Subjects such as mathematics, geography and history were 
introduced into these new Arabic schools, which were called medersas (Schmitz 
2000b). In Fuuta Toro, Al Hajj Mahmud Ba, for example, on his return from the 
Hijaz set up a new school during this period in the village of Jowol. Another 
individual, Ahmad Al-Azhari, university-trained in Egypt, sought to achieve the 
same status for Arabic that French had attained as a language of study (Ba 1985-
86: 250 et passim). He encouraged the development of modern Arabic culture in 
the valley and he himself belonged to the category of young people educated 
abroad in the Maghreb, the Middle East or Arabia. Fluent in Arabic language 
and culture and well versed in Islamic theology, they were labelled ‘arabisers’ or 
arabisants in French. 
 Developments such as these were part of a wider Islamic revivalist 
movement in West Africa. Often mistakenly labelled ‘Wahhabist’ by colonial 
authorities (Monteil 1980: 274) — a movement drawn from central Arabia and 
196 Dilley 
  
associated with the House of Saud3 — a host of reformers with a spectrum of 
Islamic viewpoints launched campaigns for the renewal of Muslim religious 
beliefs. Not only were they concerned about the imposition of Western 
education and European-centred models of social, economic and cultural 
development, they also rallied against what they regarded as religious and moral 
laxity, condemned the veneration of marabouts, and labelled maraboutic magic 
as superstition. Book magic, so central to West African Sufism, was 
disenchanted and its aura of mystique stripped away. While Wahhabis in the 
strict sense have been few on the ground in Senegal, their presence does indicate 
the radical impact of ‘Arabization’ and the severity of the attack on Sufi Islam.4 
Along with French education, reformed Islamic schooling encouraged a 
rationalist paradigm of thought and spread a functional literacy in Arabic to a 
much wider section of the population. It propagated literacy skills in the general 
population to an extent never seen before.5 This form of schooling also 
undermined, like its European counterpart, the relationship of apprenticeship 
and devotion of a disciple to his marabout, and encouraged more impersonal 
forms of learning. Schmitz (2000b), for example, reports the use of cassette 
tapes that are circulated among Muslim students eager to hear lectures of Middle 
Eastern Arabic teachers and Islamic scholars. 
 The new medersa schools contrasted, therefore, with those offering a 
traditional Qur’anic education. The latter contributed to the development of a 
narrow literate clerical elite who possessed a competence, albeit often uneven, in 
Arabic. They also provided the foundation upon which gifted scholars could 
progress into esoteric sciences and Islamic arts. At the heart of this system of 
education was what has been called the oral transmission of the written word, 
and this mode of transmission continued throughout the highly personalized 
relationship of disciple (taalibe or murid) and marabout that characterized the 
higher stages of learning and initiation. The reformed medersas developed a 
broader curriculum comprising a range of subjects and taught a competence in 
Arabic based less on rote memorization of texts and more focused on the 
language as a medium of study and communication. As Brenner and Last (1985: 
443) point out: ‘competent literacy in Arabic is the major factor in West Africa 
which separates establishment from popular Islam’. But the effect of the 
                                                 
3 It is named after Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, born in central Arabia in 
1703. He entered into an alliance with the Emir of Dariya in Saudi Arabia that resulted 
in the establishment of the House of Saud. See Clarke (1982: 216-17). 
4 The anti-Sufi Wahhabi movement was much stronger in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. See, 
for example, Brenner (1983a) and Soares (1999). 
5 Adult illiteracy levels were over 70% in the 1988 census but had dropped below that 
figure in 1995, although it is doubtful whether literacy in Arabic would have been used 
as a criterion for exclusion from this statistic (African South of the Sahara 1999). 
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development of reformist Muslim schools was to offer new routes to Arabic 
literacy and to challenge the nature of the literate Islamic establishment.6 
 
 
Islamic reform movements 
 
Within the plural educational context, a challenge was mounted to the 
institutions that were part of the restricted literacy practices of an earlier period 
in Fuuta Toro. The result was that the scope and level of access to an expanded 
literacy programme increased. Alongside this change was a two-pronged attack 
on the previous ‘establishment’ Sufi marabouts: French-based education 
encouraged secularism that charged maraboutism with religious archaism, 
superstition and unwarranted privilege; and the campaigners for Islamic reform 
charged maraboutism with the corruption of their religion, moral laxity and 
degeneracy. Reformers embraced a vision of a revived Muslim faith that was 
particularly attractive to young urban dwellers in that it was seen as a force for 
an international and universalist conception of the religion that transcended local 
boundaries and was identified with a wider Muslim world (Brenner 1983b, 
Evers Rosander & Westerlund 1997, Soares 1999). This vision also sought to re-
establish the sovereignty and uniqueness of God and offered the prospect of a 
state run according to Shari’a principles. 
 Muslim militants who have held to this latter position have frequently been 
referred to as ‘fundamentalists’, although this term is rejected in much of the 
literature. Instead, the preferred term for those movements calling for a link to 
be made between the structure of the state and the Muslim religion is ‘Islamist’, 
since their members often regard themselves not simply as returning to a 
fundamental tradition but as representing a contemporary alternative to Western 
modernity.7 The Islamist movement took hold in Senegal in the 1970s and 
1980s, adding another dimension to, or even replacing, earlier Muslim 
                                                 
6 Brenner and Last make the following comment regarding the situation in the 
neighbouring country of Mali, and it could well apply to Senegal: ‘Educational 
reformers in Mali, through medersas, have virtually managed to establish themselves as 
a new dominant class of ‘neo-‘ulama’. They not only condemn the French educational 
system that, they claim, destroys Islamic values, but they have succeeded in portraying 
the traditional maraboutic and Sufi ‘ulama class as perpetrators of a form of popular 
Islam, that is, one which is semi-literate and doctrinally aberrant’ (Brenner & Last 
1985: 442). 
7 See, for example, Evers Rosander (1997) and Gomez-Perez (1991) for a discussion of 
this issue. 
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reformists that had begun their activities in the 1930s.8 Reformism had placed a 
different emphasis upon Muslim sources such as the Qur’an, the Sunna and ijma 
or consensus, none of which was to be renounced but which could be 
accommodated within a modern world. Indeed, Islam had to be integrated into 
this new context but it would accept aspects of Western thought and culture in a 
modified form. 
 One of the earliest Senegalese reform groups was La Fraternité Musulmane, 
established in the town of Saint Louis in 1935 (Gomez-Perez 1991). This group, 
for example, intervened over escalating bridewealth payments in Fuuta Toro in 
the 1930s, and attempted to cap prestations at affordable levels (Robin 1947). It 
also complained about the excessive demands of praise-singers at ceremonies, a 
complaint often heard from a range of more contemporary Muslim leaders. 
Another influential reformist group, the Union Culturelle Musulman (UCM), 
was founded by Cheikh Touré in 1953.9 It engaged in a struggle against the 
effects of French colonialism and opposed the stance of the leading Sufi 
marabouts who had collaborated with the colonial powers. It criticized the 
French authorities for interfering with the practice of Islam and railed against the 
archaism of maraboutism — its mysticism, its talismans and amulets as well as 
the complete submission of a disciple to a spiritual guide. The tone of the UCM 
attack on maraboutism can be gleaned from the following rallying call to fight 
against: 
 
religious fetishism and exploitation, under the sway of which is the mass population 
that is the victim of a prefabricated Islam... It is in part a devalued religion with 
which our populations have been intoxicated and it will be by a renewed faith that 
detoxification will be brought about. (author’s own translation)10  
 
The Union also forbade the young from going to cinemas and nightclubs, and 
from attending French schools, and encouraged cultural ‘Arabization’, a secular 
state and a universal fraternity amongst all Muslims. 
 While voices of the Muslim reformers became muted after independence, a 
decade or so later the cries of Islamist militants could be clearly heard again.11 
                                                 
8 See Loimeier (2000) on the ‘two generations’ of Islamic reform in Senegal, the first of 
which he dates as developing in the 1950s, the second from the 1970s onwards. 
9 In Arabic this group was called ‘Ittihad ath-Thaqafi al-Islami (Loimeier 2000). 
10 See Monteil (1980: 274) from whom the quotation is taken: ‘...fétichisme religieux et 
l’exploitation dont est victime la masse sous le couvert d’un Islâm préfabriqué... C’est 
en partie par une religion dévaluée que nos populations ont été intoxiquées et ce sera 
par une foi rénovée que la désintoxication se fera.’ 
11 The account that follows draws heavily on Gomez-Perez (1991). See also Monteil 
(1980), Clarke (1982), Callaway & Creevy (1994), Evers Rosander & Westerlund 
(1997) and Schmitz (2000b). Loimeier (2000) notes that, post-independence, President 
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However, as early as 1956 a movement called Harakat al-Fallah (‘Movement of 
Salvation’), as it was later known, influenced by Wahhabism, called for the 
establishment of an Islamic republic in Senegal. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
similar kinds of groups flourished: ‘Society of Servants of the Merciful’, the 
Jama’at Ibad ar-Rahman or Jamaatou Ibadou Arraham12 began as an offshoot of 
the UCM following a breakaway by a group of young dissenters who struck up 
associations with the al-Fallah movement. Much more politically engaged than 
either the UCM or al-Fallah, the majority of its members were young urban 
intellectuals. Another Islamist group was created in 1985 by Cheikh Touré, 
founder of the moderate UCM that he had deserted due to its pro-government 
and politically uncritical stance. This group, L’Organisation pour l’Action 
Islamique (OAI), adopted a more virulent and critical anti-European discourse 
and took as a model of political organization the theocratic state of Iran. These 
reform movements are part of the second generation of Islamist groups, some of 
which gained especial social influence in the sphere of education. They 
developed a critique of maraboutic Sufism, but also adopted a critical stance 
towards the secular Senegalese state. In this respect they found common cause 
with the marabouts, and it appears that their public discourse in the 1990s 
concentrated less on confrontation with Sufi brotherhoods and more on creating 
a broad-based Muslim alliance against secular politics (Loimeier 2000). 
 A wide variety of Muslim reformist and Islamist groups in the post-World-
War-II period formulated a critique not only of the French-bequeathed political 
structure and Western modernity, but also attacked Sufi maraboutism, its 
mysticism and forms of magic. Traditional forms of charisma came under 
attack. The esoteric episteme of Sufi maraboutic knowledge and power was 
criticized, and with it by implication the esoteric construction of knowledge and 
power of the various specialized, hereditary occupational groups. 
With respect to these latter groups, the position and status of the members of 
these hereditary, occupationally specialized craftsmen and musician categories, 
the ‘castes’, became contested.13 Until then, they had by and large been excluded 
                                                                                                                       
Senghor managed to bring the UCM under state control by integrating its reformers into 
the political system and into certain professions. 
12 The first title in Arabic is translated by Loimeier (2000) as the ‘Society of the 
Servants of the Merciful’, and the second slightly different transcription as ‘a group of 
individuals recognizing the supremacy of their creator and desirous of figuring among 
his servants’ by Clark & Colvin Phillips (1994). 
13 The nature of such social categories across West Africa in particular, but known in 
other parts of the continent too, has been the subject of much research and scholarly 
debate. Indeed, the use of the term ‘caste’ to describe these categories of persons has 
also been a moot point. For a wider literature on ‘caste’ groups see, for example, 
Conrad & Frank (1995), Diop (1981), McNaughton (1988), Richter (1980), Silla 
(1966), Tamari (1997), Todd (1977) and Vaughan (1970). 
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from the central religious offices within Sufi Islam. Reformist and Islamist 
groups offered new opportunities for previously marginalized members of the 
Muslim jama’a to enter into a more active engagement with the religious 
community.  
 
 
The renegotiation of Islam and social exclusion 
 
In the mid 19th century the newly introduced Tijaniyya Order under El-Hajj 
Umar Taal was more open to individuals of lower social rank than the existing 
orders. Those members of men-of-skill categories or of slave descent who rose 
through the ranks of the Sufi brotherhood did so during the militaristic and 
expansionist phase of Taal’s Muslim campaigns. The order appears 
subsequently to have reverted to an earlier model of social organization in which 
caste prejudices surfaced again and craftsmen and musicians were once more 
marginalized and excluded from religious office. By contrast, the Qadiriyya, a 
much older order in West Africa14 appears to have been less flexible in 
assimilating and promoting those of artisan origin; while the uniquely 
Senegalese Murid Order is generally held to be more open as regards the caste 
status of its members.15 The family of the founder of the Murids, Amadu Bamba 
(1850-1927), is linked through his mother to an important Fuuta Toro family, 
the Busso clerics who hold village political office in a river valley (Morice 
1982: 282). Amadu Bamba’s father’s patronym, Mbacké, is also thought to be 
connected to Haalpulaar roots. Bamba promoted praise-singers and smiths to the 
summit of the Murid hierarchy (Monteil 1980: 362) and in the 1950s a singer 
called Ali Samba Guêye officially represented the brotherhood at Kaolack, 
collecting one million FCFA for the ‘Grand Serigne’ (ibid: 365). Smiths, 
woodcarvers and other artisans were particularly sought out by the brotherhood 
for their practical skills, especially during its formative period when it was 
                                                 
14 The first Islamic brotherhood to be introduced into West Africa, the Qadiriyya traces 
its origin to a Muslim from Baghdad named Sidi Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani or Gilani (1079-
1166 CE). The order spread throughout the region in the late 15th and early 16th 
centuries, and it is most probable that Abdul Qadir Kan, the founder of the Almamate 
regime in Fuuta Toro in the late 18th century was one of its leading figures in the area. 
15 Of the three main Sufi brotherhoods in Senegal, the Tijaniyya and Muridiyya 
represent something in the region of 47% and 30% respectively of the Muslim 
population, which itself constitutes around 85% of the total number of 7 million 
Senegalese (see Recensement Général, 1988). The Qadiriyya is a much smaller order 
than the other two. The Murid brotherhood has its roots in the Qadiriyya, and the 
Tijaniyya embraces a number of offshoot sects such as: Layeens of Cap Vert, Nyasiyya 
of Kaolack, and the Hamilliyya which developed in Mali. 
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settling the new lands (Terres Neuves) of Salum and Senegal Oriental to 
establish their characteristic village organization based around groundnut 
cultivation.16 Indeed, the late Khalif Général of the Murids, El-Hajj Falilu 
Mbacké (d. 1968), second son of Amabdu Bamba, once declared that ‘castes’ 
derive in the most part from ‘pre-Islamic beliefs’, but yet he cited a number of 
instances of marriage contracted by members of his own freeborn family with 
persons considered to belong to inferior social ranks (Diouf 1983: 230). Muslim 
leaders such as him are caught on the horns of a dilemma when they proclaim 
equality amongst all Muslims regardless of caste and rank, for in trying to gain 
the sympathy and support of those of inferior status whom they seek to protect, 
they run the risk of alienating significant numbers of their freeborn members. 
Indeed, despite the words of the late Khalif Général about caste equality, Murid 
marabouts continued to seek marriage partners predominantly among freeborn 
families or within the ancient Wolof ruling families (Diouf 1983). 
 This example of the Murids throws into relief the complex issue of 
renegotiation and indeed contestation that has been going on within Sufi 
brotherhoods over the status of believers of ‘caste’ origin. To assert that ‘the 
notion of a hierarchical caste system is anathema to the tenets of Islam’ does 
little justice to the complex processes that are being played out.17 A number of 
concerns can be raised in this respect. First, such statements elide the distinction 
between the rhetoric of equality and the social practice of a religion; second, 
they neglect local debate about the issue; and third, they treat West African 
Islam as a single undifferentiated whole, a single system of belief and practice.18 
What I call an ‘accommodationist’ Sufi Islam allowed craftsmen and musicians 
a marginal but inferior position within it but it also encompassed caste groups 
within a complex ideological framework. The proclaimed ideology of Sufi 
brotherhood ignored the question of caste and was rarely used to oppose the 
social exclusion resting at the heart of these orders. Taal’s mid-19th-century 
reform movement attempted to renegotiate the limits of inclusion but this 
                                                 
16 See Cruise O’Brien (1971) and Diouf (1983). The former argues that the Murid Order 
provided a new social framework for displaced Wolof populations, especially craftsmen 
and musicians who lost their means of patronage after the collapse of the leading 
families among the Wolof (ibid: 15). He also notes that there were more artisans in 
Murid villages than in others (ibid: 84). 
17 Villalón (1994: 57) states, for example, ‘... Islamic theology ... tends to be hostile to 
any distinction that is incompatible with the notion of the fundamental equality of all 
men before God’. 
18 Ceerno Bokar Taal, the Haalpulaar cleric who settled in Mali, believed in the 
‘inevitability of the inequality in society, but also in the equality of all men before God’ 
(Brenner 1983a: 17). This statement suggests different principles are appropriate to 
different domains of thought and different contexts of action — the secular and the 
sacred. 
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eventually met with little success. The orthodox Sufi view on the matter was 
that while the Holy Book did not sanction caste distinction, it did not forbid it 
either. The issue was often left to benign neglect. As indicated in the Murid 
example, one major field of social life and a key area of social reproduction in 
which caste considerations remained an important determinant was — and still 
is — marriage.19 The exclusive matrimonial strategies of leading marabout 
families, who often sought alliances with high-ranking freeborn families rather 
than with other social categories, evince the gulf between rhetoric and social 
action. This exclusivity in marriage, however, was prized as much by members 
of caste groups as by those of higher social status. Islam in itself did not provide 
an ideological justification of caste differentiation and did not play the same role 
as the Hindu religion in relation to Indian caste. Moreover, its muted voice in 
relation to the question of brotherhood allowed for the possibility of 
accommodating a broad range of practices in different domains of social life. 
 A good deal of debate in post-independence Senegal has centred on whether 
castes would disappear, and on whether they would be assimilated by Islam (see 
Diop 1981, Diouf 1983, Monteil 1980, Morice 1982). One obvious factor was 
the changing employment opportunities offered in urban settings, in expanding 
markets and so forth. Modernization would see an end to such an archaic social 
structure, or so many commentators thought. The rupture of the connection 
between caste status and occupation in urban areas did contribute to the 
loosening of the organization of social groups compared with that in the rural 
economy. Indeed, economic possibilities for members of lower caste groups 
offering manual skills might be greater than those for higher status clerics who 
had few practical talents to offer (see Diop 1965). However, it must be 
remembered that the social status of men-of-skill categories has never been 
linked tightly to a unique connection with one occupation. The practice of a 
trade never constituted the only criterion of caste membership, since notions of 
descent and inheritance contributed as much, if not more, to the recognition of 
status.20 Caste occupations have not been stable over time (see Tamari 1997). 
 Another dimension to this debate about the continuance of caste concerns the 
ideological and discursive nature of the relation between social differentiation 
and the presumed equality of the community of the faithful. Some authors have 
argued that Islam would come to ‘whiten’ or bleach the stain of low social status 
                                                 
19 See Diop for a discussion on this issue among Wolof (1981: 94-104). 
20 Panzacchi (1994) reports an interesting observation that among praise-singer families 
the members of the generation 40-60 years old in the mid 1990s were more self-
conscious about their social origins than their children tended to be. This younger 
generation has embraced the traditional occupation with a new zeal, offering at once a 
romanticization of an unalienated and ‘authentic’ construction of the past, as well as a 
potentially lucrative career as a modern musician in Dakar and Europe. 
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deriving from membership of a caste.21 This idiom of ‘whitening’ gains a 
significance if it is placed in the context of the opposition between white and 
black bodies of lore and knowledge that is used to distinguish Islamic from craft 
expertise respectively. The former was primarily in the hands of the freeborn 
Islamic cleric social category, and the latter in those of the men-of-skill social 
categories. From this perspective of the relationship between Islam and caste, 
the black (as in the ‘black lore’ of men-of-skill) is not accommodated within nor 
encompassed by Muslim lore and knowledge but is in fact stripped of colour and 
transformed by it. Diop (1981) concluded pessimistically about the outcome of 
this proposed transformation: 
 
It is to be admitted that Islam has not brought about in a society of castes the 
revolution that might have been expected of it. Marabouts have shown themselves to 
be conservative in the face of the force of traditions that they have not dared or 
wanted to dismantle, being themselves the offspring, in the majority of cases, of the 
superior caste. (author’s own translation of Diop’s original French text)22  
 
He went on to argue that Islam had adapted itself more to the caste system than 
the latter had adapted itself to the religion, above all in the area of the equality 
and fraternity of believers. If certain marabouts made pronouncements 
condemning the institution of caste difference as contrary to the fraternal spirit 
of Islam, and if some attempted to abolish it, then even fewer succeeded in 
making many gains in rolling it back.  
 Ambiguity and ambivalence surround the issue of caste at various levels of 
debate: it is in turn denied and subsequently claimed by those inhabitants of the 
country who live within it; different voices within Islam contest it; and the 
Senegalese state has contributed in no small way to the contradictory tensions 
surrounding it. As Morice (1982:99) states: ‘the attitude of public powers with 
regard to castes is marked with a large measure of ambiguity’ (author’s own 
translation). Since independence, it has been against the law to make reference 
to an individual’s caste origins or to discriminate against a person in 
                                                 
21 Diouf (1983: 233), for example, states: ‘De nombreux marabouts aujourd’hui encore 
ont été “blanchis” par l’Islam’. 
22 The original paragraph in French by Diop (1981: 98) is as follows: ‘Il est permis 
d’affirmer donc que l’Islam n’a pas realisé dans la société de castes la révolution qu’on 
était en droit d’attendre de lui. Les marabouts se sont montrés conservateurs, devant la 
force des traditions qu’ils n’ont pas osé ou voulu bousculer, étant issus eux-mêmes, 
dans leur grande majorité, de la caste supérieur. Ils ont justifié leur attitude en affirmant 
que ‘la religion ignore les castes mais ne s’oppose pas à elles’. Ainsi, l’Islam s’est 
beaucoup plus adapté au système des castes que ce dernier ne s’est conformé à ses 
principes, surtout en ce qui concerne l’égalité et la fraternité des croyants.’ 
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employment on these grounds. It is also illegal to organize an official political 
party around the issue of caste or on the basis of religion. A complex and 
ambiguous situation has arisen which has its roots in colonial times, when a 
system of European-based law ran in parallel with customary tribunals 
(tribunaux indigènes). In the latter context it was possible to claim divorce on 
the grounds of one partner withholding or hiding his or her true caste origins. 
Changes brought about in the legal system, shifting the emphasis away from 
customary law and towards European-based law, involved the introduction of 
new codes, especially the Family Code (Code de la Famille) of 1972, revised in 
1990 (Callaway & Creevy 1994). These codes attempted to establish changes to 
procedures in marriage, divorce, inheritance and the economic independence of 
women but were opposed on many fronts by marabouts and Islamists as an 
attack on the principles of Islamic law. While part of customary practice had 
been to allow a recognition of caste, changes brought in to modernize and 
simplify the plurality of legal codes were condemned. Moreover, the 
implementation of the Family Code was much more effective in urban areas 
than in rural towns and villages, where issues of caste are more deeply rooted.23 
The issue of the Family Code illustrates a case in which Islamists and Sufi 
marabouts have buried their theological differences and have worked towards a 
common cause to protect an Islamic domain. 
 Under the Family Code, caste was no longer an issue in a legalistic sense, 
and Islamists opposed the changes to customary law not on the grounds of the 
advantages they might appear to give caste members in terms of marriage, but as 
an aspect of law that was previously much more under the control of local 
Muslims. It is difficult to say, however, whether the adoption of the Family 
Code has made it any easier for cross-caste marriages to take place, although it 
might now be less onerous if one were to lie about one’s caste origins prior to 
marriage. Changes that may be detectable in marriage patterns could well be 
attributable to the conditions of modern urban living rather than to amendments 
to legal statutes.24 
                                                 
23 One of the problems of land development schemes, particularly irrigation systems 
introduced in Fuuta Toro over the last 20 years or so, has been the challenge they posed 
to the customary distribution of land among different caste groups in any village. Many 
schemes have insisted upon private ownership and equal access to land by all members 
of a community irrespective of caste status, whereas those that have attempted to be 
more sensitive to local conditions run the risk of maintaining the differential distribution 
of cultivable land. See Knight (1994) and Adams (1996). 
24 See Panzacchi (1994) on the changing roles of traditional praise-singers, one of whose 
tasks today in modern urban settings is to investigate the status of potential marriage 
partners for the sons and daughters of the patron’s family. 
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 The Islamic reformist groups that developed between the two World Wars 
and then after independence have frequently sought to abolish caste distinctions 
that were a feature of many Sufi brotherhoods. The educational reformer Al Hajj 
Mahmud Ba, who set up medersa schools in Fuuta Toro, called for the 
abandonment of ‘tribal and professional considerations’ (a coded reference to 
caste) in the provision of schooling (Ba 1985-86: 250 et passim). Many 
reformist groups appealed to nouveau-riche traders, to craftsmen, artisans and 
praise-singers (Schmitz 2000b), for they found in them the opportunity of social 
elevation and religious advancement previously denied to them. Similarly, 
Islamist movements attracted individuals of low caste origin. But there were 
contradictory forces of inclusion and exclusion working within them upon 
different marginal groups. Generally within Sufi brotherhoods, women were 
placed in a subordinate position: it was harder for them to receive the same level 
of Qur’anic education as boys; there were barriers to them becoming disciples to 
a male marabout, and women seldom held formal religious office or positions of 
responsibility within Sufi orders. There were, however, instances of women 
creating ‘shadow’ or parallel organizations that ran alongside those of the men, 
but they rarely attained the same public profile as their male counterparts.25 
Despite slight differences among the Sufi brotherhoods regarding this issue, the 
marginalized position of women was nonetheless never as extreme as that 
advocated by certain Islamist groups. Members of these radical reform groups 
called for the seclusion of women, the wearing of the veil and their withdrawal 
from public life.26 These demands placed on women by Islamists mark a 
significant disjuncture with the older Sufi orders, and their exclusionary force 
suggests an intriguing paradoxical movement within radical reformist groups. 
While they advocate the differential treatment of followers on the basis of 
gender, they have attracted followers previously marked out as different on the 
basis of caste. The position of women within Sufi Islam and the position of 
craftsmen and musician groups were in some ways comparable: both were 
marginalized, muted and treated with mistrust regarding the full and proper 
functioning of the Muslim community. There appears, then, to be evidence to 
suggest that the educational opportunities, as well as the possibilities for social 
advancement offered by reformist Muslim organizations have led to a 
                                                 
25 See Callaway & Creevy (1994) for further discussion of the variations in the position 
of women in relation to different Sufi brotherhoods. 
26 Callaway & Creevy (1994: 174) suggest that paternalistic, maraboutic Sufism 
provides a check on the extremes of fundamentalism that is spreading through a young 
and educated urban elite: ‘So far, the continuing political power of the marabouts has 
acted as a buffer protecting Senegalese women against the extremes of seclusion, 
veiling, and withdrawal from many facets of public life, all of which the 
fundamentalists demand’. 
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significant up-take by those of artisan, craftsman and caste status in their 
participation within those organizations. 
In relation to reformist and especially Islamist groups, the integration or 
‘whitening’ of one category of persons is accompanied by the extreme 
differential marking or exclusion of the other. Moreover, while a European-
educated urban elite militates for Western-style equality of opportunity between 
genders and among castes, an Arab-educated sector of the urban population 
seems to militate for one but not the other. 
 
 
The changing nature of caste and Islam: The Islamic Brotherhood of 
the Nyasiyya 
 
I now turn to an example of the renegotiation of the connection between caste 
and Islam to illustrate something of the dynamism of their relationship. It 
illustrates the way in which exceptional individuals, who became powerful 
Muslim reformers, have emerged from time to time in West African history. 
They combine the mystery of Sufism with the potency of traditional artisan 
status and have harnessed the institutional division of power and knowledge 
among castes to the driving force of individual charismatic power. 
 It is necessary first to describe something of the background to this 
Senegalese Muslim brotherhood and the significance that is read into its 
development by members of different social categories. This is an example not 
so much of how Islam might be considered to ‘whiten’ low status castes but 
how, from the perspective of some followers of the Nyasiyya, caste status has as 
it were ‘blackened’ Islam. In this example an echo will be heard of the earlier 
Sufi reform movement started in the mid 19th century by El-Hajj Umar Taal, 
whose exceptional spiritual powers were interpreted by some as evincing a 
connection to blacksmith stock through his mother’s line. 
 Members of the Nyas family, now based in the town of Kaolack, are part of a 
relatively new offshoot of the Tijaniyya Sufi Order.27 The establishment of the 
order goes back to a late-19th-century forefather of the Nyas line, one Abdoulaye 
Nyas who died in 1922. The main contemporary branches of the family stem 
from two of Abdoulaye’s sons, the elder son Khalifa who was supposed to 
succeed his father and his younger brother Ibrahima ‘Baye’ who developed the 
                                                 
27 This account is based on a number of sources on the Nyas movement (sometimes 
spelt Niasse or Niass in the literature). See for example: Abun-Nasr (1965), Brenner 
(1983a), Clarke (1982), Diouf (1983), Gray (1988), Kane (1997), Klein (1968: 223-24), 
Marty (1915-16), Monteil (1980: 155-56), Morice (1982), Schmitz (2000b) and Villalón 
(1995: 140-42). 
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Nyasiyya Order into the important movement it is today. Two of Khalifa’s sons, 
Ahmed Khalifa and Sidi Lamine, disseminated Islamist ideas, the latter 
especially through the newspaper Wal Fadjri, established in 1983, of which he 
was the editor. Various calls were made by them for the creation of an Islamic 
state in Senegal, and Ahmed Khalifa gained the reputation as the ‘Ayatollah of 
Kaolack’ following pronouncements that drew on ideas used during the Iranian 
revolution (Gomez-Perez 1991). It is, however, the Nyas line from Abdoulaye 
through to Ibrahima ‘Baye’ that represents the focus of interest here. 
 Abdoulaye Nyas, a Wolof speaker born in the country’s northern region 
around the town of Louga in 1844 or 1845,28 was descended from a line of 
blacksmiths.29 His father, Mamadou, was nonetheless a marabout and had 
migrated to the central regions of Senegal around 1865 where he founded the 
village of Niassene, and later his son Abdoulaye established the settlement of 
Taiba Niassene. Abdoulaye too became a marabout, having studied in 
Mauritania under Matar Fal Ndiaye among others, and is said to have received 
the Tijani wird from a companion of Shaykh Umar Taal, the mid-19th-century 
militant and mystic.30 In the Tijani tradition, tracing a chain of transmission of 
knowledge (silsila) back to Umar Taal is an important ingredient in establishing 
authority as a religious leader. Abdoulaye had also fought alongside the Islamic 
leader Ma Ba in the jihads conducted in Senegal’s central regions in the 1860s. 
The Nyas family thus gained a reputation for leadership in religious affairs: they 
possessed an erudition in Islamic sciences, advanced expertise in Qur’anic study 
and Muslim theology, and they were also renowned for their mastery of Arabic. 
 On Abdoulaye’s death in 1922, his eldest son Muhammad, also known as 
Khalifa, succeeded his father and took over as religious leader within the family. 
However, it would be Ibrahima, his younger brother (born in 1902), who was to 
become the more influential of the two sons. Ibrahima, who died in 1975, was a 
charismatic religious leader who developed a massive international following 
among Muslims in West Africa,31 and set up his headquarters (zawiya)32 on the 
outskirts of the town of Kaolack, the centre of groundnut production in the 
country’s middle belt. Here in Medina he built a mosque and a school, and it is 
                                                 
28 Dates vary concerning his birth: for example, Gray (1988) gives 1840, Marty (1915-
1916) 1845, others 1844. 
29 See Seesemann (n.d.) on this claim about his ancestry, first made he argues by French 
colonialists in the 1950s; but it is one that is held by many Senegalese today. 
30 See Seesemann (n.d.) on the connections between Mauritanian Tijanis and the Nyas 
family. 
31 Kane (1997) estimates the number of disciples of the movement in West Africa to be 
in the order of millions, most notably in Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, Guinée, 
Ghana, Burkina Faso and Chad. 
32 It is known as Zawiya al-Madinat al-Jadi or ‘Retreat of the New City’. 
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to this religious centre that up to 30,000 pilgrims reportedly flock each year for 
the annual ziyara ceremony in celebration of the Prophet’s birthday (mawlud).33 
Some Islamist groups are especially critical of the Nyas Order for what they see 
as excessive veneration of the Prophet’s birthday and naming-day. 
 Ibrahima was hailed by some members of the Muslim Sufi community as the 
‘Saviour of the Age’ (ghawth al-zaman) and as the ‘pole’ or ‘axis’ (qutb) of the 
saints, one who has reached the summit of spiritual discipline. Both of these 
titles are time-honoured epithets bestowed throughout the Muslim world, and 
they are applied exclusively to great Sufi saints. He was also made Khalifa of 
the Tijaniyya Order by a shaykh in Fez in 1937 at the age of about 35. He 
created important religious alliances with the Emir of Kano in Nigeria, where 
there is a huge following, and he emerged as a man of remarkable stature in 
West Africa, being consulted by political leaders such as Nkrumah and Egypt’s 
Nasser. On his death in the mid 1970s, Ibrahima was succeeded by his son 
Abdoulaye, although the position of Khalifa of the Order was left to Ibrahima’s 
son-in-law, a disciple and imam of the Kaolack Medina mosque, a man named 
El Hajj Alioune Cissé.34 This has created tension in the movement between 
blood relatives and their direct descendents and a line of ‘spiritual kinship’ and 
the inheritance of baraka established through ties of ‘breath or saliva’ (Schmitz 
2000a). The religious following that has developed around Ibrahima Nyas is 
drawn from virtually all the countries within West Africa, and has extended 
most notably into Nigeria and the United States too. Indeed the movement is 
perhaps better recognized outside of Senegal than within its borders.35 There are 
reasons for this large disparity in the number of followers at home and abroad. 
Schmitz (2000b: 128) sees part of the success of the Nyas religious movement 
                                                 
33 Schmitz (2000b: 129) reports that each year in the 1980s some 4,000-5,000 Nigerians, 
many of whom were rich Hausa traders, made their way to Kaolack. The town was 
connected to Kano by two flights per day, especially during the period of the annual 
celebrations. 
34 See Villalón (1995: 141) who suggests that this form of succession and the inheritance 
of charisma by a son-in-law are unusual. Schmitz (2000a) has illustrated, however, that 
the favouring of a bright and gifted pupil, who is often given the hand of a daughter of a 
marabout, is one means by which religious authority and charisma in Sufi orders are 
passed on. 
35 It is difficult to gain an accurate picture of the number of followers of the Nyasiyya in 
Senegal. The figures that are available regarding religious affiliation usually embrace 
under the rubric of ‘Tijani’ an array of such offshoots. Villalón (1995) reports that in the 
town of Fatick, just 50 miles or so north-west of Kaolack, the centre of the Nyas Order, 
only one of the 17 dahiras or urban cells of a Sufi order belongs to the Nyasiyya. This 
perhaps gives an indication of its minority status in the country. Kane (1997) notes that 
one family with the patronym Sakho is especially associated with the order in Fuuta 
Toro, where it is particularly attractive to the young. Sakho is a patronym associated 
with the Fishermen social category. 
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as resulting from the ability of its leaders to slide into the space vacated in the 
course of rivalry and competition between the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya. 
There are, I suggest, other reasons for this skewed popularity. 
 The Nyas family background is intriguing given the strength of the claims 
that the 19th-century marabout Mamadou Nyas and his son Abdoulaye Nyas 
were of blacksmith stock. It is taken as evidence of the social mobility made 
possible by the Tijaniyya, in particular, that someone of caste origins could have 
been elevated to the position of religious leader (Gray 1988). This openness 
among the Tijaniyya was noted during the mid 19th century under the leadership 
of Umar Taal. The elevation in status of Nyas, if indeed it was such, must have 
occurred in the late 18th or at least the early 19th century, and he would probably 
have been very old, if not dead, by the time Umar Taal’s militant Tijani 
movement got underway. Nyas may have been caught up in a reorganization of 
members of various social categories that mirrored what was happening in Fuuta 
Toro in the mid to late 18th century under Abdul Qadir Kan, a member of the 
Qadiri Order. The period just prior to the Almaamate uprising in Fuuta Toro (the 
1790s) was characterized by the possibility of social promotion for those of 
caste origin who affiliated themselves to the cause of radical reformist cleric 
Islam. Perhaps a similar situation prevailed around Louga, in the area just south 
of Fuuta Toro from where the Nyas family hailed prior to their migration south 
towards Kaolack. Like the Caams (Tyams or Thiams) of Fuuta Toro who are 
reputed to have blacksmith origins but yet became important in Umar Taal’s 
movement maybe Nyas achieved the same degree of elevation under a liberating 
and open form of Sufi Islam that was later to close ranks after its initial impetus 
was lost. 
 Morice (1982) reports that the evocation of this artisan past is altogether 
prohibited by the Nyas family. It is likewise the case that it would be seen as a 
huge insult to accuse the descendents of Taal or Caam lines of having a similar 
ancestry. The Nyas family today observes a strict form of endogamy among 
only those of freeborn descent (Morice 1982: 99). Again, there are parallels here 
with the situation in Fuuta Toro of the newly elevated families, which, having 
assimilated themselves among the ranks of the toorobe clerics, began 
progressively to marry within that social category to the exclusion of their own 
cognate kinsmen. The Nyas family have married many times into the old 
nobility of the Siin and Saloum (Diouf 1983: 229), although these unions were 
not uncontested by members of those high-ranking families. Silla (1966) 
reported the following anecdote (also related in Diouf 1983) that tells of how a 
proposed marriage between Nyas and a woman of freeborn stock stirred up 
discontentment in the region. Those opposed to the marriage decided to boycott 
the ceremonies and even planned to abscond with the bride, so preventing the 
union. However, they were not able to carry out their plan as a serious car 
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accident involving a number of the conspirators put an end to the proposed 
abduction. The accident was seen by many of those sympathetic to the Nyas 
cause as a punishment from God and his Prophet on those who wanted to 
obstruct the desire of one of His representatives on earth. 
 The hugely successful Muslim proselytiser Ibrahima Nyas, who presided 
over the enormous expansion of the order into territories beyond the boundaries 
of Senegal, is an ambiguous and ambivalent figure in the eyes of many 
Senegalese. There are echoes again of the popular image of the 19th-century 
figure, Umar Taal, who was likewise seen as charismatic, divinely gifted and 
spiritually powerful. A similarly charismatic figure, Ibrahima, was reported to 
have possessed marvellous esoteric abilities and controlled an array of 
supernatural powers. He is attributed by some educated Senegalese with the 
power of magically crippling one of the country’s politicians who opposed him. 
Furthermore, he was said to able to talk to trees and summon the spirits who 
lived there in order to attack his enemies (Gray 1988). These are the powers 
associated with craftsmen, and woodcutters (lawbe) in particular, and bring an 
image to mind of Umar Taal, who was likewise attributed with such powers that 
stemmed, as some would have it, from a line of common ancestry with both 
blacksmiths and tree-fellers. Ibrahima Nyas was also the target of pejorative 
remarks, defamatory characterizations and attacks upon his moral integrity, not 
only in official reports but also more generally in popular circulation (Kane 
1997). He was described as being a ‘dubious’ or ‘unwholesome Sufi’, a person 
of ‘questionable morality’ and a person of ‘detestable filiation’ or ancestry. 
These reports again echo the kinds of moral evaluation attached to members of 
craftsman and praise-singer castes. 
 The ‘taint of caste’ on the Nyas family history seems to have been an 
important factor in restricting the spread of the movement within Senegal among 
freeborn sectors of the population.36 The fact that these matters of social origin 
carry very little significance beyond the geographical boundaries of Senegambia 
might contribute to our understanding of Ibrahima’s success in places such as 
northern Nigeria. There, it is Nyas’s high reputation for Islamic erudition, his 
abilities in esoteric sciences and the Arabic language, and his depth of Qur’anic 
exegesis that are indexes of his popularity and authority among his following. 
Kane attributes the attraction of the movement in large measure to the fact that it 
advocated a much greater ‘democratization of the sacred’ than other Sufi 
                                                 
36 Villalón (1995: 68) makes a similar observation: ‘...Abdoulaye Niasse [Nyas] was a 
blacksmith, and despite several generations of clerical careers the taint of caste seems to 
continue to play a role in limiting the family’s capacity to draw followers from non-
casted people. Perhaps partly as a result, the Niasse have been especially successful in 
developing a following outside Senegal, most notably in northern Nigeria.’ 
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orders;37 but with this democratization of the sacred comes the possibility of 
involvement of members of lower castes in positions of authority within the 
brotherhood. Those Senegalese who have become attached to the Nyasiyya are 
attracted by its openness and its lack of restriction on religious promotion to 
those of low caste origin. Not only have craftsmen and musicians been attracted 
to and prospered within the order, but women too have been drawn by its spirit 
of openness. Women have been encouraged to pursue Qur’anic study and 
Islamic learning, and some have even become muqaddams or religious leaders 
appointed to transmit the wird or litany of the brotherhood. A number of 
Ibrahima’s sisters and daughters have achieved renowned scholarly and spiritual 
reputations (see Callaway & Creevy 1994, Schmitz 2000b). This reformed Sufi 
order — in many ways no different from other Tijani movements, but in contrast 
to Sunna militants and Islamists — has embraced and promoted the interests of 
persons of low caste origin and of women, both of whom were previously 
marginalized by cleric-dominated brotherhoods. 
 The last issue to be developed in this discussion is the idea of legitimacy of 
the Nyas movement in the eyes of those who have joined, especially from the 
point of view of previously marginalized craftsmen and musicians. While a 
sense of the conventional cleric freemen perception of the low caste status of 
Nyas’s Islamic brotherhood has already been suggested — namely, it is morally 
repugnant ‘unwholesome Sufisim’ led by an individual of ‘destestable’ ancestry 
— those who are persuaded of the Nyas family’s spiritual mission evaluate it 
differently. 
 A dahira linked to the Nyas Order operated in a location on the outskirts of 
Dakar where I conducted fieldwork during the early 1980s and mid 1990s 
among resettled Haalpulaaren from Fuuta Toro. A dahira (or daaira) is a cell or 
‘circle’ (from the Arabic) or local unit of a Senegalese Sufi order based in urban 
areas. Located near Tiaroye a few miles from the capital city, a Haalpulaar 
community established itself in a quartier centred around the household of a 
toorodo cleric, El Hajj Demba Ngaydo. He had been the patron (njartigi) to a 
number of men-of-skill or low caste families, one of whom was the weaver 
family Gisse that I had worked closely with. In the mid 1960s, during the early 
stages of settlement of the quartier, nineteen families had formed a mutual aid 
and support group called the Fedde Sahabaabe, or the ‘Age-set of the 
Companions of the Prophet’. It organized savings for members, each of whom 
paid a weekly subscription, and was the focus of rituals and celebrations on the 
occasion of the births, marriages or deaths of its families’ members. It also met 
each Thursday for entertainment and a meal, and these weekly soirées were held 
                                                 
37 Kane’s words in the original are: ‘L’attrait de ce mouvement s’explique en grande 
partie par le fait qu’il prônait une plus grande démocratisation du sacré’ (1997: 316). 
 Global connections, local ruptures 213 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evening prayers at the Nyas dahira in Tiaroye 
Photo: Roy Dilley 
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in turn in members’ houses. In this context, the specialized roles of each of the 
social categories represented by its members were played out, such that, for 
instance, the maabu weaver sang songs accompanied by the young bambaado 
hoddu player, or those of servile origin made the preparations and served food 
during the collective festive or ceremonial gatherings (see Dilley 1984). 
 By the mid 1990s, the patron cleric Ngaydo was dead, and although the 
mutual aid group (Fedde) continued, a new organization had established itself. 
This was a Nyas dahira or cell of the brotherhood linked to Ceerno Alhusseni 
Nyas. The local cell was led by an imam who was of Haalpulaar Fisherman 
origin, a caste that, like craftsmen and musicians, was previously excluded from 
holding religious office within Islam. For those of men-of-skill origin, the Nyas 
dahira represented a synthesis of the white lore and knowledge of Islam (gandal 
danewal) and the black lore and knowledge (gandal balewal) of the caste 
specialist that is derived from the bush or the wild. This union was evinced, 
various members pointed out, by the nature of the origins of the Nyas family — 
namely it was of blacksmithing stock — and by the fact that the imam was a 
Fisherman (cubbalo), a social category associated with the powerful black lore 
of the river. Moreover, my weaver friend had become the imam as-salat, the 
leader of the group prayers, who chanted the litany and performed the rakas that 
the congregation would follow. This role contrasted with the one he occupied in 
the Fedde, which would also conduct communal prayers for the last two 
scheduled daily prayer times at dusk and at dark on a Thursday evening. In this 
context, he would defer to the religious authority of a group member of 
jawaando or Courtier origin. Since joining the Nyas prayer group, the weaver 
had felt it necessary to give up cowrie divination, for on the advice of his new 
imam his prayers would not be heard for forty days after each divinatory 
consultation. The weaver had much earlier been persuaded to cease practising 
nyengi magic, since he had been told that it led to eternal damnation. He 
continued, however, with the practice of herbal medicine and curing with 
incantations and protective verses. It would seem that what informants meant by 
the idea that this Muslim order represented a synthesis of white and black lore 
was not that it entertained a series of ritual practices that might be condemned 
by other branches of Islam. It did not amalgamate in a novel combination 
Islamic with non- or pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. Instead, what appears to 
have been meant by this claim was that the close association between men-of-
skill and spiritual powers that derived from the wild did not deflect from the 
possibility of divine blessing offered by the Muslim religion. It is as though the 
spiritual expertise that men-of-skill possessed by virtue of their ancestry could 
be an important ingredient in building a foundation of legitimacy for religious 
authority in this branch of Islam. The legitimacy of Umar Taal and of Ibrahima 
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Nyas had been built around precisely this combination in the eyes of certain 
sectors of their followings. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This brief ethnographic example illustrates how, at the grass-roots level of the 
Nyas brotherhood, the issue of caste, forbidden as a topic of discussion by the 
family, is a key element in the construction of a religious following amongst 
members of particular social categories. Whilst this feature works to attract a 
following from the ranks of lower caste or marginalized sections of the 
population, it also acts as an obstacle to the members of those social categories 
previously associated with religious leadership in longer established Sufi 
brotherhoods. The pattern in these conventional cleric-dominated brotherhoods 
has been to assimilate the faithful from low caste ancestry, albeit in an inferior 
position of dependence and not of spiritual leadership. This is a pattern of 
accommodation and not of integration. The Nyasiyya at grass-roots level has 
integrated and embraced the powers of caste groups such that it has become in 
the eyes of some an essential element in its ideological scheme and in the 
process of legitimising authority. The grass-roots organization of the Nyas Order 
seems to have succeeded where others have failed, although the extent of that 
success is tempered by the toorodo resistance to non-cleric Islam. 
 This discussion has led to an appreciation of the sources of power and 
potency that form part of the contested field of culturally defined realms of 
mystical force that constitute one of the key dynamics in the social relations of 
Haalpulaaren and other neighbouring language groups. As Villalón (1995:122) 
points out, we must recognize the ‘very real centrality of the metaphysical’ that 
is ‘all too often ignored in secular discussions of Senegalese Islamic 
organizations’. While the critiques of West African Sufism stemming from 
Western-educated elites versed in secular rationalism and from arabisants and 
Islamists versed in ideas of Middle Eastern origin have attacked this 
metaphysical core of brotherhoods, the popular view of legitimate religious 
authority holds fast to such spiritual considerations. A bifurcation of the Muslim 
community has occurred around opposition to Sufi mysticism. Western-
educated Senegalese intellectuals and Arabic-educated Islamists make odd 
bedfellows in their stance against mystic Sufi brotherhoods. These attacks on 
Sufi mysticism and its particular esoteric construction of knowledge and power 
are also by implication an attack upon the similar construction of knowledge and 
power among men-of-skill groups. However, these two parties are joined in a 
common voice of criticism by the conventional freeborn Muslim clerics. The 
latter denounce reformed brotherhoods such as the Nyasiyya for proposing a 
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form of integration of cultural knowledge and power that should normally, from 
their point of view, be kept apart. Freeborn clerics, while recognizing the 
legitimacy of Sufi constructions of knowledge and power, are critical of its 
assimilation with those forms associated with men-of-skill. The Islamists hold 
that Sufi mysticism represents a retrograde step in the standing of the Muslim 
religion. They reject outright the esoteric paradigm of conventional forms of 
knowledge and power. The cultural dialogue instigated by the cleric-inspired 
Islamic revolution in the mid 18th century has broadened to become today a 
conversation involving numerous parties, each with its own view of the 
composition of the Muslim community. 
The Islamic community is perhaps more fractured than at any time in recent 
history. Islamists are blind to caste but eagle-eyed with regard to gender. Clerics 
and the followers of the Nyas brotherhood both recognize caste, although with 
very different consequences. The Nyas Order has also extended religious 
privileges to women in a way few other orders have done. Moreover, the 
example of the Nyasiyya is suggestive of a range of sometimes-contradictory 
forces that operate within the field of globalization. When considered from a 
pan-West-African perspective, the Nyas Order might be seen as a globalizing 
force that has transcended ethnic and national boundaries. It has a broad appeal 
to Muslims right across the region from Côte d’Ivoire to Nigeria and into Chad. 
Yet, at the same time, the local understanding of what the order embraces within 
Senegal has given it an appearance that is less appealing to many Muslims, 
whether these be cleric-led Sufis from one of the older-established brotherhoods 
or radicals from one of the reformist and Islamist groups that look instead to 
sources of inspiration of a modernist or internationalist persuasion. 
The processes of globalization constitute part of a two-way movement: 
connections that are made between one place and another across the globe are at 
the same time shaped by specific local networks of social relations and 
frameworks of meaning. The numerous conceptions of Islam variously 
established within Senegal are thus the product of an exchange of ideas and 
practices between West Africa and elsewhere, and are simultaneously the 
product of localizing factors. The local ruptures caused by the institution of 
caste have long composed an element in a dialogue about the religion of Islam 
in Senegal. The examples of reformist Muslims, Islamist groups and the 
Nyasiyya presented here suggest that within this matrix of relations between 
caste and Islam, new senses of identity and belonging are being generated such 
that being a member of a low caste social category can be integrated in a variety 
of fashions within the compass of a long-established world religion. 
 Global connections, local ruptures 217 
  
References 
 
Abun-Nasr, J.M. 1965, The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in the Modern World, London: 
Oxford University Press. 
Adams, A. & J. So 1996, A Claim to Land by the River: A Household in Senegal 1720-
1994, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Africa South of the Sahara 1999, London: Europa Publication, (28th ed.). 
Ba, O. 1985-1986, ‘Le Rôle des Ecoles Islamiques dans le Développement de la Culture 
Arabo-islamique dans le Bassin du Fleuve Sénégal’, Thèse de doctorat de 3ième 
cycle, Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne. 
Bouche, D. 1974, ‘L’Ecole Française et les Musulmans au Sénégal de 1850 à 1900’, 
Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer 61 (223): 218-35. 
Brenner, L. 1983a, West African Sufi: The Religious Heritage and Spiritual Search of 
Cerno Bokar Salif Taal, London: Hurst & Co. 
Brenner, L. (ed.) 1983b, Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
London: Hurst & Co. 
Brenner, L. 2000, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in a West 
African Muslim Society, London & Bloomington: C. Hurst & Co./Indiana University 
Press. 
Brenner, L. & M. Last 1985, ‘The Role of Language in West African Islam’, Africa 
(special issue on ‘Popular Islam’ South of the Sahara) 55 (4): 432-46. 
Callaway, B. & L. Creevy 1994, The Heritage of Islam: Women, Religion and Politics in 
West Africa, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Clark, A.F. & L. Colvin Phillips 1994, Historical Dictionary of Senegal, Metuchen, NJ 
& London: The Scarecrow Press, (2nd ed.). 
Clarke, P.B. 1982, West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 
8th to the 20th Century, London: Edward Arnold Ltd. 
Colin, R. 1980, Systèmes d’Education et Mutations Sociales: Continuité et Discontinuité 
dans les Dynamiques Socio-educatives. Le Cas de Sénégal, Paris: Librairie Honoré 
Champion. 
Conrad, C. & B.E. Frank (eds) 1995, Status and Identity in West Africa: Nyamakalaw of 
Mande, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Cruise O’Brien, D. 1971, The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic 
Organisation of an Islamic Brotherhood, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Dilley, R.M. 1984, ‘Weavers among the Tukolor of the Senegal River Basin: A Study of 
their Social Position and Economic Organisation’, Unpublished D.Phil. thesis, 
University of Oxford. 
Dilley, R.M. 2000, ‘The Question of Caste in West Africa, with Special Reference to 
Tukulor Craftsmen’, Anthropos 95: 149-65. 
Diop, A.B. 1965, ‘Société Toucouleur et Migration. Enquête sur l’Immigration 
Toucouleur à Dakar’, Initiations Africaines XVIII, Dakar: IFAN. 
Diop, A.B. 1981, La Société Wolof: Tradition et Changement: Les Systèmes d’Inégalité 
et de Domination, Paris: Karthala. 
Diouf, M.B. 1983, ‘Forgerons Wolof du Kajoor; Forgerons Sereer du Siin et du Jegem: 
De l’Epoque Précoloniale à Nos Jours’, Thèse de doctorat de 3ième cycle, EHESS 
Paris. 
218 Dilley 
  
Evers Rosander, E. 1997, ‘Introduction: The Islamization of “Tradition” and 
“Modernity”’, in: E. Evers Rosander & D. Westerlund (eds), African Islam and 
Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 
1-27. 
Evers Rosander, E. & D. Westerlund (eds) 1997, African Islam and Islam in Africa: 
Encounters between Sufis and Islamists, London: Hurst & Co. 
Gomez-Perez, M. 1991, ‘Associations Islamiques à Dakar’, Islam et Sociétiés au Sud du 
Sahara 5: 5-20. 
Goody, J. (ed.) 1968, Literacy in Traditional Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gray, C. 1988, ‘The Rise of the Niassene Tijanniyya, 1875 to the Present’, Islam et 
Sociétés au Sud du Sahara 2: 34-60. 
Kane, O. 1997, ‘Shaikh al-Islam Al-Hajj Ibrahim Niasse’, in: D. Robinson & J.L. Triaud 
(eds), Le Temps des Marabouts Itinéraires et Stratégies Islamiques en Afrique 
Occidentale Française, v. 1880-1960, Paris: Karthala. 
Klein, M.A. 1968, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine-Saloum 1847-1914, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Knight, D. 1994, A Burning Hunger, London: Panos. 
Loimeier, R. 1994. ‘Cheikh Toure: Du Reformise à l’Islamisme, Un Musulman 
Sénégalais dans le Siècle’, Islam et Sociétiés au Sud du Sahara 8: 55-66. 
Loimeier, R. 2000, 'L'Islam Ne Se Vend Plus: The Islamic Reform Movement and the 
State in Senegal', Journal of Religion in Africa XXX (2): 168-90. 
McNaughton, P.R. 1988, The Mande Blacksmiths : Knowledge, Power, and Art in West 
Africa, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Marty, P. 1915-1916, L’Islam en Mauritanie at au Sénégal, (Revue du Monde 
Musulman, t. 31), Paris: E. Leroux. 
Monteil, V. 1980, L’Islam Noir: Une Religion à la Conquête de l’Afrique, Paris: 
Editions du Seuil. 
Morice, A. 1982, ‘Les Forgerons de Kaolack: Travail Non Salarié et Déploiement d’une 
Caste au Sénégal’, Thèse de doctorat de 3ième cycle, Paris. 
Panzacchi, C. 1994, ‘The Livelihoods of Traditional Griots in Modern Senegal’, Africa 
64 (2): 190-210. 
Recensement Général de la Population 1976 [1982] & 1988 [c. 1992], Dakar: Bureau 
National du Recensement. 
Richter, D. 1980, 'Further Considerations of Caste in West Africa: The Senufo', Africa 
50 (1): 37-54. 
Robin, J. 1947, ‘L’Evolution du Mariage Coutumier Chez les Musulmans du Sénégal’, 
Africa XVIII: 192-201. 
Schmitz, J. 2000a, ‘Le Souffle de la Parenté: Mariage et Transmission de la Baraka 
Chez des Clercs Musulmans de la Vallée du Sénégal’, L’Homme 154: 241-78. 
Schmitz, J. 2000b. ‘L’Islam en Afrique de l’Ouest: Les Méridiens et les Parallèles, 
Autrepart (16) (special issue, E. Grégoire & J. Schmitz (ed.), Afrique Noire et Monde 
Arabe: Continuités et Ruptures) pp. 117-37. 
Seesemann, R. n.d., ‘The Shurafâ’ and the Blacksmith: The Role of the Idaw ‘Alî of 
Mauritania in the Career of the Senegalese Tijânî Shaykh Ibrâhîm Niasse (1900-75)’, 
Unpublished paper. 
 Global connections, local ruptures 219 
  
Silla, O. 1966, ‘Persistence des Castes dans la Société Wolof Contemporaine’, Bulletin 
de l’IFAN (série B) XXVIII (3-4): 731-70. 
Soares, B.F. 1999, ‘Muslim Proseltization as Purification: Religious Pluralism and 
Conflict in Contemporary Mali’, in: Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (ed.), 
Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa, New York: Orbis 
Books, pp. 228-45. 
Tamari, T. 1997, Les Castes de l’Afrique Occidentale, Paris: Société d’Ethnologie. 
Todd, D.M. 1977, 'Caste in Africa?', Africa 47 (4): 398-412. 
Vaughan, J.H. Jr. 1970, 'Caste Systems in the Western Sudan', in A. Tuden & L. 
Plotincov (eds), Social Stratification in Africa, New York: The Free Press, pp. 52-92. 
Villalón, L.A. 1994, ‘Sufi Rituals as Rallies: Religious Ceremonies in the Politics of 
Senegalese State-Society Relations’, Comparative Politics 26 (4): 415-38. 
Villalón, L.A. 1995, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens 
in Fatick, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Willis, J.R. 1967, ‘Jihad fi sabîl Allâh: Its Doctrinal Basis in Islam and Some Aspects of 
its Evolution in 19th Century West Africa’, Journal of African History 3: 395-415. 
Willis, J.R. 1970, ‘Al-Hâjj ‘Umar b. Sa’îd al-Fûtî al-Tûri (c. 1794-1864) and the 
Doctrinal Basis of his Islamic Reformist Movement in the Western Sudan’, PhD 
thesis, SOAS, University of London. 
 
8 
 
 
How is a girl to marry without a bed? 
Weddings, wealth and women’s value  
in an Islamic town of Niger 
 
Adeline Masquelier1 
 
 
In Niger, bridewealth has become the target of Izala, a 
reformist Muslim organization that condemns ostentatious 
expenditure and promotes frugality. In the Muslim town of 
Dogondoutchi, where Mawri residents are increasingly exposed 
to Western bourgeois values, the Izala ban on excessive 
bridewealth and conspicuous weddings has angered many for 
whom gift exchange is inseparable from social worth. Thus, 
mothers struggling to equip their daughters with the latest 
trappings of modern domesticity reject Izala expressions of 
Islamic frugality. For them, prosperity is not antithetical to 
Islamic piety. This chapter looks at a young woman’s insistence 
on receiving a Formica bed from her impoverished mother and 
shows how the acquisition of such beds is implicated in the 
reconfiguration of a domestic lifestyle that owes as much to 
                                                 
1 Research for this chapter has been carried out since 1988, supported by awards from 
the National Science Foundation, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological 
Research, the National Institute of Mental Health, and fellowships and grants from 
Tulane University. I would like to thank everyone who has been generous with their 
comments and critiques, including Dorothy Hodgson, Sue O’Brien, Steven Pierce, 
Rosalind Shaw and Pnina Werbner. Special thanks go to Misty Bastian and Brad Weiss 
for their invaluable comments on a preliminary draft of this chapter. I am indebted to 
Barbara Cooper whose engaging and imaginative work on Hausa women and marriage 
has paved the way for my own musings on the subject. As always, the women of 
Dogondoutchi deserve thanks for their valiant efforts to share with me their concerns, 
their aspirations, their world. Finally, I am grateful to Wim van Binsbergen and Rijk 
van Dijk, first, for inviting me to the conference on Globalization and Questions of 
Ownership and, second, for pointing out key issues in this chapter that needed to be 
clarified. I alone am responsible for any flaws that remain. 
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local understandings of matrimony and morality as to Western 
bourgeois domesticity. 
 
If her family can afford it, [a Hausa woman] will have a four-poster bed piled high 
with mattresses, covered with a satin spread adorned with many pillows. This bed is 
the central decorative piece in the room and she neither sleeps nor sits on it. 
(Callaway 1987) 
 
A [Mawri] mother must [...] contribute to the dowry of the young bride who should 
arrive at her husband’s with her calabashes, ladles, basins, mats, water pots, 
furniture, etc, which will be exhibited for all to see. Fashions change. Today, a 
mother will burst with pride if, on her wedding day, her daughter can display a metal 
bed with a mattress in addition to all the conventional utensils. (De Latour 1992) 
 
‘Fathers, they have nothing to say about marriage. It is our business,’ one 
Mawri2 woman interjected as I was discussing matters of bridewealth (sadaki) 
with my neighbour in the rural town of Dogondoutchi, Niger in March 2000. ‘If 
the daughter wants a man for a husband and her mother agrees, shi ke nan 
(that’s it)! They “tie” the marriage,’ she concluded. By insisting that marriage 
was women’s business, this senior resident was resolutely challenging 
patriarchal authority and defining wedding prestations as a female arena of 
power from which men were — or at least, should be — theoretically excluded. 
She further implied that women should systematically resist Islamic ideologies 
that had in the last decade or so started to undermine forms of accumulation 
through which women traditionally created value and generated status for 
themselves. Her testimony echoed the words of numerous Mawri women 
similarly anxious to secure some measure of autonomy and preserve their power 
base at a time when economic forces and religious reforms increasingly appear 
to be working against women’s interests and agendas.  
 In this chapter, I describe some strategies female Dogondoutchi residents 
have been employing to challenge patriarchal notions of social order that have 
emerged through the forum of new Islamic ‘traditions’. With a discussion of 
Mawri women’s creative efforts to redefine their roles and responsibilities in the 
matrimonial economy, I hope to contribute my two cents to an already extensive 
and growing anthropological debate on globalization. By focusing on the 
                                                 
2 Traditionally recognizable by their ‘ethnic’ marks, a double scar that cuts the cheek 
from the corner of the mouth to the ear on both sides, Hausaphone Mawri are a largely 
heterogeneous population of 250,000 people. They tend to identify with the more 
inclusive Hausa ethnic group that mainly occupies southeastern Niger and northern 
Nigeria. For a detailed political, economic and religious history of Dogondoutchi and 
the surrounding region (known as Arewa), see Piault (1970). 
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cultural dynamics of global processes, such debate has made it increasingly 
clear that globalization can no longer be equated with cultural imperialism and 
described as a process of homogenization promoting the convergence of cultural 
style and resulting in a world of sameness (Friedman 1994, Inda & Rosaldo 
2002, Meyer & Geschiere 1999). Far from gradually making the world over in 
the image of the West — a scenario based on the problematic assumption that 
globalization is synonymous with Westernization — global flows have turned 
out to presuppose and even promote local fixity. Rather than eroding 
boundaries, the seeming intensification of flux appears to reaffirm borders and 
redefine categories. Put another way, globalization is about uprooting as much 
as it is about belonging. Making sense of this ‘paradoxical articulation of flow 
and closure’ (Meyer & Geschiere 1999: 3) means attending to the sometimes 
highly variable and subtle ways in which people everywhere utilize global 
capital (consumer goods, foreign symbols, information technology) to reassert 
local values and re-inscribe cultural identities. For our purposes here, the 
recognition that global consumption and local transformation are two sides of 
the same coin translates into an appreciation of the creative strategies through 
which Mawri women customize imported goods to redefine themselves in 
resolutely local terms. By embracing emblems of the foreign to reaffirm cultural 
difference, women in Dogondoutchi are actively resisting the tide of 
Islamization while at the same time they are participating in local redefinitions 
of Islamic identity. If they are neither the passive recipients of global cultural 
imports nor the silent victims of male-centred hegemonic designs, they are 
nonetheless struggling to respond to the challenges and limitations imposed by 
the social transformations currently affecting their world. Out of this struggle 
emerge new forms and spaces of reflexivity. Following Butler (1997) and 
through a focus on women’s preoccupation with bridewealth and wedding gifts, 
I show how the processes and means that have secured Mawri women’s 
subordination are also the conditions through which these women have become 
aware of their marginalization and I discuss the growing salience of marriage 
transactions in their strategic redefinitions of their social worth.  
Whenever people discussed bridewealth and marriage in Dogondoutchi in 
1994 and 2000, I heard women grumbling about the ridiculously limited 
quantity of household items they could buy with the small sadaki payments 
many families received now that both the government and Muslim reformists 
had put a cap on bridewealth transfers. Men, by contrast, often complained 
bitterly that bridewealth had become such an extravagant expense that no one 
could afford to marry anymore. In the last decade, weddings and the gift 
transactions they entail have become a frequent source of controversy among 
Dogondoutchi residents who are struggling to meet their social obligations in an  
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era of dwindling resources and opportunities. Amidst competing visions of how 
to solve the ‘problem’ of marriage in contemporary Niger, Mawri women feel 
increasingly compelled to articulate their own perceptions of what weddings 
entail and what their own rights and responsibilities are when it comes to 
arranging the marriage of a daughter.  
Throughout the African continent, bridewealth practices are the focus of 
considerable debate and dispute as the collapse of national or regional 
economies and the emergence of new markets and new forms of production 
have forced many to reconsider the nature and content of these often complex 
transactions. In defiance of Uganda’s tradition of bridewealth paid by the 
bridegroom to the bride’s family, a 25-year-old scooter taxi driver recently 
invited older women to vie for his hand in marriage and to present what they 
thought would be an acceptable ‘dowry’ (Fisher 2000). In KwaZulu Natal 
Province in South Africa where the centrality of cattle in bridewealth exchange 
has long been eclipsed by the money earned by migrant workers, a man decided 
to adorn his only daughter with cash and clothes to concretise her value as a 
future wife and mother (Stengs, White, Lynch & Zimmermann 2000). In 
southern Sudan, a Nuer brother and his full sister began living together as 
husband and wife under the assumption that since they were cattleless orphans 
with no marriage prospects — she having no extended family upon which her 
in-laws could call in times of need and he having no cattle — they had nothing 
to lose if they were later killed for having committed incest (Hutchinson 1996). 
While these three incidents constitute each in their own way fairly unique modes 
of creatively circumventing what have increasingly become contentious 
practices, they must nonetheless be seen as part of a larger debate through which 
ideologies of gender, power and family are brought under heightened scrutiny at 
a time when the sources and perceptions of prosperity shift easily with the flow 
of money and markets.  
In Niger, women’s grievances about low bridewealth and their creative 
efforts to defy the limitations imposed by a collapsing economy similarly 
underscore wider concerns about changing definitions of gendered roles and 
realities. In this chapter, I describe how women are shaping the confines and 
contours of the debate on bridewealth in a rural town in Niger, where the recent 
emergence of anti-Sufism has sparked intense questioning about the 
management of wealth, the status of women and more generally, the relevance 
of Islam in the lives of ordinary Muslims. By defending what they consider to be 
their daughters’ interests and expectations, senior women often end up 
contesting local standards of Muslim piety, virtue and civility. While they do not 
necessarily agree that fathers ‘have nothing to say about marriage’ and 
sometimes even challenge each other as they confront husbands, Muslim elites 
and the Nigerien authorities, most mothers in Dogondoutchi entertain definite 
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ideas about the meaning and purpose of bridewealth exchange and they make 
their voices heard whenever they can. At the same time, and while they feel 
pressured to indulge their daughters’ dreams of bourgeois domesticity, they are 
also mindful that respectability has increasingly become indexed through the 
language of Islam. For an increasing number of conservative Muslims eager to 
demonstrate their piety and commitment to the faith, the flaunting of wealth 
during wedding celebrations is now contrary to the maintenance of an Islamic 
moral order. For the women who devote their resources and energies to filling 
their daughters’ marital homes with furniture, mats and bowls, however, such 
conservative Islamic values make little sense. Far from being inimical to local 
concepts of morality, piety and containment upon which marriage and 
domesticity are ideally based, mass consumption, I argue here, paradoxically 
becomes for Mawri mothers the instrument through which these values are 
objectified at a time when the very fabric of society — the integrity of families 
— and the moral essence of identity have come under increasing scrutiny. How 
women chose to navigate the shifting terrain of moral identities while retaining 
access to the sources of wealth in the context of marriage transactions is the 
focus of this chapter. Amidst the controversies generated by Muslim reformists’ 
denunciation of conspicuous consumption, women’s discourses on bridewealth 
and wedding gift exchange provide a useful commentary on gender relations and 
the manifold anxieties of consumer culture. They also highlight how contested 
Islamic visions of gender, power and domesticity have given rise to, as Bernal 
(1997: 148) puts it in the case of Sudan, ‘both new mechanisms for controlling 
women and new opportunities for women to renegotiate their positions in gender 
relations’.  
Aside and apart from their impact on local religious debates, Dogondoutchi 
women’s resistance to the appeal of conservative Islam and their dynamic 
engagement in an ever-widening global consumer market underscores the 
difficulty of trying to predict first, how commodities — be they beds, beads or 
bicycles — will be put to use by local actors, and second, what understandings 
of modernity will emerge out of these experiences (Graeber 1996, Hunt 1999, 
Renne 1999, Weiss 1996). The assumptions of theorists of modernity and 
globalization notwithstanding, the interface of global and local processes has 
produced multiple and different ways of ‘being modern’ and different ways of 
understanding not only the material but also the moral impact of modernization.3 
                                                 
3 Modernity everywhere is perceived as simultaneously seductive and threatening, yet 
that hardly means that at the local level people weigh the costs and benefits of 
modernity in similar, predictable ways. Thus, while Congolese sapeurs who spend all 
their earnings on designer clothes from France and Italy appear to ‘consume modernity 
to strengthen themselves’ (Friedman 2002: 242), Ghanaian Pentecostalists, who see the 
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And while there is widespread agreement that globalization ‘is itself a deeply 
historical, uneven and even localizing process’ (Appadurai 1996: 17), we cannot 
ignore the centrality of people’s agency in creatively engaging this process. In 
contexts when people increasingly consume resources that were neither 
produced in their own societies nor produced for the uses they are now being put 
to, it becomes crucial to trace the complex ways in which the appropriation of 
foreignness becomes not simply a strategy of self-production but occasionally 
also a means of empowerment and self-defence against the perceived hegemonic 
forces of change. For Dogondoutchi women who are struggling to reinvent 
themselves in light of both the temptations of the consumer market and newly 
emerging discourses on marriage and morality, the creative appropriation of 
globally circulating emblems of domesticity highlights the resiliency of time-
honoured local forms of productivity and sociality. It also reminds us that in 
Niger, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, modernity does not solely or 
necessarily come from the West.4 Abu-Lughod (1998), Bernal (1997) and 
Cooper (2001) have already shown that for urban Egypt, northern Sudan and 
Hausaphone Niger respectively, Islam has become a crucial source of modernity 
for members of the Muslim diaspora.5 By proudly and loudly re-asserting their 
rootedness in a resilient economy of female-centred practices, Mawri mothers 
and daughters thus learn to juggle selectively with two competing paradigms of 
modernity — one Western and one Islamic — and to profit from, rather than fall 
prey to, their powers. 
 
 
The contest over Sadaki in Islamic discourses 
 
If debates about rising bridewealth and wedding expenses appear to have 
acquired of late an unprecedented prominence, the concerns they betray are far 
from new. In fact, the high cost of weddings was already a matter of intense 
interest in the colonial period. Later, the first post-colonial regime attempted to 
                                                                                                                       
global market as an abode of invisible satanic forces from which they must protect 
themselves with the power of religion, occasionally throw away commodities – such as 
underpants – that are allegedly filled with dangerous diabolic spirits (Meyer 1998). 
4 My intent, here, is not to equate globalization with modernity. Rather, I wish to briefly 
note that globally circulating goods – be they Formica beds or prayer beads, 
Tupperware bowls or televisions – become locally identified as modern things precisely 
because they come from afar, even if elsewhere they might be considered old or out-of-
date. To be modern in such a context means being connected to global consumer 
networks. 
5 I have also written on Mawri perceptions of Islam as a form of modernity and as a 
means of gaining access to modernity (Masquelier 2001b). 
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regulate the matrimonial economy, but with little success. In 1975, the Nigerien 
president Seyni Kountché, troubled by the moral climate resulting from the 
spiralling inflation of bridewealth in the country, made the following remarks to 
the women of Niamey: 
 
Faced with this social and moral chaos, the CMS (Conseil Militaire de Sécurité) has 
decided — I am confirming it — that from now on, we will not tolerate any wedding 
celebrated with ostentation and extravagance. Wedding expenses cannot exceed 
50,000 CFA francs; noisy bridal processions spilling out of the town hall with fake 
veils and a nouveau-riche look are strictly forbidden. Equally forbidden — I am 
declaring today — are the one hundred roasts that have surfaced out of who knows 
which gluttonous tradition. [Forbidden] as well are the collections of outfits for the 
bride conspicuously exhibited throughout the city’s streets and the loud and 
pretentious baptisms.  
 
In an attempt to curb the moral and material excesses of the first government of 
independent Niger, Colonel Kountché — who had seized the reins of power in 
1974 and instituted military rule following the disastrous famine of the early 
1970s — actively promoted discipline, restraint and frugality at work and at 
home. Though Kountché made no mention of religion in his speech to Nigerien 
women, Islam — systematically used by the military regime to forge a 
nationalistic consciousness among disparate ethnic elements — became a 
building block of this new moral order where ostentatious displays and 
consumption of wealth had no place. What is remarkable about the formal 
presidential announcement is that it was addressed exclusively to women. 
Women, Niger’s head of state implied, controlled the means and modes of 
wealth expenditure associated with wedding celebrations and were responsible 
for their excesses. They — and apparently no one else — must therefore be the 
targets of campaigns aimed at ridding Nigerien society of ‘gluttonous traditions’ 
and ‘moral chaos’. As has been convincingly demonstrated in a growing body of 
literature on gender in Africa (Allman 2001, Hodgson & McCurdy 2001, Hunt 
1991, Vaughan 1991), women often end up being identified as the ‘problem’ 
when far-reaching changes in economic relations are translated as moral ‘crises’ 
and described in terms of chaos, degeneration and disease. Nigerien society 
appears to be no exception in this respect.  
 Some twenty years after Kountché’s denunciatory speech — and in a 
strikingly similar fashion — the followers of Izala, an anti-Sufi movement of 
Nigerian origin aimed at purifying Islam from a host of sinful accretions, 
generated considerable interest as well as resentment among Nigeriens for 
loudly condemning the ostentatious re-distributive practices that had long 
integrated local communities through complex and enduring socio-economic 
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networks.6 Among other things, Izala reformists insisted that bridewealth 
payments should be limited to a token sum that most men would be able to put 
together fairly rapidly. They also encouraged women to spend wisely and 
conservatively when it came to acquiring the kayan ‘daki (things for the room) 
that mothers traditionally invested in to ensure their daughters’ prestige and 
well-being (see Cooper 1997, Nicolas 1986, Pittin 1979). As I have noted 
elsewhere (Masquelier 1999), their condemnation of excessive materialism and 
their pleas for frugality were perceived by many Dogondoutchi residents as 
intrusive attacks on legitimate and long-standing local traditions through which 
individuals continually affirmed their social worth. While the assertive 
individualism of Izala angered those who saw it as a threat to society and family, 
it nevertheless provided many youths with a publicly sanctioned means of 
avoiding the costly social obligations (bridewealth, gifts to patrons or clerics, 
birth celebration expenses) that generally exceeded the average farmer’s meagre 
income in this predominantly agricultural region.  
Taking advantage of the moral panic sparked by Westernization, the 
development of public education, the flood of commodities onto local markets 
and the dispersal of family and community through migrancy, Izala preachers 
boldly challenged the authority of the state and of Muslims elites, thereby 
attracting a number of people frustrated by the government’s and the local 
authorities’ failure to deal with their problems. At a time of intense parental 
preoccupation with the alleged slackening of social control, the disintegration of 
family ties and the concomitant spread of ‘immorality’ amongst unmarried 
youths, the Izala message about bridewealth payment reduction resonated with 
earlier visions of a pristine moral order unsoiled by modernity and 
secularization. By insisting that bridewealth could be paid with 10,000 CFA 
francs (1,000 CFA francs equals €1.5) rather than the customary 200,000 CFA 
francs, Izala leaders technically enabled young men to marry quickly. More 
importantly, perhaps, low bridewealth enhanced the marriageability of 
budurwoyi (virgin girls), thereby preventing the dreaded possibility that they 
could ‘spoil’ before acquiring a husband.7 Some mothers complied with the 
                                                 
6 The Izala movement, more properly known as Jama’atu Izalat al-Bid’a wa Iqamat al-
Sunna (Movement for Suppressing Innovations and Restoring the Sunna), was founded 
in Jos, Nigeria in 1978 by Malam Ismaila Idris, with the support of Sheikh Abubaakar 
Gumi, who had close ties with Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Student Society. For a 
more detailed history of Izala, see Kane (1994), Loimeier (1997), Masquelier (1999) 
and Umar (1993). 
7 In a society where virtually no young women remain single for any length of time, 
Callaway (1987: 40) notes of Kano, Nigeria: ‘the social advantage of an early marriage 
outweigh the possibilities of anything else imaginable a daughter might do’. Although 
more women are now pursuing secondary studies and contemplating careers, they do 
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reformists’ recommendation and gave up their rights to a ‘full’ sadaki. The large 
majority, however, responded to the Izala campaign for a more frugal and moral 
society by ever more openly flaunting their daughters’ wealth at wedding 
ceremonies. While senior women’s preoccupations with young girls’ unbridled 
sexuality betrays a growing concern with the loose moral standards so 
aggressively criticized by Izala reformers, few mothers are prepared to readily 
give up the sadaki for the alleged sake of their daughters’ virtue. Respectability, 
in the end, means different things to different women. Mothers’ divergent 
attitudes toward the sadaki controversy thus reveals substantial divisions within 
the female community at a time when religious identity has become ever more 
central to the ways in which Mawri women constitute themselves as 
‘respectable’ persons.8 
 
 
The changing content and value of bridewealth 
 
C. Piault (1963), M. Piault (1978) and more recently Cooper (1997) have noted 
how the terms and content of marriage prestations in Hausa-speaking 
communities have changed dramatically in the last century and, with it, the 
meaning of marriage as new kinds of material goods and new modes of 
producing wealth emerged in tandem with the commoditization of services, land 
and labour. In pre-colonial times, bridewealth payments amounted to over 1500 
cowries (Piault 1978: 422). The kyauta, which initiated the period of betrothal 
and enabled the ‘wait until the harvest’ (sai hita wuri) — when beans would be 
sold to pay the sadaki — was a negligible sum. By the 1930s in Dogondoutchi, 
the sadaki varied according to the wealth and status of the groom’s family but it 
generally consisted of two heifers, an ox and the sum of 115 francs9 (Archives 
                                                                                                                       
not see employment as an alternative to marriage and motherhood. Elite young women 
may postpone the age of marriage to complete their studies but the fact remains that for 
them as well as for every other woman – and man – marriage remains a social 
obligation rather than an option. 
8 Despite the rapid spread of Islam since independence in 1960, the indigenous form of 
spirit worship known as bori has remained an integral and influential dimension of 
Mawri experience even as it appears to be being swept away by a growing Muslim 
influence (see Masquelier n.d., 2001b, 1996). A large majority of the bori membership 
is comprised of women who can, in theory at least, derive power and prestige from their 
association with spirits and their status as mediums. Young women increasingly shun 
bori, however. Mindful that most prospective husbands associate bori identity with 
backwardness and rusticity, they prefer to present themselves as ‘pious’ Muslims – or 
for a tiny minority, as dedicated Christians. 
9 Piault (1978: 422) notes that around 1935 bridewealth payments could be as low as 20 
francs. 
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Nationales du Niger 1936). In the mid 1970s, the kyauta arme (wedding gift) 
had risen to 2,500 CFA francs in Dogondoutchi and despite the cap of 20,000 
CFA francs instituted by the government, bridewealth usually amounted to a 
considerable sum (Piault 1978: 422). Piault recalls that a young office clerk who 
could not count on his kin — all distantly located — for support was asked to 
pay 75,000 CFA francs as sadaki — an extravagant sum in those days, all the 
more so given that neither he nor his future in-laws could boast wealth or claim 
membership of a chiefly lineage (ibid). In the early 1980s, it was not unusual for 
families to pay a bridewealth of 60,000 or 70,000 CFA francs while the kyauta 
itself could reach 45,000 CFA francs. Today, the sadaki is officially set at 
120,000 CFA francs if the bride has never married and is technically a virgin 
(burdurwa). Childless women who have married once before command a sadaki 
of 50,000 CFA francs, while those who marry for the second time and have 
given birth should expect their future husbands to pay 30,000 CFA francs. At a 
time when unskilled labourers can rarely hope to make more than 30,000 CFA 
francs a month, earning the cash necessary to pay bridewealth for a budurwa can 
be quite challenging especially when Dogondoutchi mothers, mindless of the 
Islamist message, decide the marriage will not be ‘tied’ unless their financial 
expectations are met. 
 In addition to paying sadaki, the groom must provide a whole array of gifts 
for the bride’s family. In the past, these gifts were part of an elaborate and 
complex circuit of exchange which played a crucial role in solidifying the 
couple’s marriage – defined not so much in terms of husband-wife relations but 
in terms of the cross family linkages that emerged out of the wedding ceremony. 
Successful marriage transactions today still hinge primarily on the groom’s 
ability to secure the support and patronage of numerous kin and friends who 
through their gudummawa (assistance in the form of gifts) help meet the 
demands of the bride’s family, but the mobilization of these social networks has 
become harder to achieve. Junior men can no longer systematically call upon the 
assistance of their families to meet the multiple demands of their future in-laws. 
They are generally expected to leave their fathers’ compounds and to set up their 
own households when they marry. Thanks to generational divisions, increasing 
individuation and economic privatization, Mawri men are now free to choose 
their own brides but they are less able to depend on shared family resources for 
procuring the cash and goods they need to fulfil their numerous and onerous 
obligations (De Latour Dejean 1980). The ‘problem’ with marriage, as junior 
men see it, is therefore not simply that financial obligations have multiplied and 
grown more burdensome thereby slowing down the processes culminating in the 
‘tying’ ceremony. It also hinges on the erosion of the complex web of 
relationships — traditionally forged or strengthened through wedding gift 
contributions and counter-gifts — that enabled a marriage to occur in the first 
 Weddings, wealth and women’s value in Niger 231 
 
  
place. Amid dwindling economic opportunities, increasing land shortages and 
the loosening of social ties, Islamic campaigns against immorality and 
profligacy have found eager support amongst a minority of residents for whom 
the drastic reforms in the management of wealth provide a welcome solution to 
the exigencies of both modern life and membership in the Islamic community. 
 
 
Kayan Aiki: Female images of industriousness and fertility 
 
While men are struggling to meet their financial obligations at marriage, women 
scramble to assemble the kayan ‘daki (things for the room) with which their 
daughters will carefully decorate their new homes. They invest considerable 
time, labour and resources to acquire impressive arrays of household goods that 
will ensure the stable beginnings for a young couples marriage.10 In the not so 
distant past, a mother’s steady labour — spinning cotton or growing groundnuts 
— allowed her to acquire some of the gifts her daughter would one day proudly 
exhibit in her home. A significant portion of the goods was further obtained 
through the social networks she carefully nurtured by attending and contributing 
to other wedding and birth celebrations. Old women I interviewed recalled that 
once the marriage had been ‘tied’ and the wedding celebration was over, the 
bride would then leave her parent’s compound with her ‘things’. Piault (1986: 
427), in his account of marriage in Mawri society, similarly notes that when the 
young woman departed for the marital compound, she would take with her ‘all 
the necessary cooking utensils’ given to her by her mother. This is how Malka, a 
widow of about sixty, described to me the wedding gifts she received: 
 
When I married, 2,000 francs were paid for ku’din arme [bridewealth] and 1,500 
francs were paid for kyauta [gift]. Cloth was brought, there can’t there be a wedding 
without cloth, you see. Calabashes and cooking pots were brought as well as a talla 
[leather bags to draw water from the well]. How can you bring a bride to her 
husband without her kayan aiki [work things]? It is the mother of the bride who 
buys everything she [her daughter] needs. I did not get a bed but I brought a kujera 
                                                 
10.In her wonderfully rich and insightful analysis of wedding gifts in the neighbouring 
Hausa town of Maradi, Niger, Cooper (1997) points out that earlier accounts of 
marriage in Hausa society have generally described women’s investments in kayan 
‘daki as labour-intensive activities from which wives and mothers reap no appreciable 
benefits because they simply serve the very social system that constrains female 
opportunities in the first place. What both the Maradi and the Dogondoutchi cases 
demonstrate, however, is that women generate more than simply material value when 
they invest in, and display, material goods for the benefit of their newly married 
daughters.  
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mata [women’s low wooden stool]. I also brought a pestle and my husband brought 
the mortar. 
 
What is striking in Malka’s description of the gifts she received in the early 
1950s is the emphasis on ‘work things’. In contrast to the kayan ‘daki (things for 
the room) which brides receive today primarily to adorn their rooms, Malka 
stressed that a bride entered her marital home with not so much decorative but 
practical things, utensils she would use daily to perform the requisite household 
chores: pounding the grain, cooking millet flour, preparing sauces, drawing 
water at the well, etc. From this perspective, the little stool she mentions was not 
a piece of furniture designed ‘to look good’. Rather, it was a functional item, 
something women but never men sat on when they cooked or braided another 
woman’s hair — in short, not a decorative object visitors admired.  
‘Work things’ evoked images of industrious domesticity but, like the 
ubiquitous pestle and mortar, some of them had further symbolic resonances. 
Together they represented the fruitful unity of and complementarity between 
male and female principles, principles which provided the basis for local 
conceptions of the universe and its reproduction (Last 1979, Nicolas 1975). In 
Malka’s youth, Mawri brides brought the pestle while their new spouses 
provided the mortar (see also Piault 1963). While the vision of the pestle next to 
the mortar had potent sexual implications during the wedding, in the daily act of 
pounding, the woman thereafter symbolically re-enacted the fecund union of 
complementary elements (mortar=womb/pestle=penis) so crucial to the viability 
of marriages and the vitality of society because of what it produced 
(food=child). Nowadays, the mortar and the pestle are purchased together at the 
market, something which has only faintly weakened their association with sex 
and reproduction.11 Calabashes, too, evoke fertility and the life cycle. Grown, 
collected and carved by the women themselves, they were treated not only as 
utensils but also as objects of decoration which housewives proudly exhibited in 
carefully assembled rows. Because they visually resembled the ridges on a farm 
and the multiple rows of harvested grains — both images of agricultural 
                                                 
11 One need only hear the self-conscious laughter that erupts among women at the mere 
mention of ‘pestle and mortar’ to verify the sexual connotations that are still attached to 
these objects despite the changing protocol in the acquisition of wedding gifts. Before 
my very eyes, a young woman once threatened to hit her husband with her pestle in a 
moment of anger. Appalled by the boldness of her gesture, the husband retaliated by 
threatening to divorce her. The story of their altercation quickly spread via the 
grapevine causing shock and outrage. Yet, I believe that these intense reactions – 
including the husband’s – were caused as much by the violence of the young woman’s 
act as by the symbolic message it conveyed – inverting sexual roles as it were and 
turning her husband into the mortar in which she was planning to thrust her ‘phallic’ 
implement. 
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fecundity — the high columns of stacked calabashes ‘bespoke of future fertility 
and wealth earned through the work of creating and nurturing social ties’ 
(Cooper 1997: 95). At another level, calabashes summon up images of fecundity 
and reproduction through their common association with the womb. Unadorned 
calabashes often feature in ceremonies held to promote the fertility of afflicted 
individuals. Before twin sisters can marry, for instance, they must break a 
calabash in two to liberate the fertile potential that was locked in their 
problematic ‘oneness’. Only by thus breaking the womb of twinship can they be 
reborn as single and separate beings, each with her own womb (Masquelier 
2001a). As womb-like products of the land and through their various stages of 
growth and decay, they graphically reproduce critical stages of the human life 
cycle — in the present context, processes of production and reproduction. 
The colourful hand-woven cotton blankets women received during their 
weddings also evoked fertility and reproduction. Aside from the fact that they 
were — and still are — only displayed prominently on the walls of their rooms 
on the birth of a new child to celebrate a mother’s fertility, the very manufacture 
of these multicoloured sakala (blankets) metaphorically re-enacted the process 
through which the social fabric is woven. The basket and the spindle used in 
spinning cotton respectively symbolized the male and female genitals in their 
productive coupling (Darrah 1980: 125). In Mawri society, women used to spin 
while men wove — and dyed cotton threads (Masquelier 1996). Husbands 
provided women with the raw material for cotton spinning after which the 
thread would be sold or brought to a weaver and then a dyer before being worn. 
The cloth she wore thus concretely ‘tied’ a wife to her husband The rise of the 
market economy, which made imported cloth readily available during the 
colonial period, progressively led to the demise of local cotton production (see 
Cooper 1997) but the act of tying clothing still bears conjugal associations. The 
verb darme (to tie), which describes the action of putting one’s clothes on, is 
also used to refer to the process of contracting a marriage (darmen arme: to tie a 
marriage). This is why, as Malka put it, ‘there can’t be a wedding without cloth’. 
When the bride was sent to her new husband’s home with her kayan aiki, the 
display of these images of fertility and reproduction in the streets of 
Dogondoutchi further underscored the sexual symbolism of the wedding 
ceremony.  
 
 
Mothers’ work: Reconfiguring wealth and worth 
 
In their respective descriptions of the marriage ceremony in Mawri society, 
neither C. Piault not M. Piault mention the festive and colourful parades through 
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which brides publicly display their kayan ‘daki as they are themselves ushered 
to their new homes. This silence over what I found in the late 1980s to be such a 
conspicuous part of the wedding celebration suggests that prior to the late 1960s 
or 1970s, bringing the kayan ‘daki to the bride’s marital compound was not as 
elaborate a process as it has now become. While brides obviously derived a 
significant amount of prestige from the pots, bowls and calabashes, which 
promoted their productive and reproductive capacities and effectively launched 
them in the world of marriage and motherhood, the public act of bearing kaya 
(things) was unremarkable enough to escape the scrutiny of two anthropologists 
in the early 1960s. In contrast, contemporary public displays of kayan ‘daki are 
one of the most visually stunning dimensions of the marriage process and one 
through which women actively contribute to their self-actualization, as we shall 
see. Once the ‘tying’ ceremony and the semaine (three-day wedding celebrations 
sponsored by the groom’s friends) are over, the bride’s mother assembles in her 
compound all the kayan ‘daki she has acquired including the bed, mattress and 
other furnishings. After a close and drawn-out inspection process that allows 
everyone in the neighbourhood to admire and comment on the quality and 
quantity of the goods, female kin or friends each hoist a bundle of gifts on their 
heads and proceed in a loud and boisterous column towards the bride’s marital 
compound. Known as kan kaya (bearing or carrying the things), the joyful 
procession of ululating women bearing calabashes, cloth and cooking 
implements convey an image of ‘head-borne wealth’ that is essential to the 
prestige women earn as brides, as Cooper (1997: 94) has pointed out. 
Meanwhile, the bride hides under a heavy woven blanket and, together with a 
similarly veiled friend, reaches her husband’s house inconspicuously and away 
from the potentially deadly glare of jealous onlookers. Her own invisibility 
during the kan kaya paradoxically enhances the salience of her ‘things’ while 
these, in turn, promote her and her mother’s worth by providing a concrete 
measure of their productive abilities and their social network — a vast array of 
gifts implies both material wealth and a dense web of contributors even if 
women are increasingly unable to maintain the social ties that once secured 
access to wedding gift contributions. Once paraded along the streets all the way 
to their final destination, the goods belong to the bride and, as movable property, 
they are hers to keep should the union end in divorce.12 
                                                 
12 Women similarly pointed out to me that the goats and sheep tethered in their 
compounds were their exclusive property, and not that of their husbands. Husbands are 
not simply morally but also legally obliged to support their wives (and children). 
Because a man has such obligations, the income his wife may derive from her cash-
generating activities is considered hers. She can dispose of it in any way she wants (and 
buy goats, for instance), even if it means, in some cases, lending money to her own 
husband so that he may support her. 
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One of the reasons for the increasing prominence of the kan kaya is that the 
content and value of the gifts themselves have shifted in the last fifty years with 
the changing economic context, the weakening of social ties and the impact of 
mobility, migration and consumer goods. As imported goods flooded local 
markets and wealth became increasingly derived from access to cash rather than 
land, the calabashes women decorated were partially — but not entirely — 
replaced by enamelled metal pots of varying sizes and shapes, mass-produced 
carpets of Mecca or of kittens playing with their mothers outnumbered the 
multicoloured locally woven sakala (blankets), and wooden utensils gave way to 
metal spoons, porcelain teapots and Pyrex cups made in China. Brides are still 
sent to their new homes with peanut oil, grain, onions and salt — a reminder, 
perhaps, of the organic basis of traditional forms of wealth in a region still 
dominated by farming — but the prominent gifts a young woman receives today 
are neither handmade nor produced locally. Wealth and prestige are increasingly 
articulated in the language of money, modernity and cosmopolitanism. The 
fashionable outfits that migrant labourers bring back from Abidjan or Cotonou, 
the video cassette recorders with which pilgrims return from Mecca, and the 
shoes or watches which traders smuggle from Nigeria have firmly inserted rural 
Mawri in the global economy. The best and priciest wax cloth is referred to as 
‘Java’, a term that enhances the appeal of the fabric by designating it as 
‘foreign’. Similarly, the fact that the elaborate metal beds so prized by 
housewives in the 1980s and 1990s were known as gadon Kano (bed from 
Kano) is no coincidence, I suggest. Rather than evoking fertility, actualizing ties 
to the land or reflecting the skills of their makers as they once did, wedding gifts 
now display a different kind of value, one tied to the complex translocal circuits 
of migrancy, marketing and smuggling through which Mawri people acquire, 
exchange and consume mass-produced goods of all sorts. 
Because they can no longer count on the support of extensive social networks, 
farm groundnuts or spin cotton to generate the resources needed for their 
daughters’ kayan ‘daki, women have responded to this economic challenge by 
actively reforming the use to which the sadaki and other marriage payments are 
put. In the past, a large part of the money was re-distributed among the bride’s 
kin — in compensation for their contribution to the collection of kayan ‘daki — 
and the various individuals who assisted the two families through the various 
stages of the marriage transactions. Nowadays, the uban arme, the two women 
who wash the bride with henna and the siblings of the bride’s parents receive a 
small gift of money from the groom, but the bulk of the marriage payment 
automatically becomes the property of the bride’s mother who is in turn solely 
responsible for equipping her daughter with the latest indispensable commodity,  
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Calabashes filled with millet and covered with hand-woven blankets soon to be 
transported during the kan kaya, while the men haul the furniture and mattress. In the 
late 1980s, a metal bed was a new bride’s most prized possession. 
Photo: Adeline Masquelier 
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namely, a bed — made of pressed wood covered with Formica — with 
adjoining shelves and drawers for displaying nick-nacks or storing clothes. 
Aside from the mattress, the sheets, pillows and coverlet she must also purchase 
to set her daughter up, the bride’s mother is sometimes pressured by her 
daughter into buying a matching Formica armoire in which the young woman 
will store her ample collection of metal bowls, plastic containers and Pyrex 
dishes in neat vertical rows. A decade or so ago, it was the canopy metal bed 
‘from Kano’ with its innumerable mirrors and alarm clocks that was a ‘must’ for 
any self-respecting bride. So indispensable was it to the wedding that its absence 
could provoke the postponement of the ceremony, Fala (1988) notes. 
Like the bowls, blankets and calabashes that are conspicuously paraded 
through town to convey prosperity and confer value, the imposing bed acquired 
nowadays by the bride’s mother will be carried through the streets for all to see. 
When beds consisted of a simple wooden structure or could be divided into 
separate metal pieces, a maternal cousin of the bride was traditionally assigned 
to haul the bulky structure — or the metal headboard — to the bride’s new 
home. If the bed had been purchased by the father instead of the mother, a 
paternal cousin of the bride would carry it on his head. The sheet or hand-woven 
blanket he had used as buffer during the transport would be his to keep after the 
wedding. Today, women happily and noisily parade with head-borne calabashes 
overflowing with grains or bundles of enamel bowls tied in chequered cloth but 
the bed, due to its massive weight, arrives on a truck, and more rarely by donkey 
cart. Before returning home, each participants in the kan kaya will be rewarded 
by the groom with a tukuici (gift of appreciation to bearer of another gift) of 
1,000 or 1,500 CFA francs.  
Because it so visibly indexes a mother’s wealth as well as her capacity to 
produce that wealth, the kan kaya must dazzle onlookers with the sheer quantity 
of the items displayed. The more, the better. As Cooper (1997: 95) notes, 
profusion and repetition, not the originality of each piece, are key because they 
create an image of arziki, or prosperity (see also Smith 1955). Failure to express 
satisfactorily one’s (and one’s daughter’s) worth is worse than no kayan ‘daki at 
all because it lodges itself permanently in the social memory to ‘mark’ a 
woman’s reputation. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a mothers who has little 
or no savings and limited means of raising funds at the time of her daughter’s 
wedding to postpone the kan kaya altogether for two or three years until she can 
adequately impress the community with a belated, but nonetheless, sufficient 
display of wealth, and by extension, self-worth.  
So crucial is the ceremony that publicly demonstrates a mother’s productivity 
and value that when a father negotiates a ‘marriage of alms’ (armen sadaka) for 
his daughter to demonstrate piety and reap divine reward, it is generally 
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understood in Dogondoutchi that he must reimburse his own wife for the ‘loss’ 
of sadaki. Women, I was told, do not generally oppose their husbands’ plans to 
give their daughters ‘for nothing’ provided that they receive from their husbands 
the 120,000 CFA francs or more they need for the bride’s bed and mattress. In 
addition, a father should give his wife the kyauta arme of 40,000 or 50,000 CFA 
francs so that, as one woman explained, ‘she can start the work of acquiring 
bowls for her daughter’. Piety, in a woman’s view, is a good thing to have and to 
display because it might ensure one’s entry into paradise. But even lada (divine 
reward), it appears, should not come at the expense of one’s earthly honour. For 
the majority of local women who cannot count on a salaried kin or a profitable 
business to provide easy access to cash, the sadaki that they now receive in its 
quasi entirety when a daughter marries has become an inalienable right that they 
are unwilling to sacrifice even for the assurance of eternal salvation. For some, 
this inalienability further translates as a right to dispose of the money for 
whatever use they see fit. As a mother of eight bluntly put it: ‘you know, the 
wife of that prophet Boubacar (sic) who returned the sadaki to her husband, she 
was a fool. Me, I would have kept the money and started a trading business.’ In 
this mother’s eyes, bridewealth, once it was paid, became a woman’s property 
no matter what the circumstances, even in extreme cases when it did not 
ultimately serve to purchase things for the room. 
 
 
A bed for Hadiza  
 
I started this essay by noting that Mawri women’s struggles to be valued have 
been played out in the controversial arena of marriage where their understanding 
of wealth, prestige and social capital now often clashes with more conservative 
ideologies of gender, family and society. I now turn to a conversation that took 
place between a young migrant and a senior woman to illustrate the extent to 
which women are provisionally carving out their own spaces for self-
determination in a society that militates increasingly against them despite the 
recent liberalization of national politics and the concomitant proliferation of 
religious discourses.13 ‘So, where is the bridewealth you are going to bring so I 
can buy Hadiza the fine bed she wants for her wedding?’ Bebe asked Boubacar 
in a provocative tone. Tired of finding my assistant Boubacar hanging around 
                                                 
13 The décrispation (liberalization) promoted by former Nigerien president Ali Shaibou 
in the late 1980s to facilitate the country’s transition to a civilian regime ushered in an 
era of unprecedented public debate and also fostered the emergence of new forms of 
social protests. Nigeriens throughout the country started organizing in specific groups to 
express and defend their own interests. It was during this period of democratization that 
the Izala association emerged in broad daylight. 
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her daughter, a long-time friend Bebe was demanding that he start seriously 
thinking about sadaki. It was April 2000, everyone in town was hoping that the 
coming rainy season would offset the catastrophic losses of the previous year 
and Boubacar, who had just returned to Dogondoutchi after a three-year 
absence, had recently learned that his wife had divorced him because he had sent 
her no money from abroad. He was now courting Bebe’s oldest daughter 
Hadiza, hoping that she would consider marrying him. Hadiza had recently 
divorced her own husband because he could not provide for her and their young 
daughter.14 
 
‘Women, that’s all you think about, things you can show off to your friends,’ 
Boubacar responded warily. 
‘But you know Hadiza will not consider you otherwise. She already has a suitor, a 
rich commerçant, who brings her gifts every Friday [market day in 
Dogondoutchi],’ Bebe teased. 
‘Even if she got a bed worth one million CFA francs, would it ensure that she is 
happy with her husband and that the marriage will last?’ an exasperated 
Boubacar retorted. 
‘No, of course not,’ Bebe said. 
‘Well, there,’ Boubacar countered. ‘So why always think about the bed? There are 
more important things in a marriage.’ 
‘Yes,’ Bebe responded. ‘But Boubacar, listen! What is going to happen if your wife 
comes to your house with a karaga [traditional wooden bed]? Aren’t all her 
friends going to make fun of her and you? You, yourself, will feel shame for your 
wife.’ 
‘Of course,’ Boubacar reluctantly agreed. ‘I wouldn’t let her come home with a 
wooden bed. But there’s a difference between a gadon kara [bed made of millet 
stalk] and a 100,000 CFA franc bed! One must be reasonable and not live above 
one’s means.’ 
 
Burdened by the need to take care of her daughter as any respectable mother 
would, Bebe refused to entertain Boubacar’s plea for moderation on the matter 
of wedding expenses. Despite the serious financial difficulties she had faced 
ever since her husband had gone ‘mad’ and been unable to earn a regular income 
in the early 1990s, she felt that her honour and prestige were at stake if she did 
                                                 
14. In addition to providing food and shelter for his wife and children, a husband should 
buy them new clothes (see Masquelier 1996). Bebe angrily pointed out to me that 
Hadiza’s husband had not bought his wife even one complet (a custom-made blouse, 
ankle-length wrapper and shawl/veil of matching fabric) during their short marriage. 
Even worse, Hadiza occasionally came to her mother for food because her husband’s 
family would not feed her. 
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not send her daughter off with an impressive array of kayan ‘daki if and when 
the young woman eventually settled on a suitor. 
Bebe’s attitude towards wedding gifts illustrates a widespread female 
concern with changing definitions of marriage, sexuality and respectability. On 
several occasions, my friend had confided in me her worries about her 
daughters’ dissipated lifestyles and her frustrations at not being able to curtail 
their freedom. She was anxious to marry them off but she also knew that times 
had changed and that modern girls now freely hung out with their boyfriends 
before settling into married life. Yet, like other Nigerien mothers forced to 
acknowledge the rise of premarital sexual encounters and the concomitant 
proliferation of unwed mothers, Bebe lent a deaf ear to the exhortations of Izala 
preachers who aggressively promoted the virtues of low bridewealth, thereby 
hoping to increase the marriageability of young women in this era of economic 
uncertainty and growing public anxiety about ‘wayward’ youths. While she 
grappled with the sexuality of her unwed daughters and concurred with her 
peers that illegitimate pregnancies brought nothing but shame upon families, she 
was not ready to concede that doing away with high bridewealth and 
ostentatious kan kaya would solve the ‘problem’ of marriage and help young 
girls achieve matrimonial respectability. It was precisely the transfer of sadaki 
and the performance of kan kaya that created value, something that, in Bebe’s 
view, was essential to the production of a vital kind of female respectability. 
Boubacar, on the other hand, felt that Bebe was simply too interested in 
Hadiza’s material comfort and that her obsession with beds and other pricey 
items blinded her to far more important issues, such as the fragility of the 
marital bond. Several years before, he had experienced first-hand the greed of 
his in-laws when, after paying the sadaki, sponsoring the semaine (three-day 
wedding celebrations) and giving his new wife an impressive valise (a 
supplemental gift consisting of several three-piece wrappers, pairs of shoes, 
soap, perfume and jewellery) to demonstrate his generous intentions, they had 
insisted he provide further gifts of cash to several individuals not traditionally 
designated as recipients of the groom’s largesse. Yet despite all his efforts — at 
least initially — to satisfy his affines’ expectations and to provide generously 
for his wife, he was now wifeless. Though he wanted to remarry and was 
attracted to Hadiza, he had no intention of handing over to his future mother-in-
law the equivalent of several months’ wages so that she could buy a bed too 
bulky to fit in what would become in all probability his new wife’s quarters in 
the family compound. In the end, and while everyone still speculated as to 
whether or not she would marry the young Izala trader who brought her such 
extravagant gifts every week, Hadiza married a bush taxi driver. Bebe, in a letter 
to me, recounted a couple of months after my departure how disappointed she 
had been with her daughter’s choice of husband. She had approved of the Izala 
 Weddings, wealth and women’s value in Niger 241 
 
  
merchant because he was kind and patient, worked hard, and had honourable 
intentions despite the fact that he already had a wife. He was an active member 
of the Izala association but displayed none of its devotees’ proverbial 
parsimony: he regularly brought gifts to all of Bebe’s children and had showered 
Hadiza with expensive clothes and jewellery for nine months in an effort to win 
her heart. 
After Hadiza announced her imminent wedding, Bebe worked feverishly to 
earn the money she would need to purchase wedding gifts. For almost a year she 
had already participated in an adashi (a rotating credit association) to save 
enough cash to be able to buy a mattress for Hadiza. In addition to the money I 
had given her as compensation for her invaluable help during my field study, 
she was slowly earning money through petty trade but as a secluded wife, she 
relied upon her younger daughters to buy at rural markets the condiments and 
vegetables which would be later resold at a profit in Dogondoutchi. Despite her 
multiple income-generating strategies, she could not save money fast enough. 
With her husband out of work and the family field in the hands of unscrupulous 
brothers-in-law, her regular resources were already stretched to the limit. On 
good days, Bebe earned enough cash braiding women’s hair — or having her 
daughters hawk food door to door — to buy a new ladle or a pair of flip-flops 
for one of her eight children, while on other days, she had to scrimp to feed her 
large family. Only weeks before, some of her hard-earned cash had gone to fix 
the family’s crumbling thatched house, which threatened to fall apart even 
further with the coming rains. Despite these obstacles, Hadiza eventually left her 
parents’ home with the assortment of bowls, the new Formica bed and the 
mattress her mother had managed to purchase. In her frenzied search for money 
(neman ku’di), Bebe tapped into all her cash reserves and exhausted every 
available resource: Hadiza even took the family’s only pair of sheets, those I had 
given her mother as a parting gift. Bebe’s honour was safe. 
 
 
The bed of marriage and the mother-daughter bond 
 
Originally, mother and daughter had disagreed as to what kind of bed would be 
purchased: Bebe felt that 50,000 CFA francs would buy a very nice bed but 
Hadiza had set her sights on a bed twice as expensive. Despite their differences, 
both knew long before Hadiza had chosen a husband that the young woman 
would eventually own a fine looking gado (bed) designed to elicit the 
admiration of her female visitors. Bebe, like many of her peers, was determined 
to not let her own poverty limit the reputation she was carving out for herself as 
mother of, and provider for, the bride. I want to ponder briefly on senior 
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women’s preoccupations with kan kaya for what they tell us about Mawri 
mothers’ attempts to define themselves as creators and providers of value. 
Women’s worth, as I have already noted, is inscribed publicly through the 
performance of kan kaya which testifies to their capacity to assemble and 
display wealth (see also Cooper 1997). By amassing things that their daughters 
will then store in their own ‘room’, women forge intergenerational female bonds 
and compensate for their transience in a society where marriage is virilocal. 
Moreover, the wealth a young wife stores in her room in the form of beds and 
bowls may one day be used to acquire the things for the room her own daughter 
will expect to bring to her marital home. In this respect, and despite changing 
tastes and fashions, kayan ‘daki may literally and figuratively tie generations 
together. When members of the Izala association started forbidding high 
bridewealth and the ostentatious consumption and display of kayan ‘daki, they 
effectively prevented women from symbolically stating the wealth of brides and 
the productive capacities of senior women — thereby negating the latter’s social 
contributions and revoking their status as providers. 
By regularly ‘banning’, or at least discouraging traditional forms of kan kaya, 
‘yan Izala are also disrupting the mother-daughter bond that women work so 
assiduously to create through gift giving. The kan kaya loudly and colourfully 
concretises the lasting connection between a mother and her daughter through 
the physical link the long parade of head-borne kaya (things) creates between 
the two compounds. In delineating through a graphic trail of moving things both 
the departure of the transient daughter and her attachment to her mother, the kan 
kaya weaves together two places and two people through what De Certeau 
(1984: 99) calls a form of ‘pedestrian enunciation’. When they complain that 
Izala marriage reforms are foolish and absurd, women who decry the ban on 
costly weddings are also indirectly lamenting the erasure of the mother-daughter 
connection so vividly inscribed through the ‘rhetoric of walking’ (ibid: 100) of 
the kan kaya.15 ‘Yan Izala are notorious for rushing things and insisting that the 
bride be brought to the groom’s home five days after the ‘tying’ ceremony. Such 
a short interval leaves little time for the bride’s mother to acquire the kayan 
‘daki once the bridewealth has been paid. ‘What kind of work can a mother do 
in five days?’ Maimouna, a savvy trader and mother of six, once asked 
rhetorically to underscore the lengthy and painstaking labour of women who, I 
was often told, traditionally started ‘working’ for their daughters long before the 
                                                 
15 Furthermore, Izala restrictions on sadaki and gift exchange have potent implications 
for not simply the creation but also the circulation of women’s wealth if we consider 
how a mother’s own material property may ultimately be used to finance her daughter’s 
kayan ‘daki. Though it is at this point too soon to tell, it may well be that women are 
also bemoaning changing patterns of inheritance which, under Izala influence, have 
become more male-centred. 
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latter reached the age of marriage. Aside from cheating her of the wealth and the 
time she requires to fulfil her responsibilities as provider properly, Izala 
marriage practices also render the bride’s mother literally invisible: in Izala 
households, the kan kaya occurs at night so that no one can watch and assess 
how much the bride has received. Ostentation, here, becomes irrelevant because 
one’s worth is expressed through frugality and piety rather than through images 
of arziki. It is precisely such invisibility that women are resisting when, in total 
defiance of Izala rules, they loudly parade through the streets of Dogondoutchi 
at midday with kayan ‘daki on their heads. 
 
 
Of beds and other modern things: Making value and marking 
difference 
 
To my question about what wedding gifts a young girl had received upon 
marrying an Izala devotee, my neighbour Rakiya answered succinctly, ‘What 
can you buy with 30,000 CFA francs? Not even a good mattress.’ Rakiya’s 
response, like other complaints I heard about ‘unaffordable’ wedding gifts, must 
be understood in terms of both the material and symbolic losses that senior 
women experience when they can no longer be publicly honoured for their 
wealth-producing capacities. It is as much the absence of social capital as the 
lack of material wealth that women decry when they criticize the stinginess of 
‘yan Izala and complain about the transformations affecting marriage. While 
many of them agree implicitly with reformist Muslims that an early marriage is 
the most effective prevention against the shame of single motherhood, they 
nonetheless actively resist Izala’s calls to facilitate weddings by doing away 
with needless and burdensome expenditure. Besides openly manifesting their 
disapproval by simply declining low bridewealth offers, women further resist 
their gradual exclusion from the local economy by feverishly working to equip 
their daughters with kayan ‘daki whose value resides not in their practical utility 
or in their evocations of fertility — as they once did — so much as in their 
association with national and transnational circuits of wealth and information.  
When wealth in things is held as the last bastion against the marginalizing 
impact of an increasingly male-centred economy, ensuring one’s daughter’s 
well-being now means acquiring household furnishings whose comfort and 
characteristics owe more to Western ideas of bourgeois lifestyle than to an 
Islamist vision of frugal domesticity.16 Aside from the fact that beds and 
                                                 
16 If I have drawn a sharp distinction between Western bourgeois ideology and reformist 
Muslim notions of restraint and asceticism, I do not want to imply that all Izala devotees 
live austere lives away from the temptations of consumer culture. Local members of the 
244 Masquelier 
armoires remain items of prestige in households where, up until a few decades 
ago, mats — and women’s stools — provided the essential furnishings, their 
value further resides in their exchangeability: during hard times, a woman may 
opt to sell some of her furnishings to obtain the cash necessary for vital goods 
such as food or medicine (see Schildkrout 1982). As shameful as it might be, 
selling one’s kayan ‘daki is sometimes the only option for women whose access 
to scarce resources is becoming increasingly challenged by the worsening of the 
Nigerien economy and the normalization of reformist Islam. Bebe herself was 
forced sell her bed when her husband fell sick and lost his job at the car park. 
Her insistence that Hadiza be provided with a costly bed before settling into a 
new marriage must perhaps be seen against the backdrop of her own history of 
poverty and deprivation. From this perspective, Hadiza’s 50,000 CFA franc bed 
was not simply a form of insurance against hard times but also served to 
actualize Bebe’s personal victory against adversity: she had lost her bed in a 
desperate struggle for economic survival but she could now buy it back, so to 
speak, and use her daughter’s kan kaya to ensure there would be multiple 
witnesses to her triumphant display of arziki (prosperity). Hadiza’s marriage 
thus afforded her a unique opportunity to transcend the crippling limitations of 
poverty and dependency: through it, she could simultaneously recreate herself in 
the image of a young wealthy bride (her daughter) and polish her image as an 
industrious and resourceful mother who could afford to marry off her daughter 
in lavish style. 
In demonstrating how Mawri women have fought Islam and the state’s 
efforts ‘to “moralize” the matrimonial economy’ (De Latour 1992: 71), I have so 
far focused on senior women’s roles, activities and preoccupations. Even if they 
contemplate marriage and dream of prosperous homes have their own concerns 
and aspirations that do not always accord with those of their elders. I want to 
consider briefly the frustrations and ambitions of this group of women to tease 
out another dimension of the complex value-making process associated with the 
consumption of Formica beds. During my last visit to Dogondoutchi in 2000, 
the perceived shortage of not-yet-married, educated civil servants was a routine 
subject of conversation among schoolgirls and young school leavers eager to 
escape the rusticity of their mother’s lifestyle and embrace bourgeois values. 
Mindful that many of them ‘offered’ themselves to professional men in the hope 
of securing marriage,17 Muslim preachers regularly admonished parents to keep 
                                                                                                                       
Izala association include very wealthy merchants who live in two-storey houses (the 
ultimate expression of wealth in Dogondoutchi), own cars and provide their wives with 
luxurious beds, armoires, televisions and refrigerators. 
17 A similar situation has been described for Nigerian elite women by Bastian (2002: 3), 
who points out that though educated young women aspire to marriage, they often ‘find 
themselves wrestling with the multiple failures of nationalist political and Western-
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their daughters ‘at home’, while they advised junior women to lower their 
matrimonial expectations and marry hardworking and honourable farmers. 
While very few junior women wedded educated men whose salary allowed them 
to fully indulge in the comforts of bourgeois domesticity, owning a modern bed 
covered with Formica (rather than the metal canopy bed so popular only a 
decade ago) was on the minds of many future brides. Aside from the fact that 
they come with their own display shelves, these new beds are coveted precisely 
because they differ so starkly from the metal beds women brought to their 
marital homes a generation ago. By insisting on Formica beds, junior women are 
demarcating themselves from their mothers and creating the generational 
differences that enable them to carve their own spaces for definition and agency 
as they settle into matrimony. In contemporary Mawri society, wedding beds are 
not simply emblematic of consumer culture and bourgeois values. Through their 
imposing presence, first, in the kan kaya and then, in the marital home, they 
become objects of female pride and central repositories of value, simultaneously 
enabling senior women to forge enduring bonds with their married daughters 
and allowing brides to create their own generational distinctions. 
 
 
Aesthetics and interiority 
 
In his work on modernity and mass consumption in Trinidad, Miller (1994) 
describes how the hanging out of curtains, the trimming of cakes and other 
decorative tasks associated with Christmas celebrations reassert the physical 
interiority of the home for family members in a manner which changes their 
relationship to it. In this festive reawakening and celebration of domesticity, he 
suggests that ‘the physical environment is inseparable from the social values to 
which it is host’ (ibid: 89). Whether Trinidadians decorate their windows or 
their cakes, what is significant to these various aesthetic tasks, Miller argues, is 
that they highlight the centrality of the notion of enclosure. Celebrating 
Christmas, in this context, becomes a means of focusing on what is ‘inside’ from 
an aesthetic and social as well as spatial perspective. Creating or reasserting 
interiority through a focus on physical enclosure is an equally important concern 
among Mawri women, I would argue, and it is precisely in the context of birth 
and wedding celebrations that such a concern can be appreciated. Just as the 
Trinidadian family ‘strives towards a sense of quiet solidity’ (ibid: 101) once 
new or newly cleaned curtains have been hung days before Christmas, so new  
 
                                                                                                                       
based economic ideologies’ in a society whose marital and sexual practices remain 
essentially patriarchal. 
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Women nowadays proudly display decorative items on the shelves that come with their 
Formica beds. 
Photo: Adeline Masquelier  
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naming ceremony of their newborns. By hanging hand-woven, colourful 
wedding blankets on each and every wall of the room in such a manner that even 
the doors and windows are covered, they create a warm, dark and comfortable 
environment in which their child can be ‘re-born’ as a named, and therefore 
fully human, individual — a true person. Hospital births — whereby children do 
not come into the world in their mother’s natal compound as was traditionally 
the case but in an impersonal white-walled and brightly lit ‘public’ space (from 
which they depart a few days later to return to the family compound) — have 
altered the significance of these aesthetic preparations. Despite such 
modifications in the extended ‘birth’ process, however, ‘interiorization’ (ibid: 
217) remains a central concern for mothers who welcome both their new child 
and their kin and friends into their homes on the day of the biki (birth 
celebration). By literally re-building the boundaries of her room with heavy 
blankets that prevent dust, breeze and even light from entering, the new mother 
constructs an ‘ideal of intensive sociality’ (Miller 1994: 216) as well as a space 
of rootedness in which all — including the newborn — can ‘belong’. 
If naming ceremonies provide a compelling example of enclosing practice, 
they are hardly exceptional, I would point out. Taking my cues from Miller once 
again, I want to suggest that the labour-intensive and now increasingly 
controversial task of ‘filling up’ a home with beds, carpets and armoires must be 
similarly seen as part of the ‘centripetal aesthetic’ (ibid: 144) through which 
women in Dogondoutchi anchor their sense of family and morality. By working, 
at times feverishly, to equip their daughters with cumbersome pieces of 
furniture, some of which barely fit into the small spaces they are destined to 
embellish, mothers are effectively reasserting the dichotomy between ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’. Once the bride’s room is furnished, it becomes a potent 
expression of beauty and prosperity, not simply because of the sheer quantity of 
kayan daki, but also because by literally filling up the place (until there is hardly 
a patch of uncovered wall or space to walk around), the conspicuous wedding 
gifts (and the surrounding space) reaffirm the sense of interiority that is so 
central to women’s moral and sexual identities. Because their bodies are 
perceived as containers, women must strive to preserve their personal integrity 
and prevent external forces from contaminating them despite their inherent 
openness (see Masquelier 2001b). Accumulating stuff in one’s marital room is 
thus a step in the process of progressive incorporation through which, as Miller 
puts it in the Trinidadian context, ‘the domestic becomes not merely an enclosed 
space but a kind of centripetal force striving to incorporate as much of the 
outside world as possible into itself’ (ibid: 101). Far from being antithetical to 
the moral values preached by conservative Islam and enforced through such 
practices as veiling and seclusion, kan kaya and the congested rooms it produces 
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appear to reinforce the notion of enclosure so vital to female productivity and 
respectability, thereby becoming the very means through which such qualities 
are displayed and objectified aesthetically. Let me also add that while the beds 
that teenage girls and prospective brides yearn for may be coming from Kano or 
from an equally distant place, in the end, they are more than mere symbols of 
the modern and the foreign. Through their incorporation into the cramped rooms 
they adorn, they not only bring in the outside world but also become 
transformed by the context. By saturating the inside space with their solidity and 
beauty after having been prominently displayed through town, they enable the 
kind of enclosing and incorporative aesthetic that ultimately reaffirms local 
ideals of female domesticity. From this perspective, kan kaya is hardly a morally 
reprehensible practice that requires banning. On the contrary, it acts to visibly 
insert and root new brides into the very space from which they will derive their 
social place and identity as wives, mothers and mistresses of their homes. 
 
 
Conclusion: Marriage, identity and agency in Dogondoutchi  
 
Even if Islam, in its multiple and antagonistic expressions, increasingly focuses 
on women as the instruments of its reforms, Muslim women in Dogondoutchi 
are not powerless pawns in the ideological battles through which Sufi and anti-
Sufi factions advance competing visions of gender, domesticity and social 
control. Rather, and despite the erosion of certain income-generating strategies 
through which wives traditionally secured autonomy and heightened their 
visibility, women for the most part now appear to be gaining greater control 
over the terms of marriage and the sources of prestige derived from conspicuous 
wedding ceremonies. Of late, their efforts to resist marginalization in an 
increasingly male-centred economy have taken on a more aggressive form since 
many of them started to openly denounce marriage reforms that threatened to 
undermine their own networks of wealth and value. Hence, when they criticize 
the stinginess of Izala grooms, insist on the defective quality of wedding gifts in 
some households,18 or, in direct contradiction with reformist norms, stage ever 
                                                 
18 As I was talking with a friend about wedding gifts, her sister interjected that an Izala 
bride had received a very small metal bed purchased by the groom, one that, she 
stressed, no mother would ever buy for her daughter today. My friend, who because she 
knew the young woman’s mother, had had a chance to inspect the wedding gifts, further 
pointed out that the matelas (mattress) was of such poor quality that it would probably 
get ruined very fast. More than a reproach of the mother’s inability to generate wealth 
for her daughter, the two women’s critical evaluation of the bed and mattress this bride 
had received was an indirect condemnation of the marriage reforms that forced local 
women to undermine their own and their daughter’s access to wealth and status.  
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more impressive kan kaya, mothers (and daughters) are striving to preserve, or 
even enhance, their control over material wealth and, through it, their capacity to 
generate social capital, affective bonds, self-identity, as well as the sense of 
enclosure so vital to their well-being and productivity. More generally, women’s 
active engagement with the redefinition of marriage as a traditional female-
centred process highlights the complex ways in which globalization and 
belonging work to simultaneously encompass and reject imported forms as they 
transform them. Put another way, women’s engagement and the transformations 
it produces provide a striking example of how, far from simply leading to an 
erasure of local traditions or a seamless blending of different pre-existing 
cultural traditions, globalization is directly implicated in the ‘production of 
locality’ (Appadurai 1996: 178) through the promotion of new boundaries and 
the ‘parochialization’ of traditions. 
 When Malam Awal, the self-declared Shehu who settled in Dogondoutchi in 
1997, presented himself as a Sufi liberator who could put an end to both the 
corrupt exactions of orthodox Muslim elites and the egalitarian excesses of Izala 
leaders, local residents flocked to attend his sermons. Predictably, sadaki was 
one of the contentious issues the charismatic leader initially raised in his 
campaign against greed and immorality. Arguing that few girls would marry if 
their parents kept on requiring bridewealth payments nobody could afford, 
Malam Awal soon convinced many that a small sadaki payment was better than 
none at all. In a matter of months, the Sufi preacher allegedly facilitated the 
marriage of some three hundred young women by negotiating for each a 
bridewealth payment of 30,000 CFA francs. At first, Malam Awal’s 
‘progressive’ policies appeared to have broken new ground, for instance, by 
convincing senior women that they could require the groom to pay for the bed 
and mattress or that the kayan ‘daki could always be brought later. By mid 2000 
however, it had become abundantly clear that women’s initial enthusiasm for his 
campaign for purity and piety was fading as they came to terms with the social 
implications of these marriage reforms. Women, who had originally not dared to 
speak up against their husbands, were now finding the courage to resist Malam 
Awal’s marriage initiatives and defend their own interests. I was told that some 
junior women had allegedly threatened to spoil their own wedding ceremonies 
by refusing to enter their new marital compound if they only received a karaga, 
the traditional wooden bed their grandmothers had and which Izala preachers 
were promoting as an alternative to the pricier Formica models. If marriage in 
Hausaphone communities ‘has served as a central institutional and discursive 
locus for the mediation of change’ as Cooper (1997: xlviii) rightfully notes, it 
has also provided a fertile terrain for women’s self-actualization as modern 
brides and respectable mothers. 
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In considering the growing popularity of Formica beds among Mawri brides, 
I have shown that we must re-evaluate the conventional assumption made by 
both anthropologists and reformist leaders that, when women buy wedding gifts 
for their daughters, they tend to channel their resources into unproductive and 
impractical investments.19 Far from being burdensome or useless property, the 
beds that future brides admire in their friends’ homes before eventually 
acquiring their own have become vital means of creating wealth, social and 
moral value and generational difference for women whose social aspirations are 
being increasingly thwarted by the combined effects of economic collapse and 
religious intolerance. Whether they are poor or rich, pious or indifferent 
Muslims, loud or shy critics of marriage reforms, Dogondoutchi women have 
actively contributed to the means and terms through which they are valued as 
wives and mothers. In this respect, reformist Islam has both successfully limited 
women’s powers of autonomy and self-expression and exacerbated their 
discontent with these limitations. Through what Butler (1997) calls the paradox 
of subjectivation, the very structures Izala established for securing women’s 
subordination have become the means through which women can regain control 
over their own lives. By attempting to regain control over the terms of their 
lives, women are also actively shaping what it means to be both modern and 
grounded in the secure interiority of their domestic world.  
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The social life of secrets 
 
Ferdinand de Jong 
 
 
By looking at initiation rituals it is possible to arrive at a better 
understanding of secrets in a given society in a globalizing 
world. This chapter, however, suggests that the secret emerges 
in a performance in which initiates and non-initiates are 
complicit. Secrecy produces a shared subjectivity between 
initiate and non-initiate. Such complicity is often denied in 
ethnographic texts that claim authority for a subject penetrating 
the secret of the Other. This chapter holds that these 
ethnographic poetics make a distinction between subject and 
object, which, in the case of secrecy, seems untenable. To 
acknowledge this implies recognition of the co-ownership of 
secrets. The secrets performed in a globalizing world can no 
longer be localized properties. As ethnographic cases in the 
chapter demonstrate, secrecy creates a translocal 
intersubjectivity that requires recognition in ethnographic texts. 
 
‘The Field’, seen as a place of writing, leaks. (Clifford 1990: 64) 
 
 
A widespread paradigm holds that secrets represent the core of culture. 
Moreover, many ethnographic texts assert that secrets are the inalienable 
property of those who hold them. In my experience in south Senegal, this 
impression was largely confirmed. Those who hold secrets consider them 
essential to the definition of their self-definition. Secrets are ‘owned’ by those 
who hold them. The ethics of anthropology therefore require that 
anthropologists do not expose the secrets they have traced in their research, as 
they are the property of the researched. Secrets appear in the ethnographic text 
as signs of alterity. 
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After a long period of intense interest in issues of ethnographic writing, the 
question of how authority is established in ethnographic texts remains acute 
(Clifford & Marcus 1986, Clifford 1988, Geertz 1988, James et al. 1997). We 
need to re-examine every aspect of the way in which we make representations. 
Here, I examine how secrecy structures the production of knowledge. I argue 
that the metaphor of secrecy contributes to the making of both ethnographic 
subject and object. This chapter deals with the politics and poetics of secrecy. 
Rather than assuming that a focus on the poetics of ethnography leads us away 
from its politics (Said 1989), it works on the assumption that poetics and 
politics are intricately intertwined. Concealment and revelation are part and 
parcel of the fieldwork experience. Secrecy often produces ambiguity (Piot 
1993) but in spite of this, secrets are often represented in unambiguous terms in 
ethnographic texts. The metaphor of revelation is frequently used in 
anthropological rhetoric and, in ethnographic texts, fieldwork often appears as 
the gradual penetration of hitherto hidden knowledge (Clifford 1988, Gable 
1997). Anthropology reveals the innermost cultural essence of the ‘Other’. The 
rhetoric of secrecy reinforces the notion that culture is located in secrets and 
that cultural knowledge can only be obtained by a penetrating subject. 
Secrecy as a metaphor in the construction of ethnographic authority 
contributes to our paradigmatic assumption that cultures are bounded. The 
metaphor of secrecy creates cores of culture that are set apart and require 
revelation through ethnography. The trope of secrecy in anthropological texts 
posits boundaries and should be exposed as instrumental in the production of 
boundaries. That alterity should be spatially distributed is problematic, and it 
becomes even more problematic in the age of globalization. If we can no longer 
think of culture as territorialized (Gupta & Ferguson 1992, Malkki 1995), then 
we need to acknowledge that the anthropological ‘field’, in Africa or elsewhere, 
can no longer be spatially defined. It is no longer productive to posit 
impermeable cultural boundaries. This is a serious challenge to anthropology, as 
the discipline has always relied on the spatialization of cultural difference. Here, 
I hope to demonstrate that secrecy engages anthropological subject and object, 
rendering this categorical distinction problematic. I demonstrate that secrecy is, 
in fact, an intersubjective performance enmeshed in historically contingent 
power relations. 
 
 
Secrets as boundaries 
 
It is not hard to establish that secrecy serves to establish boundaries (Barth 1969). 
In the most general sense, a secret establishes a boundary between those ‘in the 
know’ and those excluded from the secret knowledge. When conducting fieldwork 
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in south Senegal I noticed that secrecy worked in precisely that way. To what 
effect secrecy is used, however, depends very much on the context. For instance, it 
can be argued that Jola male initiation primarily serves to demarcate a realm of 
male ritual activity from which women should be excluded. Such a realm allows 
the construction of a particular masculinity based on ritual separation and 
instruction into male esoteric lore. Male initiation, arguably, not only structures the 
male population into a hierarchy of age-sets, it also differentiates the entire 
population into separate genders (De Jong 2001a). 
 The male initiates are instructed into the secret knowledge transmitted in the 
ritual process. While they become fully entitled to this knowledge by virtue of 
their initiation, women are deliberately excluded from it, never expecting to be 
initiated into male secret lore, just like men would never expect to be initiated into 
the female secret lore as transmitted through female initiation rites. In other words, 
the performance of secrecy should not be understood as a power struggle between 
those who know and those who want to know. The excluded are expected to play 
the role of the excluded and they usually do so. In that sense, secrecy is a 
performance that requires the cooperation of the members of the excluded sex. 
Secrecy includes those who are de facto excluded. When those who are excluded 
do not object to their exclusion, they become complicit in the performance of 
secrecy that excludes them. The construction of boundaries through secrecy is not 
a simple matter but a highly complex form of interaction in which the excluded are 
fully aware of their necessary presence. 
In the light of this, it is not surprising that the actual secret lore is often known 
to the excluded. As mothers, wives or girlfriends, women do access parts of the 
secret lore from which they are actively excluded in ritual contexts. Even outsiders 
can sometimes access the secret lore denied to them in other contexts. The 
boundary of the secret can be permeable. While doing fieldwork in Casamance, it 
took a while before I realized that secrecy was pervasive in this region and that it 
was mostly performed in connection with the secrets of initiation. The Kankurang 
masquerade, for instance, is predominantly performed in contexts of initiation (De 
Jong 2000, 2001b). Such initiations are regularly performed in Ziguinchor, the 
regional capital, and blacksmiths have a particular responsibility in these 
ceremonies. I went to see one blacksmith who had been organizing a number of 
these events and who, besides having such heavy ritual responsibilities, was a 
gardener at a local lycée. He kindly consented to talk about circumcision, initiation 
and masquerading, and we had various conversations at his home and in the school 
playground. During one of our meetings he told me the myth of origin of 
circumcision and Kankurang. He solemnly concluded his story by saying: ‘This is 
the story I tell the initiates in the sacred grove’, implying that this was the secret 
knowledge transmitted to the novices in the sacred grove. Secret knowledge can 
apparently be transmitted without the formal initiation of the anthropologist.  
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This is not surprising, as Bellman (1984) established that secrecy does not 
depend on the contents of the secret but on the ‘speech environment’ that 
defines the status of knowledge. In other words, the blacksmith defined the 
knowledge he had just transmitted to me as typically transmitted to novices (and 
therefore secret for non-initiates). However, he did not explicitly refer to me as 
a non-initiate, and thereby defined the knowledge as accessible to me. 
 At other times, however, I was deliberately excluded. The most salient 
example relates to an embarrassing moment in my fieldwork when I wanted to 
explore the social dynamics that had led to the execution of two men by the 
Kankurang secret society. In Marsassoum, a town in mid Casamance, the 
Kankurang mask had once been desecrated by one of its inhabitants. The man 
had partially undressed the Kankurang and thereby exposed the secret of the 
mask. The man and his uncle, who had come to his assistance, were then 
executed by the mask and its companions (De Jong 2000, 2001b). When my 
assistant and I settled in the town with the intention of examining this event, the 
prosecution of the perpetrators was still under way and the judicial process had 
not yet been concluded. We were not aware of this. However, our inquiries into 
the matter were quickly noticed and our presence was identified as being of 
possible harm to the perpetrators. At one point, a young man came to see us and 
explained the delicacy of the topic of our research, adding that any person 
willing to give us information would face a verdict similar to those men who 
had disclosed the mask’s secret. We had no alternative but to leave the town. 
Imposed silence prevented us from revealing the knowledge that, the culprits 
imagined, might have an impact on the judicial process. 
Mandinko men consider the Kankurang masquerade the core secret of male 
initiation. They can be swiftly mobilized to defend the secret or, if it has been 
divulged, to avenge its desecration. In that sense it may be argued that the 
Kankurang masquerade represents the core of Mandinko culture (although we 
should not dismiss the feelings of women about this masquerade, that is first 
and foremost used to inculcate values associated with ‘appropriate’ female 
behaviour). However, in the case of my obstructed research in Marsassoum, 
secrecy did not pertain so much to the masquerade itself but to the executions 
allegedly perpetrated by the masquerade. The secrecy with regard to the 
executions can hardly pertain to the core of Mandinko culture. It was performed 
to protect the culprits from persecution. This performance of secrecy was part of 
an established mode of cultural performance, but the conditions under which it 
was re-enacted were not those of a pristine, bounded culture. Indeed, secrecy 
was performed to create an impermeable boundary vis-à-vis the State and the 
Court. What can be conceived as the core of culture is in fact a cultural mode of 
performance to negotiate external relations (cf. De Jong 1999b, 2002). 
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Core of culture 
 
Anthropologists use a variety of metaphors to establish ethnographic authority. 
One of the best-known textual strategies describes the arrival of the 
anthropologist among the people to be studied, his or her initial confusion, the 
separation between the ethnographer and the Other, and the gradual 
rapprochement through the establishment of rapport. Geertz’s arrival among the 
Balinese is the most frequently quoted example (Geertz 1973). Another textual 
strategy relates to the anthropologist’s initiation. The initiation of the 
anthropologist into the secrets of the tribe authorizes the ethnographic text. 
Clifford (1988: 53) made this argument with regard to the work of Marcel 
Griaule. What was to become a classic ethnography was entirely framed in 
terms of an initiation. Griaule’s magnum opus Dieu d’eau (1948) is allegedly 
based on revelations made to the author, and whether Griaule was indeed 
initiated into secret cultural knowledge or had simply been told a number of 
intricate improvisations by his principal informant and master, Ogotemmêli, is 
beside the point. What matters is the rhetoric used by Griaule. His ethnographic 
authority rests upon his alleged initiation into the deep cultural knowledge of 
the Dogon. Initiation provides the organizing metaphor and evokes the 
deepening of understanding that accrues to long-term field research (Clifford 
1988: 81).1 Many monographs relate how the researcher gradually learns about 
the secrets of the Other. The ethnographer undergoes a ‘parallel’ initiation: ‘As 
an initiate, the researcher receives and interprets revelations’ (Clifford 1988: 
84). The metaphor of initiation in Griaule’s work has been fully documented but 
is not restricted to his ethnography. In fact, Marxist anthropologists have just as 
artfully employed the trope. Let me quote from Maurice Godelier’s The Making 
of Great Men (1986: xiii) on male domination among the New Guinea Baruya: 
 
One may easily imagine, on reading these pages, just how much time and 
confidence it must have taken on the part of the Baruya to introduce me to their way 
of thinking and allow me to see (as they have expressed it) not only the leaves, 
branches, and the trunk, but also some of the most secretly buried roots of their 
thought. 
 
                                                 
1 Van Beek’s field evaluation of the work of Marcel Griaule (Van Beek 1991) questions 
the recognizability of his ethnography. Van Beek suggests that Griaule’s ethnography is 
not an accurate representation of Dogon culture and that the ethnography is not based 
on a direct revelation of secrets but on complex interactions between the anthropologist 
and his informants. The secrets revealed in Griaule’s ethnography are not ‘deep’ secrets 
but result from collaboration between Griaule and his informants. 
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Godelier confidently asserts that he was trusted by the Baruya — a precondition 
for successful fieldwork. He suggests that, due to the appropriate conduct of 
fieldwork, the Baruya themselves took the initiative to part with their secret 
knowledge and allowed him to see ‘the most secretly buried roots of their 
thought’. 
 Ethnographies often portray fieldwork as ‘a gradual penetration in which 
surface appearances — facades — give way to deeper truths’ (Gable 1997: 
227). These deeper truths are understood to constitute the core of culture. 
Indeed, when ethnographers talk about male initiation, secrecy and secret 
societies, they assume they are dealing with the hard core of culture. In a 
parallel initiation, the ethnographer accesses the deep, hidden truths of the 
Other. As Clifford (1988: 158) states, a classic topography assumes barriers and 
thresholds surrounding a ‘secret’ to be penetrated by the explorer, researcher or 
ethnographer. The deep truths of the Other are revealed to us by the 
ethnographer. Let us return to Godelier’s preface: 
 
I must ask the reader who may sometimes be tempted, according to the lights of his 
or her own philosophy or mood, to regard the secrets confided to me by the Baruya 
as derisory, grotesque, or even obscene, to remember that for them they are an 
essential part of their identity, a vital, sacred force inherited from the past, on which 
they depend in order to withstand all those voluntary or involuntary pressures that 
our world brings to bear upon them, often enough in perfectly good faith, but more 
often still deliberately. (Godelier 1986: xiii) 
 
This is a complex sentence in which negative evaluations of Baruya secrets are 
projected onto the reader who is not initiated and as yet unaware of the real 
meanings of the secrets. The author, by contrast, recognizes the importance of 
secrets to the Baruya: they constitute an essential part of their identity, even a 
sacred force inherited from the past. Godelier defines the secrets as the core of 
Baruya culture, an essential core that remains in times of turmoil, on which the 
Baruya depend in order to withstand change. Change, however, comes to the 
Baruya from outside, from ‘our world’. Change cannot be a Baruya invention 
since the core of their culture is made up of secrets. Godelier is sympathetic 
towards the Baruya and the allegory of redemption voluntarily offered to the 
Baruya is clearly noticeable (Clifford 1986). But it seems the Baruya stand little 
chance of surviving in a world where pressures are deliberately brought to bear 
upon them. 
 Godelier’s preface, to which we will return later, is not idiosyncratic. Secrets 
are often portrayed as the hard core of culture, which anthropologists have set 
themselves the task of revealing. While my argument only relates to the 
metaphors of secrecy and revelation, I hypothesize that a good deal of narrative 
anthropology, even if it does not use the trope of initiation in a literal sense, still 
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displays a similar rhetorical structure. We expect monographs to make a 
cumulative argument and we always hope for a final, deep ethnographic ‘plot’ 
that will make the parts of the monograph fit. In other words, ethnography often 
takes the form of a narrative of gradual revelation, whereby facades give way to 
deeper truths. In fact, Geertzian ‘thick description’ casts the anthropological 
narrative into a mould that privileges gradual revelation (Geertz 1973). As a 
form of layered description, it suggests that a cultural core is only accessible 
through a series of revelations. ‘Thick description’ may be a model for, and of, 
ethnography in which a core of culture is revealed to the reader. 
 
 
Secrets of fieldwork 
 
To understand why secrets have come to represent the core of culture, we need 
to look at the practice of fieldwork. The idea that the core of culture can be 
accessed through fieldwork is essential to the history of anthropology. The 
discipline claims to have developed the methodology — fieldwork — through 
which such cultural knowledge can be obtained. It forms a necessary stage in 
every anthropologist’s initiation into the profession. Bronislaw Malinowski was 
the first scholar to declare fieldwork an appropriate method for the collection of 
ethnographic data. Remember that question in the first chapter of Argonauts of 
the Western Pacific: ‘What is then this ethnographer’s magic, by which he is 
able to evoke the real spirit of the natives, the true picture of tribal life?’ 
(Malinowski 1999: 6). The ethnographer’s magic, Malinowski answers, lies in 
the patient and systematic application of a number of rules, the most elementary 
of which is ‘to live without other white men, right among the natives’ (ibid: 6). 
This has been recognized as the methodological innovation that revolutionized 
anthropology. Malinowski was conscious of the revolutionary nature of his 
charter and claimed that the method of fieldwork was entirely his discovery: ‘At 
any rate, I found out where lay the secret of effective fieldwork’ (ibid: 6). The 
metaphor of secrecy highlights a breakthrough when Malinowski reveals to 
anthropology its proper method.2 
Malinowski established extended fieldwork as the method of anthropological 
investigation. Through observation of the natives and participation among them, 
data were generated. Experience in the field became a requirement for the 
establishment of ethnographic authority. Its most essential elements were, first 
of all, a protracted sojourn in the field to attend all the events associated with 
the seasonal cycle and, secondly, near-proficiency in a local language. Not all 
                                                 
2 Although he was not the first ethnographer to do fieldwork, he has to be credited with 
producing a charter for this method of investigation (Stocking 1983a). 
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anthropologists met these standards. In fact, one of the classic monographs, The 
Nuer, makes no secret of the constraints on the research that the author 
conducted (Clifford 1988: 32). The Nuer is based on eleven months of 
fieldwork in almost impossible conditions, as the following testifies:  
 
As every effort was made to prevent me from entering the cattle camps and it was 
seldom that I had visitors I was almost entirely cut off from communication with the 
people. My attempts to prosecute inquiries were persistently obstructed. (Evans-
Pritchard 1940: 12) 
 
At various points the author acknowledges that fieldwork was not conducted in 
ideal conditions. In other words, after rapport and language proficiency had 
been defined as the quintessential requirements for successful fieldwork, Evans-
Pritchard had to acknowledge that these requirements had not been met in his 
fieldwork. The Nuer transgressed anthropology’s central values. However, his 
confession did not make much of a difference in terms of the monograph’s 
reception, which became a classic in the field. Evans-Pritchard’s failure to live 
up to professional expectations was apparently not critical. The fact that field 
researchers sometimes fail in their professed methodology was acknowledged 
and may be considered anthropology’s public secret. This is reflected in the 
general consensus that field notes are not to be treated as public evidence 
(Sanjek 1990). We do not require that field notes should become accessible to 
others, and they are often surrounded by a measure of secrecy (Jackson 1990: 
22, Clifford 1990: 52). The discipline of anthropology resembles a secret 
society whose members do not publicly question matters of evidence. 
Aspiring anthropologists nevertheless continued to be initiated into the 
profession by means of a protracted stint of fieldwork, the techniques of which 
were usually learnt in the field by means of a sink-or-swim method. Fieldwork 
remained curiously unanalysed for as long as functionalism was the dominant 
paradigm and remained the subject of considerable mythic elaboration 
(Stocking 1983b: 8). Although the publication of Malinowski’s Diary (1967) 
probably only added to this elaboration, it also instigated profound doubts about 
fieldwork as a methodology. The deliberate deconstruction of fieldwork, 
however, only seriously began with the publication of Rabinow’s Reflections on 
Fieldwork in Morocco (1977). Fieldwork, he had been told as an undergraduate, 
constitutes the essential rite of passage for the aspiring anthropologist, and he 
was eager to undergo the experience: ‘At the time, this intrigued me. The 
promise of initiation into the clan secrets was seductive. I fully accepted the 
dogma’ (ibid: 3). But when returning from the field, it was made clear to him 
that the experience of fieldwork was not what made him an initiate. What was 
required instead was ‘objective data’ (ibid: 4). Frustrated by this positivist 
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approach, Rabinow decided to describe his actual experiences and how these 
constituted the data, no longer to be understood as ‘objective’. Rabinow 
demonstrates that the method of fieldwork cannot yield scientific data in the 
way Malinowski claims it does. While he acknowledges that fieldwork 
constitutes a rite of passage, he asks how the data generated through fieldwork 
can be separated from the experience that generates them. Initiations are meant 
to make the initiates ‘see’ things and Rabinow, after his initiation, saw things 
differently (cf. Poppi 1993). He exposed fieldwork – the secret of anthropology 
– as an experience that contradicts the dogma: reflection was required. 
 When the dogma of fieldwork as a scientific method for the production of 
ethnographic data had been shattered, anthropology became increasingly self-
reflexive. The literary turn in anthropology emphasized the fact that ethnography is 
first of all an exercise in writing (Clifford & Marcus 1986, Geertz 1988, Sanjek 
1990). The literary turn also established that cultural knowledge is created in 
conversations between fieldworkers and informants. Anthropological texts, it was 
asserted, need to be self-reflexive about the process of writing culture, from the 
first field note to the final postface. To me, this implies that anthropology has to be 
self-reflexive about the measure in which fieldwork can still be represented as an 
initiation into the secrets of the Other. 
 
 
My initiation 
 
Many monographs that explicitly analyse initiation ceremonies give an account 
of how the author (usually a man) was initiated into the secrets of the tribe.3 As 
already suggested, the description of an initiation into secrets should be 
understood as an assertion of ethnographic authority. A good example from the 
field of Casamance studies is the recent book by Robert Baum (1999), in which 
the author claims to have been allowed to attend ‘secret’ rituals. It is part of the 
same rhetoric to suggest that such permission can only be obtained as a result of 
established rapport. Reading such sections makes me envious. For one reason or 
another, I never established such good relations or, if I did, my introduction to 
the ‘secret’ proved disappointing. What had been concealed from me proved to 
be of very limited relevance once it was revealed. Or the revelation of the secret 
happened in such an irregular way that my access to the esoteric lore was 
immediately framed as illegitimate. Invariably, my presence at secret places was 
taken as a violation of established modes of revelation (cf. Taussig 1999). 
                                                 
3 Is there, as Clifford (1988) and Van Beek (1991) suggest, an affinity with the 
conception of research as a military operation? 
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At no point during my fieldwork in Casamance did I undergo one of the 
local initiation ceremonies. It must be said, however, that my initiation would 
certainly have compromised my academic career since the secrecy imposed on 
the initiates would have limited me in my writing. I was not prepared to go all 
the way towards creating intersubjective knowledge on initiation as my 
initiation would have prevented the production of academic knowledge. Others, 
however, have been initiated and have acquired a full command of esoteric lore. 
Van Binsbergen (1991) gives a particularly dramatic and moving account of his 
initiation as a sangoma healer, describing his initiation as a painful process 
towards an experience of intersubjective healing. His journey was largely 
triggered by the exclusion that he experienced in the ‘field’. Indeed, power 
relations remain central to the performance of secrecy (Fabian 1998: 55). 
Although I never submitted myself to formal procedures of initiation in order to 
establish rapport and ‘productive’ relationships, exclusion certainly made me 
eager to learn more about the secret (cf. Simmel 1967: 333). This is apparent, 
for instance, from the following description of my experiences in a particular 
initiation ceremony, which I was able to attend because the sons of my host 
were participating in it. I travelled with my host and his family to his natal 
village where several of his sons were to be initiated by means of a week of 
seclusion in the bush. During this week I heard rumours about discussions being 
held in the sacred grove. The sons of my host who had already been initiated, 
and therefore were allowed to enter and exit the initiation camp, informed me 
about what was going on. They complained about the bad organization of the 
entire ceremony and, remarkably, shared their misgivings with me. Again, the 
secrecy pertaining to matters of the sacred grove was not so carefully observed. 
Although I was informed about the proceedings in the sacred grove I also felt 
terribly excluded when, after a week of seclusion, the initiates were taken to the 
river for a ritual bath and I was the only man in the village not allowed to 
accompany them, being left in the company of women who took advantage of 
the men’s absence to mock them and their religious piety. 
Surprisingly, after the ritual bath of the initiates my host invited me to visit 
the sacred grove and suggested that I make a gift to the initiates, who would 
then pray for me. I was eager enough to accept such a mise-en-scène. So we set 
out for the sacred grove, going past the bend in the path that had for days 
marked the forbidden. While heading for the grove, we met a number of men 
returning from it and some politely asked where I was going. All seemed 
satisfied with the explanations provided by my host, but when we finally got to 
the place where the initiates were gathered, I felt uneasy. The initiates were 
gathered in the shade of some mango trees, while their guardians and elders 
oversaw them. My host informed the elders about the reasons for my presence. 
There was some confusion. My host showed the 1,000 francs, explaining that I 
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wanted to offer the money to the initiates. One man replied: ‘Youssouf, what 
you have done, no one has ever done before!’ The men started a heated 
discussion and I wanted to leave, but my assistant said that the harm had already 
been done. Then people calmed down and actually started praying. All of them 
sank to their knees and raised their hands. Dozing boys were woken up to join 
the prayer. I was in utter confusion. Luckily, the whole affair lasted for only 
half a minute, and everyone got up. My host then suggested I take some 
pictures, and although I had been told at numerous occasions that there is no 
worse sacrilege than a photograph of the secret, I could not resist the 
temptation. Some men explicitly asked to be photographed. Having taken a few 
pictures, I left, complaining to my host about the awkward position he had put 
me in. Most of the photographs did not turn out well. (There is a widely held 
belief in Casamance that pictures of the secret never turn out well.) 
This set of transactions was utterly complex. While my curiosity drove me to 
accepting the offer of my host, I was from the outset most hesitant. I had 
become sensitive to the rules of secrecy. When we approached the sacred grove, 
I felt excitement and angst about the intrusion I was about to make. My 
intrusion into the realm of the secret did not fail to produce the expected results. 
However, once the men had calmed down there seemed to be no real issue. I 
continued to feel ill at ease, especially when taking pictures. In other words, I 
was still under the spell of the secret. This may be taken as indicative of the 
empathy conventionally required of the anthropologist. I had indeed made the 
secrecy of my interlocutors my own. Yet how and when to perform secrecy 
remained an unresolved question to which, I realize, no predetermined answers 
exist. 
 
 
The mask of secrecy 
 
As anthropology has moved away from structural functionalism, the old 
assumptions about patterns of culture have been abandoned. Roles and rules 
have given way to research on the invention and inventedness of culture. In a 
similar vein, it may be argued that secrecy is not laid down in a set of carefully 
observed rules, as if written in stone. Secrecy is instead a cultural performance, 
the eventualities of which cannot be predicted in some kind of ethnographic 
inventory. How and when secrecy is performed is highly dependent on the 
context. Secrecy is situationally defined (Bellman 1984). I found this confirmed 
in my own fieldwork in the Casamance region. The first time I went to do 
fieldwork my aim was to study masquerades and in order to examine the history of 
the Ekumpo masquerade I was going to live in Diatock, a Jola village. My teacher 
Jos van der Klei, who had conducted fieldwork in this village (Van der Klei 1989), 
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introduced me to a young man who was presumably involved in the masquerade 
and he recommended me as a student of the performance. Van der Klei was 
careful to point out that I ‘had not come to discover secrets’. The man nodded: he 
had already understood. My teacher had apparently found a way of speaking the 
language of secrecy. To me his words remained an enigma. Had I come to 
discover secrets? 
 I had not come to discover secrets. At the time I knew very little about 
masquerading, and next to nothing about secrecy. I was still unaware of how 
secrecy structures communication. Witness, for instance, my naivety in 
confronting my research assistant Jimmy Carter with a question that had long been 
on my mind. Suspecting the secret but tempted by my good relations with my 
assistant, I asked him who was in fact dressed in the Ekumpo costume when the 
mask performed in the village square. Feigning surprise, he replied: ‘What makes 
you think that a man stages Ekumpo?’ My curiosity was countered with a 
performance of secrecy. Although his smile revealed that my question was well 
taken, Jimmy Carter clearly did not want to divulge secrets and suggested that the 
mask was not actually a human being. I was left with a mystery. But I noticed that 
other men — notably elders — were not so reticent and freely discussed the 
intricacies of the masquerade. I learnt that the young men had a vested interest in 
the masquerade and were not willing to share their knowledge of it, whereas the 
elders, whose interests were not promoted by the masquerade, freely talked about 
backstage matters. The extent to which knowledge is secret, I learnt, depends on 
the context. 
 While I was living in Diatock, I tried as far as possible to participate in the 
Ekumpo masquerade. My friends welcomed my participation, especially my 
performance in the nightly Ekumpo dance. As I felt I was a very incompetent 
dancer, I preferred instead to attend the meetings that the Ekumpo society 
occasionally held in one of the village squares. Only initiated men were allowed 
to participate in these meetings and I am grateful that I, a non-initiate, was 
allowed to attend some of them. However I learnt that in addition to these semi-
secret meetings in the village clearing, other more exclusive meetings, to which 
I was never invited, were held in sacred groves. In other words, my 
participation was limited, as befitting a non-initiate. Although I was never in a 
position to discuss the intricacies of the masquerade with the members of the 
Ekumpo society freely, the interaction between me and my informants 
increasingly relied on the mutual understanding that young men staged the 
masquerade. The Ekumpo became a shared secret. 
 The Ekumpo masquerade consists of a number of masks, the central figure of 
which is called Ekumpo, a mask that looks very much like a haystack as it is 
made out of the leaves of palm trees that extend from the head to cover the 
entire body, including the arms, legs and feet. A pole projects upwards from the 
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head. However, Ekumpo’s companion, Jarimamma, is dressed in black cloth 
and wears a carved facemask. Having studied the masquerade, I wanted to 
acquire such a carved mask. I raised the issue with my assistant who, 
surprisingly, told me that this could be arranged. One day, I accompanied the 
young men and women of Diatock on an excursion to a neighbouring village 
where an Ekumpo feast was to be celebrated. For two days, the young men and 
women of Diatock and the hosting village indulged in singing, dancing and 
feasting on the chickens that the girls had to present to the Ekumpo as a penalty 
for a transgression committed by one of them (De Jong 1999a). In this village 
Jimmy Carter introduced me to a carver who was allegedly capable of 
producing the carved mask I hoped for. We negotiated a price and agreed that 
the mask would be finished before I was to leave Diatock. The entire 
conversation was conducted in the man’s compound, although my interlocutors 
made sure the carver’s wife was out of earshot. I returned to Diatock anxiously 
anticipating the mask’s arrival. It duly arrived a few weeks later and my 
assistant instructed me to bring a bag to his compound. In the seclusion of his 
room, he uncovered the mask for me to inspect, hid it in my bag and told me to 
take it out of the village without letting anyone see it. Some of my host’s sons, 
however, noticed me walking down the road with the bag and made polite 
inquiries regarding its contents. Versed in the language of secrecy, they 
accepted my vague answers and made no further enquiries about the bag’s 
contents. Then I left and smuggled the mask out of the village.4 
At no point during my sojourn in the village or in any conversation, did the 
young men tell me that Ekumpo was a man in disguise. Although information 
about Ekumpo was made available to me, the transmission of this knowledge 
never took the form of an initiation. I gathered bits and pieces of information. 
While ‘in the know’, I remained a non-initiate. As my fieldwork progressed, I 
gradually came to understand that the Ekumpo masquerade is indeed shrouded in 
secrecy (De Jong 1999a). Although I never swore an oath on the secrets of the 
Ekumpo mask, I became complicit in the secrecy surrounding it. I smuggled the 
mask out of the village, as if I had a responsibility to keep the mask a secret vis-à-
vis non-initiates. But was I not a non-initiate myself? 
 
                                                 
4 I now realize that my purchase of the mask may have set a precedent in the 
commodification of the mask, the performance of which was already being 
commodified (De Jong 1999a). Interestingly, the commodification of both mask and 
masquerade occurs in secret. Although the mask and masquerade acquire monetary 
value and are nowadays removed from their original context and use value, secrecy is 
such a powerful and flexible form of social intercourse that it can even encompass the 
commodification of the secret. 
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Translocal secrecy 
 
As Bellman notes, the content of the secret is not important. Rather, it is the 
context of the communication of secrets that matters. As the case of my 
intrusion demonstrates, one can become proficient in the performance of 
secrecy without learning the secret, or without being authorized to talk about 
secrets. Secrecy is to a large extent performed and is not restricted to the 
communication of knowledge. In any case, I became particularly sensitive to 
secrecy as a performance. Every time the novices were led into the sacred grove I 
was denied access to that mysterious place. A young man would walk up to me 
and say: ‘Whites are not allowed to go any further’. Women would tease me, 
asking me why I was denied access. Although they would not expect a white 
European to be initiated, they suggested that I remained somehow inept. In an 
ironic way, the women identified with a ritual that was designed to exclude them. 
Others did not really appreciate the irony of their exclusion. A Frenchman married 
to a girl born in a Jola village where I attended a male initiation ceremony was not 
at all amused by his exclusion. He had once spent a year in the village and had 
now come to visit his relatives for the initiation celebration. The man was outraged 
about his exclusion from the sacred grove and was determined to seek ‘revenge’. 
His excitement need not surprise us. After all, he considered himself a member of 
the local community. But he was obviously not familiar with the rules of access to 
the sacred grove. His case demonstrates how much the denial of access contributes 
to the idea that the most important of all activities takes place at the sacred grove. 
Secrecy is indeed important for the establishment of boundaries, especially vis-à-
vis the descendants of the former colonizers. Secrecy can take on translocal 
dimensions. 
 Secrecy creates solidarity among the initiates. An initiate is expected to remain 
silent about the activities at the sacred grove and, as long as he obeys this rule, he 
will be respected as a man capable of keeping a secret. The resulting solidarity 
among the initiates travels with them wherever they go. However, the social 
miracle secrecy produces is that it also creates a bond between those excluded 
from the secret, and it is in this sense that secrecy produces an intersubjectivity that 
can engage the excluded. Women are de facto excluded from the secret. However, 
by expressing their allegiance to the rules of male secrecy, women are included in 
the ritual congregation. The next case illustrates the secret’s ability to include 
women in the congregation. A young Jola woman in Amsterdam has a copy of an 
anthropological study on the Jola’s male initiation written by a Dutch 
anthropologist. Although she perfectly understands the language the study is 
written in, she refrains from reading it. She is afraid of learning secrets that are the 
prerogative of initiated men. Moreover, she does not want the secret to be exposed 
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for fear of it losing its mystery. The power of secrecy can extend even to include a 
female migrant in the diaspora. 
 Secrecy includes the male and female members of a community but may also 
extend to include others who have long been exposed to the secret. The following 
case demonstrates the secret’s capacity to reach outsiders. A young man, born in a 
Jola village and married to a Dutch woman, has settled in the Netherlands. At the 
time of the village’s initiation ritual, the couple had two children, one of them a 
two-year-old boy. The father was determined to initiate his son at the sacred grove. 
His wife, an anthropologist, did not know what initiation was about and feared that 
her son would be circumcised at the sacred grove. She was concerned about her 
child and did not want him exposed to unhygienic conditions that might endanger 
his health. Her husband refused to tell her about the proceedings at the sacred 
grove, saying it was a male affair. When I met her a few days before her son was 
to be taken into the sacred grove, she was worried about the consequences of the 
ritual on her son. I tried to comfort her and gave her a copy of the ethnography 
written by the Dutch anthropologist to read. Soon afterwards she had to leave the 
village and took the book with her to the Netherlands. After I returned to the 
Netherlands, I called to ask her for the book. A few days later her husband showed 
up and handed over a parcel. After he had left, I opened the tightly wrapped parcel 
that contained the secret knowledge: the ethnography on Jola initiation. The 
woman had wrapped up the book so as not to reveal to her husband that she had 
learned the knowledge forbidden to her. 
Interestingly, in this particular case the secrets included in the ethnography 
have been reincorporated in the domain of secrecy. While the anthropologists 
committed several transgressions, these can never be openly revealed. I had, for 
sure, transmitted esoteric lore to a woman (secrets that I myself was not entitled to 
know). However, the woman and I had been so much exposed to secrecy that we 
ourselves had become equally secretive. The secret, I dare say, is contagious. 
Secrecy among initiates generates secrecy among the non-initiated too. Secrecy 
creates a shared subjectivity that, eventually, incorporates the objectified secrets of 
ethnography. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the field I noticed a wide variety of reactions to my professed aim of studying 
‘local traditions’. Some people showed outright hostility to my research and 
were not prepared to transmit secret knowledge. One sacred grove officiant refused 
to talk to me, saying, ‘Whites only want to discover our secrets and disclose them 
in their books’. Fieldwork is not always a matter of dialogue. I frequently found 
myself excluded as men and women denied me access to certain places and 
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performances. My dissertation was a result of intersubjective dialogue and its 
negation, secretive silence (De Jong 2001a). However, there were times when 
secret knowledge was transmitted to me. On such occasions this knowledge was 
not defined as secret and it is, therefore, hard to establish what knowledge was 
actually framed as ‘secret’ on other occasions. Strictly speaking, I cannot be 
accused of revealing secrets since knowledge was never defined as secret to me 
anyway. Although I cannot reveal secrets, I am aware of the rules of secrecy that 
prevail in ‘the field’. ‘The field’, however, leaks and the secret has cast its spell on 
me and others who live beyond the field in the strict sense of the term, in France, 
the Netherlands, Canada and the United States. 
In this chapter I have made an attempt to demonstrate that secret knowledge 
is accessible, even to non-initiates. The important thing about secrecy is not the 
content of the secret but the way in which it is performed. Secrecy is performed 
wherever the initiates or those excluded from the secret go. In the case of 
anthropologists, the secret travels with them in their field notes. Eventually, the 
anthropologist has to decide whether to write down secrets or to refrain from 
writing about secrecy. In practice, many anthropologists use the rhetoric of 
secrecy to establish ethnographic authority, suggesting that penetration of the 
secret equals a true understanding of the Other. The secret produces locality (cf. 
Appadurai 1995). Anthropology has been complicit in the production of such 
locality, suggesting that alterity is located in a secret core. Secrecy has been 
used as a rhetorical device to demonstrate the successful penetration of a 
cultural core (whether or not the secrets thus penetrated are actually exposed in 
the ethnography). However, while secrecy may create boundaries, it also 
engages those excluded from the secret. The anthropologist may be excluded, 
but s/he may nevertheless share the performance of secrecy. The secret is 
contagious. Secrecy produces a moral binding. As a result of this, the 
presentation of secret lore in ethnography is often presented as a moral issue. 
Anthropologists have always been cautious about revealing what they consider 
to be secret information. As Godelier (1986: xiii) says: 
 
Knowledge is not a game without consequences. Every society has secrets that it 
protects and that protect it. To hand them carelessly over to the public without 
debate or precaution would not merely be treacherous or irresponsible, but would 
actually pervert the work of scientific investigation into a force of aggression and 
domination. 
 
Godelier suggests that secrets of the Other should not be divulged. While the 
ethnographer’s rapport enables him to penetrate secrets, his moral obligations 
prohibit him from bringing secret knowledge into the public domain. The 
disclosure of secrets is a morally ambiguous area. 
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While the issue of disclosure may be presented as a moral dilemma — and 
many anthropologists do present the publication of secrets as a moral issue — 
references to secrecy always convey authority to the ethnographer as subject. 
The anthropologist who ‘reveals’ secret lore and the anthropologist who 
conceals it use a similar rhetoric: the representation of a cultural core as secret. 
As Clifford suggests (1988: 158-59): ‘Countless stories of concealment, 
revelation, and initiation are structured by a similar desire that posits secrets in 
order to reveal them, imagines an other with a true “within”’. Instead of 
conceptualising culture as an ongoing and inventive process, the metaphor of 
secrecy presents the core of culture as being unavoidably weakened by the 
destructive impact of foreign influences. Only when we recognize the resilience 
of secrecy will we be able to acknowledge secrecy as a mode of performance 
reproducing itself in a globalizing world. The secrets publicized in monographs 
are eventually reincorporated in performances of secrecy. The case of the 
carefully wrapped book demonstrates that published secrets are reframed as 
secret by initiates and non-initiates alike. This suggests that the performance of 
secrecy renders ownership of the secret problematic. The secret emerges in a 
performance between initiate and non-initiate. Although the initiates claim 
ownership of the secret, the presence of the uninitiated remains a condition for 
their claim. The globalization of initiates and non-initiates in a worldwide 
diaspora implies that this ownership is increasingly delocalized. 
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The persistence of female  
initiation rites: Reflexivity  
and resilience of women  
in Zambia 
 
 
Thera Rasing 
 
 
This chapter focuses on female initiation rites in Zambia today 
and shows how Zambian women, in the context of a globalized 
environment, reflect on their culture and religion. It examines 
how initiation rites as part of their culture and religion are 
resilient to such an extent that they can still be performed in the 
same format as centuries ago. Despite many changes in society, 
the female initiation rite is a major institution that has 
remained important for women even in towns in present-day 
globalized and Christianized Zambia. The initiation rights are 
considered primordial and valuable for all women, not only for 
those who are soon to be getting married but also even for 
religious sisters. Women are showing reflexivity and resilience 
in their performance of these rites and in adapting them to 
modern urban life.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Recent discussions on globalization have opened up perspectives upon the 
reflexivity of local people and the resilience of cultures. This chapter focuses on 
female initiation rites in Zambia today and seeks to make a point about the 
reflexivity of Zambian women and the resilience of culture in this region. It is 
based on fieldwork in the Zambian Copperbelt and Northern Province, regions 
that are predominantly occupied by people identifying themselves as belonging 
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to the Bemba ethnic group. This is considered a dominant ethnic group and 
consists today of Bemba and Bemba-related groups that have spread over many 
parts of Zambia.  
 Female initiation rites (cisungu) are an intrinsic part of traditional culture 
and society. They have existed for many centuries in this region of matrilineal 
cultures1 and have always been performed by ritual specialists (banacimbusa) 
who instruct and guide girls into womanhood and marriage.  
 Initiation rites remain important for women today despite the many social, 
religious, political and economic changes that have significantly altered 
Zambian society. Initially the slave trade, pre-colonial state formation, the 
introduction of Christianity and colonization brought about changes in society, 
predominantly in the sense of a shift in power — from locals to Westerners — 
and between men and women, centralizing men and marginalizing women. 
Both implied a cosmological change (Van Binsbergen 1992, Rasing 2001). 
More recently, urbanization and economic problems such as massive 
unemployment, reduced household incomes, a lack of medical care, and the 
rapid spread of diseases such as HIV/AIDS have brought about changes 
predominantly in the economic and health spheres (Ferguson 1999, Rasing 
2001). One of the changes in Zambian society that this chapter focuses on is the 
Christianization of the majority of the population and the influence of the 
Catholic Church. Many Zambians adhere to the Catholic Church, primarily 
because the first and most important Catholic mission organization that came to 
Zambia in the late 19th century, popularly called the White Fathers, focused 
predominantly and successfully on the Bemba in their efforts to christianize the 
people (Werner 1991, Oger 1991). This has resulted in the Catholic Church 
becoming the largest church in Zambia, and one to which many women attach 
themselves for different reasons (Hinfelaar 1989, Rasing 2001). 
 The Catholic Church has raised the question of whether initiation rites can 
still be expressed in a traditional way, and whether they are being experienced 
in this way by urbanized and ‘modern’ women. The Church is trying to alter 
these rites as part of their policy of inculturation, in which several traditional 
customs are being christianized (Rasing 1995, 2001). 
 This chapter considers how the reflexivity and resilience of Zambian people 
are being shown in initiation rites for young girls and religious sisters so that 
they are still performed All young girls have to experience an initiation rite, also 
those who want to become a religious sister. Initiation rites for religious sisters 
show the reflexivity and resilience of Zambians even more than initiation rites 
                                                 
1 To a certain extent female initiation rites exist at a national level: in 1989 a picture of 
President Kaunda’s daughter at her initiation rite was published in Zambian 
newspapers.  
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for ordinary girls do. By reflexivity I refer to how people consider their culture 
and traditions, while resilience is defined as the ways people adapt their cultural 
customs to new local conditions, and manage to continue these cultural customs 
despite pressure from institutions such as the Catholic Church. In addition this 
chapter analyses the tensions between women and the Catholic Church, and 
discusses how the Church is dealing with these rites. It starts with a description 
of initiation rites, which is followed by a section on traditional culture and 
religion. Next, the policy of the Catholic Church on culture in general and 
initiation rites in particular is examined, with details about the initiation rites for 
religious sisters. This is followed by a section on the changes in Zambian 
society, highlighting the reflexivity of Zambian women and the resilience of 
their culture to these rites.  
 
 
Female initiation rites 
 
Girls’ initiation rites mark their passage from childhood to womanhood. 
Initiation emphasizes reproductive roles within marriage, domestic and 
agricultural duties, respect for elders and the novice’s future husband, sexuality, 
and food taboos. Initiation is a rite of transition and sets out the basis for adult 
life by constructing a new identity for a woman (Richards 1956, La Fontaine 
1986, Kratz 1994, Lutkehaus & Roscoe 1995). Initiation equips maturing 
individuals with the social attributes that a woman is supposed to have and deal 
with throughout her life. During initiation, boundaries between the genders, and 
between the initiated and uninitiated, are both constructed and deconstructed, 
and relationships with her lineage and her nacimbusa are established and 
confirmed. The novice is secluded and receives instructions during the rites that 
are performed by singing, dancing and displaying clay models (mbusa) that 
express traditional values.  
 In Zambia, as in many other societies, girls’ initiation rites take place just 
after a girl starts menstruating for the first time. The novice moves from a 
passive to an active state. This also concerns her sexual life, although young 
girls are told not to indulge in sexual activity before marriage. Nevertheless, 
they learn that adulthood includes the joy of sexuality and that they can take the 
initiative in sexual relations with their husbands and participate actively during 
intercourse. 
The rites include practical and religious or supernatural aspects as well. 
Spirits are thought to provide the novice with the menarche, the sign that she is 
fertile, and conception is related to the supernatural world, in particular to the 
ancestral spirits. During the rites, prayers are said to honour them. Furthermore, 
there is another type of spirit, whose name the novice is told at her initiation and 
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which is also the name of her ritual specialist and her ancestral spirit. This spirit 
is thought to be present at other initiation rites and is honoured then. All women 
initiated by a particular ritual specialist have the name of that specialist and the 
spirit, and are considered the children of the ritual specialist and of her spirit. In 
this way, the name of the spirit is spread among a group of women initiated by 
the same ritual specialist or their kin. They are related to the land (region, 
country) of origin.  
In analysing and interpreting initiation rites, classic anthropology affirmed a 
functionalist approach, while there is now a move towards a more diverse and 
eclectic approach, although the functionalist interpretation cannot be fully 
ignored. Turner’s studies (1957, 1967, 1969), which negotiate functionalist and 
transactionalist views, have greatly influenced the scientific views of initiation 
rites. From a functionalist point of view, ‘initiation is a patterned performance 
whose purpose is action to achieve transformed individuals but whose effect it 
is to demonstrate the power of knowledge and legitimize a continuing social 
order’ (La Fontaine 1986: 179). Initiation rites express and confirm solidarity 
and unity among women. Norms and values concerning gender, production and 
reproduction, and cosmological ideas are passed on. Symbols and ritual 
contribute to the creation and maintenance of an inclusive cosmology and to the 
preservation of a social system through repetition. This does not mean that rites 
are conservative or ignore new elements, but the general world view expressed 
in them seems to be maintained. This is elaborated on in the section on 
reflexivity. 
 Critiques of the functionalist views have been expressed, among others, by 
Moore (1999), Lutkehaus and Roscoe (1995) and Simonsen (2000). Roscoe 
(1995) stated that in the development of the anthropological theory of initiation 
rites, analytical concepts have largely been developed on the basis of 
comparative studies rather than on one of the categories of those who practice 
them, implying that theories have incorporated ‘etic’ instead of ‘emic’ ideas of 
childhood and adulthood that may not coincide with these concepts in the local 
societies studied. In analysing urban initiation rites, Van Binsbergen (1998) 
uses the concept of virtuality. Virtuality is obtained when a certain socio-
cultural item, for example a ritual, is transferred outside the context in which it 
originally functioned and from which it originally derived its meaning. The 
socio-cultural item has come to function in a new context so totally dissimilar to 
the original that it becomes effectively meaningless in its new context, except 
for some new meaning that it may acquire in this new context in ways totally 
unrelated to the original. ‘Virtuality then is about disconnectivity, broken 
reference, de-contextualisation, through which yet formal continuity shimmers 
through’ (Van Binsbergen 1998: 878). Although virtuality is an interesting 
concept, I do not fully agree with this analysis. Urban initiation may deal with 
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disconnectivity as Van Binsbergen suggests, but the old meaning still applies in 
the urban setting, even though it was not invented there in the first place. In the 
rite the transformation of a girl into a woman, the novice’s fertility, relations 
between fertility and agriculture, relations between the novice, her ancestral 
spirits, the ‘blood spirit’ and her future husband, all of whom are needed for 
procreation, and the ancient world view and the mbusa with their meanings, are 
affirmed. These are still relevant. The rites are not detached from socio-
economic conditions. Rites contribute to structure by (re-)installing the 
boundaries between young and old, initiated and uninitiated. The creation of 
boundaries assists in the acceptance of new situations. These boundaries are 
conceptual collective ways of seeing reality and of classifying, for example, 
fashion, sexual and marital roles, ideas about law and order, and about 
cosmology and causality in terms of ‘old fashioned’ as opposed to ‘modern’. 
Rites create order in exchange for obeisance to the ancestors. 
Grimes (2000) takes a symbolic perspective to examine initiation rites. He 
stresses the role of power in rituals and emphasizes that initiation rites are just 
as important for the person concerned as for the community. He extends this 
point of view not only to small-scale societies but also to Western societies.  
In this chapter, however, I focus on the reflexivity of the people who 
perform these rites and examine how resilience is shown in these rites in the 
context of globalization. In particular, attention will be paid to traditional 
leaders and church leaders of the Zambian Roman Catholic Church who seek to 
have a say in these rites. Studies by Jules-Rosette (1979) on female initiation 
rites for Independent Churches and those in the United Church of Zambia 
(UCZ) by Kangwa (1990) have shown that in both churches, rites are performed 
in a Christian way, emphasizing women’s domestic role. Although initiation 
rites among Catholic women are unavoidably influenced by Christianity, these 
rites are performed in a quite traditional way, and seem to be almost unaffected 
by Christianity. This can be explained by the concept of reflexivity, as will be 
seen later. 
 
 
The position of ritual leaders, banacimbusa in religion and culture 
 
Initiation rites deal with cosmological views. These ideas have been scrutinized 
by Audrey Richards (1956) who studied and described the cosmological and 
sexual views of the Bemba in the 1930s. The ideas are similar to the views of 
neighbouring peoples, and we may perhaps speak of a Northern or Eastern 
Zambian cosmological view. Many of these ideas are still relevant in urban 
areas, albeit in a fragmented state. 
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 The instructions in initiation rites are given by a tutor, a nacimbusa (pl. 
banacimbusa). This is sometimes translated as a ‘traditional midwife’ or 
‘mentrix’. However, these terms do not fit her role and function since her office 
is a combination of midwifery, mediation and teaching. She is a ritual specialist 
and well known for her knowledge of herbs, the spiritual world and midwifery, 
and she guides the young woman during the first few years of her married life. 
Many are traditional healers as well. For the lack of an appropriate translation, I 
use the Bemba word nacimbusa.  
 The banacimbusa claim to have inherited their skills from their paternal or 
maternal (classificatory) grandmother, whose spirit (mupashi) guides them.2 
Traditionally, banacimbusa were regarded as priestesses and as healers, 
ng’anga (Labreque 1931). Indeed, today many banacimbusa are still recognized 
as healers. 
 The banacimbusa are the transformers in rites: they transform and make the 
novice aware of what it means to be transformed. The nacimbusa has to take 
care of the proper rituals and is knowledgeable about everything concerning 
fertility, delivery, spirits and all the herbs, roots and medicines used during 
pregnancy. She is called the ‘blood chief’ (mfumu wa mulopa) and is thought to 
communicate with the ‘blood spirit’, which starts a girl’s menstruation and, 
consequently, her fertility. The nacimbusa is the mediatrix between the spirit 
and the novice. The spirit appears to be of a certain category of spirits, perhaps 
higher than ancestral spirits, who people the land and monitor human fertility. 
 The position of the banacimbusa is related to religious ideas in the 
matrilineal society such as that of the Bemba. Before the 16th century, women 
had a central political and religious role and there was equality between men 
and women (Van Binsbergen 1992, Ahmed 1996). Women did not depend on 
men and were relatively autonomous. In the 16th century, when political and 
religious leadership was claimed by male chiefs, the social, economic, political 
and religious position of women altered but women continued to have important 
religious roles and could execute their functions to a large extent (Rasing 2001, 
see also Van Binsbergen 1992). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Richards (1956) did not mention anything about spirits in connection with initiation 
rites. She stated that there were rumours that the skills of banacimbusa were inherited 
but having no evidence, she left this out of her reports. Etienne (White Fathers’ 
archives, undated, but presumably from the 1930s), however, mentioned the 
involvement of spirits in initiation rites. Being a Catholic priest, he had a negative view 
of both these rites and spirits and although it is unlikely that he ever attended a rite, he 
mentioned that during these rites women often became possessed. 
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A nacimbusa applying mpemba (white chalk) to a novice’s body to denote her 
relationship with the spiritual world 
Photo: Thera Rasing 
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 The women’s central position was derived from the important role they 
played in this matrilineal society and their role in agricultural production. 
Women had a firm grip on the cosmic and symbolic order and had a central role 
in procreation and, therefore, in humankind. They were considered to have 
contacts with ancestral spirits and were holders of the domestic shrine. The 
banacimbusa were the main shrine-holders of the domestic ancestral shrines 
and of the ngulu (natural spirits) shrines, and hence were priestesses. The 
banacimbusa were strong women who had a mission through their inherited 
skills and their duty to initiate girls into womanhood. Their religious 
instructions, mainly given during initiation rites, were at the same time 
preparation for a girl’s married life. 
 The banacimbusa also have political power. For instance, in the 1950s a 
European priest, who was thought to have too much inside information about 
initiation rites, was ordered by a nacimbusa to leave the country (see Rasing 
2001) and she worked — using her political power — together with officials to 
ensure that the priest did in fact leave. 
 Women have a unique authority in this matter. While women were 
marginalized in terms of political power and could only claim the religious 
domain, they can still operate in political areas, emphasizing their important 
religious position and confirming the link between religion and political 
authority, as was the case before Christianity took root and before colonial rule. 
However, certain religious aspects remained in the hands of women. The 
initiation rite remained a female institution, performed by banacimbusa who 
kept their authority in the fields of these rites and human fertility.  
 
 
Christianity takes root in Zambia 
 
In the late 19th century, the first missionaries3 arrived in Zambia with the 
specific aim of christianizing and civilizing the African people. They spread the 
gospel and taught mores that were common in Europe at that time, wanting to 
imprint these values on the local people and abolish indigenous customs and 
rituals that they considered pagan and immoral. The sisters of the Missionaries’ 
Society of Our Lady of Africa (MSOLA), popularly called the White Sisters, 
arrived in the country in 1902. They were mainly occupied with teaching girls 
household tasks, childcare and hygiene, and worked as nurses. 
 The Catholic Church, as part of the global institution of Catholicism that 
aims at spreading a homogenizing Christian faith all over the world, has become 
                                                 
3 Most Catholic missionaries belonged to the White Fathers, originally a French 
missionary organization that later included missionaries from all over Europe.  
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the largest church in Zambia. During the 20th century, local people adopted 
Christian ideas in addition to their cultural ideas. Christianity is a world religion 
that recently arrived locally as an aspect of globalization, with adherence to it, 
implying a belonging to the modern globalized world. Christianity has become 
part of a meaningful world view of Zambians.3 
 Christianity changed gender relations, tipping the balance in favour of men. 
The missionaries marginalized women and undermined women’s positions in 
the home and in the villages. Even in church circles, women were pushed into 
the background and the missionaries imposed Western concepts of domesticity 
on Africans. They saw men as the essential elements of labour, while women 
were regarded as the wives and servants of their husbands (cf. Comaroff & 
Comaroff 1991, 1992, Hastings 1989). This resulted in the loss of traditional 
values and in a deterioration in the position of women.  
 The missionaries had a negative attitude towards sexuality in general and 
women in particular. Many offences against church discipline were of a sexual 
nature, with initiation rites (cisungu) considered as one of the main culprits.4 
Expressions of explicit (female) sexuality were considered to be potentially 
dangerous.5 The missionaries, however, did not have access to initiation rites 
because the uninitiated — and particularly single men — were not allowed to 
attend. The White Sisters were also denied access to these rites since they too 
lived celibate lives. Nevertheless, when the missionaries gained more 
knowledge of what happened during the rites,6 they tried to abolish them. 
Punishments such as exclusion from Holy Communion, excommunication or 
the withholding of baptism were stipulated. The missionaries considered the 
role of the banacimbusa to be evil. The banacimbusa, who were related to 
spirits, could not openly claim their position as priestess vis-à-vis the Christian 
                                                 
3 Reasons for adhering to Christianity included access to education and the goods 
brought by the missionaries. The Catholic Church particularly appealed to the local 
people because it used statues and images of saints that resembled the images of 
mythical figures. Moreover, Catholic priests used certain rituals that resembled local 
ones, for instance, baptism in times of danger of death (lubatisho lwa pa kufwa). 
Women were also attracted by the image of Mary, the mother of Jesus (cf. Hinfelaar 
1989; and for other parts of Africa: Green 1999, Notermans 1999).  
4 The other cultural practices the church severely opposed were succession by ritual 
intercourse (bupyani) and the use of the nuptial vessel (akanweno, inweno) for ritual 
ablutions throughout married life. The local people considered it a sacred symbol and a 
means of ensuring fidelity. The missionaries, however, considered the link between this 
vessel and the ancestors as ancestral worship, and therefore condemned its use. 
5 Cf. Comaroff & Comaroff (1991) who describe this for Botswana.  
6 The Catholic missionary Labreque (1931) wrote a book in which he painted a 
reasonably accurate picture of traditional culture, including a section on initiation rites. 
He described these without imposing any personal judgment.  
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missionaries. As a consequence of Christianity, the traditional religion and the 
office of traditional female priests were forbidden or at least marginalized.  
 However, many of the cultural activities forbidden by the missionaries 
continued to be performed, often in secret. Richards (1956) mentioned that, near 
mission stations, rites were curtailed due to punishments by the missionaries but 
the elaborate rite she described was in fact performed near a mission station, so 
their power may not have been as great as she suggested. They failed to 
convince people to withdraw from ‘pagan’ practices and the women continued 
to perform initiation rites. 
 
 
The Church’s changed policy on initiation rites 
 
Today, many Catholic priests recognize that initiation rites are painful for the 
church. Priests and religious sisters admit that during initiation women teach 
certain admirable values. But although priests acknowledge that they were 
wrong in trying to abolish these rites, and claim that they see positive aspects in 
them, many said that the rites should be changed and christianized.7 From the 
late 1950s onwards, a shift towards greater appreciation of initiation and a 
changing attitude towards traditional religions emerged.8 Traditional cultures 
and values were re-evaluated (cf. Dondeyne 1967) and required thorough study 
to see if and how they could be combined with Christianity (Gundani 1994).  
                                                 
7 This is not really new. In 1928 women, together with a missionary from the Dutch 
Reformed Church in the eastern part of Zambia, suggested that the church consider 
organizing a Christian initiation rite, cilangizo. Initially this rite was only performed for 
girls belonging to Protestant churches but it was later also extended to other Christians. 
The combination of Christian and traditional aspects made the rite attractive 
(Verstraelen-Gilhuis 1982: 184). Following this example, Catholics tried to organize 
Christian initiation rites (see also Phiri 1998). In 1936, a Catholic nacimbusa 
constructed a Christian initiation rite but it was not adopted by priests. In 1940, 
Catholics tried again to organize a Christian rite in Zambia but failed (Rasing 2001). 
8 In the late 1950s, the policy of bringing initiation rites more in line with the Christian 
faith was taken up by certain Catholic priests (Hinfelaar 1989: 199). This was the 
prelude to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) that aimed, among many other 
things, at more freedom in adapting the liturgy to African culture.  
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 In the 1980s the Catholic Church stipulated a policy of enculturaltion,9 a 
Catholic term that refers to the adoption of the Christian message in a certain 
culture.10 This term has recently been replaced by ‘dialogue’. Enculturation or 
dialogue is encouraged by the church as a way of meeting local people and is 
considered a method of learning more about local culture, but it may be 
assumed that this ‘locality’ is constructed by lay people in ways agreed to by 
priests. In fact, it is a means of facilitating the adoption of the Christian faith 
and of gaining access to, and control over, cultural aspects in order to use or 
alter them. Through enculturation, the church can exert power and influence.11 
As part of enculturation, European priests also want initiation rites to be 
christianized. 
 In my interviews with European priests, they claimed that they were not 
against initiation per se, but only against the certain parts of it they regarded as 
uncivilized or brutal. An initiation would be acceptable for priests if the (ritual) 
beating of the novice, which sometimes happen during the rites, and the 
emphasis on her lowly position towards elders and her future husband were 
omitted, if the novice were fully dressed, Christian prayers could be said, parts 
of the Bible could be read and the thanking of the ancestors by clapping and 
rolling on the floor were omitted. African priests, however, consider these rites 
as the correct teaching of values and good preparation for marriage, which 
should thus be preserved. There is a definite gap in appreciation between 
African and European priests. 
 The Zambian priests I interviewed said that initiation rites are not oppressive 
for women. According to them, christianizing initiation rites means that the 
actual sense of initiation is lost, and the rites are destroyed. When some parts of 
                                                 
9 Enculturation started a long time ago (although the word was not used) with the 
question of African music in church. Oger (1991: 122) wrote that African music was 
introduced into public worship in the cathedral in Ilondola in 1923. The question of 
Africanizing church music has been widely discussed since the 1931 General 
Missionary Conference. Enculturation came to be emphasized and encouraged during 
and after the Second Vatican Council. A synod on enculturation was set up entitled 
‘Walking with Christ towards the year 2000’, starting in 1993 and ending in 1998. The 
subjects discussed included family life, initiation, anointing, the parish structure, justice 
and peace.  
10 Protestant churches use the word ‘conceptualization’ for the same process. 
11 For some, the dancing group buomba (minstrels), which sings and dances at special 
masses in church, is an example of enculturation. This group started in the early 1990s 
and has spread to different parts of Zambia. The groups are considered ‘traditional 
Bemba’ and refer to the people who used to perform songs and dances at the chief’s 
palace. There is much discussion about these groups. Some also perform initiation rites 
since they are supposed to be traditional and claim they should teach traditional matters. 
They also initiate priests. 
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the rite are omitted and Christian aspects are added, the meaning is believed to 
change. This is important and helps clarify the problems of christianizing 
initiation rites.  
 Despite the generally more tolerant attitude of priests, European priests still 
consider the rite pagan (Chakanza 1998), immoral, and oppressive for women 
(Rasing 2001). Traditional customs are considered a hindrance to genuine 
advancement.  
 The church wants to have a say, not only because it seeks more Christians 
with a profound faith but also because it wishes to influence people in a moral 
way. The church condemns many aspects that have to do with sexuality, such as 
initiation rites. Morality and sexuality are part of all religions. Jansen (1993: 
159) stated that religions are moral systems, and as such are preoccupied with 
controlling morality and sexuality (see also Neuhaus 1990). People’s moral 
behaviour influences the community but not all religious systems define sex as 
a moral issue in the way Christianity does. Besides extramarital relationships, 
an age-old phenomenon, new issues arose in the 20th century: contraception, 
abortion12 and HIV/AIDS. 
 Some European priests suggest that initiation can be useful for informing 
girls about HIV/AIDS and they regard initiation as a way of reducing its spread. 
However, while the banacimbusa see the need to minimize the number of new 
HIV/AIDS cases, only a few reported instructing girls directly about 
HIV/AIDS. They teach about the dangers of illicit sex, emphasizing that one 
can contract diseases from extramarital relationships. According to these 
banacimbusa, the specific illness concerned is not important — the girls have 
been warned that HIV/AIDS does not belong to the repertoire of initiation 
rites.13 
 
 
Tensions between priests and women over initiation rites  
 
Some priests have taken the initiative to stimulate a dialogue with women on 
initiation rites as a way of changing the rites. Today priests recognize that 
banacimbusa are important and seek their collaboration to gain more 
information about the topic.  
                                                 
12 For instance, see Bishop Mpundu’s claim that abortion is shameful, Zambia Daily 
Mail, 1 February 1998. 
13 According to Zambians, the concept of illness after sexual infidelity is very old and is 
called icifuba. It is said to have the same characteristics as AIDS and cannot be cured. 
This illness is caused by the breaking of a taboo concerning sexuality. This idea that 
improper sex is dangerous dates back some centuries. 
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 Individual priests who were interested in initiation looked for ways to 
combine initiation rites with confirmation or baptism, or to bless girls in church 
towards the end of the rite. But these efforts failed for various reasons. In many 
parishes priests are trying to take the initiative by setting up groups of women to 
teach girls because of the assumed immoral behaviour of the youth and the 
increasing number of divorces.14 These groups are taught by a nacimbusa who is 
supposed to teach from a booklet containing texts from the Bible (St John’s and 
St Matthew’s gospels, Acts) and are supposed to integrate Christian aspects into 
traditional rites. However in these groups, rites are also performed in traditional 
ways using clay models and songs, and missionaries still complain that they 
have no control over them. The church is trying to create an infrastructure but 
has failed to implement this policy. In only a few rites can Christian aspects be 
observed, usually a Christian prayer that is said at the start or when food is 
served. 
 The majority of women, on the other hand, do not want to reveal much to 
priests and do not want them to influence the ways the rites are performed.15 For 
many, the idea that a priest attend a rite is unacceptable. Initiation should be 
secret and private, and no man, and certainly no celibate (European) man, is 
supposed to be involved. If it were merged with Christian issues and brought 
into the church, the rite would be publicly performed and would lose its 
meaning. There are three aspects at stake here: a religious aspect, namely that of 
Christianity as opposed to traditional religion in which priests and women each 
defend and support their own religion, the gender aspect, and the aspect of 
secrecy, as women consider the rites secret and private, while the priests want 
them to be more open.16  
                                                 
14 Whether the percentage of marriage break-ups is increasing is a matter of debate, as 
statistics are not available. The claim that divorce is on the increase is often made by 
clergy, laity and in the literature. See, for instance, Chondoka (1988). Two points must 
be made here, however. Firstly, the number of divorces has no doubt increased but that 
does not say anything about the number of divorces per 100 weddings conducted. 
Moreover, in (pre-)colonial times marriages were not registered, let alone divorces. The 
claims are not based on statistics. See also Larsson (1991). 
15 This can be concluded from the following event that happened during my fieldwork. 
At a meeting of a Nazareth group, the women discussed the fact that in a neighbouring 
town a Nazareth group had invited a priest to attend an initiation rite. The women 
present at the meeting protested strongly, repeatedly saying: ‘Initiation rites and 
wedding ceremonies are for women only’ (cisungu no bwinga ca banamayo beka beka 
fye), and ‘It is a case for women’ (mulandu wa banamayo), implying that they might 
claim their right in court. 
16 Occasionally, individual priests were, and still are, invited to attend parts of initiation 
rites, but apparently most of the clay models and sexual aspects are not revealed to them 
(see Rasing 1995). In 1992 I attended a rite in an urban area, part of which the parish 
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 Initiation rites deal with secrets and secrecy. What happens in the rites 
should not be heard beyond their confines to prevent uninitiated persons from 
knowing or hearing anything. One should not speak about it, particularly not 
when uninitiated people (men or young people) are within earshot. Also, what is 
taught during the rite is considered secret, concerning mainly knowledge about 
sexuality and marriage. This is something between a husband and wife, and 
should not be talked about with others. It is visualized and symbolized in 
various ways during the rites. Hence the secret knowledge demarcates a border, 
both in initiation rites and in marriage. 
 Women consider the rites as a primordial fact, as a custom that they have to 
perform. They are thought to be given by the ancestors, and have to be 
continued. In this way the rites are linked to the past but also to the present and 
future. They are thought to be related to spirits, something the church opposes. 
Moreover, according to women, the rites should be performed in a particular, 
traditional way, otherwise they would be misleading and would not teach the 
novice the right things. So even though they are Christians, many women 
continue to adhere to their traditional religion. 
 The rites concern the construction of womanhood, menstruation and female 
sexuality, and should be kept away from the male-dominated church, for these 
are subjects to be discussed neither in church nor with men. Their daughters 
have to be taught about adult life but in this respect membership of any one 
church is irrelevant. Women stressed that even in a modern, urban context, they 
have to perform these rites because a woman’s role in sexuality is as important 
in marriage today as it was in the past. This is shown by the symbols, rituals and 
taboos concerning sexuality that are taught in the rites in the same way as they 
were in the past. They are still valuable. The construction of female identity, as 
imprinted by the rites, remains central but in new ways.  
 Thus the missionaries and the women have different and contradicting 
interests. The church seeks to incorporate ideas on initiation into the church 
while women refuse to have the rites as part of church matters. They have a 
sub-discourse within the hegemony of the church that is provoking tensions 
between priests and women. Women have a diplomatic and diffuse attitude and 
operate in a way that is beneficial to them. They overtly adhere to Christianity, 
while at the same time they perform rituals that belong to the traditional 
religion. In their performances of initiation rites they stick to the old format and 
keep the rites away from the missionaries. In this regard, women have ‘won the 
battle’, while missionaries are giving up the fight at a time when the Roman 
                                                                                                                       
priest was allowed to attend. In 1995 I attended a rite in a village every night for four 
weeks. Here a priest was allowed to be present on only one night.  
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Catholic Church is still seeking ways to christianize initiation rites and discuss 
the topic as part of its Synod.  
 
 
Ritual leaders in the context of globalization 
 
In the 1960s, when the churches were more positive about initiation rites and 
tried to chrisitanize them, Catholic women in church lay groups appointed other 
women to teach their daughters. These women, called mamakalale 
(grandmother from the town), are Catholic women who are considered to be 
similar to banacimbusa, even though they did not inherit their skills from their 
grandmothers. Since they are Christian, one would expect them to teach in a 
Christian way but in fact their teaching is performed in a traditional way. So 
within the hegemony of the church, women find their own personal space in 
which they celebrate their own religion. 
 Although among Christians the ideal is that banacimbusa are Christian, and 
Catholic among Catholic people, in practice many Christians prefer famous 
banacimbusa for their daughters, and always look for a nacimbusa who comes 
from the same region as the novice. Traditional aspects are important and are 
incorporated in Christian rites. The banacimbusa, as traditional priestesses, 
accept the Christian perspective but continue their own religion at the same 
time. So these two types of religion are parallel and banacimbusa use both. In 
this way the banacimbusa remain priestesses and mediate across boundaries. 
Thus, apart from Christianity, which is shown publicly by attending mass and 
membership of a lay group, aspects of traditional religion continue. 
There is rivalry between these banacimbusa and mamakalale: both perform 
initiation rites but the rivalry tends to be over payments.17 The one who teaches 
has to be paid handsomely because of her important job. In addition, the 
payment is a sign of honour to the nacimbusa and to the spirit whose skills she 
has inherited. Since the mamakalale has not inherited her skills from a spirit, 
she is usually paid less. Competition between the banacimbusa and mamakalale 
about money is understandable when considered in the Zambian context of 
                                                 
17 It is unclear how much money is paid for a rite. Generally, women claimed that real 
banacimbusa do not ask for money but leave it up to the parents of the girls concerned 
to decide how much importance they attribute to the initiation of their daughters and 
consequently how much they want to pay. The bamamakalale may ask little beforehand 
but are often disappointed afterwards and ask for more money and presents to be given, 
such as a citenge (a cloth), a chicken, beer and sometimes other items. This frequently 
creates bad feelings. It is also a reason why some people do not ask the woman who 
initiated their first daughter to perform the rite for their second daughter. This never 
happens when the rites are performed by a nacimbusa.  
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economic decline, debasement and humiliation. Zambians used to be part of the 
modern world but have become marginalized (Ferguson 1999, Rasing 2001). 
Ferguson sees this as disconnectivity and uses the word ‘abjection’ to describe 
the process of being thrown aside, expelled or discarded.  
However, everyone recognizes that the real banacimbusa are the best ones 
when it comes to performing a rite. They are considered to be knowledgeable, 
to perform better and explain the mbusa more clearly because they have 
inherited these skills and are guided by their ancestral spirit. Real knowledge is 
the central dispensation one receives through inheriting the spirit of a 
nacimbusa. Such a nacimbusa has much more power and authority. The 
experience and knowledge of the banacimbusa gives them the authority that is 
incorporated into ritual structure and recreated by their ritual roles. The mbusa 
are thought to convey knowledge and it is believed that only a nacimbusa who 
has inherited the skill from her (classificatory) grandmother can make these 
mbusa and explain their meanings. These sacred objects are believed to be 
given by the ancestor and to be related to the ancestral spirit and the ‘blood 
spirit’. The majority of the rites are, therefore, performed by banacimbusa.  
The banacimbusa’s claim of contact with a spirit refers to a claim on 
tradition, on the past, on the continuation of the rites performed in the same way 
as they have always been and in the way the ancestral spirits tell them. In 
addition, for women, banacimbusa are still important people to be consulted in 
the event of marital or sexual problems. Women usually ask advice from a 
nacimbusa instead of from someone from the church, even though the churches 
have groups in which marital problems are discussed. 
 In addition, initiation rites performed by banacimbusa who come from the 
same area as the novice can play an important role in the reproduction of ethnic 
identities, in particular in urban contexts. This is shown by the competition over 
cultural claims by other women.  
   
 
Youth opinions about initiation rites  
 
Let us now turn to young girls who were raised in town in a modernized and 
Christian environment, to see how they experienced their initiation.  
Before being initiated, young girls do not know — or at least are not 
supposed to know — about the initiation rites. It is, therefore, difficult to get 
information from them beforehand. Young girls have no say about participating 
in these rites: they are ordered by their (grand)mothers to experience the rite and 
during it the nacimbusa has the power and authority to order the novice to do 
and undergo certain acts. This authority and power, based on hierarchy and 
knowledge, is an aspect of the rite.  
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 The girls I interviewed after their initiation rites all claimed that they had 
learned to take responsibility, which is good preparation for their future lives 
and marriage, mainly because the teachings are about hardship in life. ‘They 
teach you that life isn’t easy. So it is mainly about perseverance.’ Also, some 
girls said: ‘It gives you an identity. Somehow it gives you a sense of belonging.’ 
The claim that it gives an identity and a sense of belonging points to the 
changes in identity, from child to adult, and more precisely, what it means to be 
a woman and to become part of the world of women. Girls said they considered 
themselves different from those who have not been initiated. In the rite they felt 
that a change in female self-understanding is evinced. Generally, people claim 
that the behaviour of initiated girls is different from that of uninitiated girls. 
Girls claim to have learned a lot, such as taking responsibility, feeling grown 
up, and are considered adults by others. The knowledge they get is different 
from what they are taught at school: the school curriculum covers human 
biology and procreation but they all consider most of the knowledge taught in 
the initiation rites as valuable. Although it may seem backward or to conflict 
with Western knowledge that is taught in school, girls always seem to 
appreciate the fact that the knowledge revealed during the rite offers lessons for 
life and imprints a new and adult identity. In addition to any knowledge 
received, the experience of the rite and the fact of becoming a full member of 
society are equally or even more important to the girls. 
 
 
Initiation rites for sisters 
 
Among the people who adher to Catholicism, a minority of young women 
become religious sisters. Two religious congregations that were set up by two 
Zambian Catholic bishops with the assistance of Western religious sisters have 
included traditional initiation rites at a certain stage in the novices’ curriculum 
before they fully become a sister, in addition to the church rites they experience 
when they take their vows.18 
Surprisingly, these rites are performed with the consent of Zambian bishops 
and follow the same format as the rites for lay women. This has been 
                                                 
18 The congregations that perform these rites are the Sisters of the Child Jesus, founded 
in Mbala-Mpika Diocese in Northern Province, a predominantly Bemba and Bemba-
related area but spread all over Zambia, and among the Sisters of Mercy in Mansa 
Diocese in Luapula Province, an area that is occupied by Aushi, Ngombo and others but 
who claim to be related to the Bemba, and often refer to themselves as Bemba. The 
initiation rites for the Sisters of the Child Jesus take place just before they take their 
final vows. Among the Sisters of Mercy this takes place at the time of their first vows 
but they are considering changing this to the time of the final vows. 
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condemned by missionaries and priests since the early 20th century onwards, as 
we have seen. The issue of traditional initiation rites among religious sisters 
raises questions about the appropriateness of these rites for religious sisterhood. 
Some sisters did not experience an initiation rite at their menarche because 
they were being educated in institutional environments where the rites were not 
practised, but the majority of the sisters I interviewed had experienced the ritual 
of ukusolwele, the ritual in the bush, as part of the initiation rite.19 Thus many 
religious sisters experience two initiation rites — one at their menarche before 
                                                 
19 In this ritual they are anointed with medicine and are told about menstruation. 
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A novice dancing during the coming-out part of the initiation rite 
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they start living in a convent, and another at the time of their vows. There is 
a parallel with lay Bemba girls: they have the ritual of ukusolwele in the bush 
when they first menstruate, while other parts of the initiation rites are postponed 
until their wedding, which is similar to the initiation rite they experienced at 
their menarche. A ‘wedding ceremony’ for religious sisters is performed when 
they take their vows and hence are ‘married’ to God.  
 The initiation is performed in a non-Christian way, using clay models. The 
same ritual acts are performed as in the initiation rite (cisungu).20 A sister 
explained: ‘It is to be taught about our tradition. To be taught by experience, 
instead of by hearing it, like in school, and to become responsible women.’ 
 Religious sisters experience the same initiation rites as lay girls but in 
initiation rites for sisters reference is made to the Bible, mainly to Genesis. 
Religious sisters as well as lay women claim that these rites are performed as 
part of the traditional culture in which they were raised. The sisters explained 
that they should know these traditional values about sexuality and traditional 
norms because in their lives as sisters they may come across people who have 
problems due to a lack of or improper performance of traditional rituals. ‘It is 
good preparation for life: they learn about hardship, that is what they 
experience, also in the community. We are respected more since we know more 
about these things.’ However, it can be concluded that experiencing such a rite 
is important for the novice herself, whether she is a religious sister or a lay girl.  
 Cultural aspects are important. As one sister explained: ‘We want sisters in 
their full cultural background, we want to bring the real Zambian women into 
Christianity, into sisterhood’. Consequently, after experiencing a rite, religious 
sisters feel more complete and more accepted by the community. They perceive 
                                                 
20 In these rites the novice is taken to the bush where the same rituals as in an ordinary 
initiation ceremony are performed around certain trees. During these rites a novice only 
wears a slip of cloth, she has to crawl on the ground and is hidden under a citenge. She 
is taught about the beads (that are given to a woman at her wedding ceremony and used 
to attract a husband). The novice’s mother is symbolized by the mother superior. She 
has to welcome her daughter from the bush at the end of the rite. The ritual of taking 
fire (ukutekensho) is performed to remove the ban on fire because during her initiation 
she is not allowed to come near a fire. During the rite the novice frequently has to thank 
(ukushikulo) the ancestors in a traditional way by rolling on the ground and clapping. 
The novice has to perform the ritual cleansing that is supposed to be performed after 
sexual intercourse. In this rite it is explained as: ‘This means that one has to be good to 
the community’ (a couple that is not cleansed after sexual intercourse can endanger the 
community). At the coming out, the novice has to dance with rattles around her ankles 
and wrists, an act that is always performed during the final stage of the rite. The novice 
is taught household tasks, about marriage and family life with the emphasis on social 
living, and other traditional values and norms on how to behave, how to dress, about 
hygiene, how to treat visitors, how to serve food, and show respect, in particular 
towards elders. 
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themselves as adults and subsequently feel more responsible. They are 
considered adults both by themselves and by others, and they gain wisdom from 
their culture. They also consider themselves more female, as one sister said: 
‘You appreciate your gender more’.  
Through initiation, religious sisters may be made to perceive themselves as 
real women but may also be considered asexual and genderless. While sisters 
claim they consider themselves as adult women, they are, sociologically, seen 
as neither men nor women. The rites seem to confirm the genderless identity of 
sisters. Their initiation rites appear to be a culturally accepted way of becoming 
a ritual woman. By showing them aspects of marital life, represented by mbusa, 
and the sexual act related to the cosmological view, banacimbusa transform 
sisters into ritual women since they cannot be considered women (wives or 
mothers) in the cultural and sociological sense. They have a ritual status higher 
than ordinary women. Cosmologically, sisters are nearer to God or Lesa than 
common people. 
For some parents it is problematic when their daughter wishes to become a 
religious sister, especially if they have only one daughter.21 This may also be a 
reason why initiation rites for sisters are performed because after they have been 
properly initiated they are considered close to ‘real’ women.  
  As a consequence of their voluntarily chosen profession, sisters do not 
reproduce. This remains a problem for many religious sisters and their parents, 
and constitutes the main reason why sisters leave religious sisterhood. A sister 
who had been initiated explained: ‘We are women, we are fertile, so we have to 
thank the ancestors for our fertility.’ During their initiation rites, sisters also 
perform the ritual honouring of the spirits in the bush. This is an important part 
of the initiation rite that cannot be left out and is performed in all initiation rites, 
also for lay girls, since through this ritual, the spirit of fertility, the so-called 
‘blood spirit’ is honoured. It is the spirit that is thought to provide women with 
fertility. Through this ritual one becomes the child of the blood spirit. Although 
in the rite for sisters this ritual may also be seen as asking the ancestors for 
forgiveness for the fact that she has voluntarily given up her gift of parenthood, 
I suggest the most important meaning is that she becomes a ‘child of the spirit’, 
and is subsequently recognized as belonging to a specific group of women.  
 It is the superiors in the congregation who want sisters to be initiated, and 
these rites are favoured by the local laity, African priests and some African 
bishops. They are organized and performed by banacimbusa and lay women.22 It 
                                                 
21 Parents have to give their consent if their daughter wishes to become a religious sister. 
Sometimes sisters want to leave the sisterhood but in most cases fellow sisters know 
this is because the parents do not want their daughter to become a sister. 
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may be explained as a way for the banacimbusa to reclaim their previous 
religious role as priestesses of traditional religion.  
 Yet the performance of initiation rites for religious sisters and the need to 
teach them about sexuality in detail remains debatable and is a multifaceted 
matter that raises questions hinging on traditional issues as well as on issues of 
church authority. In Zambian society, women have authority and are the owners 
of their body and of their sexuality. For sisters, the question of sexuality and the 
human body is complex. They are taught sexual points, for example, how to 
‘dance’ moving their pelvis in a way that attracts men, and other aspects 
concerning sexuality. While learning this by experiencing these rites, it appears 
that religious sisters also have authority over their own body and sexuality and 
learn to have sexual control over their body. But they are supposed to refrain 
from sexual life. Moreover, religious sisters belong to a religious congregation 
and to the bishop of the specific diocese where they are working and have to 
obey the bishop. As such, they are ‘owned’ by the hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church but because initiation rites for religious sisters are performed by 
traditional female religious leaders, in the same format as initiation rites for lay 
women, sisters become a child of the traditional religious leaders. In these rites, 
relationships with the sister’s lineage and her nacimbusa are established and 
confirmed. Hence they are also ‘owned’ by their nacimbusa and her spirit. This 
may lead to personal conflicts. 
Furthermore, the fact that initiation rites are compulsory for religious sisters 
reveals that experiencing an initiation rite — including being shown the mbusa, 
the sexual act and the knowledge that is revealed — is important for a woman 
regardless of whether she voluntarily chooses to refrain from sexual 
relationships and motherhood. Since she is a Bemba woman, she has to 
experience this rite and become a child of a nacimbusa, and know the 
traditional knowledge that is passed on through the generations. She has to 
know her ancestors, the spiritual world, and be part of it. So, the rites are a 
symbolic way of becoming an adult and being Bemba, irrespective of whether 
one is a Christian as well.  
  
 
                                                 
22 Other people attending these rites included the novice’s grandmother and father’s 
sister (or a representative). Also for rites for religious sisters it is important that the 
nacimbusa is from the same area as the novice. All the sisters who have been initiated 
attend the rites and drink traditional beer. The novices do not know or at least are not 
supposed to know about this initiation rite beforehand. 
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Women’s changed socio-economic position 
 
Female initiation rites can be traced back to at least 400 AD (cf. Roberts 1976: 
32, Ahmed 1996: 12) but before analysing the continuing performance of urban 
initiation rites in present-day Zambia, we first have to understand the many 
changes that have taken place in Zambian society over the past few centuries, 
partly due to (proto)globalization, and the context in which the rites are 
performed today. I have already described the influence of Christianity on 
Zambian culture but many other changes have also taken place.  
From the 1960s onwards, due to urbanization, initiation rites were more 
often performed in towns, where about half of the Zambian population lived. 
The urban population is composed of various ethnic groups and many of these 
groups perform female initiation rites. Subsequently, women from different 
ethnic groups get together to attend a rite.  
 Further in the past and over the last few centuries, women have moved from 
having a central role in the villages and in religion and politics to a more 
marginalized position due to the bena ngandu rule of male chiefs and 
subsequent pre-colonial state formation, colonialism, Christianity and migration 
to urban areas. Before the colonial time, and particularly before the 16th century, 
banacimbusa had both political and religious power, with the position probably 
of chief. With the coming of the chiefs of the bena ngandu who belonged to a 
particular ethnic group that started to rule the Bemba area and whose name they 
have taken over, these predominantly male chiefs took over political and 
religious power.  
 Furthermore, women are no longer attracted to the traditional system of 
agriculture in which they used to have an important role. Formal education for 
girls, changing family patterns in urban areas and rapid urban class formation 
have all served to disengage an increasing number of women from farming. Yet 
even in urban areas, the role of women in farming is important to families, 
albeit at a reduced level, either for household consumption or for generating 
income. Women still tend to be identified with their role in agriculture as food 
producers, in particular with hoeing. This implies, at least in their own eyes, a 
certain autonomy vis-à-vis their own labour and produce. ‘Women tend to think 
of their labour effort in terms of being part of a natural order to ensure adequate 
food production and basic survival of their dependants and themselves’ 
(Bryceson 1995: 8, cf. Richards 1939). Obviously, the natural order Bryceson 
appeals to is socially constructed. Yet, I think it is precisely this construction of 
the natural order that emphasizes the role of women in agriculture and that is 
expressed in daily narratives and in initiation rites.  
 Men dominate the formal economy due to Western colonial ideas, to the 
introduction of capitalism and the exploitation of the copper mines in the late 
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1920s. The informal sector was occupied by urban women in the early days of 
the towns in the late 1920s, and it is still dominated by women but, as a result of 
class formation and formal education, women have also gained access to the 
formal sector. Due to the current economic situation, men have started to lose 
their jobs, and incomes are insecure for those still in employment. Women 
continue to generate income from other activities. At present, women can 
increasingly be seen engaging in trade, often across impressive distances. 
Women used to be the mainstay of the traditional economy based on agriculture 
but they are currently forming the backbone of the Zambian economy by having 
paid jobs and engaging in trade, a vital sector of the country’s economy in 
today’s uncertain economic situation.  
 The importance of kinship structures is dwindling. Women are experiencing 
increasing difficulty in successfully appealing to traditional kinship structures in 
which they had a prominent role under the matrilineal system. Kinship lines are 
negotiated and offset against economic benefits. The matrilineal system still 
exists but is vanishing and the matrilocal setting has disappeared.  
 The state, which has come to be an important institution, has a 
predominantly male bias. Women have little access to political functions and 
power (except for issues concerning initiation rites, as already mentioned). 
Christianity, another important institution, is also dominated by men. On the 
one hand it has been a liberalizing force for women, while on the other it has 
been oppressive. Women are being marginalized in the political, religious and 
social spheres.  
 These socio-economic and political changes have led to an imprinting of 
Western concepts of womanhood. This has amounted to a certain 
deconstruction of womanhood for Zambian women: their important role as the 
centre of the matrilineal extended family has decreased, men are supposed to be 
the breadwinners, and their significant role in religion has vanished. Changes in 
society, such as urbanization, modernity, a declining economy and 
globalization, are triggering a search for fixed orientation points and action 
frames, as well as determined efforts to affirm old boundaries and construct new 
ones. In this, ethnic identity is a central concept (Meyer 1998, Meyer & 
Geschiere 1998, Inda & Rosaldo 2002). This may explain the importance 
ascribed to the fact that the nacimbusa and the novice have to originate from the 
same area and to belong to the same ethnic group to which the spirit is thought 
to be related.  
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Resilience of culture and religion, and the reflexivity of women  
concerning initiation rites  
 
To analyse the persistence of initiation rites in urban Zambia today, the concept 
of reflexivity is useful. Reflexivity in this sense does not mean the awareness of 
the background and position of the social researcher (cf. Hammersley & 
Atkinson 1995). Instead, the concept refers here to an understanding of how 
Zambians create specific forms and domains as arenas of reflexivity. The 
positive and negative aspects, the marginalization as well as the creativity of 
globalization are debated, lived and experienced. Forms and domains of such 
reflexivity are both cultural and historical, shaped by prevalent sociological and 
economic circumstances and by aspirations and imaginations of certain groups. 
Reflexivity on cultural and religious aspects has always existed but through the 
process of globalization the form and domain of reflexivity may change in 
nature and in quality more rapidly than before. Interesting questions to now 
consider are how, in the globalization process in which many changes in society 
have taken place, women reflect on their culture and how culture is resilient to 
such an extent that initiation rites can still be performed and experienced.  
 For Zambian women, the performance of initiation rites is a form and 
domain of reflexivity. Initiation rites are related to the private and concealed 
domain of the inner quarters of family life, and this rite is an intimate issue as 
well as an intimate experience. Large parts of it are performed secluded from 
the ‘normal’ social world, in the bush and in a room inside the house separated 
from other daily activities. Moreover, the rite mainly deals with issues that are 
private and concern the home, husband-and-wife relationships and sexuality, 
while in a sense these private issues may also affect the whole community. 
 Zambians maintain relationships with other parts and aspects of the world. 
They keep links open and do not create boundaries but are looking for ways to 
open them up. They adhere easily to Christianity, have adapted to a quite 
Western lifestyle, and use many items that are alien to their own culture. They 
reflect on how globalization is or should be transformed to local circumstances 
and imaginations. Local discourses, debates and discussions revolve around the 
question of whether and which elements of globalization can fruitfully be used. 
They deliberately adopt new items and dismiss what they consider useless.23  
                                                 
23 This can be seen for instance in the organization and performance of kitchen parties, 
which are common among working-class women in urban Zambia today. These parties 
are based on and have the format of an ancient ritual performed as the final part of the 
wedding ceremony, but are combined with what Zambians believe are elements of 
bridal showers as performed in the United States, at which Western kitchen utensils are 
given to the bride (Rasing 1999). 
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 Concerning initiation rites, however, women stick as far as possible to the 
format in which these rites are supposed to be performed, since this is the way it 
should be done, according to them. Changes due to compression and 
curtailment or as a result of omitting or adding small parts do not change a basic 
centuries-old symbolic structure but are responses to the modernization of daily 
life. Despite minor changes, the rites’ central message and meaning have 
remained the same over the course of time. Major alterations of ideological 
content, like those stressed by priests from Christian churches, however, would 
change the symbolism and ideology of the rites. For this reason, women prefer 
to keep them separate from church matters and certainly away from any 
interference by priests, even though the church’s lay organizations may provide 
a ready setting for the mobilization of women. Moreover, transformations in the 
performance of these rites may occur rapidly as they shift from the private to 
the public sphere. This is what the Catholic Church seeks to reach in its policy 
of opening up these rites to bring them more into the open, and to add Christian 
elements while certain traditional aspects are omitted. 
 Zambian people, like people in all societies responding to globalization, 
show resilience. This resilience emphasizes not a return but a continuation of a 
proud consciousness of their own time-honoured resources of norms and values, 
world views, religion and forms of social and political organization. The 
resilience seems to restore the balance against the overwhelming and rather 
dominating effects of globalization and favours a view according to which 
Zambian people, in the globalization process, are eminently capable of creative 
responses. They adapt their tradition and cultural practices to the urban 
environment. This form of resilience is successful not only in so far as the 
appropriation of alien aspects is concerned, such as Christianity, modern 
lifestyles and urbanization, but also in so far as the affirmation is concerned of 
the importance of female initiation rites, which have been owned by Zambian 
women for many centuries, and which, after a few centuries of colonial and 
post-colonial suppression and exclusion, and the marginalization of women, 
now prove capable of once more showing their values and importance. Despite 
suppression, women have continued to perform these rites, showing their 
reflexivity. As conditions and circumstances change, resilience also changes. 
For instance, when the church tried to abolish the rites, they were performed 
more or less secretly. In the urban environment, they have been curtailed and 
adapted to urban conditions. 
Urban initiation rites mediate deeply-felt tensions between local and global 
influences, which in turn are constituting gendered notions about what being 
Zambian or being Bemba means at present (Hansen 1997). Experiencing an 
initiation rite provides women with a sense of being female, a sense of 
belonging, of humanity, and of adulthood: it continues to establish women’s 
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identity, adulthood and womanhood. Initiation is performed and experienced at 
a local level, and deals with local ideas of womanhood and adulthood. Other 
items derived from modern urban life, including Christianity, are added to their 
identity of being a person.  
Initiation is about being incorporated into society but also about individual 
personhood. It indicates and provides knowledge about a certain type of 
individual personhood, that of being female and adult in a Zambian society and 
related to others in that society, in particular parents, ancestors, elders, a 
husband, and future children. Women articulate themselves as women and 
adults, in full personhood, experiencing personhood through the rites and in 
their lives after the rites. To reach this stage of full personhood and gain 
knowledge about the spiritual world, one needs to be humiliated, to be brought 
back to zero and reborn with a new status (see Turner 1967, 1969). This can 
only be reached by initiation rites.  
 Initiation rites denote a sense of belonging to a community of women and 
create a gender identity. In urban areas, in social interaction in daily life and 
through inter-ethnic marriages, the lines between ethnic groups have become 
blurred. Women attending the rites can be from different ethnic groups and are 
constructing a community based on the urban situation and on womanhood, 
instead of one based on ethnicity and kinship, as was the case in the villages. 
Urban rites have created new patterns of solidarity among women. Yet, the 
nacimbusa because she is guided by the ‘blood spirit’ that is related to the land 
of origin has to be from the same ethnic group and area as the novice. This 
points to the fact that women perceive themselves not only as urbanites taking 
part in the modern world but also as members of a specific ethnic group.  
 The initiation rite denotes important gender roles and clarifies a central 
tension in gender relations, one between complementarity and interdependence 
in households. Although respect for the husband is emphasized in the rites, a 
man should equally respect his wife. Moreover, the novice is taught to be 
independent. The need for independence is stressed due to the present economic 
situation in which men are losing their jobs and women are being forced to rely 
on themselves. Women enjoy a considerable measure of power and authority, 
not only regarding female and sexual matters, but also in family life, gender 
relations and food production.  
 During initiation, symbols are used which originally derive from village life. 
The cosmology peculiar to a certain region with a specific form of socio-
economic organization (the village) is not strictly tied to this region and forms 
of socio-economic organization, but may also spread to other places like urban 
areas with other economic and social structures, and can even survive there. 
Initiation, although initially a rural institution, does not exclusively belong to 
the village but is related to a way of life, to life itself as defined in that way of 
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life. Initiation rites may be enacted wherever that way of life is being pursued. 
At the same time, there is the suggestion that, even when still tied to the village, 
a girl’s initiation is not entirely a merely local and particularistic cultural item. 
On the contrary, universal themes emerge in that specific rural form. These 
themes include the universal human life-cycle, gender oppositions and the need 
to transfer cultural knowledge from one generation to the next.  
 In constructing initiation rites as meaningful because they are authentic and 
handed down from the remote ancestors, Zambian participants in their verbal 
expressions depend heavily on the notion of tradition, which in Bemba is called 
ntambi or ifishalano. No doubt contemporary use of this local concept is 
somewhat influenced by the circulation of the word tradition in modern media, 
and its frequent use in the idiom of enculturation by which the Roman Catholic 
Church seeks to affirm its presence in contemporary Zambia. However, for 
Zambians, ntambi refers to time-honoured ways of social valuation that are not 
primarily due to the inroads of globalization. 
 The notion of tradition may be applied to the initiation rites in two inter-
related ways. First, cultural identity is expressed by performing the rites. The 
link with the ancestors is revived in a general, abstract way regardless of the 
specific form and content of the actions performed. But secondly, in the 
performance of these initiation rites, specific, now obsolescent and typically 
rural aspects of the life of the ancestors are being enacted, for example, how 
they used to pour libations at ancestral shrines, how they used to apply the 
agricultural system of citemene, and how essential aspects of their everyday life 
were represented in the mbusa clay figures shown at important moments during 
the initiation rite. The mbusa themselves contain traditional items such as a 
pestle and mortar, a hoe, and symbols that refer to animals no longer seen in 
urban areas. 
 This process of selectively representing the past in the present in an attempt 
to build an identity and to give form and meaning to life is perhaps inherent in 
every ritual or culture. It allows people to recreate their sense of themselves and 
to deal with changing circumstances. The image of tradition emerges from a 
dialectic between similarity and difference and between past and present. 
Known practices become original practices, and current memory becomes 
primordial (Kratz 1994: 321-24). Thus the way people speak about ritual creates 
an image of tradition that supports the assertion of continuity. This sense of 
continuity is produced both in practice and in discourse about practice. Past 
becomes present, in part through a projection of present practice into the past. 
‘The past becomes present in different ways as people have multiple images of 
both, commenting on and framing current practice, politics, and their sense of 
identity through history’ (ibid: 320). The people on the Zambian Copperbelt 
refer to the continuity of tradition as both explanation and justification for doing 
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things in a certain manner. Imagining tradition also presupposes a sense of 
cultural identity, the continuity of tradition and a sense of being a member of a 
group of people who follow similar traditions.  
 Yet there is a striking similarity between current initiation rites in towns and 
villages and those that Richards (1956) noted in the 1930s. The ideas 
surrounding them, their format, ritual actions and mbusa remain the same. Their 
persistence today demonstrates the permanence of ceremonial tradition. 
Although certain new songs have been added and old ones have disappeared, 
the themes in the songs are identical and the rite still has the same structure and 
meaning.  
 The rite is a representation of continuity. Descent continues because the 
ancestors are able to manage the life of the living, and in turn are able to 
produce and control the next generation. Descent implies obeisance, honouring 
the ancestors and elders. Thus the rite represents two sides of life: that of the 
ancestors and that of ‘this world’. The continuation of the rite explains cultural 
continuity, and symbolizes the reproduction of society and of the cosmos 
(Lutkehaus 1995: 28). Initiation points to the individual autonomy of maturing 
persons. Elders confer on them the trust that they will continue the reproduction 
of the community. Reproduction refers to more than the female body and 
biological procreation. It incorporates ideas about social relations, the exchange 
of resources, power and cosmology. According to this cultural schema, 
reproduction is a biological, political and economic process (Lutkehaus 1995: 
27). The continuity of initiation rites ensures the continuity of female self-
understanding (Grohs 1989: 202), in other words female identity. Once this is 
realized, it can be seen why these rites, regardless of their origins in a distant 
rural context and (presumably) in the remote past, are not stray flotsam that has 
accidentally ended up in town. Female self-understanding or identity in South 
Central Africa has been under attack ever since the arrival of Europeans over a 
hundred years ago. This has created a situation where the ritual technology of 
self-understanding through initiation is all the more indispensable. While this 
observation applies throughout modern Zambia, it is particularly pertinent in 
town. Here there is unmistakably an environment inimical to women, marked 
by male control over the state and the economy, and supported in this power 
position by the patriarchal orientation of Christianity. Experiencing an initiation 
rite provides the basis and knowledge that construct a woman’s identity and 
create solidarity among women.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has tried to discover how Zambian women, in the context of a 
globalized environment, reflect on their culture and religion and how initiation 
306 Rasing 
  
rites as part of their culture and religion are resilient to such an extent that they 
can still be performed in the same format as centuries ago. As conditions and 
circumstances change, so may resilience.  
 Female initiation has not become obsolete or diminished by globalization. 
Despite the influence of Christianity, urbanization, changed gender roles and 
the decreasing role of women in agriculture, the female initiation rite is a major 
institution that has remained important for women even in towns in present-day 
globalized and Christianized Zambia. They are considered primordial and for all 
women, not only for those who will soon be getting married, but also for 
religious sisters who need to experience such a rite.  
In male-dominated Christianity, women are marginalized. Tensions between 
missionaries and local lay women have evolved around womanhood in general 
and initiation rites in particular. Missionaries have made several attempts to 
christianize initiation rites but have failed to alter them. Women consider 
Christian initiation rites insufficient to impart the knowledge a young woman is 
supposed to receive. The rites remain important for women as a means of 
constructing their identity and celebrating their culture. Women prefer and 
manage to keep initiation rites separate from priests, and show their authority in 
the rites. 
 The performance of initiation rites in today’s urban Zambia should not be 
seen as a longing for the past that is forcibly being maintained in a globalized 
world, but as a local institution that is part of a religion. The perpetuation of 
these rites cannot be considered a way of holding back on religion but is one of 
the explanations of traditional religion. In this religion woman’s power is shown 
in the sense of continuing life, giving birth, having contact with spirits that have 
power over fertility and life and death. In the rite, the most important features of 
religion, spirituality, fertility, adulthood and womanhood are taught and 
clarified. This is not only for the girl who is being initiated but is a repetition for 
all women who attend a rite. They celebrate their procreation together and at the 
same time honour the spirit of fertility. They also show and clarify belonging to 
a community of women related to the spiritual world and fertility. In addition, it 
is also a profound model of transcendence and adulthood. Even in a global 
context, this concept is valued by Zambians.  
Imitation rites emphasize traditional knowledge, mainly about procreation, 
human relationships and relationships with the spirits, topics that remain 
important in a globalized formal economy. The performance of initiation rites in 
modern urban Zambia reveals that women consider these rites as their own: it is 
their institution that was first, that has always existed and always will exist, no 
matter what comes later and is added or adapted to society. 
Experiencing an initiation rite gives a sense of being female among females, 
in a world that is divided into males and females. This gender division and strict 
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gender roles can be seen in many aspects of daily life. Women and men have 
different tasks in the household, in agriculture, in child raising, and men and 
women are expected to occupy different spaces: the house is the domain of 
women, while the public sphere is that of men. Although both men and women 
are expected to earn a living, in practice more women than men have jobs or are 
generating income. 
Initiation rites emphasize female power and autonomy. This power and 
autonomy are related to women’s dominant role in sexual activities, such as 
how to please a man, how to attract a man and maintain a good relationship, and 
the woman’s role in rituals surrounding sexuality that are connected with the 
ancestral spirits and the spirit of initiation rites. Women’s power and autonomy 
are also related to procreation. Fertility is a person’s most important gift — 
particularly for women — according to matrilineal cosmological ideas.  
 In these rites and in this concept, the banacimbusa play an important role, 
having knowledge about fertility and contacts with the spirits that provide 
human fertility and fertility of the land. They guide young women into this 
world of fertility and the spirits that provide fertility. In this regard, women, and 
more specifically banacimbusa, have a privileged role in and knowledge of 
society. The knowledge they have can be regarded as intellectual knowledge of 
culture, religion, fertility, illness and health in Zambia, and probably in the 
larger area. 
 Women show reflexivity and resilience in their performance of the rites and 
in adapting them to modern urban life. With this, they demonstrate their 
authority in this matter, and in society. Women remain a powerful group. 
Through their reflexivity on their culture and religion, and through their 
continuing performance of initiation rites they pass on important values. 
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